G. R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.
Joaquin Mendez-Hernandez moves to vacate, set aside, or correct his sentence, under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. CR413-004 doc. 902.
Mendez-Hernandez pled guilty on February 19, 2014 to conspiracy to engage in sex trafficking. Doc. 775 at 1. He had one year from the date that his conviction became final to seek § 2255 relief. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f). He didn't appeal his conviction. His counsel moved for additional time to appeal, which the Court denied. Doc. 799, reconsideration denied, doc. 875 at 3, adopted doc. 879; see also doc. 875 at 1 (recounting procedural history). His judgment became final, therefore, when the time for filing his appeal expired. See Dauphin v. United States, 604 F. App'x 814, 817 (11th Cir. 2015) (citing Mederos v. United States, 218 F.3d 1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2000)). That happened 14 days after the entry of the judgment. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A)(i). The §2255(f) clock thus began to run on March 5, 2014 and expired on March 5, 2015. Mendez-Hernandez didn't file his § 2255 motion until December 6, 2016
Because Mendez-Hernandez has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right, the Court should also
This Report and Recommendation (R&R) is submitted to the district judge assigned to this action, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and this Court's Local Rule 72.3. Within 14 days of service, any party may file written Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b)(2) Objections to this R&R and serve a copy on all parties. The document should be captioned "Objections to Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations." Any request for additional time to file objections should be filed with the Clerk for consideration by the assigned district judge.
After the Rule 72(b)(2) Objections period has ended, the Clerk shall submit this R&R together with any objections to the assigned district judge. The district judge will review the magistrate judge's findings and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C). The parties are advised that their failure to timely file Objections will result in the waiver of certain rights on appeal. 11th Cir. R. 3-1; see Symonett v. V.A. Leasing Corp., 648 F. App'x 787, 790 (11th Cir. 2016); Mitchell v. U.S., 612 F. App'x 542, 545 (11th Cir. 2015).
If counsel's failure to appeal triggered the one-year clock, it would start on "the date on which the facts supporting the claim . . . could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence." 28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(4). The record shows that Mendez-Hernandez knew that no appeal had been filed no later than March 19, 2015, when, acting pro se, he moved the Court to reconsider its previous denial of the appeal extension. See doc. 865. Even assuming that he discovered his counsel's failure on the day he filed his motion, the one-year clock expired on March 21, 2016 (because March 19, 2016 fell on a Saturday, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a)(1)(C)) — 206 days before he filed this motion. Since Mendez-Hernandez knew of his counsel's failure to appeal by March 19, that date is the latest that the one-year clock could have started. Hence, Mendez-Hernandez's motion is still untimely. See Tucker, 249 F. App'x at 765 (explaining that the timeliness of a § 2255 motion, based on counsel's failure to file appeal, "turns not on whether he asked his lawyer to file an appeal," but on when the movant could have discovered that failure by reasonable diligence).