LESLIE K. KOBAYASHI, District Judge.
The parties have requested a continuance in the trial date because defense counsel needs additional time to review the voluminous discovery and for the defendant to consider disposing of the case via plea agreement. If the Court does not grant a continuance, then the defendant would be denied reasonable time necessary to effectively prepare for trial, taking into account due diligence.
The parties further agree that the period of time from the old trial date of March 1, 2016, to and including the new trial date of April 12, 2016, constitutes a period of delay which shall be excluded in computing the time within which the trial in this case must commence pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(B)(iv), and because the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial. 18 U.S.C. §3161(h)(7)(A).
IT IS SO STIPULATED.
The above Stipulation Continuing Trial Date and Excluding Time Under the Speedy Trial Act is hereby approved, and the agreements set forth therein are adopted as findings by the Court. For the reasons stated,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the time period from March 1, 2016 through and including April 12, 2016 be excluded in computing the time within which the trial in this case must commence pursuant to the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. §§3161(h)(7)(A) and (b)(iv) because the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.