J. MICHAEL SEABRIGHT, Chief District Judge.
Plaintiffs Mike Yellen, Paul Chilson, and Carole Chilson (collectively, "Plaintiffs"), proceeding pro se, filed this suit asserting federal civil rights violations based on an ongoing state court guardianship/conservatorship proceeding. Plaintiffs seek injunctive relief to halt or reverse decisions made in that state court proceeding, as well as damages, against (1) Hawaii State Circuit Judge Glenn Hara ("Hara"); (2) three private attorneys — Peter K. Kubota ("Kubota"), Michelle Oishi ("Oishi"), and M. Kanani Laubach ("Laubach") — who were appointed by the state court to perform court-related functions; (3) a private attorney, John Carroll ("Carroll"), who apparently was both a court-appointed temporary guardian ad litem, and also represented one of the Plaintiffs; (4) a private financial services company, Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. ("Merrill Lynch"); and (5) the State of Hawaii (the "State").
Two Motions to Dismiss, along with a substantive joinder, are pending before the court. First, Defendants Hara, Kubota, Oishi, Laubach, and the State (collectively, the "State Defendants") move to dismiss the August 4, 2015 Complaint against each of them. Doc. No. 21. Second, Defendant Carroll moves to dismiss the Complaint as to himself. Doc. No. 28. And Defendant Merrill Lynch joins in Carroll's motion only "to the extent that it seeks dismissal of any claims asserted against Merrill Lynch." Doc. No. 36.
The Motions seek dismissal on various grounds for failure to state a claim or for lack of jurisdiction, and indeed many aspects of the Complaint are obviously and plainly subject to dismissal. Federal courts generally do not interfere with ongoing state court proceedings, judicial officers have immunity from suit for performance of judicial functions, and private actors usually cannot be liable for constitutional violations. Defendants have thus, in fairly perfunctory fashion, sought dismissal of the entire Complaint based on those general principles. And as set forth below, the court GRANTS the Motions in part and DISMISSES claims that are clearly without basis.
Upon close review, however, the Motions raise two questions without such clear-cut answers, at least on the current record — (1) whether the court-appointed private officials (Kubota, Oishi, and Laubach) are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity (as opposed to possible qualified immunity) for performing discretionary court functions; and (2) whether constitutional claims against them otherwise fail for lack of "state action." Answering these two questions requires further consideration (and the written arguments have not fully addressed them) both as to the precise legal standards, and as to the application of those standards to the factual record. Addressing these specific questions is more appropriate for a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, rather than under the standards of a motion to dismiss. Accordingly, as to individual capacity claims against these Defendants (Kubota, Oishi, and Laubach), the Motion is DENIED without prejudice to the questions being raised in a motion for summary judgment on more complete briefing.
In short, the Motions are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.
Plaintiffs allege federal jurisdiction based on violations of their civil rights. Doc. No. 1, Compl. at 1. The court construes the Complaint liberally in favor of the pro se Plaintiffs. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1137 (9th Cir. 1987). So construed, Plaintiffs are alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments to the U.S. Constitution based on actions of (1) a judge of the Third Circuit Court of the State of Hawaii taken in a pending state court conservatorship/guardianship case, In re Carole June Chilson, CG No. 14-1-001; (2) three attorneys appointed by that judge in that case to fulfill various roles; and (3) others allegedly acting in concert with those persons in that pending action. They also contend that all Defendants are illegally conspiring to deprive them of property without due process of law.
Specifically, the Complaint alleges that:
The Complaint describes the particular proceedings in the state court guardianship/conservatorship proceedings, and contains more specific allegations against each Defendant. It alleges that Carroll "filed for conservatorship when Plaintiff was just asking for guardianship," id. ¶ 14, and claims that he "was acting in a conspiratorial act with Defendant Hara and Kubota to take control over Plaintiffs Paul and Carole Chilson['s] bank accounts." Id. It claims that Carroll "was responsible to ensure that Plaintiff Carole Chilson was served with the petition for guardianship/conservatorship, [and] that failing to do so violated [her] constitutional rights to due process, the right to be heard and the right to be represented at any and all hearings held in which Plaintiff Carole Chilson's money is [to] be taken." Id. The Complaint notes that "Defendant Carroll is before the [Office of Disciplinary Counsel] on allegation[s] of over charging, forging documents, and false billing statements." Id. at 9 n.1.
