G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
In this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action involving a Chatham county, Georgia jail inmate's in-custody death, plaintiffs served defendants (and then-jail correction officers) Eric Vinson and Frederick Burke (collectively, "defendants") on April 9, 2016. Docs. 43 & 45 at 1; doc. 40 at 1 (plaintiffs' motion for default stating that service occurred on April 10, 2016). Neither man timely answered, see Fed. R. civ. P. 12(a)(1)(A)(i) (defendants must answer within 21 days of service), so plaintiffs moved for entry of default. Doe. 40. That motion remains pending, as do defendants' motions to "open" their defaults.
Vinson and Burke claim they failed to timely answer because (1) they thought they had 21 weekdays within which to do so, and (2) their employer unexpectedly declined to provide counsel, a decision not made until at least nine days into their response period. See, e.g., doe. 43 at 1. Once defendants learned of plaintiffs' default motion, they immediately began preparing answers. Burke has since filed his answer (doe. 44), while Vinson included a partial Answer with his motion to open default. Doe. 43 at 2, 5.
Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 55(c), the Court "may set aside an entry of default for good cause." No default has actually been entered against Vinson or Burke, but they unquestionably are in default, having not timely answered. That said, the Court finds good cause to allow their answers.
Compania Interamericana Exp.-Imp., S.A. v. Compania Dominicana de Aviacion, 88 F.3d 948, 951-52 (11th Cir. 1996), quoted in Farmer, 2016 WL 1424060 at * 9.
Vinson and Burke acted promptly to correct their defaults (no entry of default has even been entered yet), nothing indicates any intentional conduct on either's part, and plaintiffs will suffer no prejudice from allowing them to proceed. That's enough to show good cause.