SUSAN OKI MOLLWAY, District Judge.
In the Complaint filed on April 11, 2014, Plaintiff David Husted, Jr., alleges that between 1979 to 1982, while he was a minor, he was sexually abused by Father James A. Spielman of The Diocese of Buffalo, New York. The legislature of Hawaii has reopened the statute of limitation for such claims, and no party is arguing at this time that the present action is time-barred.
In addition to suing Spielman, Husted sues The Diocese of Buffalo, the Roman Catholic Church in the State of Hawaii, Southern Tier Catholic School Archbishop Walsh Academy, and The Southdown Institute. Before the court is Southdown's motion for summary judgment on all claims asserted against it. Husted claims that Southdown negligently treated Spielman for a psycho-sexual disorder before the alleged abuse, and claims that Southdown is legally responsible for having allowed Spielman to go back to work as a priest, giving Spielman the opportunity to sexually abuse Husted.
Southdown argues that the only admissible evidence shows that it did not treat Spielman until after the period in which Husted was allegedly abused. Southdown also argues that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over it. This court determines that Southdown is entitled to summary judgment because Husted fails to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Southdown treated Husted before the alleged abuse of Husted ended.
The Complaint alleges that Husted was sexually abused from 1979 to 1982 by Spielman while Spielman, an ordained Roman Catholic priest, was on the faculty of Archbishop Walsh High School and Husted was a teenaged student there. ECF No. 1, PageID #s 2, 3-4, 9. Husted says that Spielman abused and molested him "at churches, rectories, schools and retreat centers," and that some of the abuse occurred in Hawaii, where Spielman allegedly accompanied Husted in or around 1982.
According to Husted, Spielman was treated by Southdown, an organization in Ontario, Canada, that provides support for members of the clergy with addiction and mental health issues.
Southdown did not have a records retention policy until 2000.
For an individual whose treatment at Southdown ended more than fourteen years before Southdown had reason to retain records, Southdown's only record of the individual's treatment is a one-page summary showing that individual's name and dates of treatment, and the identity of the person who referred the individual for treatment.
In contending that Spielman may have been treated at Southdown prior to the abuse, Husted relies on a log of allegedly privileged documents. That privilege log lists as a document withheld during discovery a letter dated June 5, 1972, that pertained to "Personal Private Medical Information." ECF No. 160-2, PageID # 1575. It also describes other documents dated after 1982 that Husted says might reference pre-1982 treatment of Spielmen at Southdown for a sexual disorder. Husted's attorney asserts in her declaration that Spielman had a "long history of entering into and out of treatment facilities and medical treatment for psycho-sexual disorders including pedophilia." ECF No. 160-1, PageID # 1569.
On August 3, 2015, the Magistrate Judge held a discovery conference regarding The Diocese of Buffalo's privilege log. Ultimately, he ordered The Diocese of Buffalo "to produce documents which describe or refer to Fr. James A. Spielman having problems with or treatment for pedophilia prior to Plaintiff Husted's alleged abuse from 1979 to 1982 regardless of when the document itself was created." ECF No. 132, PageID #s 1355-56. The Diocese of Buffalo has represented to the court that none of the documents on the privilege log fell into that category.
In the eight months since the Magistrate Judge's order, Husted has apparently not obtained any document from The Diocese of Buffalo showing or even suggesting that Spielman was treated at Southdown prior to the period from 1979 to 1982 during which Husted was allegedly abused. The record contains no evidence that The Diocese of Buffalo has violated the court order regarding production of documents indicating that Spielman was treated at Southdown.
At the hearing on the present motion, counsel for The Diocese of Buffalo confirmed that none of the documents on the privilege log fell within the court order. Counsel also specifically addressed the letter dated June 5, 1972, a date preceding the start of the abuse Husted allegedly suffered. According to counsel, that letter did not come from Southdown and does not mention or relate to treatment of Spielman at Southdown.
Husted offers Thomas P. Doyle, who was ordained as a Catholic priest and has worked on sex abuse cases involving clergy, as an expert witness. Doyle notes that Southdown's records should include more about Spielman than has been produced. As noted earlier in this order, this is not a revelation, as Southdown itself says Spielman's file was discarded given its age. Nothing in Doyle's affidavit indicates that Spielman was treated at Southdown prior to or even during the period of alleged abuse.
