ORDER

(Pending in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, Civil Action No. 1:15-cv-00007-HRH).

G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

JCB, Inc., a Savannah, Georgia area heavy equipment manufacturer, initiated this proceeding (a miscellaneous filing in this Court) to quash a Fed. R. Civ. P. 45 deposition subpoena served upon it by Clark Equipment Company, d/b/a Doosan Infracore Construction Equipment America ("Doosan"). Doc. 1. As the above caption shows, Doosan was sued in an Alaskan state court by Miller Construction Equipment Sales, Inc. ("MCESI"), and that case (removed to the United States District Court for the District of Alaska) is ongoing. In fact, Doosan's subpoena originated from that underlying federal court action, but it was served on JCB in this District since this is where it is to be enforced or quashed.1

This Court stayed Doosan's subpoena (doc. 2) and initially granted JCB's quash motion as administratively unopposed per Local Rule 7.5 (no response means no opposition), but then granted Doosan a second chance to litigate the quash motion on the merits. Miller Constr. Equip. Sales, Inc. v. Clark Equip. Co., ___ F. Supp. 3d ___, 2015 WL 5016504 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 21, 2015). The briefing has been extensive and, while the Court was considering it, Doosan moved to transfer this matter to the underlying District of Alaska action, insisting that it meets Rule-45(f)'s "exceptional circumstances" requirement for doing so. Doc. 22 at 1; see also supra n. 1. JCB opposes. Doc. 24.

I. BACKGROUND

MCESI sued Doosan over what it alleges to be Doosan's constructive termination of MCESI's heavy construction equipment Dealer agreement with it.2 CV115-007, doc. 29 at 6.3 It has since moved for partial summary judgment on some of its claims and against Counts One, Two, and Three of Doosan's countclaims. Doc. 29. In support of that, MCESI General Manager Andrew H. Miller supplies some background facts which inform the motion before this Court:

Doc. 31 at 2 ¶ 4 (Miller Declaration).

MCESI was not only unhappy about the non-renewal, but also with Doosan's relationship with Craig Taylor Equipment ("CTE"), a much larger equipment dealer in Alaska. Doosan had enabled CTE to become "a full Doosan dealer in CTE's Fairbanks office and to carry and promote Doosan products in its other offices which were located in MCESI's area of primary responsibility (`APR')." Id. ¶ 5. MCESI thus complained, and the MCESI/Doosan relationship continued to deteriorate as Doosan promoted CTE at MCESI's expense. Id. ¶ 7. Miller ultimately wrote "Doosan[,] indicating that MCESI would be pursuing its rights under Alaska's statute governing distributorships, AS §45.45.710-790." Id. at 3 ¶ 8.4 Efforts to work things out failed, and MCESI sued Doosan for "effectively terminating MCESI's rights under its Dealer agreement by failing to renew MCESI's 2014 contract after it expired and [promoting CTE's interests at MCESI's expense]." Id. at 3-4, 6; see also doc. 1-2 at 7 (MCESI seeks over $3 million for repurchase of equipment and payments for the value of lost business and its expenses). MCESI says its

Doc. 29 at 6 (footnote omitted). "In its Answer and Counterclaims," "Doosan alleges that MCESI did not use its best efforts to promote Doosan products during 2014. The basis for this allegation is MCESI's relationship with JCB, another equipment manufacturer." Doc. 31 at 6 ¶ 30; MC415-013, doc. 22-1 at 2 n. 3 (Doosan illuminating its counterclaim that MCESI failed to use its best efforts to promote Doosan's products when it commenced promoting JCB's).5

In fact, Doosan views the litigation in a more complex manner. It insists that MCESI terminated the relationship based on pretextual grounds so it could further its longstanding plan to sell competing JCB products. CV115-007, doc. 5 at 3; see also id. at 3-4 (recounting MCESI's alleged duplicitous conduct and insisting that "MCESI has inflicted injury on Doosan as set forth in Doosan's Counterclaim."). It thus wants information from JCB (hence, its subpoena and JCB's quash motion here) to uncover information if not evidence on that score. And, it reminds (in urging transfer here), it is moving the Alaska court "to compel MCESI to produce documentation of its relationship with JCB." MC415-013, doc. 22-1 at 2.

The picture is even more nuanced given MCESI's insistence that in 2013 it told Doosan that it had been "pursuing an arrangement with JCB to provide MCESI with a line of mini equipment that would not compete with MCESI's existing Doosan equipment."6 CV115-007, doc. 31 at 6 ¶ 31 (emphasis added). A Doosan representative, claims Miller, "responded [that] it would not be a problem and he might have a few questions." Id. Miller welcomed them, but heard no further, so MCESI "understood that to mean there was no problem." Id. And in fact, Miller emphasizes, "MCESI never sold any JCB equipment "that competed with Doosan in its inventory during [2014 and the first six months of 2015]. During 2013 and 2014 MCESI never actively marketed any competing JCB equipment." Id. ¶ 34.