As for Hara, Plaintiffs allege that Hara violated Carole Chilson's rights by conducting a May 7, 2014 hearing without proper notice to her, and "illegal[ly] appointed attorneys in the attempt to [draw] all the money out of Plaintiffs Paul and Carole Chilson['s] bank account and trust." Id. ¶ 22. Plaintiffs refer to the appointments of Kubota, Oishi, and Laubach, id. ¶¶ 22-24, claiming that Hara "has done nothing more than [prey] on the elderly." Id. ¶ 25. Plaintiffs also allege that Hara and Carroll are conspiring to violate Carole Chilson's rights, pointing to Hara's act of appointing Carroll as guardian ad litem for her even though Paul Chilson had a disciplinary action pending against Carroll. Id. ¶ 27. (Plaintiff Yellen had filed a motion to be appointed as her guardian ad litem, but the motion was denied. Id. ¶ 28.)
As for Kubota, Plaintiffs allege that he wrongfully performed duties as Kokua Kanawai by not interviewing Paul Chilson, preaching to Carole Chilson, and conspiring with Merrill Lynch to be the successor trustee. Id. ¶ 34. They allege that "what Defendant Kubota did was preach to Plaintiff Carole Chilson and also informing her about donating money to charity . . . in direct violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution, in that Defendant Kubota was not authorized to preach to Plaintiff Carole Chilson as a Kokua Kanawai nor was Plaintiff Carole Chilson wanting Defendant Kubota to preach to her. . . . Defendant Kubota['s] desire to push his religious upon Plaintiff Carol Chilson is in direct violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. Id. ¶ 32. Plaintiffs complain of his "conspiratorial action with Defendants Hara, Carroll, Oishi and Laubach." Id. ¶ 34.
As for Oishi, the Complaint alleges that, after her "illegal appointment" as conservator, Oishi "illegally took control over [Carole Chilson's] bank account" and "Paul and Carole Chilson['s] trust account." Id. ¶ 35. It alleges that she conspired with Hara, Carroll, Kubota, and Laubach to violate Carole Chilson's constitutional rights. Id. ¶ 36. "The whole intent to appoint Defendant Oishi was to illegally take over all of Plaintiff Paul and Carole Chilson's bank and trust accounts . . . in direct violation of the United States Constitution, pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment as Plaintiff Carole Chilson was never provided a hearing to inform her that Defendant Oishi was taking over her bank and trust accounts." Id. ¶ 35.
Similarly, the Complaint alleges that Laubach was wrongfully appointed as guardian ad litem as part of a conspiracy "to have Defendant Laubach withdraw Plaintiff Carole Chilson's motion to vacate Defendant Hara's illegal order appointing Defendant Oishi as conservator and to have the case [dismissed]." Id. ¶ 37. It alleges that "Laubach has said she was going to move the court to withdraw Plaintiff Carole Chilson's motion. This . . . violates Plaintiffs Paul and Carole Chilson's constitutional rights, as Plaintiff Carole Chilson was never served with the petition for guardianship, in direct violations of Plaintiff Carole Chilson's due process rights." Id. It contends that Laubach was part of the same conspiracy with Hara, Carroll, Kubota, and Oishi. Id.
As to Merrill Lynch, the Complaint alleges that Merrill Lynch, as trustee of an account "in Plaintiff Paul Chilson's name," is acting illegally by freezing access "supposedly based on a court order." Id. ¶ 39. It alleges that the order is "illegal as the court never had jurisdiction," id., and that Merrill Lynch did "not check into if the courts had jurisdiction over Plaintiff Carole Chilson before taking any adverse action over a personal account." Id. ¶ 40. It further contends that Merrill Lynch should have known its actions were in violation of the Constitution, and that it was part of the same conspiracy with Hara, Carroll, Kubota, Laubach, and Oishi. Id. ¶ 42.
Finally, the Complaint alleges that "Plaintiff Yellen filed a writ of mandate with the Hawaii Supreme Court . . . alon[g] with other motions, but the Hawaii Supreme Court has failed to take any corrective measures in Defendant Hara's unconstitutional conduct." Id. ¶ 29.
The Complaint seeks injunctive and declaratory relief (1) to enjoin Defendants from continuing to violate Plaintiffs' Constitutional rights; and (2) to require Hara to "immediately dismiss the case[] before him, [In re Carole June Chilson]." Id. at 15-16. It also seeks compensatory damages of $5 million from each Defendant, punitive damages in the same amount, as well as attorney's fees and costs. Id. at 16.
