ORDER

G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

Antonio Tavaris Brown moves for 28 U.S.C. § 2255 relief, seeking a sentence reduction from 180 to 51 months. Doc. 62 at 1, 12.1 The Court is preliminarily reviewing it under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2255 Proceedings.

I. BACKGROUND

Brown pled guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) and § 924(e). Doc. 47 at 1; see also doc. 54 at 20-21. This Court's December 14, 2013 judgment makes no mention of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), but the sentencing judge applied it during sentencing: "[T]he Court concurs with the findings in the presentence report, including the addendum, and determines that the applicable advisory guidelines are: a total offense level of 30, criminal history category [VI]; 180-to-210 months of 15 imprisonment. . . ." Doc. 55 at 6; see also Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) at 4 (noting §922(g) conviction, plus three violent felony priors — "two convictions for felony eluding and one for obstruction with violence"). The judge then imposed the low end of that range, 180 months. Id. at 23 ("[A] lot of the underlying offenses that qualify for the armed career criminal mandatory minimum make that penalty too high[,] in my judgment. But I have to apply the law. I can't just go off flying on my own and say, well, I don't agree with the law so I'm going to do something different.").

In his only § 2255 claim raised here,1 Brown argues that Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), applies to his case, and because this Court sentenced him under ACCA's "residual clause" — which Johnson invalidated on vagueness grounds — he is entitled to resentencing "to a term of imprisonment not exceeding 120 months by statute, and a term of imprisonment not exceeding 51 months by [application of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines]." Doc 62 at 4.

II. ANALYSIS

The ACCA enhances penalties for defendants who are (1) convicted of being felons in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), and (2) have "three prior convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). Plain vanilla felon-inpossession convictions fetch a maximum 120-month sentence, see 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(2), while the ACCA enhancement mandates a 15-year (180-month) minimum and a maximum of life. 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The Act defines the term "violent felony" as meaning

18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Johnson invalidated the "residual clause" (italicized above). Johnson, 135 S. Ct. at 2560 ("Invoking so shapeless a provision to condemn someone to prison for 15 years to life" violates the Fifth Amendment's prohibition on vague criminal laws); McClouden v. United States, 2016 WL 775831 at * 6 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 25, 2016).2 Johnson, however, did not call into question enhancements predicated on convictions under the ACCA's first two clauses, known as the "elements clause"3 and the "enumerated clause."4 Johnson, 135 S.Ct. at 2563 ("Today's decision does not call into question application of the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act's definition of a violent felony.").

Hence, enhancements based on those offenses remain valid. See United States v. Tinker, 618 F. App'x 635, 637 (11th Cir. 2015) (convictions that qualify as violent felonies under the "elements" clause of the ACCA rather than the "residual" clause survive Johnson); McClouden, 2016 WL 775831 at * 7 ("Burglary is a specifically enumerated offense pursuant to Section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) and thus, does not fall within the scope of that Section's residual clause, which was invalidated by the Johnson decision.").5

The question that immediately surfaces in this case, then, is whether Brown was improperly sentenced under the residual clause. The PSI noted only his three prior felonies: "two convictions for felony eluding and one for obstruction with violence." PSI at 4 ¶ 17. Brown impliedly argues6 that they were classified under the residual clause when he contends that, under Johnson, his

Doc 62 at 4 (Brown's § 2255 brief); see also doc. 63 at 6-7.

The problem, however, is that neither the sentencing judge nor the PSI specify which of the ACCA's three clauses supported Brown's ACCA enhancement. A somewhat similar situation arose in McCarthan, 811 F.3d at 1243 ("In imposing sentence, the district judge, like the [PSI], did not expressly identify which of McCarthan's prior convictions qualified as predicate offenses for purposes of the ACCA enhancement.").7 The McCarthan panel thus performed a reverse-engineering analysis of McCarthan's ACCA-enhanced sentence to discern the answer. Id. at 1254-1257.8

But an overarching question also arises: Does Johnson even apply to cases on collateral review? That question is now before the Supreme Court in Welch v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 790 (2016) (granting certiorari to decide "[w]hether Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___ 135 S.Ct. 2551, 192 L.Ed.2d 569 (2015), announced a new substantive rule of constitutional law that applies retroactively to cases that are on collateral review."); see also Welch v. United States, 2016 WL 537626 (Petitioner's Feb. 9, 2016 Brief); In re Johnson, ___ F. 3d ___, 2016 WL 762095 at * 6 (11th Cir. Feb. 26, 2016) (holding an application for leave to file a successive § 2255 motion "in abeyance, pending the Supreme Court's decision in Welch."), vacated for reh'g en banc, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 919483 (11th Cir. Mar. 10, 2016).

The Court will hear from the Government within 30 days of the date this Order is served. Rule 4(b). Brown is directed to furnish the United States Attorney in Savannah, Georgia, with copies of all further motions or papers that he files in this case.

SO ORDERED.