Filed: Sep. 23, 2019
Latest Update: Sep. 23, 2019
Summary: ORDER DUDLEY H. BOWEN , District Judge . On May 31, 2018, Defendant Jacob Lee Caldwell pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). He was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment. Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. On September 20, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to appoint counsel to help him seek relief pursuant to a new rule of constitutional law announced in United States v. Davis , ___
Summary: ORDER DUDLEY H. BOWEN , District Judge . On May 31, 2018, Defendant Jacob Lee Caldwell pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, a violation of 18 U.S.C. 924(c). He was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment. Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence. On September 20, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to appoint counsel to help him seek relief pursuant to a new rule of constitutional law announced in United States v. Davis , ___ U..
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ORDER
DUDLEY H. BOWEN, District Judge.
On May 31, 2018, Defendant Jacob Lee Caldwell pled guilty to one count of possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, a violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). He was sentenced to 60 months imprisonment. Defendant did not appeal his conviction or sentence.
On September 20, 2019, Defendant filed a motion to appoint counsel to help him seek relief pursuant to a new rule of constitutional law announced in United States v. Davis, ___ U.S. ___, 139 S.Ct. 2319 (Jun. 24, 2019). Specifically, in Davis, the United States Supreme Court found that the "residual clause" of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) is unconstitutionally vague.1
In order to attack the legality of his sentence, which is what Defendant is trying to do, Defendant must petition for habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 by filing a motion to vacate, set aside or correct his sentence. Here, Defendant's motion to appoint counsel does not reference § 2255 in any way. Nevertheless, this Court intends to recharacterize his motion as a § 2255 motion. See Castro v. United States, 540 U.S. 375 (2003) (explaining that a district court must notify a litigant of its intent to recharacterize a pro se motion as a § 2255 habeas petition). This recharacterization means that any subsequent § 2255 motion will be subject to the statutory restriction on "second and successive" § 2255 motions. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(b) & 2255(h) (prohibiting claims in second or successive § 2255 motions except under certain specified circumstances). Accordingly, Defendant must notify this Court in writing within thirty (30) days hereof if he contests the recharacterization of his motion, whether he wishes to withdraw the motion, or whether he wishes to amend the motion to assert any other § 2255 claims aside from his Davis claim.2 If Defendant fails to respond to this Order within 30 days, his motion for relief will be recharacterized as a § 2255 motion, the Clerk will docket it as a new civil action,3 and his claim will be addressed under the standards applicable to § 2255 motions.
Further, a habeas petitioner has no absolute constitutional right to the appointment of counsel. Henderson v. Campbell, 353 F.3d 880, 892 (11th Cir. 2003) (held in the context of a habeas proceeding under 28 U.S.C. § 2254). Rather, a court may appoint counsel only if the interests of justice so require. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(g) (incorporating by reference the standards of 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(a)(2)(B) for the appointment of counsel); see McCall v. Cook, 495 F. App'x 29, 31 (11th Cir. 2012) (stating that civil litigants, even prisoners, have no constitutional right to counsel; rather, appointment of counsel in civil cases is "a privilege that is justified only by exceptional circumstances" (quoted source omitted)). Here, Defendant has not shown that the interests of justice demand the appointment of an attorney. Accordingly, he is not entitled to the appointment of counsel.
ORDER ENTERED.