Although Husted describes Southdown as a treatment facility near The Diocese of Buffalo that treated clergy with psycho-sexual disorders, Husted's counsel referred at the hearing to the existence of three treatment facilities used by the Roman Catholic Church to treat priests with sexual disorders. Co-counsel similarly acknowledged at the hearing that there "may be" treatment facilities other than Southdown. There is no admissible evidence in the record suggesting treatment of a priest within The Diocese of Buffalo for a sex-related disorder would necessarily have been at Southdown, or that, even if Southdown did treat a priest, that the treatment was necessarily for a psycho-sexual disorder. This court notes that Paragraph 2.3 of the Complaint describes Southdown as having been "established in the 1980s to help the needs of religious and clergy with addictions and mental health issues." ECF No. 1. Husted's "Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" repeats that description at Paragraph 5. ECF No. 160-4.
The burden initially falls on the moving party to identify for the court those "portions of the materials on file that it believes demonstrate the absence of any genuine issue of material fact."
The nonmoving party must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.
All evidence and inferences must be construed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.
Southdown's motion for summary judgment argues first, that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over it, and second, that Southdown is not legally responsible for any of Husted's alleged injuries because the only admissible evidence indicates that Southdown treated Husted only after the alleged abuse had ended. The court grants the motion on the second ground.
The Due Process Clause of the United States Constitution protects a defendant's "liberty interest in not being subject to the binding judgments of a forum with which he has established no meaningful `contacts, ties, or relations.'"
In the present case, the minimum contacts necessary for exercising personal jurisdiction over Southdown may well have been lacking. Even if that is so, Southdown may have waived any personal defense. That an objection to personal jurisdiction may be waived is clear.
Although Southdown raised personal jurisdiction as a defense in its December 2014 Answer, ECF No. 63, PageID # 680, it asked this court to rule on the merits of the claims against it when it filed a motion for summary judgment on May 5, 2015.
Southdown appears to have been actively participating in discovery. Given its delay until February 2016 in raising the issue of personal jurisdiction, Southdown arguably waived the defense.
However, this court is cognizant that the Ninth Circuit has not made statements equivalent to those made in the Third Circuit cases cited above. This court therefore refrains from ruling on the issue of whether Southdown may pursue its personal jurisdiction defense. This court's ruling on the second ground raised by the present motion resolves the claims against Southdown.
Husted's Complaint asserts nine claims against Southdown: (1) offensive physical contact/childhood sexual assault; (2) imminent battery; (3) gross negligence; (4) negligent supervision/failure to warn; (5) negligent hiring/retention; (6) fraud; (7) negligent infliction of emotional distress; (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (9) premises liability; (10) punitive damages. ECF No. 1, PageID # 16-33. Each of these claims is premised on the argument that Southdown should be held legally responsible because it inadequately treated Spielman and then allowed him to continue working, which gave Spielman the opportunity to injure Husted.
Southdown seeks summary judgment with respect to each claim, arguing that the record contains no evidence that it treated Spielman before or during the alleged sexual abuse of Husted. Southdown's one-page summary of Spielman's treatment at Southdown indicates that he was treated at Southdown from December 26, 1989, to May 25, 1990, and "Reactivated" on August 18, 1993. ECF No. 156-3, PageID # 1469. This is the only admissible evidence concerning when Spielman received treatment at Southdown. Husted alleges that Spielman abused him between 1979 and 1982. Southdown cannot be legally responsible for abuse occurring before Southdown treated Spielman. Accordingly, the court grants summary judgment in favor of Southdown.
In so ruling, the court is giving no weight to a statement in Husted's lead attorney's declaration that "Spielman was treated for his psycho-sexual disorders including pedophilia as early as the 1970s at Southdown." ECF No. 160-1, PageID 1571. This statement made under penalty of perjury purports to be "stated of [counsel's] own personal knowledge." ECF No. 160-1, PageID # 1568. However, at the hearing on the present motion, counsel conceded that the basis of her "personal knowledge" was what she has learned as Husted's attorney. That is, her knowledge was gained in connection with this litigation. Counsel's knowledge of whether Southdown treated Spielman for a psycho-sexual disorder in the 1970s is no more "personal" than this court's (or an appellate court's) knowledge might be. Counsel is relying on the statements of others, not on her personal observations of Spielman's or Southdown's actions in the 1970s. Clearly counsel could not testify at trial as to whether Spielman was treated at Southdown prior to or during Husted's alleged abuse.