Plaintiffs filed suit on August 4, 2015. Doc. No. 1. On August 11, 2015, they filed a Motion for Temporary Restraining Order ("TRO"), Doc. No. 11, which the court denied on August 13, 2015.
On October 13, 2015, the court determined that the Motions would be decided without an oral hearing under Local Rule 7.2(d). Doc. No. 39. On October 30, 2015, the court requested supplemental briefing regarding the functions performed by Kubota, Oishi, and Laubach. Doc. No. 45. Accordingly, the State Defendants filed a Supplemental Memorandum on November 6, 2015. Doc. No. 46.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss a claim for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted[.]" A Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal is proper when there is either a "`lack of a cognizable legal theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged.'" UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Shelter Capital Partners, LLC, 718 F.3d 1006, 1014 (9th Cir. 2013) (quoting Balistreri v. Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990)).
Although a plaintiff need not identify the legal theories that are the basis of a pleading, see Johnson v. City of Shelby, Mississippi, 135 S.Ct. 346, 346 (2014) (per curiam), a plaintiff must nonetheless allege "sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Weber v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 521 F.3d 1061, 1065 (9th Cir. 2008). This tenet — that the court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in the complaint — "is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Accordingly, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555); see also Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202, 1216 (9th Cir. 2011) ("[A]llegations in a complaint or counterclaim may not simply recite the elements of a cause of action, but must contain sufficient allegations of underlying facts to give fair notice and to enable the opposing party to defend itself effectively.").
Rather, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). In other words, "the factual allegations that are taken as true must plausibly suggest an entitlement to relief, such that it is not unfair to require the opposing party to be subjected to the expense of discovery and continued litigation." Starr, 652 F.3d at 1216. Factual allegations that only permit the court to infer "the mere possibility of misconduct" do not show that the pleader is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss claims over which it lacks proper subject matter jurisdiction. The court may determine jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) so long as "the jurisdictional issue is [not] inextricable from the merits of a case." Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., LLC v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008). The moving party "should prevail [on a motion to dismiss] only if the material jurisdictional facts are not in dispute and the moving party is entitled to prevail as a matter of law." Casumpang v. Int'l Longshoremen's & Warehousemen's Union, 269 F.3d 1042, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2001) (citation and quotation signals omitted); Tosco Corp. v. Cmtys. for a Better Env't, 236 F.3d 495, 499 (9th Cir. 2001).
"A Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack may be facial or factual." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial attack such as the case here, the court may dismiss a complaint when its allegations are insufficient to confer subject matter jursidiction. When the allegations of a complaint are examined to determine whether they are sufficient to confer subject matter jurisdiction, all allegations of material fact are taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fed'n of African Am. Contractors v. City of Oakland, 96 F.3d 1204, 1207 (9th Cir. 1996). In such a facial attack on jurisdiction, the court limits its analysis to the allegations of and the documents attached to the complaint. See Savage v. Glendale Union High Sch. Dist. No. 205, 343 F.3d 1036, 1039 n.2 (9th Cir. 2003).
Because Plaintiffs are proceeding pro se, the court liberally construes their pleadings. See Eldridge, 832 F.2d at 1137 ("The Supreme Court has instructed the federal courts to liberally construe the `inartful pleading' of pro se litigants.") (citing Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam)). The court also recognizes that "[u]nless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint's deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action." Lucas v. Dep't of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th Cir. 1995); see also Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1126 (9th Cir. 2000).
Although the Motions to Dismiss were filed independently and seek dismissal as to different Defendants, in part they raise the same or similar issues. Accordingly, where appropriate, the court considers them together. The court first analyzes issues that apply to both Motions or all Defendants, and then discusses questions unique to any remaining Defendants.
Both Motions contend that this court should dismiss or abstain under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), because related or parallel proceedings are currently pending in state court or before the disciplinary board of the Hawaii Supreme Court. See Doc. No. 21-1, State Defs.' Mot. at 9-10; Doc. No. 28-1, Carroll Mot. at 7-8. Younger, however, does not apply here.
