MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.
The plaintiff asserts that she was retaliated against, harassed, and ultimately terminated from her job with a school district in violation of state and federal prohibitions on race discrimination, after she objected to comments about her biracial child. In a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, the defendant school district asserts that portions of the plaintiff's claims are time barred and that the plaintiff cannot establish a prima facie case regarding her claim the school district terminated her because of the race of her child.
I set forth those facts, both undisputed and disputed, sufficient to put in context the parties' arguments concerning defendant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts recited here are undisputed, at least for purposes of summary judgment. Additional factual allegations and the extent to which they are or are not disputed or material will be discussed, if necessary, in my legal analysis.
Plaintiff Toni Van DeWalle was employed as a teacher's associate in the Clarion Goldfield Community School District ("the District") from November 20, 2007 until August 2009. Van DeWalle is white. She has a biracial son, born on November 6, 2007, whose father is African-American. Van DeWalle's job at the District was as a teacher's associate for a special needs student, Emily Olson. Van DeWalle's entire day was typically spent with Emily that year. At the time Van DeWalle started, Emily was in the second grade. During the 2008-09 school year, Van DeWalle was again assigned to Emily.
Martha Slagle started working in the District as a special education teacher during the 2008-09 school year. Slagle was Emily's teacher for certain subjects in which she needed additional help. Van DeWalle spent approximately two hours per day in Slagle's room helping Emily. Tricia Rosendahl was the elementary principal at the District during the 2008-09 school year. This was Rosendahl's first year as elementary principal.
November 5, 2008, was the day after the 2008 national elections in which Barack Obama was elected President of the United States. On this date, Van DeWalle alleges that Slagle told her she was in "mourning" because a black person was elected President. Slagle is also alleged to have said that Obama was an illegal immigrant and that he didn't have a birth certificate. Van DeWalle allegedly responded that she had an African-American son and that she was offended by Slagle's comments. Slagle allegedly retorted by telling Van DeWalle that her son would not amount to anything because of the color of his skin.
Van DeWalle told another teacher, Mrs. Suhumskie, about Slagle's allegedly racial derogatory comments. Van DeWalle did not complain to Principal Rosendahl. Suhumskie reported to Principal Rosendahl that Van DeWalle was upset by Slagle's comments Slagle had made concerning the election. Principal Rosendahl took no immediate action, because Van DeWalle did not complain to her directly about anything. On the evening of November 6, 2008, Slagle called Principal Rosendahl to complain that Van DeWalle had been telling other staff members that Slagle hated black people. Van DeWalle denies that she told others on the staff that Slagle hated black people.
Principal Rosendahl called a meeting with Slagle and Van DeWalle for the morning of November 7, 2008. The purpose of the meeting was to try and resolve the apparent conflict between DeWalle and Slagle. At the November 7th meeting, Van DeWalle told Principal Rosendahl that Slagle had told her she was in morning because a black person was elected President, and that Slagle had attacked Van DeWalle's son's integrity because of his race. Slagle either denied making the derogatory statements or she altered them to make them sound inoffensive. Principal Rosendahl believed that Slagle and Van DeWalle simply had a misunderstanding or miscommunication. The meeting concluded with Principal Rosendahl telling Slagle and Van DeWalle, "Come Monday morning, let's put the past in the past and start fresh." November 5, 2008, was the only date Slagle allegedly uttered racially derogatory statements. Slagle made no further derogatory statements to Van DeWalle or in her presence the rest of the school year.
After November 7, 2008, Slagle did not talk to Van DeWalle, but communicated with her by writing notes. Van DeWalle was upset that Slagle would not talk to her. Van DeWalle confided her frustration to Suhumskie, who, in turn, reported it to Principal Rosendahl. Principal Rosendahl called another meeting with Slagle and Van DeWalle to discuss the communication issue. The meeting occurred in February 2009. At the meeting, Principal Rosendahl stated that if Van DeWalle and Slagle thought they could work together and have a good relationship then she would have Slagle stop communicating only with notes. After the meeting, Slagle and Van DeWalle were able to work together and there were no further problems.