Indeed, MCESI further emphasizes, Doosan — prior to filing its Answer — "never raised any issue with MCESI's representation of JCB's mini equipment line." Doc. 31 at 7 ¶ 39 (emphasis added). Nor did it complain about MCESI's sales performance during 2014. Id. ¶ 40. Yet, Doosan now raises unfair trade practices and trademark infringement counterclaims. Doc. 29 at 6; doc. 5 at 36-39. Again, it served its Rule 45 subpoena on JCB to uncover information about the MCESI/JCB relationship.7 MC415-013, doc. 1 at 29-110. And JCB, in turn, moves to quash it.8

II. ANALYSIS

Rule 45(f) was revised in 2013:

Agincourt Gaming, LLC v. Zynga, Inc., 2014 WL 4079555 at *6 (D.Nev. Aug. 15, 2014) (cite omitted). MCESI does not consent here, so Doosan must show exceptional circumstances:

Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(f) advisory committee's note (2013).9

Courts faced with a transfer motion "must account for the complexity, procedural posture, duration of pendency, and the nature of the issues pending before, or already resolved by, the issuing court in the underlying litigation." Google, Inc. v. Digital Citizens Alliance, 2015 WL 4930979 at * 2 (D.D.C. July 31, 2015) (quotes and citation omitted). They also "must balance the interest of local resolution against factors such as judicial economy and risk of inconsistent rulings." Venus, 2016 WL 159952 at * 3 (citing Agincourt, 2014 WL 4079555 at * 7 (because similar discovery issues in issuing district had been briefed, the danger of inconsistent rulings therefrom weighed in heavily in favor of transfer)); Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Kobach, 2014 WL 3818490 at * 4 (D. Kan. Aug. 4, 2014) (exceptional circumstances found where similar issues arose in discovery in multiple districts, thereby creating the risk of inconsistent rulings)).

Here, the above factual recitation unmistakably shows that JCB either is or is not intricately involved in the District of Alaska case — depending on which way that court rules on the still-pending partial summary judgment motion filed by MCESI, as well as Doosan's still-pending motion to compel MCESI to produce, inter alia, "documents regarding its communications and relationship with JCB." CV115-007, doc. 46 at 2. That court alone must interpret the meaning and reach of the above-excerpted Alaskan statute, including what constitutes distributor coercion, "best efforts," fair and reasonable repurchase and expense determinations, and so forth. The nature, and thus the relevancy, of the MCESI-JCB relationship comprehensively figures into that court's summary judgment and discovery determinations. And that, in turn, will drive that judge's determination of what JCB data and documents are relevant and thus necessary to disclose in order to resolve Doosan's motion to compel, MCESI's motion for partial summary judgment, and perhaps even trial on the parties' claims.10 A potentially inconsistent relevancy determination by this Court would hamper, not assist, the litigation there.11

Finally, the internet enables easy access to the Alaska federal court's docket and Rule 45(f) goes out of its way to minimize "distance litigation" in this context. See supra n. 9. It thus is fair to conclude that the transfer burden on JCB (no small player on the world's industrial machinery stage) is easily outweighed by the exceptional circumstances that Doosan illuminates.

Transfer of this proceeding to that court therefore is warranted. Argento, 2015 WL 4918065 at * 7 (granting transfer because it "advances judicial economy, avoids the potential for inconsistent rulings, and prevents disruption of the management of the underlying litigation."); Google, 2015 WL 4930979 at * 5; Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Deloitte & Touche LLP, 309 F.R.D. 41, 44 (D.D.C. 2015) (transfer was proper because the underlying case demanded a "nuanced legal analysis based on a full understanding of the [u]nderlying [a]ction," not "a mere relevancy determination," and the minimal burden on local party, if any, was far outweighed by the exceptional circumstances shown); XY, LLC v. Trans Ova Genetics, LLC., 307 F.R.D. 10, 13 (D.D.C. 2014) (transfer warranted where the nonparty was intricately involved with a party to the underlying case and the need for relevance determinations outweighed the minimal burden on the nonparty); Wultz v. Bank of China, Ltd., 304 F.R.D. 38, 46-47 (D.D.C. 2014) (transfer motion granted; the issuing court was "in a better position to rule . . . due to her familiarity with the full scope of issues involved as well as any implications the resolution of the motion will have on the underlying litigation").

III. CONCLUSION

"Courts are in agreement that Rule 45(f) motions to transfer fall within the gambit of non-dispositive matters properly determined by a magistrate judge." Argento, 2015 WL 4918065 at * 2; see also id. ("The nondispositive nature of the resulting order is not altered by the fact that a Rule 45(f) motion to transfer comes before the Court in the context of a miscellaneous action based entirely on the disputed subpoenas, even though the resolution of the motion to transfer may be dispositive of the miscellaneous action and result in the administrative closing of that case."). The Court therefore GRANTS the motion of Clark Equipment Company, d/b/a Doosan Infracore Construction Equipment America to transfer this Miscellaneous Proceeding (MC415-013) to the federal district court in Alaska where the above-captioned case (CV115-007) originated. Doc. 22. Doosan's oral argument motion is DENIED. Doc. 17. However, Doosan moved to seal its transfer brief, and that motion, which is unopposed, doc. 23, is GRANTED (it meets L.R. 79.7's sealing criteria).12 To that end, the Clerk is DIRECTED to assist the Alaska federal court in accessing (if not physically transferring to it) that document. Finally, and subject to any JCB Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(a) Objection, the Clerk is DIRECTED to administratively close this case after it is TRANSFERRED to the Alaska federal court.13

SO ORDERED.