Younger "reaffirmed the long-standing principle that federal courts sitting in equity cannot, absent exceptional circumstances, enjoin pending state criminal proceedings." ReadyLink Healthcare, Inc. v. State Comp. Ins. Fund, 754 F.3d 754, 758 (9th Cir. 2014). "The Court, citing comity concerns, later extended the Younger principle to civil enforcement actions `akin to' criminal proceedings, and to suits challenging `the core of the administration of a State's judicial system[.]'" Id. (citations omitted). Subsequently, Middlesex County Ethics Committee v. Garden State Bar Ass'n, 457 U.S. 423 (1982), "found abstention appropriate when (1) there is `an ongoing state judicial proceeding,' (2) those `proceedings implicate important state interests,' and (3) there is `an adequate opportunity in the state proceedings to raise constitutional challenges.'" ReadyLink Healthcare, 754 F.3d at 758 (quoting Middlesex Cty., 457 U.S. at 432). ReadyLink Healthcare acknowledged that Ninth Circuit "post-Middlesex decisions have sent mixed signals on whether Younger remains limited to criminal cases, quasi-criminal actions, and orders involving the administration of a state's judicial system." Id.
ReadyLink Healthcare, however, analyzed an intervening Supreme Court Opinion, Sprint Communications, Inc. v. Jacobs, 134 S.Ct. 584 (2013), and concluded that "Younger abstention is appropriate only when the state proceedings: (1) are ongoing, (2) are quasi-criminal enforcement actions or involve a state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts, (3) implicate an important state interest, and (4) allow litigants to raise federal challenges." ReadyLink, 754 F.3d at 759 (citing Sprint, 134 S. Ct. at 593-94) (emphasis added). "Each element must be satisfied, and the date for determining whether Younger applies is the date the federal action is filed[.]" Id. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
Applied here, although state proceedings are ongoing, they are not "quasi-criminal enforcement actions," nor do they "involve a state's interest in enforcing the orders and judgments of its courts." Id. This action involves routine state-court orders appointing individuals to assist the court — guardianship, conservatorship, and Kokua Kanawai appointments. These are not orders that involve "the process by which a state `compels compliance with the judgments of its courts.'" Id. (quoting Potrero Hills Landfill, Inc. v. Cty. of Solano, 657 F.3d 876, 886 (9th Cir. 2011)). In short, Younger does not apply, and provides no basis for dismissal or abstention.
Similarly, both Motions invoke the "Rooker-Feldman" doctrine
Although Plaintiffs appear to be asking this federal court to vacate or reverse state court orders, Rooker-Feldman applies to bar federal court review of state court judgments. See, e.g., Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1164 (9th Cir. 2003) ("If a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly erroneous decision by a state court, and seeks relief from a state court judgment based on that decision, Rooker-Feldman bars subject matter jurisdiction in federal district court."). Here, there is no state court judgment, and it appears undisputed that the state court guardianship/conservatorship proceeding is still ongoing.
Moreover, Rooker-Feldman can apply where the federal plaintiff (1) "complain[s] of harm caused by a state court judgment that directly withholds a benefit from (or imposes a detriment on) the federal plaintiff, based on an allegedly erroneous ruling by that court," Noel, 341 F.3d at 1163, or (2) "complain[s] of a legal injury caused by a state court judgment, based on an allegedly erroneous legal ruling, in a case in which the federal plaintiff was one of the litigants." Id. But, "on the other hand, [where] a federal plaintiff asserts as a legal wrong an allegedly illegal act or omission by an adverse party, Rooker-Feldman does not bar jurisdiction." Id. (emphasis added).
In short, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not provide a basis to dismiss this action.
Plaintiffs have claimed civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985, and 1986.
Section 1981 ("Equal rights under the law") provides in pertinent part that "[a]ll persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts . . . and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens." Sagana v. Tenorio, 384 F.3d 731, 737 (9th Cir. 2004) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1981(a)). It protects against discrimination in making or enforcing contracts on the basis of race or alienage, but otherwise "[t]he text of § 1981 circumscribes the kinds of protections that may be claimed under its auspices." Id. at 738. "The guarantee that `all persons' may enjoy the same rights that `white citizens' enjoy does not protect against discrimination on the basis of gender or religion, disability, age, or political affiliation." Id. (internal citations omitted).
But nothing in Plaintiffs' Complaint alleges any wrongful conduct regarding Plaintiffs' race or alienage, much less the making or enforcing of contracts. Rather, the Complaint alleges violations of due process in an ongoing court proceeding. The Complaint fails to state a cause of action under § 1981. This claim is dismissed without prejudice.