Van DeWalle believes Principal Rosendahl treated her unfairly after the November 5, 2008, incident. She claims Principal Rosendahl would look at her in an intimidating way and was not as friendly to her as she was with other teachers. Toward the end of the school year, in late May or early June 2009, Principal Rosendahl held a meeting with all the elementary teacher's associates. She informed them about a new state requirement that teacher's associates would have to be certified within one year. She offered each associate the opportunity to take certification classes over the summer at the District's expense. Van DeWalle did not take certification classes during the summer of 2009. Van DeWalle did not work for the District during the summer of 2009.
In August 2009, Principal Rosendahl decided not to renew Van DeWalle's contract for the upcoming 2009-10 school year. She recommended to the District superintendent that Van DeWalle's contract not be renewed. The superintendent deferred to Principal Rosendahl's judgment on the contract decision. On August 3, 2009, Principal Rosendahl called Van DeWalle to inform her of her decision not to renew her contract. DeWalle claims Principal Rosendahl said the decision was made in part because "of the incident that happened in the fall." Van DeWalle interpreted that to mean the controversy between her and Slagle over Slagle's allegedly racial statements. Principal Rosendahl claims the reason she did not renew Van DeWalle's contract was because Van DeWalle was not a team player and she did not think Van DeWalle was giving 100 percent to her job. Van DeWalle filed an administrative complaint with the Iowa Civil Rights Commission ("ICRC") on February 22, 2010.
On December 10, 2010, Van DeWalle filed a Complaint against her former employer, the District, alleging the following causes of action: pendent state law claims under the Iowa Civil Rights Act ("ICRA") for racial harassment, discrimination and retaliation, IOWA CODE CH. 216 (Count I); and claims of racial harassment, discrimination and retaliation in violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Count II), and 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (Count III).
On February 1, 2012, the District filed their Motion For Partial Summary Judgment. First, the District seeks summary judgment on Van DeWalle's claims for discrimination, harassment, and retaliation arising out of conduct that occurred before April 29, 2009, which is 300 days before Van DeWalle filed her administrative complaint with Iowa Civil Rights Commission. The District argues that Van DeWalle's claims under both Title VII and the ICRA are time barred because her administrative complaint was not filed within the applicable time limitations for either statute. The District also requests summary judgment on Van DeWalle's claim that the decision not to renew her contract was motivated by racial discrimination. The District argues that there is no evidence that the District's decision not to renew Van DeWalle's employment contract was because of her son's race. The District does not seek summary judgment on Van DeWalle's claim that the District's decision not to renew her contract was in retaliation for her opposition to race discrimination or harassment. On March 16, 2012, Van DeWalle resisted the District's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, arguing that she can prove a continuing retaliation violation under the ICRA. Van DeWalle further argues that all of her claims are timely under § 1981. Van DeWalle, however, concedes that her racial harassment claims under the ICRA and Title VII "may be" untimely. On March 29, 2012, the District filed its reply brief in support of its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Motions for summary judgment essentially "define disputed facts and issues and . . . dispose of unmeritorious claims [or defenses]." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 585 (2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) ("One of the principal purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims or defenses. . . ."). Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c) (emphasis added); see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Summary judgment is appropriate if viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.").
A fact is material when it "`might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'" Johnson v. Crooks, 326 F.3d 995, 1005 (8th Cir. 2003) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). Thus, "the substantive law will identify which facts are material." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248. An issue of material fact is genuine if it has a real basis in the record, Hartnagel v. Norman, 953 F.2d 394, 395 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)), or when "`a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party' on the question," Woods, 409 F.3d at 990 (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248); see Diesel Machinery, Inc. v. B.R. Lee Indus., Inc., 418 F.3d 820, 832 (8th Cir. 2005) (stating genuineness depends on "whether a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party based on the evidence").
