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Ashley v. Shuemake, 6:15-cv-53. (2016)

Court: District Court, S.D. Georgia Number: infdco20161213892 Visitors: 13
Filed: Dec. 12, 2016
Latest Update: Dec. 12, 2016
Summary: ORDER J. RANDAL HALL , District Judge . Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs Objections, (doc. 48), to the Court's Order dated October 25, 2016, (doc. 44). The Court construes Plaintiffs Objections as a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's October Order. 1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. BACKGROUND In its October 25, 2016, Order, the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge over Plaintiffs and
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ORDER

Presently before the Court is Plaintiffs Objections, (doc. 48), to the Court's Order dated October 25, 2016, (doc. 44). The Court construes Plaintiffs Objections as a Motion for Reconsideration of the Court's October Order.1 For the reasons set forth below, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration.

BACKGROUND

In its October 25, 2016, Order, the Court adopted the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge over Plaintiffs and Defendants' Objections. (Doc. 48.) The Court granted in part and denied in part Defendants' Motion to Dismiss, (doc. 29). Plaintiffs First Amendment retaliation claims, failure to intervene claims against Defendants Shuemake and Watkins, and supervisor liability claimagainstDefendant Shuemake survived Defendants' Motion to Dismiss. However, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs Fourteenth Amendment due process claims, excessive force claims against Defendants Shuemake and Watkins, failure to intervene claims against Defendant Murphy, and all deliberate indifference claims.

In his instant Motion, Plaintiff objects to the Court's dismissal of his claims for compensatory and punitive damages. (Doc. 48, p. 1.) In support, he provides, along with a reiteration of his Objections to the Motion to Dismiss and Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, several anecdotal examples of "incidents where officers at Georgia State Prison experienced the effects of pepperspray [sic] and each needed `immediate' medical attention." (Doc. 48, p. 2.)

DISCUSSION

A motion for reconsideration, or a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59(e) motion, is "an extraordinary remedy, to be employed sparingly." Smith ex rel. Smith v. Augusta-Richmond Cty., No. CV 110-126, 2012 WL 1355575, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Apr. 18, 2012) (internal citation omitted). "A movant must set forth facts or law of a strongly convincing nature to induce the court to reverse its prior decision." Id (internal citation omitted). "The only grounds for granting a Rule 59 motion are newly-discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact." Jacobs v. Tempur-Pedic Intern., Inc., 626 F.3d 1327, 1344 (11th Cir. 2010) (quoting In re Kellogg, 197 F.3d 1116, 1119 (11th Cir. 1999) (internal punctuation omitted)). "A Rule 59(e) motion cannot be used to relitigate old matters, raise argument or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Id. (quoting Michael Linet Inc. v. Village of Wellington, 408 F.3d 757, 763 (11th Cir. 2005) (alterations omitted)).

The Court discerns no reason to grant Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration. Here, Plaintiff does not present any newly discovered evidence or manifest errors of law or fact. Plaintiff simply reasserts the arguments from his previous Objections and provides unsupported anecdotes of prison guards receiving medical treatment for pepper spray and alleged CERT officer abuses with pepper spray. The Court already discussed at length the law supporting its holding that Plaintiff cannot recover compensatory and punitive damages. (Doc. 36, pp. 6-9.) The Court sees no error in that analysis, much less clear error warranting reconsideration.

CONCLUSION

For all of the above-stated reasons, as well as those included in the Court's prior Order and the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs Motion for Reconsideration, (doc. 48). The Court's Order dated October 25, 2016, (doc. 44), remains the Order of the Court.

SO ORDERED.

FootNotes


1. "Courts generally `must look beyond the labels of [filings] by pro se [parties] to interpret them under whatever statute would providerelief.'" Edwards v. Hastings. No. 2:14-CV-41, 2016 WL 686386, at *1 (S.D. Ga. Feb. 18, 2016)(quoting Lofton v. Williams. No. CV415-146, 2016 WL 126408, at *2 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 11, 2016) (first alteration in original)) (citing Means v. Ala., 209 F.3d 1241, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000) (concerning pro se inmates); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e) ("Pleadings must be construed so as to dojustice."); Wilkerson v. Ga., 618 F. App'x 610, 611-12 (11th Cir. 2015)).
Source:  Leagle

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