Section 1985 ("Conspiracy to interfere with civil rights") provides, in pertinent part:
"Section 1985 contains discrete substantive clauses." Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985). Substantive clauses concern conspiracies to prevent an officer from performing duties, obstruction of justice or to intimidate witnesses or jurors, to deny equal protection of the laws, or to interfere with federal elections. Id. Class-based animus (e.g., racial discrimination) is required for such an equal protection conspiracy claim under §§ 1985(2) & (3). Id. at 1028 (analyzing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971) and Kush v. Rutledge, 460 U.S. 719 (1983)). That is, Griffin established that the reach of § 1985 is limited to conspiracies based on "some racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspirators' action." 403 U.S. at 102.
Plaintiffs' Complaint fails to allege any conduct regarding conspiring to (1) prevent any officer from performing official duties, (2) obstruct justice, (3) discriminate based on class, or (4) interfere with elections. Rather, the Complaint alleges a conspiracy to deprive Plaintiffs of due process, which does not fall within § 1985. See, e.g., Seguin v. City of Sterling Heights, 968 F.2d 584, 590 (6th Cir. 1992) (upholding dismissal of claim under § 1985(3) based on conspiracy to deprive plaintiff of due process); Parker v. Chicago Housing Auth., 730 F.Supp. 115, 121 (N.D. Ill. 1989) ("[I]n enacting Section 1985(3), Congress did not seek to prohibit alleged conspiracies to deny due process; rather, Congress sought to prohibit alleged conspiracies to deny equal protection."); cf. United Bhd. of Carpenters & Joiners of Am. v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 838 (1983) (holding that § 1985(3) does not "reach conspiracies motivated by economic or commercial animus"). Accordingly, as to any claim for conspiracy under § 1985, the Complaint is DISMISSED without prejudice.
It follows that a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 also fails. Section 1986 provides in part:
But "a cause of action is not provided under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 absent a valid claim for relief under section 1985." Trerice v. Pedersen, 769 F.2d 1398, 1403 (9th Cir. 1985) (citing Mollnow v. Carlton, 716 F.2d 627, 632 (9th Cir. 1983)). Thus, given that the Complaint fails to state a claim under § 1985, it also fails to state a claim under § 1986. As with the § 1985 claim, the § 1986 claim is DISMISSED without prejudice.
It is also clear that any claims for damages against the State of Hawaii are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See, e.g., Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677 (1974); Lindsey v. Matayoshi, 950 F.Supp.2d 1159, 1165 (D. Haw. 2013) ("Pursuant to the Eleventh Amendment, states cannot be sued in federal court, whether by their own citizens or citizens of another state.") (citations omitted). Moreover, to the extent the Complaint seeks damages against any of the State Defendants in their official capacities, such claims are also barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) ("[A] suit against a state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit against the official but rather is a suit against the official's office [and] is no different from a suit against the State itself.") (citations omitted); Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 278 (1986) ("Relief that in essence serves to compensate a party injured in the past by an action of a state official in his official capacity that was illegal under federal law is barred [by the Eleventh Amendment] even when the state official is the named defendant.").
Accordingly, claims against the State and against all State Defendants in their official capacities are DISMISSED with prejudice.
The State Defendants argue that Hara is entitled to absolute judicial immunity. The court agrees.
"Judges and those performing judge-like functions are absolutely immune from damage liability for acts performed in their official capacities." Ashelman v. Pope, 793 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) This immunity extends "even when such acts are in excess of their jurisdiction." Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356 (1978).
Moreover, judicial immunity is an immunity from suit, not just from ultimate assessment of damages. See Mireles v. Waco, 502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). "Accordingly, judicial immunity is not overcome by allegations of bad faith or malice, the existence of which ordinarily cannot be resolved without engaging in discovery and eventual trial." Id. Judicial immunity applies "however erroneous the act may have been, and however injurious in its consequences it may have proved to the plaintiff." Moore v. Brewster, 96 F.3d 1240, 1243-44 (9th Cir. 1996), superceded by statute on other grounds as recognized in Tia v. Mollway, 2011 WL 2945813, at *4 (D. Haw. July 20, 2011). That is, even if judges act incorrectly or with improper motive, they are immune from suit for acts performed pursuant to their official functions. Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355-56; Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) ("[I]mmunity applies even when the judge is accused of acting maliciously and corruptly.").