Procedurally, the moving party bears "the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion and identifying those portions of the record which show a lack of a genuine issue," Hartnagel, 953 F.2d at 395 (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323), and demonstrating that it is entitled to judgment according to law. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323 ("[T]he motion may, and should, be granted so long as whatever is before the district court demonstrates that the standard for the entry of summary judgment, as set forth in Rule 56(c), is satisfied."). Once the moving party has successfully carried its burden under Rule 56(c), the nonmoving party has an affirmative burden to go beyond the pleadings and by depositions, affidavits, or otherwise, designate "specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e); Mosley v. City of Northwoods, Mo., 415 F.3d 908, 910 (8th Cir. 2005) ("The nonmoving party may not `rest on mere allegations or denials, but must demonstrate on the record the existence of specific facts which create a genuine issue for trial.'" (quoting Krenik v. County of Le Sueur, 47 F.3d 953, 957 (8th Cir. 1995))).
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (8th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized in a number of panel decisions that summary judgment is "disfavored" or should be used "sparingly" in employment discrimination cases. See id., at 1043 (collecting such cases in an Appendix). The rationales for this "employment discrimination exception" were that "discrimination cases often turn on inferences rather than on direct evidence. . . .," E.E.O.C. v. Woodbridge Corp., 263 F.3d 812, 814 (8th Cir. 2001) (en banc) (citing Crawford, 37 F.3d at 1341; Bell v. Conopco, Inc., 186 F.3d 1099, 1101 (8th Cir. 1999)), and that "intent" is generally a central issue in employment discrimination cases. See, e.g., Christopher v. Adam's Mark Hotels, 137 F.3d 1069, 1071 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Gill v. Reorganized Sch. Dist. R-6, Festus, Mo., 32 F.3d 376, 378 (8th Cir. 1994)); see Simpson v. Des Moines Water Works, 425 F.3d 538, 542 (8th Cir. 2005) (noting summary judgment is disfavored in employment discrimination cases because they are "`inherently fact-based.'" (quoting Mayer v. Nextel W. Corp., 318 F.3d 803, 806 (8th Cir. 2003))). On the other hand, the Supreme Court recognized that, even in employment discrimination cases, "`the ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff.'" Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 143 (2000) (quoting Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981)).
In its en banc decision in Torgerson, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals expressly rejected the notion that summary judgment in employment discrimination cases is considered under a separate standard, citing Reeves and Celotex. Instead, the court held as follows:
Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1043.
Therefore, I will apply these standards to the defendants' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
However, I must first observe that stating the legal principles of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases is a simple task. Applying those principles to the paper record that forms the judicial crucible that decides which plaintiffs may proceed to trial and which get dismissed is far more daunting. Missing in the standard incantation of summary judgment principles is the role of experience. Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes wrote, "The life of the law has not been logic; it has been experience." OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). Thus, experience teaches that thoughtful deliberation of summary judgment in employment discrimination cases is grounded in the consideration of each case through a lens filtered by the following observations.
Employment discrimination and retaliation, except in the rarest cases, is difficult to prove. It is perhaps more difficult to prove today—more than forty years after the passage of Title VII and the ADEA, more than twenty years after the passage of the ADA, and nearly two decades after the passage of the FMLA—than during the earlier evolution of these anti-discrimination and anti-retaliation statutes. Today's employers, even those with only a scintilla of sophistication, will neither admit discriminatory or retaliatory intent, nor leave a well-developed trail demonstrating it. See, e.g., Riordan v. Kempiners, 831 F.2d 690, 697-98 (7th Cir. 1987). Indeed, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals recognized more than thirty-five years ago, that "[a]s patently discriminatory practices become outlawed, those employers bent on pursuing a general policy declared illegal by Congressional mandate will undoubtedly devise more sophisticated methods to perpetuate discrimination among employees." Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 239 (5th Cir. 1971) (later relied on by the Supreme Court in Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65-67 (1986), as one of the principal authorities supporting recognition of a cause of action for hostile environment sexual harassment under Title VII).
