LESLIE E. KOBAYASHI, District Judge.
Before the Court are: Defendants the State of Hawai'i ("the State"), Department of Hawaiian Home Lands ("DHHL"), and Neil Abercrombie's (collectively, "the State Defendants") Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Civil Rights Complaint with Jury Demand Filed June 12, 2013 ("State Defendants' Motion"), filed on July 1, 2013,
These matters came on for hearing on October 2, 2013. Appearing on behalf of the State Defendants was Craig Iha, Esq., and appearing on behalf of Defendant Davis was Christopher Bennett, Esq. Plaintiffs appeared by telephone. For the reasons stated infra, however, the parties did not present oral arguments, and this Court deemed the matters submitted on the written briefings. After careful consideration of the motions, supporting and opposing memoranda, and the relevant legal authority, the State Defendants' Motion and the Davis Motion are HEREBY GRANTED. Plaintiffs' claims against the State Defendants and Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Davis are HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
Plaintiffs filed this action on April 4, 2013. Plaintiffs previously filed a Motion
According to the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs resided on "a tract of Agricultural Hawaiian home land" in Hilo, Hawai'i ("the Property") from October 1981 until May 9, 2013, when the State and DHHL "illegally took possession of such Property...." [First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 6-7.] On May 9, 2013, DHHL executed a Writ of Possession on the Property. [Mem. in Opp. to Pltfs.' Suppl. Mem. in Supp. of Second TRO Motion, filed 7/16/13 (dkt. no. 35), Decl. of Paul Ah Yat ("Ah Yat Decl.") at ¶ 3, Exh. A.
According to the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiffs signed a lease for the Property in June 1982 ("the Lease"), and received a $27,000.00 loan from DHHL to execute their farm plan on the Property ("the Loan"). As of 2003, Plaintiffs had repaid $23,500.00 of the Loan. According to Plaintiffs, they tried to continue making payments on the Loan, but in 2005 Defendants stopped accepting payments. [First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 9-10.] On October 13, 2006, a hearings officer recommended the cancellation of Plaintiffs' Lease because Plaintiffs had failed to make payments on the Loan, which was secured by the Lease. The Hawaiian Homes Commission ("HHC") adopted the recommendation on December 15, 2006 and ordered the cancellation of the Lease. Plaintiffs allege that the cancellation violated their rights under the United States Constitution and under the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act of 1920 ("HCCA"). [Id. at ¶¶ 12-14.]
The First Amended Complaint alleges the following claims: a claim for the taking of property in violation of the due process clause and the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment ("Count I"); and a claim that the defendants retaliated against Plaintiffs in violation of the Fifth Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment ("Count II"). Plaintiffs seek: injunctive relief, including, inter alia, the return of the Property and Plaintiffs' personal belongings; compensatory and punitive damages; appointment of counsel and attorneys' fees; and any other appropriate relief.
The First Amended Complaint raises the following allegations relevant to the Davis Motion:
[First Amended Complaint at pgs. 3-6.] Plaintiffs pray for twenty-five million dollars in compensatory damages and twenty-five million dollars in punitive damages from Defendants Gordon, Parker, and Davis.
The State Defendants and Defendant Davis bring their respective motions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). Rule 12(b)(1) authorizes a district court to dismiss an action for "lack of subject matter jurisdiction[.]" "[T]he party asserting subject matter jurisdiction has the burden of proving its existence." Robinson v. United States, 586 F.3d 683, 685 (9th Cir. 2009). This district court has stated that a Rule 12(b)(1) motion "may (1) attack the allegations of a pleading as insufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction on the court (`facial attack') or (2) `attack the existence of subject matter jurisdiction in fact' (`factual attack')." Krakauer v. Indymac Mortg. Servs., Civ. No. 09-00518 ACK-BMK, 2013 WL 704861, at *2 (D.Hawai'i Feb. 26, 2013) (some citations omitted) (quoting Malama Makua v. Rumsfeld, 136 F.Supp.2d 1155, 1159 (D.Hawai'i 2001)).
Rule 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" Pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir.2008). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Accordingly, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955). Rather, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the
Further, "[d]ismissal without leave to amend is improper unless it is clear that the complaint could not be saved by any amendment." Harris v. Amgen, Inc., 573 F.3d 728, 737 (9th Cir.2009) (citation and quotation marks omitted). "But courts have discretion to deny leave to amend a complaint for futility[.]" Johnson v. American Airlines, Inc., 834 F.2d 721, 724 (9th Cir.1987) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
On September 30, 2013, Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Joinder of Mike Yellen as a Plaintiff in the Instant Cause of Action Pursuant to FRCP, Rules 19, 20, and 21 ("Motion for Joinder"). [Dkt. no. 60.] The Motion for Joinder is set for hearing before the magistrate judge on November 5, 2013.
