ORDER DENYING MOTION TO RECUSE

Re: Docket No. 241

ROBERT J. FARIS, Bankruptcy Judge.

On June 23, 2016, creditor Chad Barry Barnes, through his attorneys, Jay L. Friedheim and John C. Gibson, filed a motion seeking to disqualify me from presiding over this bankruptcy case ("Motion") (dkt. 241). The Motion specifically refers to my decision to impose sanctions on Mr. Friedheim and Mr. Gibson in the amount of $43,277.73 (dkt. 165). The motion questions my impartiality because trustee's attorney, Simon Klevansky, and I were shareholders in the same law firm before I took the bench over fourteen years ago, and because (according to Mr. Friedheim and Mr. Gibson) animosity has arisen between all concerned, including myself.

Disqualification motions against federal judges are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 455:

Fed. R. Bankr. P. 5004(a) makes section 455 applicable to bankruptcy judges:

A judge's impartiality is presumed. First Interstate Bank of Ariz., N.A. v. Murphy, Weir & Butler, 210 F.3d 983, 987 (9th Cir. 2000). Recusal under Section 455(a) is not based on speculation. Clemens v. United State Dist. Court for Central District of California, 428 F.3d 1175, 1178 (9th Cir. 2005)(citation omitted).

Generally, allegations of bias or prejudice must stem from some extrajudicial source. Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 551 (1994). While improper or incorrect judicial rulings are grounds for an appeal, they are not grounds for disqualification of a judge. Id. at 555.

The Ninth Circuit's test for disqualification under section 455 is whether a reasonable person, with full knowledge of all the facts, would conclude that the judge's impartiality might be questioned. In re Focus Media, Inc., 378 F.3d 916,929 (9th Cir. 2004). A "`reasonable person' is not someone who is `hypersensitive or unduly suspicious,' but rather a `well-informed, thoughtful observer' who `understand[s] all the relevant facts' and `has examined the record and law.'" Perry v. Schwarzenegger, 790 F.Supp.2d 1119, 1129 (N.D. Cal. 2011), citing United States v. Holland, 519 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Debtor's motion does not meet the standard for disqualification under 28 U.S.C. § 455 and applicable Ninth Circuit case law.

A "well-informed, thoughtful observer" who is familiar with the facts of this case and the applicable law would not question my impartiality. I have criticized the professional conduct of Mr. Friedheim and Mr. Gibson in this case, but a reasonable person would not conclude that I am biased (and in fact would probably agree with my criticisms). The fact that I have awarded sanctions against Mr. Friedheim and Mr. Gibson does not warrant disqualification. Yagman v. Republic Insurance, 987 F.2d 622 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that recusal was not warranted even where the judge had erroneously imposed substantial sanctions).

I have no personal bias against Mr. Friedheim, Mr. Gibson, or their client, or in favor of any of their adversaries. I have had very little contact with Mr. Friedheim or Mr. Gibson other than in connection with this case. My views about Mr. Friedheim and Mr. Gibson come entirely from my observations of their conduct in this case, and not from any extrajudicial source.

My professional relationship with Mr. Klevansky does not require disqualification or disclosure. I have had no professional relationship with Mr. Klevansky since I took the bench in 2002. Neither Mr. Klevansky nor I could have worked on this matter while we were associated with the same firm, since this matter did not begin until twelve years after our professional association ended.

For the reasons stated above,

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Motion is DENIED.