BRIAN K. EPPS, Magistrate Judge.
Defendants move to suppress distribution amounts of heroin and cocaine found in their minivan during a traffic stop in Columbia County on March 6, 2018, arguing officers did not have reasonable suspicion of drug possession or a window tint violation. (Doc. nos. 64, 65.) The Court finds the officers had reasonable suspicion as to both and
Sergeant Michael Williamson works in the Vice and Narcotics Division of the Columbia County Sheriff's Office ("CCSO"). (Court's recording system, For the Record (hereinafter "FTR") 2:36:25-2:37:10.) On March 6, 2018, DEA Agent Jeremy Youngblood called Sgt. Williamson and explained Atlanta agents were tracking a 2008 Honda Odyssey carrying two kilograms of cocaine eastbound on Interstate 20 toward Columbia County. (FTR 2:37:51-2:38:24.) Sgt. Williamson and Agent Youngblood's relationship dated ten years back to their service together at CCSO, and Sgt. Williamson trusted Agent Youngblood as a "very reliable source." (FTR 2:37:10-2:37:39; 2:46:12-2:46:29.)
Agent Youngblood instructed Sgt. Williamson to call an Atlanta agent named D.J. (FTR 2:38:31-2:38:55.) Agent D.J. informed Sgt. Williamson a 2008 Honda Odyssey with dark window tint was carrying two kilograms of cocaine eastbound on Interstate 20 toward Columbia County, en route from Atlanta to Columbia, South Carolina. (FTR 2:39:03-2:39:24; 2:52:06-2:52:12.) Agent D.J. provided the VIN, tag number, and NCIC printout, and described the occupants as one Hispanic male and one Hispanic female. (FTR 2:40:08-2:40:23; 2:40:41-2:40:46.) Agent D.J. explained he knew the van contained narcotics because he witnessed the transaction in Atlanta. (FTR 2:40:56-2:41:04; 2:54:22-2:54:33.)
Sgt. Williamson relayed this information to CCSO colleagues, including Deputies Ryan King and Michael Santana, and instructed them to establish surveillance checkpoints on Interstate 20. (FTR 2:41:08-2:41:22; 2:41:27-2:42:08.) Deputy King observed the van traveling eastbound on Interstate 20. (FTR 1:44:46-1:45:33.) Trailing the van in separate patrol cars, Deputies King and Santana did not observe any moving traffic violations but Deputy King observed the window tint "looked pretty dark" and initiated a traffic stop based on a suspected window tint violation. (FTR 1:45:55-1:46:41.) The window tint also looked too dark to Deputy Santana. (FTR 2:19:51-2:19:57.)
While Deputy King obtained identification from Defendants, Deputy Santana's K-9 Ares performed a free-air sniff of the van and alerted for the presence of narcotics. (FTR 2:21:47-2:24:04.) After removing two door panels and seats, officers located two traps, one of which contained approximately five kilograms of cocaine and two kilograms of heroin. (FTR 1:52:13-1:56:36.) At the scene, Sgt. Williamson corroborated the information supplied by Agents Youngblood and D.J. regarding the color, make, model, year, and tag number of the vehicle and the ethnicity and sex of the occupants. (FTR 2:43:11-2:45:05.)
O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1 provides in pertinent part as follows:
This code section prohibits window tint with less than thirty-two percent light transmission, except for windows located behind the driver that are either (1) tinted at the factory; or (2) installed aftermarket on a multipurpose passenger vehicle. "Multipurpose passenger vehicle" means "a motor vehicle designed to carry ten persons or less which is constructed on a truck chassis or with special features for occasional off-road operation." O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1(a)(5).
It is undisputed Defendants' van falls within the first exception because the tint was factory installed to windows located behind the driver, thus rendering irrelevant the statutory standard of no less than thirty-two percent light transmission. Because the van's tint only allows twenty-two percent light transmission, aftermarket tint would have been illegal unless the van qualified as a multipurpose passenger vehicle. (FTR 2:25:23-2:25:51.) Defendants contend there was no reasonable suspicion for a traffic stop because it should have been obvious during Deputy King's initial approach the van qualified for both statutory exceptions because (1) the tint was factory installed; and (2) the van is a multipurpose passenger vehicle.
Deputies King and Santana were unaware of the exception for factory tint at the time of the traffic stop. (FTR 1:38:03-1:38:37; 2:00:31-2:01:30; 2:33:32-2:34:13.) Even if they had known, Deputy King explained the traffic stop would have been necessary to determine by inspection whether the tint was factory or aftermarket. (FTR 2:08:25-2:08:55.) Additionally, meters used to determine percentage light transmission require contact with the window. (FTR 1:38:37-1:39:21.)
Defendants presented expert testimony concerning the tint exception from professional window tint installer Christopher McGregor, who has performed thousands of installations during his fifteen-year career. (FTR 3:02:16-3:03:10.) A common pattern for factory tinted vehicles is clear windows in the front and tinted windows behind the driver, both side and rear. (FTR 3:04:29-3:05:00.) Aftermarket tint is a piece of plastic placed on the glass while factory tint is embedded in the glass. (FTR 3:08:38-3:08:59.) Factory tint always fits the full size of the window and does not have bubbling, scrapes, or scratches. (FTR 3:08:59-3:09:13.)