Further, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 — except in narrow circumstances not at issue here — precludes prospective injunctive relief against state judges on account of their judicial acts. Specifically, § 1983 provides:
(emphasis added). Plaintiffs' Complaint does not allege that "a declaratory decree was violated or that declaratory relief was unavailable." Rather, "[d]eclaratory relief against a judge for actions taken within his or her judicial capacity is ordinarily available by appealing the judge's order [in state court]." Agbannaoag v. Honorable Judges of Circuit Ct. of First Cir. of Haw., 2013 WL 5325053, at *3 (D. Haw. Sept. 20, 2013) (quoting La Scalia v. Driscoll, 2012 WL 1041456, at *7 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2012)).
Lastly, the State Defendants argue that claims against Kubota, Oishi, and Laubach (in their individual capacities) fail for two reasons: First, in their supplemental memorandum, they argue that civil rights claims against Kubota, Oishi, and Laubach fail for lack of state action. Doc. No. 46, Mem. at 7-10. Second, they contend that these Defendants are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity from any liability. Doc. No. 21-1, Mem. at 6-7. As explained below, however, these two arguments involve relatively complex legal theories (much of which was not analyzed by the parties). Ultimately, after close review, the court requires additional information as to the specific roles that each of these Defendants played in the state court conservatorship/guardianship action. In short, the issues are more appropriate for decision under summary judgment standards.
To state a valid cause of action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for deprivation of a constitutional right, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that the deprivation occurs "under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of any State[.]" Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., Inc., 457 U.S. 922, 924 (1982). That is, there must be "state action." Id. at 935 n.18 ("[C]onduct satisfying the state-action requirement of the Fourteenth Amendment satisfies the statutory requirement of action under color of state law [under § 1983]."). This requirement "excludes from [§ 1983's] reach merely private conduct, no matter how discriminatory or wrongful." American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 50 (1999) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Determining whether there is state action is a "necessarily fact-bound inquiry." Brentwood Acad. v. Tennessee Secondary Sch. Athletic Ass'n, 531 U.S. 288, 298 (2001).
"While generally not applicable to private parties, a § 1983 action can lie against a private party when `he is a willful participant in joint action with the State or its agents.'" Kirtley v. Rainey, 326 F.3d 1088, 1092 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980)). "The Supreme Court has articulated four tests for determining whether a non-governmental person's actions amount to state action: (1) the public function test; (2) the joint action test; (3) the state compulsion test; and (4) the governmental nexus test." Ohno v. Yasuma, 723 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir. 2013) (citations and internal editorial marks omitted). "Most relevant here are the public function and joint action tests." Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted). "The former treats private actors as state actors when they perform a task or exercise powers traditionally reserved to the government. The latter focuses on whether state officials and private parties have acted in concert in effecting a particular deprivation of constitutional rights." Id. at 995-96 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
"`Joint action' exists where the government affirms, authorizes, encourages, or facilitates unconstitutional conduct through its involvement with a private party, or otherwise has so far insinuated itself into a position of interdependence with the non-governmental party that it must be recognized as a joint participant in the challenged activity." Id. at 996 (citations and internal editorial marks omitted). "A private party may be considered to have acted under color of state law when it engages in a conspiracy or acts in concert with state agents to deprive one's constitutional rights." Fonda v. Gray, 707 F.2d 435, 438 (9th Cir. 1983). But "[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient to withstand a motion to dismiss." Bruns v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 122 F.3d 1251, 1257 (9th Cir. 1997) (quoting Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982)).
And Kirtley held that a court-appointed guardian ad litem who acts independently and as an advocate for the best interests of a dependent person (in Kirtley, a minor child) does not act under "color of state law" for purposes of § 1983. 326 F.3d at 1096. The Ninth Circuit reasoned that guardians do not act under color of law because they owe duties to the child for which they were appointed — "it is the independence of the guardian that insulates the role from § 1983 liability." Id. at 1093. "[T]he intended benefits of the guardian `flow directly to' the child, in whose interests the guardian must act." Id. Although the guardian in Kirtley was court-appointed and paid by the state, "the guardian functions independently of the court, exercising advocacy obligations that are, by law, to the child, not the court." Id. at 1094. It reasoned that there is no close nexus between a guardian's duties and the state (even though appointed by, paid by, and regulated by the state) because "[w]here the guardian reports to the court, she reports as an independent investigator [and] [w]here the guardian acts as an advocate of the child, she occupies a role distinct from the court before which she advocates." Id. at 1095. In short, Kirtley looked to two factors — independence and action as an advocate for a private party — in concluding that a guardian does not act under color of law.