At the hearing on the instant motions, Plaintiffs orally requested a continuance of the hearing until the Motion for Joinder was ruled upon. Plaintiffs argued that they could not adequately defend against the motions to dismiss without Mr. Yellen's participation. This Court denied the oral motion because: 1) the factual issue whether Mr. Yellen's participation in this action is necessary to protect his interests is unrelated to the legal issues raised in the motions to dismiss; and 2) to the extent that Plaintiffs intended to rely upon to the Motion for Joinder to respond to the motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs failed to file the Motion for Joinder in a timely manner. Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to the Davis Motion was due on September 11, 2013, but this Court extended the deadline to September 23, 2013 after Plaintiffs failed to file by September 11. [Dkt. no. 52.] Plaintiffs' memorandum in opposition to the State Defendants' Motion was due on August 5, 2013, based on the original hearing date for the State Defendants' Motion. Thus, the Motion for Joinder was not a timely response to either motion to dismiss.
In light of this Court's denial of the request for a continuance, Plaintiffs refused to present oral argument at the hearing. This Court therefore deemed the matters submitted on the written briefings. This Court now turns to the merits of the motions to dismiss.
Although not expressly stated in the First Amended Complaint, both Count I and Count II allege claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
It is well settled that neither a state, a state agency, nor a state official sued in his official capacity is a "person" for purposes of a § 1983 action seeking monetary damages. See, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 70-71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989). Further, in enacting § 1983, Congress did not abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. See id. at 65-66, 109 S.Ct. 2304. Because the State of Hawai'i has not waived its sovereign immunity, this Court lacks jurisdiction over all of Plaintiffs' claims alleging federal constitutional violations against the State and against DHHL, which is an arm of the State. See Young v. Hawai'i, 911 F.Supp.2d 972, 983 (D.Hawai'i 2012). All of Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims against the State and DHHL and Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims for damages against Defendant Abercrombie, in his official capacity,
Although Defendant Abercrombie, in his official capacity, cannot be sued for damages, he is a "person" for purposes of a § 1983 claim for prospective declaratory or injunctive relief because "official-capacity actions for prospective relief are not treated as actions against the State." See Will, 491 U.S. at 71 n. 10, 109 S.Ct. 2304. Similarly, sovereign immunity does not shield a state officer's alleged violation of the federal constitution. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 102, 104 S.Ct. 900, 79 L.Ed.2d 67 (1984). Courts, however, cannot award retroactive relief for a prior violation under the guise of a prospective injunction. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 667, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974).
Thus, in the instant case, Plaintiffs could bring a § 1983 claim for prospective injunctive relief against Defendant Abercrombie, in his official capacity. The First Amended Complaint, however, merely seeks injunctive relief for past conduct. Plaintiffs essentially ask this Court to undo the cancellation of the Lease and their ejection from the Property. Plaintiffs' claims therefore do not seek prospective injunctive relief. Defendant Abercrombie, in his official capacity, is not a "person" as defined in § 1983 for purposes of claims for retrospective injunctive relief. In addition, sovereign immunity precludes such claims. Plaintiffs' § 1983 claims for injunctive relief against Defendant Abercrombie, in his official capacity, are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE because Plaintiffs cannot cure the defects in those claims by amendment.
To the extent that the First Amended Complaint can be construed as alleging claims other than the § 1983 claims against the State Defendants, they argue that the claims have already been litigated, or should have been litigated, in Frederick H.K. Baker, Jr., & Haunani Y. Baker v. Department of Hawaiian Home Lands, et al., Civil No. 07-1-0371, Third Circuit
Baker v. DHHL was an appeal of the cancellation of Plaintiffs' Lease. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of the defendants, and the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") affirmed on appeal, holding that the cancellation of the Lease was lawful. Baker v. DHHL, No. 29503, 130 Haw. 349, 2010 WL 3373913 (Hawai'i Ct.App. Aug. 27, 2010).
This Court must look to Hawai'i law to determine whether the judgment in Baker v. DHHL has preclusive effect. See Bumatay v. Fin. Factors, Ltd., Civil No. 10-00375 JMS/LEK, 2010 WL 3724231, at *4 (D.Hawai'i Sept. 16, 2010).
Ounyoung v. Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp., Civil No. 12-00322 LEK-KSC, 2012 WL 5880673, at *4 (D.Hawai'i Nov. 21, 2012) (some alterations in Ounyoung) (some citations omitted).
First, there was a final judgment on the merits in Baker v. DHHL because Plaintiffs did not seek further review after the ICA denied their motion for reconsideration. No. 29503, 2010 WL 3640199 (Hawai'i Ct.App. Sept. 16, 2010). Second, the plaintiffs were the same in both Baker v. DHHL and the instant case, and DHHL was a defendant in both cases. Third, Baker v. DHHL decided the same issue that Plaintiffs present in the instant case, whether the DHHL's cancellation of Plaintiffs' Lease was proper. The instant case also addresses the ejection from the Property, which occurred after Baker v. DHHL, but Plaintiffs' claims based on the ejection also rely upon the allegation that the that the cancellation of the Lease was improper. This Court therefore concludes that the claim preclusion doctrine applies and that this Court cannot rule upon any of Plaintiffs' claims that are premised upon Plaintiffs' challenge to the cancellation of the Lease.