Mr. McGregor inspected the van and determined the tint was legal because the front windows were not tinted and the remaining windows were tinted at the factory. (FTR 3:05:56-3:07:08.) When Mr. McGregor entered the impound lot to inspect the van, the tint appeared at first glance to be factory. (FTR 3:14:53-3:14:58.) To know with certainty, however, Mr. McGregor had to inspect the van by touching the windows and rolling them down. (FTR 3:09:52-3:10:26.) Mr. McGregor testified he must examine the vehicle up close in this manner to distinguish factory from aftermarket tint. (FTR 3:13:17-3:14:16.) Mr. McGregor did not observe any signs of aftermarket tint. (FTR 3:09:14-3:09:26.) Mr. McGregor acknowledged Honda makes vehicles with no tint on the windows, such that tint on the subject van could have been aftermarket even though it is, in fact, factory tint. (FTR 3:12:09-3:12:18.)
Andy Jones testified as a government witness regarding whether the minivan is a multipurpose passenger vehicle. A Honda dealer since 1974, Mr. Jones testified all Honda vehicles are built on a base floor pan and not on a truck chassis. (FTR 1:17:14-1:18:34.) Although Honda markets the Odyssey as a multipurpose passenger vehicle, it is not constructed for even occasional off-road operation and is not available with all-wheel drive. (FTR 1:18:55-1:20:33.) On some Odyssey models, Honda installs a standard tint pattern, which includes tint on the sliding door and back windows. (FTR 1:32:12-1:33:12.)
Deputy King and CCSO had reasonable suspicion of drug trafficking based on the detailed information conveyed by Agents Youngblood and D.J., and Deputy King's corroboration of that information before he conducted the traffic stop. Deputy King and CCSO had reasonable suspicion of a window tint violation because the tint on Defendants' van allowed less light transmission than the general legal limit.
A police officer may, "in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest."
"[R]easonable suspicion is a less demanding standard than probable cause," requiring a showing "considerably less than preponderance of the evidence," but there must be "at least a minimal level of objective justification for making the stop."
The Court must evaluate the "totality of the circumstances" to determine whether the investigators had a "particularized and objective basis" for suspecting legal wrongdoing.
"[S]ufficient probability, not certainty, is the touchstone" of Fourth Amendment reasonableness.
"An action is reasonable under the Fourth Amendment, regardless of the individual officer's state of mind, as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify [the] action. The officer's subjective motivation is irrelevant."
"Reasonable suspicion can be based on an officer's mistake of fact, so long as that mistake is reasonable."
"Reasonable suspicion may be based on information supplied by another person, as long as the information bears sufficient indicia of reliability."
The DEA tip was sufficiently reliable to justify the traffic stop because the information conveyed to Sgt. Williamson came from inherently reliable DEA sources and was sufficiently detailed and corroborated. As an agent trained by DEA to investigate drug offenses, Agent Youngblood certainly qualifies as the type of informant for whom rigorous scrutiny is unnecessary. Just as importantly, based on their ten-year relationship, Sgt. Williamson testified he knew Agent Youngblood to be an unquestionably honest and reliable person. Furthermore, the tip was sufficiently detailed and easily corroborated when, just as he predicted, a 2008 Honda Odyssey traveling eastbound on Interstate 20 drove through Columbia County on March 6, 2018. (FTR 2:37:51-2:38:24.)
Even more detailed was the information conveyed to Sgt. Williamson by Agent D.J., the DEA colleague Agent Youngblood instructed Sgt. Williamson to call. Because of Agent Youngblood's referral and D.J.'s status as an agent himself, rigorous scrutiny of the information provided by Agent D.J. is also unnecessary. Agent D.J. told Sgt. Williamson that, as a result of DEA's ongoing investigation in Atlanta, DEA knew a 2008 Honda Odyssey with dark window tint was carrying two kilograms of cocaine eastbound on Interstate 20 toward Columbia County, en route from Atlanta to Columbia, South Carolina. (FTR 2:39:03-2:39:24; 2:52:06-2:52:12.) Agent D.J. provided the VIN, tag number, and NCIC printout, and described the occupants as one Hispanic male and one Hispanic female. (FTR 2:40:08-2:40:23; 2:40:41-2:40:46.) This information proved to be true when later that same day, just as predicted, Deputy King spotted a minivan meeting this description traveling eastbound on Interstate 20 in Columbia County.
Defendants argue that, because Deputy King had no direct communication with Agents Youngblood and D.J., "the supposed window-tint violation was the only reason he had to stop the Honda Odyssey, thereby eliminating the government's purported justification of criminal activity." (Doc. no. 79, p. 2; doc. no. 80, p. 2.) The argument ignores reality. Sgt. Williamson conveyed the DEA tip to Deputy King, and Deputy King arrived at Interstate 20 and trailed Defendants' van because of the information Defendants were transporting narcotics. There is no legal requirement DEA speak directly with every member of the CCSO team.
