DERRICK K. WATSON, District Judge.
In a continuing effort to collaterally attack the state court judicial foreclosure of her property, Plaintiff Patsy Naomi Sakuma again brings claims against the entities and individuals responsible for bringing that foreclosure about. Although her First Amended Complaint is at times difficult to decipher, Sakuma is evidently attempting to relitigate the prior state court foreclosure of her property and related actions, which both state and federal courts have already addressed, several times over. Because this Court is without the authority to re-open Sakuma's previously closed cases, and because her current claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, defendants' motions to dismiss are GRANTED.
On or about December 15, 1998, Sakuma entered into a Real Property Mortgage and Financing Statement ("Mortgage") and Note to buy her home in the Tropics at Waikele, located at 94-1016 D Maiau Street, Waipahu, Hawaii 96797. The Mortgage was recorded in the Bureau of Conveyances as Document No. 98-194762 on December 29, 1998. FAC ¶ 53.
Sakuma has spent the last fifteen years litigating with various defendants regarding the property.
The Court briefly addresses this related prior litigation where pertinent to Sakuma's current action.
Sakuma sued the AOAO Tropics at Waikele ("AOAO"); Love Yamamoto & Motooka; and Hawaiiana Management Company over a dispute relating to the property, purportedly for "handicap discrimination" under the Fair Housing Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. § 3600 et seq. and Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. § 12131. See FAC Ex. GG (Docket Sheet in Sakuma v. AOAO Tropics at Waikele, Civil No. 01-CV-00556 DAE-BMK). The 2001 federal action was dismissed by stipulation and order on September 20, 2002 (Dkt. No. 53 in 01-CV-00556) together with another removed action (02-CV-00147 HG-LEK). Sakuma thereafter moved to amend the judgment (Dkt. Nos. 55 & 56 in 01-CV-00556). The district court denied that motion and Sakuma filed a notice of appeal. (Dkt. Nos. 68 & 69 in 01-CV-00556). After the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court (Dkt. No. 74 in 01-CV-00556), Sakuma filed another motion for relief from final judgment in the district court on January 26, 2005 (Dkt. No. 76 in 01-CV-00556). The district court again denied Sakuma's motion (Dkt. No. 93 in 01-CV-00556) and ordered Sakuma to show cause why sanctions should not be imposed (Dkt. No. 94 in 01-CV-00556). Sakuma appealed the district court's order denying her motion for relief from final judgment (Dkt. No. 103 in 01-CV-00556).
On October 31, 2005, the district court imposed sanctions against Sakuma pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the court's inherent power, and ordered her to pay to defendants' attorneys their fees incurred as a result of responding to Sakuma's motions (Dkt. Nos. 119 & 130 in 01-CV-00556). Sakuma appealed the award of attorneys' fees and costs on May 31, 2006 (Dkt. No. 131 in 01-CV-00556). The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling on December 12, 2006 (Dkt. No. 145 in 01-CV-00556). On June 25, 2007, the district court issued an order finding Sakuma in civil contempt for failure to pay the attorneys' fees and costs as previously ordered. (Dkt. No. 151 in 01-CV-00556). Sakuma appealed the contempt order on July 24, 2007 (Dkt. No. 159 in 01-CV-00556), which was then dismissed by the Ninth Circuit on January 14, 2009 (Dkt. No. 198 in 01-CV-00556).
On September 5, 2007, Sakuma once again filed a motion for relief from the judgment and final order, and a motion for sanctions against defendants, their attorneys, and the attorneys' law firms (Dkt. No. 169 in 01-CV-00556). On September 27, 2007, the district court denied Sakuma's motion and entered a contempt and pre-filing screening order, directing as follows:
Dkt. No. 172 in 01-CV-00556. Sakuma thereafter filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied (Dkt. Nos. 173 & 181 in 01-CV-00556), and a notice of appeal (Dkt. Nos. 183 & 186 in 01-CV-00556). The Ninth Circuit affirmed on January 14, 2009 (Dkt. No. 198 in 01-CV-00556).
In 2001, the AOAO sued Sakuma in state court (1RC-01-5514), which Sakuma removed to this court on March 8, 2002, entitled Tropics at Waikele v. Sakuma, Civil No. 02-00147 HG-LEK ("2002 Removed Action"). The case was dismissed with prejudice by stipulation and order on October 1, 2002 (Dkt. No. 10 in 02-CV-00147). Sakuma filed a notice of appeal on March 13, 2003, and the Ninth Circuit dismissed the appeal on April 10, 2003 (Dkt. Nos. 11 & 15 in 02-CV-00147).