My experience suggests the truth of that observation. Because adverse employment actions almost always involve a high degree of discretion, and most plaintiffs in employment discrimination and retaliation cases are at will, it is a simple task for employers to concoct plausible reasons for virtually any adverse employment action ranging from failure to hire to discharge. This is especially true, because the very best workers are seldom employment discrimination and retaliation plaintiffs due to sheer economics: Because the economic costs to the employer for discrimination or retaliation are proportional to the caliber of the employee, discrimination or retaliation against the best employees is the least cost effective. See, e.g., id. Rather, discrimination and retaliation plaintiffs tend to be those average or below-average workers—equally protected by Title VII, the ADA, the ADEA, or the FMLA—for whom plausible rationales for adverse employment actions are readily fabricated by employers with even a meager imagination. See, e.g., id.
Consequently, with both the legal standards for summary judgment and the teachings of experience in hand, I turn to consideration of the parties' arguments for and against partial summary judgment.
Preliminarily, the District contends that Van DeWalle's claims of discrimination, racial harassment and, retaliation, based on conduct that occurred before April 29, 2009, are time barred under Title VII and the ICRA.
Title VII makes it an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discriminate against an individual because of the individual's race. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Similarly, the ICRA also prohibits discrimination based upon race. See IOWA CODE § 216.6(1)(a). Title VII and the ICRA also prohibit retaliation against employees who allege a violation of Title VII or the ICRA by their employers, as well as those employees who participate or assist in an investigation of such a complaint.
Clearly, most of the allegations asserted by Van DeWalle, with the exception of assertions regarding her contract not being renewed and other retaliatory acts by Principal Rosendahl, predate the 300-day limitation period. Van DeWalle had no further conflicts with Slagle after their official meeting in February 2009. Accordingly, the incidents predating the limitations period are time barred unless they can be related to a timely incident as a "series of separate but related acts" amounting to a continuing violation. See National R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 117 (2002) (Title VII); Farmland Foods, Inc. v. Dubuque Human Rights Comm'n, 672 N.W.2d 733, 741 (Iowa 2003) (ICRA). In order to establish she exhausted her administrative remedies as to the whole of the alleged harassment and retaliation, Van DeWalle is required to generate a genuine issue of material fact that the harassment and retaliation predating the limitations period was part of "continuing violation" with the harassment and retaliation that occurred within the relevant time period. Van DeWalle concedes that she cannot make a showing of a continuing violation on her claims of racial discrimination and harassment. Thus, the District's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted as to Van DeWalle's claims of racial discrimination and harassment under the ICRA and Title VII. Van DeWalle, however, asserts that she can make out a continuing violation with regard to the retaliation against her which occurred within the relevant time period.
In Morgan, the United States Supreme Court indicated that, with respect to hostile environment claims, where each act is related to the whole, "the employee need only file a charge within [the statutory period] of any act that is part of the hostile work environment." Morgan, 536 U.S. at 118. However, the Morgan Court pointed out that the continuing violations doctrine does not apply to Title VII claims alleging discrete acts of retaliation.
The District also seeks summary judgment on Van DeWalle's Title VII and ICRA claims that the District discriminated against her by not renewing her employment contract because of the race of her child. The District asserts that Van DeWalle cannot establish a prima facie case of discrimination under either Title VII or the ICRA because Slagle, who Van DeWalle claims had racial animus, was not involved in the decision whether or not to renew Van DeWalle's contact. Van DeWalle "agrees that Rosendahl's decision to terminate was not directly related to the race of her child." Van DeWalle's Br. at 9. Accordingly, this portion of the District's Partial Motion for Summary is also granted.
For the reasons discussed above, the District's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is granted as to Van DeWalle's Title VII and ICRA claims of discrimination, racial harassment, and retaliation based on conduct that occurred before April 29, 2009. The District's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is also granted as to Van DeWalle's Title VII and ICRA claims that the District discriminated against her by not renewing her employment contract because of the race of her child.
IOWA CODE § 216.11(2).
42 U.S.C. § 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1). The ICRA's provision reads:
IOWA CODE § 216.15(3).
