ORDER

G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

Plaintiffs The Ford Plantation Club, Inc., and The Ford Plantation Association, Inc., a golf club community and homeowners' association, sued defendants Michael and Nancy Scott for assessments and club dues owed (and unpaid) on their Ford Plantation Club property. See doe. 1-1 (Complaint) at ¶¶ 7-9, 11-14, 20-22. Defendants counterclaimed that they were fraudulently induced into buying their property and that plaintiffs have breached the various governing documents/agreements for dues and assessments, and seek a declaratory judgment that those governing documents are invalid. See doe. 13 (Amended Answer and Counterclaim). The Scotts propounded Interrogatories and Requests for Production on plaintiffs, seeking information "reasonably calculated" to prove their allegations that plaintiffs have trapped them in a bad contract, rendered their property worthless, and won't allow them to forfeit the property in payment of the clues and assessments because they "prefer to simply keep assessing the costs against" them. Doc. 17 at 2. Plaintiffs refused, contending that the discovery sought amounts to a mere fishing expedition, and oppose defendants' instant motion to compel the production of both interrogatory responses and documents. Doe. 19.

Despite defendants' moving to compel responses, the Court is unable to determine precisely which interrogatories and document requests are the subject of dispute: defendants don't specify anywhere in their three-page motion. See doe. 17 at 1-3 (arguing that "Plaintiffs have failed and refused to answer Defendants' Interrogatories and to provide the information sought in the Request for Production of Documents" but not listing any specific numbers or reasons the responses were inadequate); see also doe. 21 at 1-3 (explaining that they have objected to "all of the Plaintiffs' responses because there is no information provided by the Plaintiff in response to a single Interrogatory or Request for Production," despite that there are several responses and multiple notes indicating that exhibits were indeed attached to those responses). On that basis alone, the Court could procedurally reject defendants' motion and make them try again. See S. D. Ga. L. R. 26.5(a)-(c).1

Diving into the correspondence between counsel, however, it appears that defendants are unsatisfied with 8 out of 13 of the Club's responses to interrogatories (largely seeking personal identifying information for individuals not related to this case) and 13 out 32 of both plaintiffs' responses to document requests (largely seeking copies of various records and communications between plaintiffs and individuals not related to this case). See does. 17-8 & 19-1. Plaintiffs objected to these requests on multiple grounds, and partially answered several by construing them more narrowly. See, e.g., doe. 17-5. And defendants were clearly unsatisfied by their responses, given the exchange of calls and meet-and-confer letters saying so (without any specifics about why the responses were insufficient) and filing of a motion to compel further responses (with nary an argument or citation to a single authority in support of the insufficiency, of course). See doc. 17. Once more, defendants fail to provide any specificity regarding their arguments or objections, apparently assuming that the Court will sniff them out like pigs do truffles. See, again, S.D. Ga. L. R. 26.5.

But, muddling through the exhibits to cobble together their arguments (as they must exist), it appears that the Scotts believe that (1) while much of the information sought is publicly available, plaintiffs must have it archived in some way so that production would be more cost-effective for plaintiffs to bear; and (2) plaintiffs' refusal to provide personal identifying information of unrelated individuals is bad faith, since that identifying information can support defendants' counterclaim of an overarching conspiracy to induce folks to buy Club properties, lock some in to those contracts, and exempt others from those same burdens for various subjective reasons. See doe. 17-8 (listing insufficient responses by number and explaining that counsel "do[es] not believe that these are valid or good faith objections certainly, this is information that is in the control of The Club and is relevant to the issues being presented to the Court."); doe. 17-9 ("You're quite correct that I'm seeking information in regard to `other member[s'] accounts'. . . . The information you provided is absolutely worthless in terms of this discovery. You have asked us to go search public records for information that you have and that your client can produce of [sic] less cost in terms of time and money. We are not on a fishing expedition[,] but we need information[,] specifically the information pointed out in our pleadings and discovery."). Plaintiffs object that this sort of information could only be relevant to a derivative action, as it would concern all members of the Club, not just the Scotts. Doe. 19 at 4 (citing Crittenton v. Southland Owners Ass'n, 718 S.E.2d 839, 842-43 (Ga. App. 2011)). Defendants — in keeping with their failure to provide specific citations to the record or authority — don't respond. Instead, they list (nonexhaustively) plaintiffs' objections and conclude that they are insufficient. See doe. 21 at 1-3.

For example, The Ford Plantation Club, Inc.'s Response to Defendants' First Interrogatories:

Doc. 17-5 at 2-4. Plaintiffs explained in their meet-and-confer letter that they would not provide "personal, sensitive information" regarding "other members' accounts," applications, or delinquencies, and that defendants "have equal opportunity to search public records" to find this sort of information. See doe. 19-1. Bar one specific-ish response, the Scotts don't offer much except their mere disagreement to rebut these objections. See generally does. 17 & 21; see also doe. 21 at 2 ("If it's a matter of public record, it can hardly be a violation of [the] Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.").

All this is to say that it is clear the parties have not meaningfully met and conferred to narrow the scope of their dispute before defendants sought court intervention.2 See S.D. Ga. L. R. 26.5 ("Counsel are reminded that Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c) [] require[s] a party seeking a protective order or moving to compel discovery to certify that a good faith effort has been made to resolve the dispute before coming to court."); Scruggs v. Int'l Paper Co., 2012 WL 1899405, at *2 (S.D. Ga. May 24, 2012) ("There is an argument for the use of general objections — they save time and repetition — and IP makes it here. [But] there are many arguments against them. That issue will not be resolved now, however, because the lawyers here are professionals" and thus capable of fulfilling their Local Rule 26.5 duty to fully meet and confer before seeking the court's intercession). They must do so, and return to this Court only with narrowed, specific, and supported objections to plaintiffs' alleged nonresponsiveness. Put another way, the parties shall in good faith (at least by phone if not in person) attempt to resolve movant's objections without further Court involvement. Fees will be assessed for any bad faith shown.3

C. CONCLUSION

In sum, defendants' motion to compel production of documents and interrogatories (doc. 17) is DENIED without prejudice. Defendants' request for extension of discovery (doe. 18) is GRANTED only regarding these disputed discovery responses, in that the parties must meaningfully meet and confer and plaintiffs must answer to the extent that defendants can muster specific, convincing, and legally persuasive reasons supporting the relevance and proportionality of these requests.

SO ORDERED.