ORDER and MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

R. STAN BAKER, Magistrate Judge.

Petitioner Raymond Yeager ("Yeager" or "Petitioner"), an inmate at the Federal Correctional Institute in Jesup, Georgia, filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Doc. 1.) Respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 9). In Response, Petitioner states that he does not oppose dismissal of his Petition. Accordingly, I RECOMMEND that the Court GRANT Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, DISMISS Yeager's Section 2241 Petition, CLOSE this case, and DENY Yeager in forma pauperis status on appeal.

BACKGROUND

Yeager pleaded guilty, in the Western District of North Carolina, to receiving and distributing visual depictions of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252(a)(2) and (b)(1). (Doc. 9-3.) The North Carolina court sentenced him to 151 months in prison. (Doc. 9-4.) Yeager unsuccessfully filed a motion to vacate pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 in the Western District of North Carolina. (Doc. 9-8.) On October 18, 2015, Yeager filed this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking modification of his sentence. (Doc. 1.)

DISCUSSION

I. Whether Yeager can Proceed Pursuant to Section 2241

In support of his Petition, Yeager cited Johnson v. United States, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (June 26, 2015). Respondent moved to dismiss Yeager's petition for lack of jurisdiction. (Doc. 9.) Respondent argues Yeager is not entitled to use of Section 2255's savings clause. (Id. at pp. 4-7.) Respondent states Johnson cannot form the basis for savings clause relief, as the rule announced in that case is a new constitutional rule1, and neither the Supreme Court nor the Eleventh Circuit has ever held that a Section 2255 motion is an "inadequate or ineffective" vehicle by which to raise such a claim. Id.

In his Response, Petitioner states that he does not oppose Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. (Doc. 13.) Moreover, courts have agreed that, while Johnson may provide relief under Section 2255(h), it does not provide grounds for filing a Section 2241 Petition under Section 2255(e) as Petitioner attempts to do here. See King v. Werlich, No. 16-CV-300-DRH-CJP, 2016 WL 1583936, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2016) ("Courts have decided that habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241 is not the appropriate method of collateral attack under Johnson."). For example, subsequent to the Supreme Court's decision in Welch making Johnson retroactive to cases on collateral review, Magistrate Judge Brian K. Epps of this District and I have independently concluded that a petitioner cannot bring a Johnson claim via Section 2241 due the availability of relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). R. & R., Edwards v. Flournoy, Case 5:15-cv-130 (May 13, 2016), ECF No. 15; R. & R., Richard v. Stone, Case 3:16-cv-1 (Apr. 25, 2016), ECF No. 15 ("Regardless of whether the [circuit court] actually grants permission for Petitioner to file a second or successive § 2255 motion, there is an available avenue to pursue a Johnson claim, and he therefore cannot pursue relief in this Court under § 2241."). Accordingly, the Court should GRANT Respondent's unopposed Motion to Dismiss.

Yeager is reminded that the filing of Section 2255 motions is governed by a statute of limitations period, and of particular significance is Section 2255(f)(3). "It is important to note that 28 U.S.C. [§] 2255(f)(3) requires that a § 2255 motion relying on a newly-recognized right must be filed within one year from `the date on which the right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court[.]'" King v. Werlich, No. 16-CV-300-DRH-CJP, 2016 WL 1583936, at *3 (S.D. Ill. Apr. 20, 2016) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)). "Further, the one-year period prescribed by 2255(f)(3) runs from the date of the Supreme Court's ruling initially recognizing the right asserted[ ] and not from the date the newly recognized right was found to be retroactive." Id. (emphasis in original) (citing Dodd v. United States, 545 U.S. 353, 358 (2005)). Johnson was decided by the Supreme Court on June 26, 2015. Accordingly, if Yeager intends to avail himself of the relief afforded by Section 2255(h) and petition the United States Court of Appeals for permission to file a second or successive 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, he must do so expeditiously. This Court expresses no opinion on the merits of such a motion.

II. Denial of Leave to Appeal in Forma Pauperis

The Court should also deny Yeager leave to appeal in forma pauperis. Though Yeager has, of course, not yet filed a notice of appeal, it would be appropriate to address these issues in the Court's order of dismissal. Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3) (trial court may certify that appeal of party proceeding in forma pauperis is not taken in good faith "before or after the notice of appeal is filed"). An appeal cannot be taken in forma pauperis if the trial court certifies that the appeal is not taken in good faith. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3); Fed. R. App. P. 24(a)(3). Good faith in this context must be judged by an objective standard. Busch v. Cty. of Volusia, 189 F.R.D. 687, 691 (M.D. Fla. 1999). A party does not proceed in good faith when he seeks to advance a frivolous claim or argument. See Coppedge v. United States, 369 U.S. 438, 445 (1962). A claim or argument is frivolous when it appears the factual allegations are clearly baseless or the legal theories are indisputably meritless. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989); Carroll v. Gross, 984 F.2d 392, 393 (11th Cir. 1993). Stated another way, an in forma pauperis action is frivolous and, thus, not brought in good faith, if it is "without arguable merit either in law or fact." Napier v. Preslicka, 314 F.3d 528, 531 (11th Cir. 2002); see also Brown v. United States, Nos. 407CV085, 403CR001, 2009 WL 307872, at *1-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 9, 2009).

Based on the above analysis of Yeager's Petition and the Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, there are no non-frivolous issues to raise on appeal, and an appeal would not be taken in good faith. Thus, the Court should DENY in forma pauperis status on appeal.

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, I RECOMMEND that the Court GRANT Respondent's Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 9), DISMISS Yeager's Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, (doc. 1), CLOSE this case, and DENY Yeager leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

The Court ORDERS any party seeking to object to this Report and Recommendation to file specific written objections within fourteen (14) days of the date on which this Report and Recommendation is entered. Any objections asserting that the Magistrate Judge failed to address any contention raised in the pleading must also be included. Failure to do so will bar any later challenge or review of the factual findings or legal conclusions of the Magistrate Judge. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140 (1985). A copy of the objections must be served upon all other parties to the action. The filing of objections is not a proper vehicle through which to make new allegations or present additional evidence.

Upon receipt of objections meeting the specificity requirement set out above, a United States District Judge will make a de novo determination of those portions of the report, proposed findings, or recommendation to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the Magistrate Judge. Objections not meeting the specificity requirement set out above will not be considered by a District Judge. A party may not appeal a Magistrate Judge's report and recommendation directly to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit. Appeals may be made only from a final judgment entered by or at the direction of a District Judge. The Clerk of Court is DIRECTED to serve a copy of this Report and Recommendation upon Yeager and Respondent.

SO ORDERED and REPORTED and RECOMMENDED.