Plaintiffs argue that the doctrine of preclusion does not prevent this Court from ruling on the issues in this case because "Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their appeal in the State Court to enable them to file in this Court." [State Opposition at 6.] Plaintiffs attached Appellant's Motion to Voluntarily Dismiss His Appeal in Frederick H.K. Baker, Jr. v. State of Hawaii, by its Department of Hawaiian Home Lands ("Baker v. State"), filed in the ICA on June 3, 2013. [Id., Exh. A.] The ICA granted the motion. State v. Baker, No. CAAP-13-0000951, 2013 WL 3270304 (Hawai'i Ct.App. June 25, 2013). Baker v. State, however, is not the same case as Baker v. DHHL. The subject matter of Baker v. State is not clear from the limited information available about the case, but
In addition, this Court notes that, insofar as there are overlapping issues between the instant case and Baker v. DHHL and Baker v. State, Plaintiffs ask this Court to conduct what is effectively an appellate view of the state courts' decisions. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents this Court from ruling on such a request.
Castro v. Melchor, Civil No. 07-00558 LEK-BMK, 2012 WL 4092425, at *14 (D.Hawai'i Sept. 14, 2012) (quoting Tejada v. Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co., Civil No. 10-00136 SOM/KSC, 2011 WL 3240276, at *5 (D.Hawai'i July 27, 2011)).
This Court therefore concludes that, insofar as the First Amended Complaint alleges claims against the State Defendants other than § 1983 claims, the claim preclusion doctrine and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevent this Court from considering Plaintiffs' claims. Further, this Court finds that, based upon the factual allegations and the procedural history in this case, Plaintiffs cannot cure the defect in the remaining claims against the State Defendants by amendment. Thus, all remaining claims in the First Amended Complaint against the State Defendants are DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE.
As to Defendant Davis, both Count I and Count II allege that Defendants Davis, Gordon, and Parker violated Plaintiffs' constitutional rights when they participated in the illegal taking of Plaintiffs' radio tower. [First Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 15-16, 18-19.] This Court notes that the First Amended Complaint does not state what Defendant Davis's role was in the radio tower transactions.
The First Amended Complaint recognizes that Defendants Gordon, Parker, and Davis are individuals. [Id. at ¶ 5.] The First Amended Complaint does not allege that they are employed by, or have any
Tsao v. Desert Palace, Inc., 698 F.3d 1128, 1139-40 (9th Cir.2012) (some alterations in Tsao).
This Court has stated:
Kaeo-Tomaselli v. Patterson, Civ. No. 11-00764 LEK-BMK, 2011 WL 6934760, at *5-6 (D.Hawai'i Dec. 30, 2011) (some alterations in Kaeo-Tomaselli).
Plaintiffs assert that the radio tower was on the Property and that Defendant Davis could not have "act[ed] in the
Although it may be possible to imagine some set of hypothetical facts which might render Defendant Davis a state actor in the radio tower transactions, nothing in the First Amended Complaint or Plaintiffs' Davis Opposition suggests that plausible facts exist in this case. This Court therefore finds that allowing Plaintiffs to amend their claims against Defendant Davis would be futile. See Johnson, 834 F.2d at 724. This Court GRANTS the Davis Motion and DISMISSES all claims in the First Amended Complaint against Defendant Davis WITH PREJUDICE.
This Court has dismissed all of Plaintiffs' claims against the State Defendants and Defendant Davis with prejudice. The only claims remaining in this case are Plaintiffs' claims against Defendants Gordon and Parker. Plaintiffs apparently have not yet served the First Amended Complaint on Defendants Gordon and Parker and, as previously noted, the magistrate judge recently denied Plaintiffs' motion for an extension of time to complete service.
Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(m), Plaintiffs have 120 days from the filing of the First Amended Complaint on June 12, 2013 to effect service on Defendants Gordon and Parker. In other words, Plaintiffs must effect service by no later than
This Court CAUTIONS Plaintiffs that, if they fail to complete service on Defendants Gordon and Parker by
On the basis of the foregoing, the State Defendants' Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Civil Rights Complaint with Jury Demand Filed June 12, 2013, which the State Defendants filed on July 1, 2013, and Defendant Davis's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' First Amended Civil Rights Complaint with Jury Demand Filed on June 12, 2013, which Defendant Davis filed on August 7, 2013, are HEREBY GRANTED. All of Plaintiffs' claims against the State Defendants and all of Plaintiffs' claims against Defendant Davis are HEREBY DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE. This Court directs the Clerk's Office to terminate the State Defendants and Defendant Davis as parties.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
