CHRISTOPHER L. RAY, Magistrate Judge.
Plaintiff seeks to permanently seal the Declaration of Caprice Roberts (doc. 44-1) pursuant to S.D. Ga. L. R. 79.7 and the parties' consent protective order, because it "contains sensitive information — specifically, `a performance review of the Plaintiff that was internally confidential at Savannah Law School.'" Doc. 47 at 1. But the declaration merely references that performance review. See doc. 44-1. It does not extensively quote from the review, or any other confidential material. Rather, it briefly explains Savannah Law Schools' teacher evaluation process and Roberts' own review of plaintiff's October — performance review authored by Professor Elizabeth Berenguer, with an attestation that the declarant "did not substantively change any criticisms she identified[.]" Id. at ¶ 8-11. The closest it comes to a direct quotation is one of a January — email — not the performance review itself. Id. at ¶ 11. Plaintiff offers no explanation for why this declaration ought to be kept off the public docket, much less permanently.
The common-law right of access "establish[es] a general presumption that criminal and civil actions should be conducted publicly" and "includes the right to inspect and copy public records and documents." Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001). It is "an essential component of our system of justice" and "is instrumental in securing the integrity of the process." Id. Nothing in plaintiff's motion, aside from a reference to defendants' granted motion to seal the actual performance review and file only redacted versions to the public docket (see docs. 40 & 45), hints at why the Court should keep this declaration shielded in perpetuity. Plaintiff's motion, in other words, is