The 2002 Removed Action was globally settled with the 2001 Federal Action, 01-CV-00556. According to Sakuma, "because of material terms in conflict in the written Release and the oral settlement, Sakuma did not sign the Release." FAC ¶ 58. She now alleges:
FAC ¶ 59.
Thereafter, the AOAO recorded a 2005 Notice of Lien for Unpaid Assessments ("2005 Lien") at the Bureau of Conveyances ("BOC") as Doc. 2005-0789021, see FAC Ex. Q. In 2005, the AOAO filed an action against Sakuma for unpaid homeowners fees, AOAO of Tropics at Waikele v. Sakuma, 1RC-05-1-006232, see FAC Ex. P, and judgment was granted in its favor on March 1, 2007. FAC ¶ 63.
On August 17, 2007, the Association of Condominium Homeowners of Tropics at Waikele ("AOCH") filed a judicial foreclosure action against Sakuma in the First Circuit Court, Civ. No. 07-1-1487 ("2007 Foreclosure Action"). The 2007 Foreclosure Action generated at least three appeals: CAAP No. 11-0000054, 12-0000145 and 12-0000870. FAC ¶¶ 64-65. On June 10, 2008, the Circuit Court entered a decree of foreclosure ("2008 Decree of Foreclosure"), and on January 22, 2009, denied Sakuma's October 6, 2008 motion for reconsideration of the court's September 23, 2008 order granting a motion to sell without open house. The Circuit Court thereafter granted the motion to confirm sale, and denied Sakuma's motion for reconsideration on February 10, 2011. Sakuma's subsequent appeals to the Intermediate Court of Appeals ("ICA") and Hawaii Supreme Court were dismissed or affirmed in favor of the AOAO and/or AOCH. Most recently, on January 21, 2016, the ICA issued a summary disposition order dismissing Sakuma's third appeal as moot, and denied Sakuma's motion for reconsideration on February 1, 2016. The ICA entered judgment on appeal on July 22, 2016 in CAAP No. 12-000870.
On November 5, 2008, Sakuma filed an independent action in this district court, Civil No. 08-00502 HG-LEK, seeking "to reopen the [2002] Removed Action based on further fraud in AOCH's attorney." FAC ¶ 69. Sakuma filed a Complaint for Unlawful Handicap Retaliation and Harassment; Injunction; and TRO Application; naming as defendants the AOAO, Circuit Court Judge Karen N. Blondin, and Commissioner James S. Kometani. FAC Ex. FF. The district court denied Sakuma's request for temporary restraining order seeking to halt the foreclosure of the property ("TRO") and motion for reconsideration (Dkt. Nos. 23, 33 & 39 in 08-CV-502). On January 13, 2009, the court granted Judge Blondin's motion to dismiss on the basis of judicial immunity (Dkt. No. 15 in 08-CV-502).
On September 16, 2009, the district court denied Sakuma's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction, finding that:
Dkt. No. 85 in 08-CV-502 at 7. The court denied Sakuma's motion for reconsideration (Dkt. No. 91 in 08-CV-502), and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the action on October 5, 2010 (Dkt. No. 102 in 08-CV-502).
After the Ninth Circuit affirmed, on November 19, 2011, Sakuma filed a Motion to Vacate the court's prior order of dismissal (Dkt. No. 105 in 08-CV-502), which the district court denied initially on January 31, 2012 and denied once more upon Sakuma's motion for reconsideration (Dkt. Nos. 110 & 112 in 08-CV-502). Sakuma once more filed a notice of appeal (Dkt. No. 113 in 08-CV-502). The Ninth Circuit summarily affirmed the district court's orders denying Sakuma's Motion to Vacate and to reconsider that denial (Dkt. No. 119 in 08-CV-502).
Sakuma filed her one-hundred page First Amended Complaint in the present case "as an independent action in lieu of a motion to reopen for fraud on the court under [FRCP] Rule 60(d)(3) her prior federal civil cases to enjoin and void the 2007 State Foreclosure Action against her, and the 2002 Removed Action[.]" FAC at 2. She alleges federal jurisdiction "to vacate a settlement of its own case for fraudulent inducement . . . to reopen the Removed Action CV:02-00147 HG:LEK for fraud on the court . . . by the defendant [AOAO] disguised as the Association Of Apartment Owners Of (without "The") Tropics At Waikele ("Tropics") in the Removed Action as AOAO disguised as Association of Condominium Homeowners of Tropics At Waikele ("AOCH") in the 2007 Foreclosure Action and Tropics in the 2008 Related Federal Action." FAC ¶ 2.
She also asserts jurisdiction "over the 2007 Foreclosure Action Civ. No. 07-1487 filed by AOCH against Sakuma and which Sakuma attempted to enjoin in the 2008 Federal Action against AOCH under all three (3) exceptions to the Anti-Injunction Act . . . and now also because these actions are not moot even after the completed and wrongful third foreclosure sale of Sakuma's Tropics Home by the Commissioner James S. Kometani[.]" FAC ¶ 4. According to Sakuma, she "was prejudiced because she lost her right again to remove the 2007 Foreclosure to this Court like she had done with the [2002] Removed Action. With respect, the 1st Circuit effectively aided and abetted the AOAO disguised as AOCH to avoid possible sanctions in the 2008 Federal Action with this Court for fraudulently inducing the global settlement when it filed the 2001 State Assumpsit Action disguised as Tropics, a[] non-existing entity with no legal authority to file the 2001 State Assumpsit Action and record the 2001 Lien[.]" FAC ¶ 14.
Moreover, "this Court retained jurisdiction because any untimeliness by Sakuma should be considered in light of the courts here failing to exercise their duty to sua sponte raise the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction if the parties fail to do so because any judgment or order rendered is void, not voidable." FAC ¶ 24.
Sakuma alleges the following causes of action:
Among other relief sought, Sakuma asks the Court to:
FAC at 98-99. That is, Sakuma seeks to directly and indirectly challenge the final decisions of the Hawaii state courts and of other judges in this district court.
Defendants Porter McGuire Kiakona & Chow, LLP; Commissioner James S. Kometani; First Hawaiian Bank ("FHB") and Watanabe Ing LLP; Milton M. Motooka and Motooka Yamamoto & Revere, LLP seek dismissal of Sakuma's First Amended Complaint. Following the hearing on the instant motions, Sakuma filed a Notice of Appeal of the Court's "oral announcement of dismissing the above-entitled action at the September 23, 2016 Hearing[.]" Notice of Appeal (Dkt. No. 88).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) authorizes a court to dismiss claims over which it lacks proper subject matter jurisdiction. A court may determine jurisdiction on a motion to dismiss for under Rule 12(b)(1) so long as "the jurisdictional issue is [not] inextricable from the merits of a case." Kingman Reef Atoll Invs., L.L.C. v. United States, 541 F.3d 1189, 1195 (9th Cir. 2008). A plaintiff has the burden of proving that subject-matter jurisdiction does in fact exist. Thornhill Publ'g Co., Inc. v. Gen. Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 594 F.2d 730, 733 (9th Cir. 1979).
A challenge to the Court's subject-matter jurisdiction may be "facial or factual." Safe Air for Everyone v. Meyer, 373 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 2004). In a facial attack, the party challenging jurisdiction argues that the allegations contained in a complaint are insufficient "on their face" to invoke federal jurisdiction. Id. A facial challenge, therefore, mirrors a traditional motion to dismiss analysis. The Court must take all allegations contained in the pleading "to be true and draw all reasonable inferences in [its] favor." Wolfe v. Strankman, 392 F.3d 358, 362 (9th Cir. 2004).
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) permits a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Pursuant to Ashcroft v. Iqbal, "[t]o survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" 555 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 570 (2007)). "[T]he tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegations contained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions." Id. Accordingly, "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555). Rather, "[a] claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). Factual allegations that only permit the court to infer "the mere possibility of misconduct" do not constitute a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief as required by Rule 8(a)(2). Id. at 679.
Courts may "consider certain materials—documents attached to the complaint, documents incorporated by reference in the complaint, or matters of judicial notice—without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment." United States v. Ritchie, 342 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 2003). Documents whose contents are alleged in a complaint and whose authenticity is not questioned by any party may also be considered in ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See Branch v. Tunnell, 14 F.3d 449, 453-54 (9th Cir. 1994).
"A party invoking the federal court's jurisdiction has the burden of proving the actual existence of subject matter jurisdiction." See Thompson v. McCombe, 99 F.3d 352, 353 (9th Cir. 1996). "Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction," possessing "only that power authorized by Constitution and statute." United States v. Marks, 530 F.3d 799, 810 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377 (1994)). At the pleading stage, a plaintiff must allege sufficient facts to show a proper basis for the Court to assert subject matter jurisdiction over the action. McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936); Johnson v. Columbia Props. Anchorage, L.P., 437 F.3d 894, 899 (9th Cir. 2006); Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1). Sakuma does not meet that burden here.
Sakuma seeks, in part, a judgment from this Court that there was at least one illegitimate lien on her real property (the 2005 Lien), which would nullify the 2008 Decree of Foreclosure. Ruling in favor of Sakuma would effectively reverse and void the decisions of the Hawaii state courts. The Court is without jurisdiction and is barred doing so because of the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine rests upon the principle that federal district courts are without the authority to exercise appellate review of the state judicial process. Henrichs v. Valley View Development, 474 F.3d 609, 613 (9th Cir. 2007). Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine (Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983), collectively referred to as Rooker-Feldman), "`a losing party in state court is barred from seeking what in substance would be appellate review of the state judgment in a United States District Court, based on the losing party's claim that the state judgment itself violates the loser's federal rights.'" Bennett v. Yoshina, 140 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 1998) (quoting Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1005-06 (1994)). The Rooker-Feldman doctrine divests federal district courts of jurisdiction to conduct direct reviews of state court judgments even when a federal question is presented or if the state court decision is challenged as unconstitutional. Litigants who believe that a state judicial proceeding has violated their constitutional rights must appeal that decision through their state courts and then seek review in the United States Supreme Court. "Rooker-Feldman prohibits a federal district court from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over a suit that is a de facto appeal from a state court judgment." Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004).
Although there are exceptions to the doctrine, none apply here. Sakuma conclusorily alleges fraudulent conduct by various defendants. Claims for fraud, wherein plaintiffs argue that fraudulent conduct was "extrinsic" to their state case and kept them from presenting their claims to the state court, are generally not barred by Rooker-Feldman. See Kougasian v. TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2004). However, far from being extrinsic to what was before the state court, the fraud alleged by Sakuma is inextricably intertwined with the merits of the state case. See Manufactured Home Communities Inc. v. City of San Jose, 420 F.3d 1022, 1030 (9th Cir. 2005); Kougasian, 359 F.3d at 1141; see also Pedrina v. Chun, 906 F.Supp. 1311, 1398 n.7 ("If anything, the evidence provides Plaintiffs a grounds for challenging the validity of the actions in the state courts."). Moreover, Sakuma asserts a legal injury committed by the state courts in the 2007 Foreclosure Action. Rooker-Feldman bars this Court from reviewing that action, which the state appellate courts have already done. Clark v. Superior Court, 2013 WL 6057498, at *2, (N.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2013); Khanna v. State Bar of Cal., 505 F.Supp.2d 633, 641 (N.D. Cal. 2007).
Neither can Sakuma now contend that she was unable to make the arguments she presently asserts in either the underlying state foreclosure action, in her prior federal actions, or in her myriad appeals. Her "allegations of . . . fraud are entirely unsupported and are nothing more than an artful attempt to plead around the Rooker-Feldman bar." Copple v. Astrella & Rice, P.C., 442 F.Supp.2d 829, 837 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
In opposition, Sakuma argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because the United States Supreme Court's decision in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005), allows for concurrent jurisdiction where a state court judgment is not yet final.
Sakuma also makes the nonsensical argument that Rooker-Feldman does "not bar a federal-court suit raising a claim previously decided by a state court unless the federal suit actually seeks to overturn, as opposed to simply contradict, the state-court judgment." Sakuma Opp. to FHB Mot. at 6 (Dkt. No. 55). The Court is unable to coherently respond to this incoherent assertion, except to decline Sakuma's invitation to "simply contradict" any state court judgment implicated in her First Amended Complaint.
