G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
Movant Rico Edwards, proceeding pro se, moves under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his 2013 conviction for armed bank robbery and interference with commerce by robbery. Doc. 58;
Edwards pled guilty to one count of armed bank robbery and one count of Hobbs Act robbery. See docs. 36, 39, 40 (judgment entered September 24, 2013 for violations of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951 & 2113(a) and (d)). Because his sentence was not enhanced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA),
While the Eleventh Circuit has not yet "decided if Johnson applies to § 924(c)(3)(B)," see In re Pindei; 824 F.3d 977, 978-79 (11th Cir. 2016) (noting "the law is unsettled" as to whether Johnson invalidates sentences that relied on the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause
And, to the extent Edwards' sentence was adjusted for brandishing, using, or possessing a firearm during a robbery, see doc. 58 at 4; PSR §§ 31 & 38, based on the advisory Sentencing Guidelines, see U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)
None of the provisions that drove Edwards' conviction or sentence rested on any language resembling the sort of residual clause found problematic in Johnson. There is also no precedent to suggest that it is improper to apply a five-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 2B3.1(b)(2)(C) under the Robbery Guideline
Edward's last argument is that his criminal history was miscalculated. That is not a Johnson-based claim, so he cannot take advantage of the one-year § 2255(f)(3) limitations period exception from Johnson. See doc. 58 at 5. Since it was not filed within a year of "the date on which the judgment of conviction became final," 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(1), his miscalculation claim is untimely, Zack v. Tucker, 704 F.3d 917, 922-26 (11th Cir. 2013) (habeas limitations periods apply on a claim-by-claim basis). See docs. 48 (March 20, 2014 order of the Court of Appeals granting his voluntary motion to dismiss with prejudice), 58 (signature-filed June 23, 2016, more than two years later). The Court further notes that any challenge to the miscalculation of his criminal history also has been procedurally defaulted because Edwards did not raise them on direct appeal. United States v. Montano, 398 F.3d 1276, 1279-80 (11th Cir. 2005). See United States v. Edwards, No. 13-14549 (11th Cir. Mar. 20, 2014).
In sum, Edwards' conviction and sentence were proper and his § 2255 motion should be DENIED.
Finally, Edwards asks that the Court appoint counsel to help him in his Johnson claims. Docs. 57 & 59. The Rules Governing § 2255 Proceedings provide that appointment of counsel is proper if an evidentiary hearing is needed or if certain discovery is required, provided that the movant qualifies under 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(g). Rules 6(a), 8(c). As reflected in his moving papers, defendant has demonstrated his ability to file appropriate pleadings seeking § 2255 relief, and neither an evidentiary hearing nor discovery are necessary to resolve his case on the merits. Jones v. United States, 2016 WL 3476429, at *4 n. 5 (S.D. Ga. June 21, 2016), adopted, 2016 WL 4472973 (S.D. Ga. Aug. 24, 2016); Bing v. United States, 2015 WL 4092699 at * 3 (S.D. Ga. July 6, 2015), adopted, 2015 WL 675168 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 4, 2015). Movant's application for appointment of counsel, docs. 57 & 59, is therefore DENIED.
This Report and Recommendation (R&R) is submitted to the district judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 72.3. Within 14 days of service, any party may file written objections to this R&R with the court and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations." Any request for additional time to file objections should be filed with the Clerk for consideration by the assigned district judge.
After the objections period has ended, the clerk shall submit this R&R together with any objections to the assigned district judge. The district judge will review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(c). The parties are advised that failure to timely file objections will result in the waiver of rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonett v. V.A. Leasing Carp., 648 F. App'x 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. U.S., 612 F. App'x 542, 545 (11th Cir. 2015).
Here, movant was charged with four counts of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) & (d), four counts of using and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), two counts of Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, using and brandishing a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A), and carrying a firearm during a crime of violence in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). See doc. 1, see also CR413-069, doc. 1. Pursuant to his combined plea agreement, he pled guilty to one count of armed bank robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2113(a) and (d), and one count of Hobbs Act robbery in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951. Doc. 40 (judgment). At no point was he charged or convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 1924(e)(1).
18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B). The first prong of this definition is sometimes referred to as the "elements clause," while the second prong contains the "enumerated crimes" and, finally, what is commonly called the "residual clause" (referred to herein as the "ACCA residual clause"). United States v. Owens, 672 F.3d 966, 968 (11th Cir. 2012). The ACCA residual clause covers "conduct that presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(ii). The Supreme Court found the residual clause unconstitutionally vague in Johnson, 576 U.S. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2557-58, 2563. But Johnson did not call into question the application of the elements clause and the enumerated crimes of the ACCA's definition of a violent felony. Id. at ___, 135 S. Ct. at 2563.
Distinct from the sentence provisions in § 924(e)(1) of the ACCA, § 924(c)(1)(A) provides for a separate consecutive sentence if any person uses or carries a firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime, or possesses a firearm in furtherance of such crimes, as follows:
18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A). For the purposes of § 924(c), § 924(c)(3)(A) and (B) define "crime of violence" as an offense that is a felony and:
Id. § 924(c)(3). The former clause is referred to herein as the "use-of-force" clause and that later clause as the § 924(c)(3)(B) residual clause." Notably, the ACCA's elements clause only involves the use of force "against the person of another," while the use-of-force clause involves the use of force "against the person or property of another." Compare 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(B)(i), with 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(A) (emphasis added).