It is premature to apply these § 1983 principles to Kubota, Oishi and Laubach. Although all are private attorneys, they were appointed by the court to fulfill particular court functions. The exact duties, however, that each individual Defendant fulfilled in the pending state court proceedings are unclear. Further, the exact allegations of the pro se Complaint (which the court is obligated to construe liberally, see, e.g., Eldridge, 832 F.2d at 1137) are difficult to discern. The Complaint nevertheless contains enough details such that the court will require further factual information before the court can apply the appropriate legal analysis.
Kubota was appointed as a Kokua Kanawai, but the statutory and regulatory duties are broad, and encompass both independent and non-discretionary duties. In particular, a Kokua Kanawai's duties include independently investigating, but, at the same time, not advocating on behalf of someone. See Hawaii Probate Rule 113 ("A Kokua Kanawai appointed in a protective proceeding shall serve as and shall be limited to serving as an extension of the court to conduct an independent review of the situation[.]) (emphasis added); Official Commentary to Rule 113 ("The Kokua Kanawai is appointed to serve as an extension of the court for independent review, analysis, and report. As such, the Kokua Kanawai is not an advocate for or against the rights of the individual and is limited in role to responding to the petition for protective proceeding. The Kokua Kanawai, without prior court order, has no authority to initiate actions on behalf of the respondent.") (emphasis added). Answering whether Kubota acted under color of state law for purposes of Kirtley will require examining the specific role he actually played, rather that just looking to his title. See Caviness v. Horizon Cmty. Learning Ctr., Inc., 590 F.3d 806, 812-13 (9th Cir. 2010) ("[A]n entity may be a State actor for some purposes but not for others.").
Similarly, as to Oishi, a conservator's duties are defined by HRS § 560:5-421, which provides essentially that a conservator is a trustee for property of the protected person.
Likewise, the record is unclear as to Laubach's duties. Although the legal duties of a guardian ad litem as set forth in HRS § 560:5-115 and Hawaii Probate Rule 28
As with the state action inquiry, determining whether Kubota, Oishi, and Laubach are entitled to quasi-judicial immunity requires additional information. Although absolute judicial immunity applies to Hara, ascertaining whether absolute quasi-judicial immunity applies to those that he appointed requires a further analysis. See Burton v. Infinity Capital Mgmt., 753 F.3d 954, 960 (9th Cir. 2014) ("[W]e take a functional approach to determining whether a nonjudicial officer is entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity by looking to `the nature of the function performed and not to the identity of the actor performing it.'") (quoting In re Castillo, 297 F.3d 940, 948 (9th Cir. 2002)).
"Absolute judicial immunity is not reserved solely for judges, but extends to nonjudicial officers for all claims relating to the exercise of judicial functions." Id. at 959 (quoting Castillo, 297 F.3d at 947) (internal quotation marks omitted). "To qualify for absolute immunity, the function performed must be a judicial act with `a sufficiently close nexus to the adjudicative process.'" Id. at 960 (quoting Castillo, 297 F.3d at 948). "However, `it is only when the judgment of an official other than a judge involves the exercise of discretionary judgment that judicial immunity may be extended to that nonjudicial officer.'" Id. (quoting Castillo, 297 F.3d at 949). To be protected, the function performed must "involve the exercise of discretion in resolving disputes." Castillo, 297 F.3d at 948 (citing Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429, 435 (1993)).
For example, bankruptcy trustees have quasi-judicial immunity while performing acts closely related to the judicial process, such as scheduling and noticing bankruptcy hearings. Id. at 952-53. Such tasks are an integral part of judicial process. See also Balser v. Dep't of Justice, 327 F.3d 903, 910 (9th Cir. 2003) (holding that United States Trustees have quasi-judicial immunity). And "parole board members . . . are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity for decisions to grant, deny or revoke parole because these tasks are functionally comparable to tasks performed by judges." Swift v. California, 384 F.3d 1184, 1189 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted). But "parole officials are not entitled to absolute immunity for conduct not requiring the exercise of quasi-judicial discretion." Id. (quoting Anderson v. Boyd, 714 F.2d 906, 909 (9th Cir. 1983)). "There is no reason to clothe actions taken outside an official's adjudicatory role with the absolute immunity tailored to the demands of that role." Id. "Thus, while parole officials `may claim absolute immunity for those actions relating to their responsibility to determine whether to revoke parole, their immunity for conduct arising from their duty to supervise parolees is qualified.'" Id. (quoting Anderson, 714 F.2d at 910).
