REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

After pleading guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute, and to distribute, cocaine, Lawrence Drayton moves under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his conviction. Doc. 1102. He claims that (1) his plea agreement's collateral attack waiver denied him "the assistance of unconflicted counsel;" (2) the government "intentionally misrepresented . . . facts in order to obtain an indictment and ensure a guilty plea;" (3) his plea "was constitutionally unintelligent . . . because he was unaware of the consequences flowing from the plea-agreement waiver;" and (4) his attorney, Matthew Hube, "misunderstood the law" of career offender sentence enhancements.1 Doc. 1132 at 4. Review of the parties' briefing shows his motion should be denied.

I. BACKGROUND

In April 2013, Drayton pled guilty to conspiracy pursuant to an agreement with the Government that contained direct appeal and collateral attack waivers. Doc. 788 at 6-7; doc. 949. An ensuing Presentence Investigation Report (PSI) designated him a career offender, assigned a total offense level of 29 and criminal history category of VI, and recommended a 151-188 month sentence. Drayton objected to his criminal history score, career offender enhancement, and the points added for his role in the offense. See doc. 762. The district judge ultimately overruled those objections, adopted the PSI's findings of facts and guidelines calculation, and sentenced him to 188 months' imprisonment. Doc. 797. Drayton appealed that sentence, but the Eleventh Circuit dismissed it because of his plea agreement's appeal waiver. Doc. 1016. He then timely filed the present motion. Doc. 1102.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Grounds 1 & 3

Drayton first claims that his "plea-agreement waiver constructively denied [him] the assistance of unconflicted counsel." Doc. 1132 at 4. By "insulat[ing] counsel from counsel's own misbehavior whether negligent or intentional," the waiver "created an actual conflict of interest" that, according to Drayton, violated his Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Id.

To find attorney ineffectiveness based on a purported conflict of interest, Drayton must show "first, that his attorney had an actual conflict of interest, and second, that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance." Pegg v. United States, 253 F.3d 1274, 1277 (11th Cir. 2001); see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). To show an actual conflict, "[a] § 2255 [movant] must show `inconsistent interests and must demonstrate that the attorney made a choice between possible alternative courses of action.'" Id. (emphasis added). Proving "adverse effect[s]," on the other hand, requires showing: "(1) the existence of a plausible alternative defense strategy or tactic that might have been pursued; (2) that the alternative strategy or tactic was reasonable under the facts; and (3) a link between the actual conflict and the decision to forego the alternative strategy of defense." Pegg, 253 F.3d at 1278. In guilty plea cases, courts look at "whether the attorney's actual conflict adversely affected the defendant's decision to plead guilty." Id.

No actual conflict existed between Drayton and Hube because of the appeal and collateral attack waivers in his plea agreement. Long has the Eleventh Circuit approved the use of such waivers and never has it found one to inherently generate a conflict. See United States v. Benitez-Zapata, 131 F.3d 1444, 1446 (11th Cir. 1997) (waivers enforced if the court questions the defendant about it or if the record otherwise shows he understood its full significance). The Georgia Supreme Court — the ultimate arbiter of ethical rules that apply to attorneys practicing in Georgia, including in this Court2 — also approves of such waivers, see Allen v. Thomas, 265 Ga. 518, 520 (1995) ("[W]aivers of the right to appeal and waivers of the right to seek post-conviction relief" each "comport[] with public policy[] and [are] enforceable."), and has never found conflicts. In fact, Fed. R. Crim P. 11(b)(N) expressly contemplates appeal and collateral attack waiver provisions. Doing so would be strange indeed if such provisions violated a defendant's Sixth Amendment rights.3

What's more, Drayton has made no showing that, no matter his interests (inconsistent or not), Hube "made a choice between possible alternative courses of action." Pegg, 253 F.3d at 1278. In essence, he claims that inconsistent interests alone suffice to prove a conflict and void his plea agreement. That's never been the law and isn't the case here.4

