ORDER

G.R. SMITH, Magistrate Judge.

Defendant Macie Youmans, indicted on drug and guns charges, seeks to suppress physical evidence and statements he made while in police custody. Doc. 24 (Motion to Suppress Evidence); doc. 25 (Motion to Supress Custodial Statements). The Government opposes. Doc. 28. The Court has scheduled a hearing on Youmans' motions for April 11, 2018. Doc. 32. The Government's opposition, however, raises several issues that cast doubt on its necessity. Despite those doubts, and in order to ensure the efficient disposition of this matter, the Court has identified the threshold issues below.

I. Standing

Youmans has challenged the admissibility of evidence discovered in a search of the car he was driving prior to his arrest. See doc. 24. He does not appear to contest the Government's representation that when he fled on foot from officers who were endeavoring to effect a warrant for his arrest he left his vehicle behind with the trunk open and discarded his car keys as he fled. See id. at 4 (noting that, prior to his flight, a detective reported "Youmans' had been at the open trunk"). Compare id. at 3 (Youmans fled and "was observed throwing what was in his hand" over nearby building's roof), with doc. 28 at 6 (Government's brief alleging that, during his flight, Youmans "threw the Opitma's key" over the nearby roof). Courts have recognized that a suspect who flees from police, leaving his vehicle unlocked and in public, has no standing to challenge a search of that vehicle. See, e.g., United States v. Falsey, 566 F. App'x 864, 867 (11th Cir. 2014) (collecting cases); United States v. Gaines, 2011 WL 744658 at * 3 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 19, 2011) (defendant "forfeited any reasonable expectation of privacy with respect to the vehicle and its contents by fleeing from the police and abandoning his car," and thus lacked Fourth Amendment standing to contest seized evidence).

Before the Court will embark on an evidentiary hearing, Youmans must state with particularity facts which demonstrate that he retained a legitimate expectation of privacy in his vehicle after he fled from police leaving it unlocked. Any such factual assertions must comply with Local Rule 12.1 — that is, they must either be supported by citation to the record or by affidavit. S.D. Ga. L. Crim. R. 12.1. He must file any such supplement no later than 5:00 p.m. on Monday, April 9, 2018.

II. Sufficiency of Voluntariness Challenge

Youmans also challenges the admissibility of statements he made during an interrogation while in police custody. See generally doc. 25. It appears undisputed that the statements were made while Youmans was in custody and that Miranda warnings were issued. See doc. 25 at 11 (conceding that "Mr. Youmans was read his Miranda Rights by the interrogating officers"); doc. 28 at 29 (conceding that interview at issue was a "custodial interrogation"). The basis for Youmans' challenge is his contention that "[d]ue to [his] intoxicated state [resulting from "using marijuana and consuming multiple opiate pain killers just prior to his arrest"], he was not able to make a knowing and intelligent waiver of his. . . rights and [his] alleged statements were therefore obtained in violation of Miranda. . . ." Doc. 25 at 10. The Government responds that, absent some coercion by police, a suspect's state of mind is never dispositive of the voluntariness of custodial statements. See doc. 28 at 29 (quoting Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 167 (1986)). The Government gets the law right.

The Connelly Court noted that "while [a suspect's] mental condition is surely relevant to [his] susceptibility to police coercion, mere examination of the confessant's state of mind can never conclude" the inquiry on whether his confession was voluntary. Connelly, 479 U.S. at 165. The Court further explained, that "[t]here is obviously no reason to require more in the way of a `voluntariness' inquiry in the Miranda waiver context than in the . . . confession context." Id. at 169-170. "The voluntariness of a waiver of [the privilege against self-incrimination] has always depended on the absence of police overreaching, not on `free choice' in any broader sense of the word." Id. at 170 (citing Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 421 (1986); Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 726-27 (1979)); see also, e.g., Atkins v. Singletary, 965 F.2d 952, 962 (11th Cir. 1992) (rejecting argument that a defendant's "mental impairment and his drug and alcohol consumption prevented a voluntary and knowing waiver of his Miranda rights" because "Miranda is about coercion."). It is not clear whether Youmans even alleges coercion, and, if he does, what conduct he contends constituted such coercion.

This conceptual obstacle notwithstanding, Youmans has also failed to comply with this Court's requirement that motions be supported by record citations or affidavit. See S.D. Ga. L. Crim. R. 12.1 (requiring every factual assertion in a motion "be supported by a citation to the pertinent page in the existing record," and where record support is lacking "supporting affidavits shall be submitted"). He supports his assertion that he fell asleep before his interrogation began. See doc. 25 at 5 (citing video recording of his interrogation). His assertion of intoxication, however, is utterly unsupported. See id. at 11 (providing record cite only for his admission of regular marijuana and pain-killer use, but nothing supporting his assertion of intoxication at the time of his interrogation).1

This Court has declined to hold evidentiary hearings pending compliance with Rule 12.1. See, e.g., United States v. Broadnax, 2016 WL 102197 at * 1 (S.D. Ga. Jan. 8, 2016) (noting the "unacceptable" consumption of public resources expended on "hearings based on supposed if not imagined `facts.'"); see also United States v. Verch, 307 F. App'x 327, 330 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding no error in court's declining to hold an evidentiary hearing because defendant failed to provide factual support as required by S.D. Ga. L. Crim. R. 12.1). Given the potential fact issue raised by the Government's standing challenge, the Court will not postpone the scheduled hearing. Nevertheless, Youmans must be prepared to support his allegation of intoxication before any further merits issues are considered. If he is unable or unwilling to do so, he should withdraw his motion.

SO ORDERED.