G. R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
After withdrawing a previous 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion that sought to invalidate a career offender sentencing enhancement (docs. 1169, 1172),
In his present motion (legally his "first" under § 2255), Knight points out that he originally received no mitigating role adjustment to his Guidelines sentence because he was classified as a career offender. Doc. 1177 at 4. Amendment 794 to U.S.S.G § 3B1.2, he says, changes something about that (what, he does not say) and entitles him to resentencing. Id.
That amendment merely "clarified the factors to consider for a minor-role adjustment" — it did not substantively change § 3B1.2. United States v. Casas, 632 F. App'x 1003, 1004 (11th Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Quintero-Leyva, 823 F.3d 519, 523 (9th Cir. 2016). "The threshold inquiry," therefore, "is whether [Knight's] claim that his sentence is contrary to a subsequently enacted clarifying amendment is cognizable under § 2255." Burke v. United States, 152 F.3d 1329, 1331 (11th Cir. 1998).
Burke mirrors this case, the only salient differences being the Guidelines enhancement at issue (obstruction of justice there, "minor role" here) and the number of the amendment underlying the defendant's claim (794 here, 347 in Burke). Id. at 1330. By voluntarily dismissing his appeal before decision, Burke effectively didn't appeal, just like Knight. Id. at 1331. Then, two years after Burke's sentencing (almost five years in Knight's case), the Sentencing Commission "added amendment 347 to the obstruction-of-justice enhancement provision." Id. Burke, also like Knight, "subsequently moved pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 for a modification and correction of his sentence based on this amendment." Id.
Because "§ 2255 is not a substitute for direct appeal," the Eleventh Circuit held that "nonconstitutional claims" like Burke's and Knight's "can be raised on collateral review only when the alleged error constitutes a "`fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete miscarriage of justice [or] an omission inconsistent with the rudimentary demands of fair procedure.'" Burke, 152 F.3d at 1331 (quoting Reed v. Farley, 512 U.S. 339, 348 (1994)). "Insofar as amendment [794] is a clarifying amendment effecting no change in the substantive law, [Knight]," like Burke, "was afforded the opportunity to" challenge the denial of a minor role adjustment "at his original sentencing and on direct appeal." Id. at 1332. He never did.
Accordingly, Anthony Knight's § 2255 motion should be
Under the ACCA, defendants receive enhanced sentences if they are convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and have three prior convictions that are violent felonies or serious drug offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1). The ACCA defines a "violent felony" as an offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year which "(i) has as an element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force against the person of another; or (ii) is burglary, arson or extortion, involves use of explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B) (residual clause emphasized). Johnson found the ACCA's "residual clause" to be unconstitutionally vague. 135 S. Ct. at 2557-58. Knight received a career offender Guidelines enhancement, not an ACCA sentence, so Johnson did not apply. See United States v. Matchett, 802 F.3d 1185, 1193-94 (11th Cir. 2015) ( Johnson, and its void for vagueness rationale, does not apply to the Guidelines).