Defendants also argue the traffic stop must be analyzed under the common knowledge doctrine instead of the framework for determining reliability of a tip. (Doc. no. 79, p. 7; doc. no. 80, p. 7.) They do so because a DEA report concerning surveillance of Defendants' van in Atlanta by Agent D.J.'s team suggests the agents did not witness a drug transaction, but instead merely saw the van enter and exit a subdivision. The underlying premise for Defendants' argument is the mistaken belief the tip framework and collective knowledge doctrine are mutually exclusive. There are at least five reasons why this is incorrect.
First, Defendants cite no precedent in support of this premise, and the Court could find none despite an exhaustive nationwide search. Second, courts within the Eleventh Circuit often describe information conveyed by officers or agents from one law enforcement entity to officers or agents from a separate law enforcement entity as a tip.
Third, this treatment in our circuit of such information as a tip is consistent with the approach of courts nationwide.
Fourth, not only are the collective knowledge doctrine and tip analysis not mutually exclusive, but the Court has serious doubts concerning whether the collective knowledge doctrine applies at all. As the Eleventh Circuit has repeatedly explained over several decades, the collective knowledge doctrine considers only the "`collective knowledge of the officers involved in the stop'" when determining if the totality of the circumstances establishes reasonable suspicion.
Fifth, support for the Court's conclusion can be found in the very decision Defendants cite for the proposition the Court must apply the collective knowledge doctrine and cannot apply the tip framework. In
Deputy King correctly observed while trailing Defendants that the van's rear windows appeared too dark to satisfy the thirty-two percent light transmission standard generally required by O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1(b)(2). He was correct. When he measured the tint during the traffic stop, the light transmission was twenty-two percent, a full ten percentage points below the Georgia minimum. (FTR 2:08:56-2:09:03.) While the van ultimately qualified for the factory tint exception, Defendants' own expert conceded one cannot determine whether this exception applies from a distance, such as while trailing the van on Interstate 20. Instead, one must conduct a close inspection to look for the subtle signs of aftermarket tint such as bubbling, scraping, and scratching. (FTR 3:10:47-3:11:39.) Deputy King thus had reasonable suspicion of a tint violation based on the specific and articulable fact he observed window tint that appeared to be, and in fact was, darker than the general legal limit.
Defendants argue there was no reasonable suspicion because (1) the tint qualified for the factory tint and multipassenger vehicle exceptions to O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1; (2) Deputy King was not aware of either exception; and (3) Deputy King's observation of windows that appear to be too dark is a mere hunch that is too generalized to support a reasonable suspicion. (Doc. no. 79, pp. 1-7; doc. no. 80, pp. 1-7.) None of these arguments are persuasive.
First, the van does not qualify as a multipurpose passenger vehicle under O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1, which defines the term as "a motor vehicle designed to carry ten persons or less which is constructed on a truck chassis or with special features for occasional off-road operation." O.C.G.A. § 40-8-73.1(a)(5). Mr. Jones testified that, even though Honda marketing materials describe the Odyssey as a multipurpose passenger vehicle, it is not constructed on a truck chassis and is not constructed for even occasional off-road operation. (FTR 1:17:14-1:18:34; 1:18:55-1:20:33.) The operative standard is the statutory definition, not whatever standard Honda applied when it decided to designate the van in marketing materials. Mr. Jones' testimony leaves no doubt the van does not qualify under the statutory definition.
Second, it does not matter Deputy King was unaware of the factory tint exception, and to reach this conclusion one need not even consider the mistake of law doctrine. Here, the objective facts did give rise to reasonable suspicion because (1) Deputy King observed window tint that was too dark to satisfy the general legal limit; and (2) the only way to discern whether the factory tint exception applied was to conduct a traffic stop. Defendants cite many cases applying the mistake of law doctrine, but in all of them the objective facts known to the officer at the time of the stop did not create reasonable suspicion of a legal violation. For example, in
Third, Defendants argue Deputy King did not offer specific and articulable facts to support his observation the window tint was too dark, which they describe as a mere hunch. (Doc. no. 79, p. 5; doc. no. 80, p. 5.) However, personal observation of the window tint is sufficient to justify a traffic stop because reasonable suspicion hinges on that simple question of whether the tint appears too dark.
Notably, Deputy Santana also believed the windows were too dark, and Agent D.J. mentioned the darkness of the windows when conveying the tip to Sgt. Williamson. Furthermore, while information acquired after the traffic stop cannot serve as a basis for the traffic stop, Deputy King's observation proved to be accurate. The tint was indeed ten percentage points below the general legal limit. (FTR 2:25:23-2:25:51);
Defendants argue Officer King's suspicion was not based on facts particular to Defendants' van because "75% of the driving public" has window tinting indistinguishable from the van's tinting, and it was more likely than not the van qualified for the factory tint exception. (Doc. no. 79, p. 6; doc. no. 80, p. 6.) In support, they cite
Finally, the Court has considered the window tint decisions cited by Defendants and determined they do not require a different outcome. In
For these reasons, the Court
SO REPORTED and RECOMMENDED.