Likewise, Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 897 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) recognized that "[o]fficials performing the duties of advocate or judge may enjoy absolute immunity for some functions traditionally performed at common law, but that protection does not extend to many of their other functions." Id. (citation omitted). For example, "[Meyers v. Contra Costa County Department of Social Services, 812 F.2d 1154 (9th Cir. 1987),] recognized absolute immunity for social workers [(acting as officers of the court)] only for the discretionary, quasi-prosecutorial decisions to institute court dependency proceedings to take custody away from parents." Miller, 335 F.3d at 898 (citing Meyers, 812 F.2d at 1157). But such social workers might not be absolutely immune "for investigating whether a removal petition should be filed." Id. (citation omitted).
"To the extent . . . that social workers also make discretionary decisions and recommendations that are not functionally similar to prosecutorial or judicial decisions, only qualified, not absolute immunity, is available." Id. at 898. "[T]he scope of absolute immunity for social workers is extremely narrow." Id. (citation omitted). See Beltran v. Santa Clara Cty., 514 F.3d 906, 908-08 (9th Cir. 2008) (concluding that absolute immunity does not apply to social workers' `investigatory conduct'"). "The presumption is that qualified rather than absolute immunity is sufficient to protect government officials in the exercise of their duties." Miller, 335 F.3d at 897 (quoting Antoine, 508 U.S. at 433 n.4).
The court is obligated to examine the precise functions performed, not the titles or labels of each Defendant. "The burden is on the official claiming absolute immunity to identify the . . . function that the official asserts is shielded by absolute immunity." Miller, 335 F.3d at 897 (citation omitted).
The record is insufficient for the court to analyze the absolute quasi-judicial standards here. As set forth above, the statutory duties for a Kokua Kanawai, conservator, and guardian ad litem under Hawaii law appear to allow much judicial-type discretion, but also include duties that are investigatory and administrative. The analysis is not simple. See, e.g., Gross v. Rell, 585 F.3d 72, 91 (2d Cir. 2009) (facing question of quasi-judicial immunity of court-appointed conservatory, and finding it necessary to certify a question of state law to Connecticut Supreme Court because "the statutes and case law in Connecticut do not sufficiently enable us to analyze the factors . . . in deciding when an individual is entitled to quasi-judicial immunity"). And it is unclear what role each individual actually performed (or is alleged to have performed) in the state court proceedings. In short, given the confusing nature of the allegations of this particular Complaint, ascertaining whether Kubota, Oishi, and Laubach are entitled to absolute quasi-judicial immunity is more appropriate in this instance for a motion for summary judgment.
Accordingly, the Motion to Dismiss as to Kubota, Oishi, and Laubach is DENIED without prejudice to issues being raised in a motion for summary judgment with a record explaining their roles in the state court proceedings.
The Motions to Dismiss are GRANTED in part and DENIED in part, without prejudice for remaining issues and/or claims to be raised at a summary judgment stage. To summarize:
Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, 1985, and 1986 are dismissed without prejudice. Plaintiffs may, if there is a good faith basis in fact, file an Amended Complaint attempting to state such claims. If no such Amended Complaint is filed by
Claims against Hara are dismissed with prejudice based on absolute judicial immunity. If an Amended Complaint is filed, Plaintiffs may not file any new claims against Hara.
Claims for damages as to the State and any Defendants in their official capacities are dismissed with prejudice based on Eleventh Amendment immunity. If an Amended Complaint is filed, Plaintiffs may not file any new claims for damages against the State or any Defendant in their official capacity.
Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Kubota, Oishi, Laubach, and Carroll (in their individual capacities), as well as against Merrill Lynch, remain in the action.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Id. (citing Bradley, 13 Wall. at 352). Sparkman reasoned that immunity applied because "the court over which Judge Stump presides is one of general jurisdiction, neither the procedural errors he may have committed nor the lack of a specific statute authorizing his approval of the petition in question rendered him liable in damages for the consequences of his actions." Id. at 359-60.
Here, although the Complaint alleges that "Defendant Hara did not have any jurisdiction over Plaintiff Carole Chilson as she was never before the Court," Doc. No. 1, Compl. ¶ 21, the allegation is not that he acted outside the scope of his jurisdiction, but that he committed an error in ruling on Carole Chilson's matter "in excess of his jurisdiction." Sparkman, 435 U.S. at 355.
And Hawaii Probate Rule 28 provides:
