ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT WILCOX MEMORIAL HOSPITAL'S MOTION TO STAY ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENT AND FOR DETERMINATION AND APPROVAL OF SUPERSEDEAS BOND

ALAN C. KAY, SR., District Judge.

For the reasons set forth below, the Court GRANTS Defendant Wilcox Memorial Hospital's Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment and for Determination and Approval of Supersedeas Bond, ECF No. 472.

BACKGROUND

On June 5, 2015, Plaintiff Cameron Raymond ("Plaintiff") filed a ten-count Complaint against nine named defendants and numerous Doe defendants. Compl., ECF No. 1. Following the voluntary dismissal of two defendants,1 a stipulation,2 the disposition of four motions by defendants,3 the death of one defendant,4 and a settlement,5 Defendant Wilcox Memorial Hospital ("Defendant") was the only remaining defendant, and Plaintiff's claims of assault, battery, and intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") the only remaining claims.6, 7 Plaintiff's claims arose out of events that took place on June 5 and 6, 2013. See Compl. ¶ 29. Plaintiff alleged that, following his detention by Kaua`i Police Department officers and involuntary transportation to Wilcox Memorial Hospital, see id. ¶ 45, 50, he was injected with Geodon and haloperidol decanoate ("Haldol") against his will, id. ¶¶ 72-78, and suffered a number of ill effects, id. ¶¶ 79-80, 94, 97-103, 110.

Following jury selection on March 12, 2019, ECF No. 436, jury trial in this matter took place on March 13-15 and 20-21, 2019, ECF Nos. 437, 438, 440, 455, 456. On March 18, 2019, Defendant filed a motion for judgment as a matter of law, ECF No. 444, to which Plaintiff filed an opposition the following day, ECF No. 453. The Court heard oral argument on the motion on March 20, 2019, ECF No. 455, but declined to rule thereon until after the verdict had been rendered. The jury deliberated on March 21 and 22, 2019, ECF Nos. 456, 461, and on March 22, 2019, returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff, ECF Nos. 461, 463. Finding Defendant liable for assault, battery, and IIED, the jury awarded Plaintiff $722,600, comprising $297,600 in compensatory damages8 and $425,000 in punitive damages. ECF No. 463.

On April 16, 2019, the Court issued an order denying Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law. ECF No. 470. Also on April 16, 2019, the Judgment was entered in Plaintiff's favor in the amount of $722,600 in accordance with the jury's verdict.

On April 22, 2019, Defendant filed the instant Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment and for Determination and Approval of Supersedeas Bond ("Motion"), ECF No. 472, together with a memorandum in support, ECF No. 472-1. Attached to the Motion was a copy of a surety bond in the amount of $867,120—i.e., 120% of the amount of the verdict. Declaration of Edquon Lee ("Lee Decl."), ECF No. 472-2 ¶¶ 4, 5; Surety Bond, ECF No. 472-5.

The Court issued a minute order on April 23, 2019, designating the Motion as a non-hearing motion pursuant to Local Rule 7.2 and directing that any opposition to the Motion be filed by April 30, 2019, with any reply being due by noon on May 3, 2019. ECF No. 473. Plaintiff did not file an opposition.

STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 62(a) provides that, absent a court order to the contrary, and as pertinent here,9 "execution on a judgment and proceedings to enforce it are stayed for 30 days after its entry[.]"

Under Rule 62(b), "[a]t any time after judgment is entered, a party may obtain a stay by providing a bond or other security. The stay takes effect when the court approves the bond or other security and remains in effect for the time specified in the bond or other security."

"The purpose of a supersedeas bond is to secure the appellees from a loss resulting from the stay of execution and a full supersedeas bond should therefore be required." Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1505 n.1 (9th Cir. 1987) (citation omitted); see also NLRB v. Westphal, 859 F.2d 818, 819 (9th Cir. 1988) ("The posting of a bond protects the prevailing plaintiff from the risk of a later uncollectible judgment and compensates him for delay in the entry of the final judgment.").

"District courts have inherent discretionary authority in setting supersedeas bonds; review is for an abuse of discretion." Rachel, 831 F.2d at 1505 n.1 (citation omitted). Courts frequently require a supersedeas bond for the amount of the judgment plus interest, costs, and an estimate of any damages attributed to the delay. 11 Charles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc. Civ. § 2905 (3d ed., Apr. 2019 Update).

DISCUSSION

Defendant moves to stay enforcement of the Judgment pending disposition of its post-trial motions and any subsequent appeal from the Judgment. Mem. in Supp. at 3.10 "To secure Plaintiff's interest in the Judgment pending resolution of post-trial motions and an appeal, [Defendant] has obtained a surety bond in the amount of $867,120[.]" Id. at 4; see also Surety Bond.

Having carefully considered the circumstances, and in light of the absence of any opposition by Plaintiff, the Court finds that the amount of the surety bond—120% of the amount of the Judgment—is sufficient to account for the accruing interest on the amount owed to Plaintiff, as well as the costs of any appeal and damages for delay. See, e.g., Alday v. Raytheon Co., No. CV 06-32 TUC DCB, 2008 WL 11441996, at *2 (D. Ariz. Sept. 10, 2008) (finding a supersedeas bond of 120% of the $1,727,431.80 judgment sufficient); United States v. Cowan, 535 F.Supp.2d 1135, 1148 (D. Haw. 2008) (setting the amount of a supersedeas bond at 120% of the $297,791.24 judgment "to take into account additions of interest, costs of appeal, [and] damages for delay").

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant Wilcox Memorial Hospital's Motion to Stay Enforcement of Judgment and for Determination and Approval of Supersedeas Bond, ECF No. 472. Defendant is directed to file the original surety bond with the Clerk of Court. Upon the filing of the bond, enforcement of the Judgment will be STAYED pending disposition of Defendant's further post-trial motions and any subsequent appeal from the Judgment.

IT IS SO ORDERED.