Filed: Aug. 09, 2016
Latest Update: Aug. 09, 2016
Summary: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION G.R. SMITH , Magistrate Judge . Having pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; distribution of five grams or more of meth; and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, (doc. 103 (plea agreement), 1 doc. 105 (judgment) (entered January 23, 2014)), Eric Arrana-Garcia moves under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his carrying conviction. Doc. 112. Review of
Summary: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION G.R. SMITH , Magistrate Judge . Having pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; distribution of five grams or more of meth; and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, (doc. 103 (plea agreement), 1 doc. 105 (judgment) (entered January 23, 2014)), Eric Arrana-Garcia moves under 28 U.S.C. 2255 to vacate his carrying conviction. Doc. 112. Review of ..
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REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
Having pled guilty to conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine; distribution of five grams or more of meth; and using and carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime, (doc. 103 (plea agreement),1 doc. 105 (judgment) (entered January 23, 2014)), Eric Arrana-Garcia moves under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his carrying conviction. Doc. 112. Review of the parties' briefing shows that his motion must be denied.
After the Court sentenced him to 216 months' imprisonment on January 12, 2015 (doc. 105), Arrana-Garcia never appealed. His conviction thus became final on January 26, 2015. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A) (criminal defendants must file a notice of appeal within 14 days of the entry of judgment). He filed the instant § 2255 motion approximately one year and four months later. Doc. 112 at 2 (signature-filed May 19, 2016). In it he argues that Johnson v. United States, U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2551 (2015), voids his 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) conviction for carrying a firearm during and in relation to a drug trafficking crime. Doc. 112 at 4.2
The Armed Career Criminal Act ("ACCA") — the statute Johnson addressed — provides enhanced penalties for defendants who are (1) convicted of being felons in possession of firearms in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) and (2) have "three prior convictions . . . for a violent felony or a serious drug offense, or both." It defines "violent felony" as, among other things, a felony that "otherwise involves conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." Id. at § 924(e)(2)(B). Johnson found that "residual" clause so vague that it violates due process. See 135 S. Ct. at 2557. Importantly, it said nothing about "serious drug offenses," which remain a valid basis for ACCA enhancements. See id. at 2563 ("Today's decision does not call into question application of the Act to the four enumerated offenses, or the remainder of the Act's definition of a violent felony," much less its definition of "serious drug offense").
Even assuming it applies at all to § 924(c),3 Johnson provides Arrana-Garcia no succor here. Under that provision, a person cannot use or carry a firearm during or in relation to "any crime of violence or drug trafficking crime." 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). Although one clause of its crime of violence definition reads similarly (though not identically) to ACCA's residual clause (and thus Johnson's logic may well apply), Arrana-Garcia committed a drug trafficking offense. As the Government aptly put it, "Johnson has no conceivable application in that context." Doc. 114 at 3.
Recall that Johnson says nothing about the viability of "serious drug offense"4 predicates. See 135 S. Ct. at 2563. The term "drug trafficking crime" in § 924(c)(1)(A) covers similar ground as that ACCA phrase.5 And just as Johnson's logic failed to implicate drug offenses in the ACCA context, so too does it not apply to "drug trafficking crimes" for purposes of § 924(c).
It follows that Arrana-Garcia cannot look to Johnson and § 2255(f)(3) to define when his one-year statute of limitations began to run. Instead, he's relegated to § 2255(f)(1), which dictates that the clock started the day his conviction became final (January 26, 2015). Time expired on January 26, 2016, so his motion is untimely by several months (he did not file it until May 19, 2016, doc. 112 at 13).6
Accordingly, Eric Arrana-Garcia's § 2255 motion should be DENIED. Applying the Certificate of Appealability (COA) standards set forth in Brown v. United States, 2009 WL 307872 at * 1-2 (S.D. Ga. Feb.9, 2009), the Court discerns no COA-worthy issues at this stage of the litigation, so no COA should issue either. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); Rule 11(a) of the Rules Governing Habeas Corpus Cases Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 ("The district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.") (emphasis added). Any motion for leave to appeal in forma pauperis therefore is moot.
SO REPORTED AND RECOMMENDED.