ROBERT J. FARIS, Bankruptcy Judge.
In this adversary proceeding, plaintiff Patrick G. Bryan seeks a determination that his claims against defendant Jason Kendrick Brown are not dischargeable in bankruptcy and that Mr. Brown is not entitled to a discharge at all. Mr. Brown has filed a motion to dismiss the case in which he argues (in summary) that the allegations of the complaint are false.
I have carefully read the parties' written submissions and I conclude that this motion is appropriate for decision without oral argument.
Mr. Brown, who is not represented by counsel, does not cite the procedural basis for the motion. There are two possible bases.
The first is Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), made applicable by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7012, which requires the court to dismiss a complaint if it "fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." This seems to fit Mr. Brown's motion because he calls it a motion to dismiss, which is the usual title for a rule 12 motion. But a defendant cannot make such a motion after the defendant files an answer,
For purposes of a rule 12 motion, the court must assume that the facts alleged in the complaint are true.
The court then evaluates the alleged facts to determine whether they are sufficient "to state a claim for relief that is plausible on its face."
An additional requirement applies when a complaint alleges fraud or mistake. In such a case, the plaintiff must state with particularity the circumstances constituting the fraud or mistake.
I conclude that the complaint satisfies the applicable pleading requirements. Assuming (for purposes of this motion only) that the allegations are true, the complaint plausibly states claims under sections 523(a)(2), (a)(6), and 727(a)(4)(A), and contains more than enough detail to satisfy the particularity requirement (to the extent it is applicable).
The second possible basis for Mr. Brown's motion is Fed. R. Civ. P. 56, which requires the court to "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." In resolving a summary judgment motion, the court does not weigh evidence, but rather determines only whether a material factual dispute remains for trial.
Mr. Brown's motion does not meet the standard of rule 56 for two reasons. First, it is not supported by any admissible evidence; Mr. Brown's statements in his memoranda are not evidence because they are not made under penalty of perjury. Second, it is abundantly clear that there are many genuine disputes of material fact.
Therefore, the motion is DENIED. Mr. Brown is ordered to file a proper answer to the complaint, in compliance with all applicable requirements of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure, within fourteen days after the entry of this order.
For the future, I caution both parties to refrain from making arguments and factual assertions that are not relevant to this adversary proceeding. For example, the relationship among Mr. Brown, his ex-wife, and their children, and Mr. Brown's allegation of racism among employees of the Hawaii state government, have nothing to do with the legal issues in this case.
SO ORDERED.