ORDER

G. R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

Relators in this False Claims Act case have moved the Court to reconsider its Order granting defendants' motion to file a reply — or, as they correctly point out, a sur-reply — providing further argument on relators' Amended Complaint.1 Doc. 62. They cite authority from the Middle District of Georgia disfavoring such sur-replies. Id. at 2 (citing, inter alia, Sanford v. Walmart, Inc., 2016 WL 5662029 at * 9 (M.D. Ga. Sept. 29, 2016)). In this Court, however, "`[p]arties may file as many reply briefs as they like . . . .'" Lee-Lewis v. Kerry, 2016 WL 6647937 at * 4 (S.D. Ga. Nov. 8, 2016) (quoting Brown v. Chertoff, 2008 WL 5190638 at * 2 (S.D. Ga. Dec. 10, 2008)). Defendants' request, therefore, was granted as a matter of course. Given this Court's policy, it DENIES relators' request to reconsider.2 Doc. 62.

Although the unlimited-reply-brief policy allows defendants' proposed reply, relators raise a legitimate concern about possible abuse. See doc. 62 at 1-2. Relators protest that defendants have "blackballed them from working in their [sic] hospice profession," thus increasing their interest in prompt resolution of their claims. Id. at 1. Further, they accuse the defendants of adopting a "scorched earth/eternal delay of discovery" strategy.3 Id. Those are serious accusations.

A motion for reconsideration is simply not the forum to litigate realtors' concerns. If they contend that someone is maliciously interfering with their employment — their brief does not clearly allege how they were "blackballed" or who is responsible — they may have a tort claim. Such a possible claim, however, is irrelevant to this case. Their claim that defendants' motion is purely dilatory implicates Fed. R. Civ. P. 11. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11 (b)(1) (attorney's signature on motion certifies, among other things, that the motion "is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to . . . cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation."). That Rule, subject to its procedural requirements, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(2), provides relators with a remedy. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c)(4). Neither alternative, however, undermines the propriety of defendants submitting a sur-reply.

Although the Court will not reconsider its Order or its unlimited-reply-brief policy, relators' concerns merit additional discussion. They contend that an "endless volley" of briefs is antithetical to the "just, speedy, and inexpensive determination" of actions.4 Doc. 62 at 1 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 1). They're absolutely right. However, this Court relies on the judgement and professionalism of the members of its bar, and the deterrent effect of Rule 11, to avoid interminable or frivolous arguments. The Court's long experience with its policy has justified that reliance, and shown that it does not unduly interfere with the speedy and inexpensive resolution of cases. It also ensures that parties are able to make the case they wish and are not penalized for failing to exhaustively anticipate their opponents' responses. That, in turn, ensures that actions are resolved as justly as possible. To the extent that there is a tension between those values, the Court errs on the side of justice. However, it will not hesitate to invoke Rule 11 to remedy any apparent abuse.

SO ORDERED.