Husted also relies on the privilege log produced to Husted by The Diocese of Buffalo, arguing that the log suggests that Spielman may have been treated at Southdown in 1972.
In asking this court to draw an inference that the 1972 document incriminates Southdown, Husted is ignoring the August 2015 order concerning the privilege log that required The Diocese of Buffalo to produce "documents which describe or refer to Fr. James A. Spielman having problems with or treatment for pedophilia prior to Plaintiff Husted's alleged abuse from 1979 to 1982 regardless of when the document itself was created." ECF No. 132, PageID #s 1355-56. Counsel for The Diocese of Buffalo represented at the hearing that none of the documents referenced in the privilege log pertained to Spielman's treatment at Southdown.
Southdown met its initial burden on the present motion for summary judgment of demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law because it did not treat Spielman prior to or during Husted's alleged abuse.
At the hearing on the present motion, Husted also argued that this court should consider what Husted called "circumstantial" evidence that Spielman had been treated at Southdown in the 1970s. What Husted pointed to, however, was mere speculation, not circumstantial evidence at all. Husted's own Complaint alleges that Southdown was not even established until the 1980s. The court is not, of course, relying on the Complaint as evidence. Indeed, Southdown might conceivably be a successor to an earlier entity and may have assumed its predecessor's liabilities. The court points to the Complaint only by way of noting that Husted's own allegations fly in the face of Husted's argument that the privilege log establishes that Southdown treated Spielman during the 1970s.
Because Husted fails to raise a genuine issue of fact as to whether Spielman was treated at Southdown at any time relevant to Husted's claims of sexual abuse. Southdown is entitled to summary judgment with respect to all claims asserted against it in the Complaint.
Husted urges this court to allow further discovery before ruling on the present motion. A party requesting a continuance under Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure bears the burden of (1) filing a timely application that specifically identifies relevant information; (2) demonstrating that there is some basis to believe that the information sought exists; and (3) establishing that such information is essential to resist the summary judgment motion.
Additionally, the party seeking a Rule 56(d) continuance must demonstrate that it diligently pursued discovery.
Husted does not demonstrate entitlement to a Rule 56(d) continuance. Husted's attorney's declaration does not specifically identify relevant information reasonably believed to exist that is essential to resist the summary judgment motion. At most, she says that discovery requests were served on March 30, 2015, but that Defendants have not produced requested documents.
Husted says that it would serve the interests of justice for the court to hold the motion in abeyance until the close of discovery or to deny the motion and allow a jury to decide when Southdown treated Spielman. While this court agrees that a person who establishes that he was abused by clergy is entitled to be compensated, that cannot mean that whenever a party is sued that party must automatically proceed to trial. Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that trial is not warranted if there are no genuine issues of material fact to be tried. Husted fails to show how he could possibly meet his burden at trial of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Southdown acted wrongfully at a time relevant to Husted's claims against Southdown.
At most, Husted asks for more time to conduct discovery to determine whether Spielman might have sought treatment at Southdown for a sexual disorder prior to the alleged abuse at issue in this case. But Husted, having had ample opportunity to at least provide a basis for believing such evidence exists, fails to provide such a basis. Husted cannot simply come into court and ask for a continuance of the present motion without either providing some reason for this court to suspect that The Diocese of Buffalo has violated the Magistrate Judge's order or satisfying the requirements of Rule 56(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Because Husted identifies no genuine issue of fact as to whether Southdown treated Spielman before or during the alleged abuse of Husted, Southdown is entitled to summary judgment on all claims asserted against it.
The court understands the difficulty of obtaining evidence from many decades ago. Accordingly, if Husted timely discovers some evidence that Southdown treated Spielman before or during the alleged sexual abuse at issue in this case, Husted may move for reconsideration of this order. The court cannot, of course, say in advance that in that event claims against Southdown may proceed to trial. At this point, this court makes no comment on what the future may bring or on whether the claims against Southdown will be legally cognizable if supported by such new evidence.
IT IS SO ORDERED.