To the extent Sakuma argues that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply because this action seeks to "reopen" the 2002 Removed Action or the "2001 State Action" and "2005 State Action," her contentions are wholly without merit. This Court lacks such authority, and Sakuma has not offered any for consideration.
As Sakuma's claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman and res judicata, the Court need not review all of the other grounds for dismissal identified by Defendants. However, having considered the parties' other arguments, the Court notes that, even if it did have jurisdiction, Sakuma's claims would fail for a number of other reasons. Of particular note, the First Amended Complaint does not state a RICO claim, or any other federal claim conferring this court with federal question subject matter jurisdiction.
The First Amended Complaint implausibly alleges that several defendants operated an association-in-fact enterprise (the "AOCH Enterprise") for the "purpose of abusing the judicial process" and "based on its diabolical sinister plan that the `judicial process' once in motion would work to realizing AOCH[] Enterprise's goals because of the courts' reluctance to overturn a mistake made by the lower court or itself based on maintaining the integrity of the judiciary in the public's eyes." FAC ¶¶ 161, 165.
To the extent Sakuma attempts to allege a civil RICO claim, she must demonstrate "(1) conduct (2) of an enterprise (3) through a pattern (4) of racketeering activity and, additionally must establish that (5) the defendant caused injury to plaintiff's business or property." Chaset v. Fleer/Skybox Int'l, LP, 300 F.3d 1083, 1086 (9th Cir. 2002) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 1962(c), 1964(c)); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1961. Although the First Amended Complaint conclusorily alleges several of the elements of a civil RICO claim, Sakuma does not plausibly allege any of these elements. The conclusory allegations that defendants "associated together" to form an enterprise are insufficient. See Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009) ("From the terms of RICO, it is apparent that an association-in-fact enterprise must have at least three structural features: a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise's purpose."). Nor does Sakuma sufficiently identify the predicate acts that form the basis of the alleged "scheme of racketeering." See Graf v. Peoples, 2008 WL 4189657, *6 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 4, 2008) (citing Savage v. Council on American-Islamic Relations, Inc., 2008 WL 2951281, at *14 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2008) (finding that a RICO claim was insufficient where plaintiff set forth a "redundant narrative of allegations and conclusions of law, but [made] no attempt to allege what facts are material to his claims under the RICO statute, or what facts are used to support what claims under particular subsections of RICO"); and Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco v. HK Systems, 1997 WL 227955, at *3 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 24, 1997) (finding that a complaint was insufficient for failure to "identify exactly which acts are `predicate acts' for RICO liability")).
Moreover, Sakuma's purported RICO claim rests on the abuse of judicial process relating to a single judicial foreclosure of a single piece of real property—there is no allegation of racketeering by an enterprise outside of Sakuma's individual property—hence there can be no evidence of an ongoing organization or pattern of racketeering activity, nor can she "show that the racketeering predicates are related, and that they amount to or pose a threat of continued criminal activity." H.J. Inc. v. Nw. Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 239 (1989). Under these circumstances, amendment of her RICO and conspiracy to commit RICO claims would be futile. See, e.g., Izenberg v. ETS Services, LLC, 589 F.Supp.2d 1193, 1203 (C.D. Cal. 2008) (dismissing RICO claim where no other attempted foreclosure or loan collection activities were alleged beyond the individual plaintiff's nor any continuing relationship between the defendants); Dysart v. BankTrust, 516 Fed. Appx. 861, 864 (11th Cir. 2013) (dismissing RICO claim where alleged scheme to divest plaintiff of her home could not be repeated and the alleged racketeering activity was related to a single foreclosure).
Where, as here, all federal claims are dismissed before trial, and, indeed, before the onset of discovery, the Court, in its discretion, would decline to exercise jurisdiction over the remaining state claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 726 (1966).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court dismisses this action with prejudice. The following motions are granted: Porter McGuire Kiakona & Chow, LLP's Motion To Dismiss First Amended Complaint (Dkt. No. 23) and related joinders (Dkt. Nos. 42, 80); James S. Kometani's Motion To Dismiss First Amended Complaint With Prejudice (Dkt. No. 27) and related joinders (Dkt. Nos. 29, 41, 45, 79); First Hawaiian Bank and Watanabe Ing LLP's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 32) and related joinder (Dkt. No. 81); and Milton M. Motooka and Motooka Yamamoto & Revere, LLP's Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 51).
The Clerk's Office is directed to close the case.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
