Filed: Jul. 09, 2019
Latest Update: Jul. 09, 2019
Summary: ORDER CHRISTOPHER L. RAY , Magistrate Judge . This case involves an arrestee's allegations of excessive force. See doc. 7 at 8. On March 29, 2019, defendants John Doe 1-4 answered plaintiff's complaint. See doc. 29. No motions were filed, however, until June 17, 2019. See doc. 31. Because the undersigned's former law partner and firm appeared in this case (by filing the most recent motion) and to avoid any appearance of impropriety, I recuse. Two federal statutes govern judicial dis
Summary: ORDER CHRISTOPHER L. RAY , Magistrate Judge . This case involves an arrestee's allegations of excessive force. See doc. 7 at 8. On March 29, 2019, defendants John Doe 1-4 answered plaintiff's complaint. See doc. 29. No motions were filed, however, until June 17, 2019. See doc. 31. Because the undersigned's former law partner and firm appeared in this case (by filing the most recent motion) and to avoid any appearance of impropriety, I recuse. Two federal statutes govern judicial disq..
More
ORDER
CHRISTOPHER L. RAY, Magistrate Judge.
This case involves an arrestee's allegations of excessive force. See doc. 7 at 8. On March 29, 2019, defendants John Doe 1-4 answered plaintiff's complaint. See doc. 29. No motions were filed, however, until June 17, 2019. See doc. 31. Because the undersigned's former law partner and firm appeared in this case (by filing the most recent motion) and to avoid any appearance of impropriety, I recuse.
Two federal statutes govern judicial disqualification due to conflict of interests. The first, 28 U.S.C. § 144, only applies when "a party . . . makes and files a timely and sufficient affidavit . . . ." Since no such affidavit has been filed, it does not apply here. The second, 28 U.S.C. § 455, "places a judge under a self-enforcing obligation to recuse himself where the proper legal grounds exist." United States v. Alabama, 828 F.2d 1532, 1540 (11th Cir. 1987), superseded by statute on other grounds as recognized by J.W. by and through Tammy Williams v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed., 904 F.3d 1248, 1254 (11th Cir. 2018). Courts have generally recognized that prior partnership in the law firm representing a party is not an absolute bar on a judge's hearing a case. See Draper v. Reynolds, 369 F.3d 1270, 1281 (11th Cir. 2004) (prior partnership in law firm not grounds for recusal); Apex Oil Co. v. Apex Oil, 981 F.2d 302, 304 (8th Cir. 1992) (judge's prior partnership in law firm that represented party involved in case was not required to recuse); Ford v. Bank of Am., 2000 WL 1028238, *2 (10th Cir. July 26, 2000) (unpublished) (disqualification not required because of judge's prior employment with law firm representing defendants). Nevertheless, judges typically observe a two-year recusal period from cases involving their prior law firms. Draper, 369 F.3d at 1281 (citing Guide to Judiciary Policies and Procedures, Vol. II, Ch. V, Compendium § 3.3-1(b) (2003). Nevertheless, it is vital that litigants and the public see that the judicial process is fair and impartial. Accordingly, I will exercise my discretionary power to recuse in this case.
The Clerk is, therefore, DIRECTED to reassign this case to Magistrate Judge James E. Graham for all further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