Regardless, Drayton has always been free — whether waivers create inherent conflicts or not — to argue that his attorney was ineffective in negotiating, communicating, or otherwise facilitating the plea bargain itself (e.g., that counsel negligently failed to convey a better plea offer, or lied to or threatened Drayton in some way). So even assuming arguendo that counsel's participation here amounts to some sort of ethical conflict, it is beside the point. United States v. Garst, 2015 WL 631402 at * 4-5 (D. Kan. Feb. 13, 2015) (rejecting same "inherent conflict of interest" argument since "`a plea agreement waiver of post-conviction rights does not waive the right to bring a § 2255 petition based on ineffective assistance of counsel claims challenging the plea or the waiver'") (quoting United States v. Cockerham, 237 F.3d 1179, 1183-87 (10th Cir. 2001)).5

Even if it weren't beside the point, Drayton cannot show that the conflict adversely affected counsel's performance. See Pegg, 253 F.3d at 1278. He decided to plead guilty in the face of overwhelming guilt evidence.6 By doing so, even with appeal and collateral attack waivers, he avoided a Guidelines recommended sentence of 360 months to life and instead faced a 151-188 month recommendation (and actually received 188 months). PSI ¶ 68. Put differently, "Drayton would have ple[d] guilty whether or not there was a collateral attack waiver in his plea agreement because his guilty plea provided an extraordinary benefit to him in the face of overwhelming evidence of his guilt." Doc. 1114 at 7. Hence, there was no "plausible alternative defense strategy" Drayton could have pursued that "was reasonable under the facts." Pegg, 253 F.3d at 1278. His conflict of interest claim thus fails.7

In Ground Three, Drayton actually claims that his "guilty plea was constitutionally unintelligent, thus invalid, because he was unaware of the consequences flowing from the plea-agreement waiver." Doc. 1132.8 As discussed above in footnote seven, he knew quite well what rights he gave up, the nature of those rights and the charges against him, and the possible penalties he faced both with and without the plea agreement. Again, he signed his name to the agreement, which itself explained what he gave up and the consequences he faced. See doc. 788 at 10.9 And the district judge thoroughly covered that same ground when he found that Drayton knowingly and intelligently pled guilty. See doc. 949 at 18 (asked if he had any complaints with Hube's representation, or any other ways in which the judicial system had treated him, Drayton said no); id. at 19 (stating that Hube had been truthful at all times and never tried to force him to plead guilty); id. at 20 (Q: "Are you satisfied with Mr. Hube and the way he has represented you in this case? A. Yes, sir."); id. at 22 (reviewing the possible sentence Drayton faced); id. at 25 (reviewing the appeal and collateral attack waivers and ensuring that Drayton understood each); id. at 29 ("Q: Do you fully understand all rights and procedures . . . that you are giving up by pleading guilty, including your right to an appeal?" A. Yes, sir.") (emphasis added).

Drayton argues that the plea colloquy "does not remedy the defect" caused by Hube's conflict of interest. Doc. 1155 at 5. Instead, it "reveals not a single mention that the plea waiver excuses defense counsel misconduct," or that he waived "his right to seek a writ of habeas corpus." Id. Only in an alternate universe could the plea colloquy be read to exclude those two items. The district judge made abundantly clear that the waivers barred Drayton from appealing under any circumstances (including on ineffective assistance grounds) unless the Court sentenced him to an above-Guidelines sentence, or the Government itself appealed. Doc. 949 at 25-26. He also highlighted that the waiver included collateral attacks, like habeas petitions and § 2255 motions. Id. at 25. Most importantly, Drayton affirmed multiple times that he understood the nature of the waivers and the rights he gave up. Id. at 25, 29. His conclusory allegations to the contrary cannot suffice to overcome "the strong presumption that . . . statements made under oath at [his] plea colloquy" are true. Winthrop-Redin, 767 F.3d at 1217. His "unintelligent-plea" claim thus fails.

B. Ground 2

Drayton's second claim nominally surrounds "illicit romantic or sexual relations" between the Assistant United States Attorney assigned to this case and the lead case agent investigating Drayton and others in the conspiracy. Doc. 1132 at 3. He believes those relations led the AUSA "not to disclose [to the grand jury] . . . conduct designed to either create or present false or unreliable evidence." Id. In particular, says Drayton, the grand jury heard no testimony that connected him to a conspiracy. Doc. 1103 at 11. Instead, the AUSA elicited testimony from the case agent that "during his investigation, [Drayton] was identified as a cocaine and marijuana distributor," but never a conspirator. Id. That omission led to an improper indictment which "ensureEd his] guilty plea." Doc. 1132 at 4.

Drayton's knowing and voluntary guilty plea, however, waived all non-jurisdictional pre-plea claims he may have had. See Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258, 267 (1973) ("When a criminal defendant has solemnly admitted in open court that he is in fact guilty of the offense with which he is charged, he may not thereafter raise independent claims relating to the deprivation of constitutional rights that occurred prior to the entry of the guilty plea."); Keye v. Perry, 2015 WL 3902330 at * 3 (S.D. Ga. June 24, 2015) ("A knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional, pre-plea defects, including ineffective assistance of counsel with respect to issues not implicating the voluntariness of the plea.") (citing Wilson v. United States, 962 F.2d 996, 997 (11th Cir.1992)), adopted, 2015 WL 5116830 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 28, 2015). Because claims involving prosecutorial conduct before a grand jury fall into that basket, see Tollett, 411 U.S. at 266 (claim of unconstitutional grand jury selection procedures provided no ground for "federal collateral relief . . . after a criminal defendant pleads guilty"),10 ground two also fails.

C. Ground Four

In his final claim, Drayton contends that Hube provided him with ineffective assistance11 by misunderstanding the law governing the use of [his prior convictions] to designate him a career offender and increase the commencement point for the court's § 3553(a) analysis." Doc. 1132 at 3. Under both "the categorical and modified categorical approach," says Drayton, his "Georgia convictions fail . . . to qualify as career offender predicates." Id. Hube's "miscomprehension resulted in a failure to object to the [PSI's] conclusions; a failure to argue against the career designation at sentencing; and a failure to raise the sentencing errors on direct appeal." Id.

To begin, Hube did file extensive objections to Drayton's PSI, including to the career offender recommendation. See doc. 762. He argued that the prior drug convictions used as predicate offenses shouldn't qualify because they occurred within two years of each other and almost a decade before Drayton's present arrest, not that they categorically could not qualify. Id. at 7-8. That, however, almost certainly is because they categorically do qualify as predicates.

Under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(b)(2), a "controlled substance offense" (all of Drayton's career offender predicates fall under that designation, not the crime of violence category),12 is one "punishable by imprisonment . . . exceeding one year, that prohibits the manufacture, import, export, distribution, or dispensing of a controlled substance . . . or the possession of a controlled substance with intent to manufacture, import, export, distribute, or dispense." Drayton was convicted of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute in 2000 (PSI ¶ 31), possession of marijuana with intent to distribute in January 2002 (PSI ¶ 33), and possession of cocaine with intent to distribute later that year in September. PSI ¶ 34. All of those crimes carry possible prison sentences "exceeding one year," and both cocaine and marijuana are controlled substances. The convictions thus qualify as career offender predicates under § 4B1.1. Hube "miscomprehend[ded]" (doc. 1132 at 3) nothing by not arguing to the contrary, and, in turn, provided effective assistance.13

III. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, Lawrence Drayton's § 2255 motion should be DENIED. His motions to amend (doc. 1132) and for an extension of time (doc. 1123) are GRANTED. Applying the Certificate of Appealability (COA) standards set forth in Brown v. United States, 2009 WL 307872 at * 1-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb.9, 2009), the Court discerns no COA-worthy issues at this stage of the litigation, so no COA should issue either. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1), (2); Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases ("The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.") (emphasis added). Any motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis therefore is moot.

SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED.