MARK W. BENNETT, District Judge.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. INTRODUCTION ............................................................782
A. Factual Background ..................................................782
B. Procedural Background ...............................................784
II. LEGAL ANALYSIS ..........................................................785
A. Standards For Summary Judgment ......................................785
B. Claims No Longer At Issue ...........................................785
C. The "Manufacturing Defect" Claims ...................................787
1. Arguments of the parties ........................................7872. "Manufacturing defect" standards ................................7883. Application of the standards ....................................790a. Departure from intended design ..............................790b. Causation ....................................................792D. The "Design Defect" Claim Against Ohlins ............................7921. Arguments of the parties ........................................7932. Component manufacturer liability for a "design defect" ..........7933. Application of the standards ....................................795E. Punitive Damages Claims .............................................7961. Arguments of the parties ........................................7962. Standards for punitive damages under Iowa law ...................7973. Application of the standards ....................................799III. CONCLUSION ..........................................................800
In this diversity action under Iowa products liability law, arising from a motorcycle accident, I am asked to determine whether the plaintiffs are entitled to present to a jury both their design defect and manufacturing defect claims and, if so, whether the plaintiffs can assert either or both claims against the motorcycle manufacturer and the manufacturer of an adjustable steering damper incorporated into the motorcycle's steering mechanism. These questions, and others, are presented on the defendants' motions for summary judgment.
As is my usual practice, I set forth here only those facts, disputed and undisputed, sufficient to put in context the parties' arguments concerning the defendants' motions for summary judgment. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts recited here are undisputed, at least for purposes of summary judgment. I will discuss additional factual allegations, and the extent to which they are or are not disputed or material, if necessary, in my legal analysis.
At about sunset on March 21, 2009, Scott Thompson was riding his 2007 Kawasaki Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle in a convoy with two friends on county road K-22 in Plymouth County, Iowa. One of Thompson's friends, Dave Lachioma, who was also riding a motorcycle, led the convoy, the other friend, Michael Welter, followed in his car, and Thompson brought up the rear on his motorcycle. While driving northbound on K-22, Thompson passed Welter, who was driving at 60 to 65 mph. A few seconds after Thompson passed him, Welter observed the taillight of Thompson's motorcycle wobble from side to side. Although Welter observed that it looked like Thompson was regaining control of his motorcycle, Thompson was tossed from the motorcycle, slid on his back, feet first, across the highway, and landed in a ditch on the west side of the highway. The motorcycle continued upright in the northbound lane for another several hundred feet, before exiting the highway on the east side. As a result of the accident, Thompson suffered a burst fracture at the T3-T4 vertebrae, causing paralysis below that level. Thompson died on December 25, 2011.
Turning to essential background on motorcycle performance, "kickback" occurs when there is a disturbance to the motorcycle, such as a gap in the pavement might cause, that creates handlebar vibrations. "Convergence" occurs when kickback decreases and disappears as the motorcycle continues to run. In contrast, "expansion" occurs when kickback continues to increase as the motorcycle continues to run. Kickback expansion, in turn, can turn into "wobble" of the motorcycle, but if kickback
The parties agree that a "steering damper" is a device with which a motorcycle can be equipped for the purpose of minimizing kickback and bringing about faster convergence — indeed, Kawasaki expressly concedes that a steering damper is a "safety device" for that purpose. In general, the higher the dampening force in a steering damper, the quicker kickback can be dampened. A "dampening curve" provides the various dampening levels at a particular velocity (piston speed) for a particular steering damper. The dampening curves are generated through laboratory tests by a hydraulic machine referred to as a "dyno machine" (dynamometer). A steering damper may be adjustable, that is, have different "click positions," which adjust the dampening to rider preferences. The plaintiffs allege that Thompson's motorcycle accident was the result of the defective design and/or manufacture of his 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle, because the steering damper on the motorcycle was insufficient and the motorcycle was not reasonably stable.
Defendant Kawasaki Heavy Industries, Ltd. (KHI), a Japanese company, admits that it is responsible for the design, developmental testing, and manufacture of the 2007 Kawasaki ZX-10R model motorcycle at issue in this case. Defendant Kawasaki Motors Corp., U.S.A. (KMC), a Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Irvine, California, admits that it is responsible for the marketing of the motorcycle in question in the United States and the wholesale sale of the motorcycle in question to independent dealers in the United States. The parties agree that the motorcycle in question was equipped with a steering damper, as an Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) component, designed and manufactured by Ohlins Racing, AB (Ohlins), a Swedish company with its principal place of business in Väsby, Sweden.
The parties agree that both the 2006 model and the 2007 model Ninja ZX-10R motorcycles are part of Kawasaki's 1010 motorcycle platform and that they have the identical chassis. Indeed, they agree that the only difference between the 2006 and the 2007 model year Ninja ZX-10R is that the steering dampers on the two models are different. In over a year-and-a half of development of the model year 2006 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle, Kawasaki selected the Ohlins model SD-1790 steering damper with specific dampening levels and values that Kawasaki believed provided the optimal performance for the customer and the best fit for the 2006 model year. On March 10, 2006, however, Kawasaki made the decision to modify the steering damper on the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R by reducing the dampening value. This decision followed a test ride in which the mounting bracket for the steering damper failed. The parties agree that, on April 11, 2006, Mr. Björkman, an Ohlins design engineer, wrote an e-mail to Kawasaki about the change, in which he stated, "I don't think you want very much less damping either, because there is almost no function left." Plaintiffs' Appendix at 47, Exhibit 3. The parties dispute whether Mr. Björkman was stating a safety concern or simply relaying performance concerns from racing customers. Ultimately, Kawasaki selected the Ohlins model SD-1791 steering damper for the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle to replace the SD-1790 steering damper that had been used on the 2006 Ninja ZX-10R. Although the parties dispute the precise values, they agree that the steering damper on the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R model had significantly less viscous dampening for the motorcycle system (a maximum of 1750 newtons at .6 meters per
On March 16, 2011, prior to Scott Thompson's death, Randy W. Thompson and Vicky J. Thompson, individually and as personal representatives of Scott Thompson, filed a Complaint (docket no. 2), initiating this action against various defendants, including KHI, KMC, and Ohlins, and alleging claims arising from Scott Thompson's accident. The Thompsons' controlling pleading is now their First Amended Complaint (docket no. 48), filed on April 23, 2012, after Scott Thompson's death. In their First Amended Complaint, the Thompsons assert claims of "strict liability product defects," alleging both "design" and "manufacturing" defects, "breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose," and "negligence" against KHI and KMC, in
On November 5, 2012, KMC and KHI, referring to themselves collectively as "Kawasaki," filed their Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (docket no. 64), seeking summary judgment in their favor on that part of the Thompsons' "product defects" claim alleging a "manufacturing defect" — but not on the part alleging a "design defect" — their "breach of implied warranty" claim, their "negligence" claim, and their prayer for "punitive damages." On November 5, 2012, Ohlins's filed its Joinder In Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 66), seeking summary judgment in its favor on the same claims as Kawasaki, but accompanied by a separate brief, statement of undisputed facts, and appendix. After obtaining authorization and extensions of time to do so, Ohlins filed its November 27, 2011, Supplemental (Amended And Substituted) Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 71), adding that Ohlins is also entitled to summary judgment on the Thompsons' "design defect" claim.
On December 18, 2012, the Thompsons filed separate Responses (docket nos. 73 and 74, respectively) to Kawasaki's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment and Ohlins' Supplemental (Amended And Substituted) Motion For Summary Judgment. Kawasaki filed a Response (docket no. 75) to the Thompsons' statement of additional facts and a Reply (docket no. 76) in further support of its Motion For Partial Summary Judgment on December 28, 2012. After an extension of time to do so, Ohlins filed a Reply (docket no. 80) to the Thompsons' statement of additional facts.
By Order (docket no. 82), dated January 11, 2013, I granted the Thompsons leave to file a supplemental response to the defendants' Motions For Summary Judgment, based on their assertion that they had only recently obtained additional information relevant to their responses. On January 14, 2013, the Thompsons filed their Supplemental Opposition To Ohlins's Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 84), and their Supplemental Opposition To Kawasaki's Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (docket no. 85). On January 21, 2013, Kawasaki filed its Reply (docket no.
The parties requested oral arguments on the summary judgment motions. My crowded schedule has not permitted the timely scheduling of such oral arguments, and I find that the parties' written submissions on the issues presented are sufficient to resolve the pending motions without oral arguments. Therefore, I will resolve the motions based on the parties' written submissions.
Summary judgment is only appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." FED. R.CIV.P. 56(c) (emphasis added); see Woods v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 409 F.3d 984, 990 (8th Cir.2005) ("Summary judgment is appropriate if viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there are no genuine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."); see generally Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained,
Torgerson v. City of Rochester, 643 F.3d 1031, 1042-43 (8th Cir.2011) (en banc). Summary judgment is particularly appropriate when only questions of law are involved, rather than factual issues that may or may not be subject to genuine dispute. See, e.g., Cremona v. R.S. Bacon Veneer Co., 433 F.3d 617, 620 (8th Cir.2006).
Kawasaki seeks summary judgment on all but the Thompsons' "design defect" claim — that is, on the Thompsons' "manufacturing defect," "breach of implied warranty," "negligence," and "punitive damages" claims — and Ohlins joined in Kawasaki's motion on those claims, then
As the Iowa Supreme Court most recently explained, in Scott v. Dutton-Lainson Co., 774 N.W.2d 501 (Iowa 2009),
Scott, 774 N.W.2d at 504 (footnote omitted) (also noting that "Wright rejected the categorical labels of strict liability or negligence in the context of design defects").
The court in Scott also observed,
Scott, 774 N.W.2d at 505 n. 3. This observation suggests that a "negligent manufacturing defect" claim is still tenable under Iowa law, even after Wright.
Scott, 774 N.W.2d at 505 n. 2. This observation suggests that a "breach of implied warranty" claim may also be tenable under Iowa law, even after Wright.
Nevertheless, where the Thompsons concede that summary judgment is appropriate on their "breach of implied warranty" and "negligence" claims under Iowa law, I will grant the defendants' Motions For Summary judgment on the Thompsons' "breach of implied warranty" and "negligence" claims.
More analysis is required of claims still in dispute. Among those claims are the Thompsons' "manufacturing defect" claims against both Kawasaki and Ohlins. I will first summarize the parties' arguments for and against summary judgment on the "manufacturing defect" claims.
Kawasaki argues that, although the Thompsons have alleged that the motorcycle contained a manufacturing defect — that is, that the motorcycle departed from its intended design, because the steering damper failed to provide sufficient dampening and/or the motorcycle was unstable — the Thompsons have failed to produce any evidence that the motorcycle deviated appreciably from Kawasaki's intended design.
In their original Responses, the Thompsons asserted that information relevant to their "manufacturing defect" claims had recently been produced, so that they required additional time to respond to the defendants' Motions For Summary Judgment on these claims. After being granted leave to supplement their Responses, the Thompsons argue that the steering damper (SD1791) on Scott Thompson's 2007 Ninja ZX-10R did have a manufacturing
In reply, Kawasaki asserts that nothing in the record shows that it called for the functional specification on which the Thompsons rely. Kawasaki also argues that, as Ohlins has explained, the functional specification was an internal testing tolerance, not a design "specification," and that it related to "click" position 15, but the Thompsons' own expert has opined that the steering damper on Scott Thompson's motorcycle was set at "click" position 5, 11, or 17, making a purported "specification" for "click" position 15 irrelevant. In arguments that Kawasaki also adopts, Ohlins asserts that, even if the "tolerance" is accepted as a design "specification," the October 2012 and November 2012 test data on which the Thompsons rely are not evidence that the subject damper was out of tolerance, because the dynamometers used in those tests were never "correlated" to the dynamometer used by Ohlins to conduct the testing that the Thompsons now assert created the manufacturing specification. Ohlins also points out that the subject steering damper was not new, had been in an accident, had been subjected to numerous expert tests, and had been exposed to Midwestern winter weather conditions, all of which can affect performance. Ohlins points out that no expert has opined that, when the testing data was properly "correlated" to the Ohlins dynamometer, it showed that the damper was outside of the 30% left-right balance tolerance. Ohlins also asserts that the Thompsons have failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact, based on admissible evidence, that any manufacturing defect was a proximate cause of Scott Thompson's accident, relying only on one expert's conclusory assertion that the purported manufacturing defect "aggravated the problem of the subject motorcycle having insufficient steering damping and played a role in contributing to cause the accident."
As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has noted,
Linden v. CNH America, L.L.C., 673 F.3d 829, 834 (8th Cir.2012).
More specifically, the Iowa Supreme Court has defined a "manufacturing defect," within the meaning of Iowa products liability law, as follows: "A product `contains a manufacturing defect when the product departs from its intended design even though all possible care was exercised in the preparation and marketing of
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2, cmt. c (emphasis added).
In light of Wright and other authorities, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has concluded that, under Iowa law, "essential elements" of a manufacturing defect claim are (1) the intended design of the product, and (2) how the manufacturing of the particular product at issue departed from the intended product design, and that court has held that, when a plaintiff fails to prove one or both of these elements, summary judgment in favor of the defendant is appropriate. Depositors Ins. Co. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 506 F.3d 1092, 1095 (8th Cir.2007). I have also observed, in a prior case involving a "manufacturing defect" claim under RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(a), as adopted by the Iowa Supreme Court, that "`[w]hat must be shown under either [a negligence or strict liability] theory is that the product in question did, in fact, have a manufacturing defect at the time of sale that contributed to causing the plaintiff's harm.'" Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co. v. SMA Elevator Constr., Inc., 816 F.Supp.2d 631, 663 (N.D.Iowa 2011) (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2, cmt. n, with emphasis added here). Thus, there is a "causation" requirement for a strict liability "manufacturing defect" claim. This conclusion is consistent with the Iowa Supreme Court's recognition, well before it adopted RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2, that, even in strict liability cases, including products liability cases, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant's actions were a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damages. See, e.g., Hagen v. Texaco Ref. & Mktg., Inc., 526 N.W.2d 531, 537 (Iowa 1995).
It is not surprising, then, that Iowa Civil Jury Instruction No. 1000.1 states the elements of a manufacturing defect claim, in light of Wright and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(a), as follows:
Iowa Civil Jury Instruction No. 1000.1. Nor is it surprising that I have previously found that "this formulation of the elements of a manufacturing defect claim is consistent with the formulation of the claim in Wright and RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(a)." Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 816 F.Supp.2d at 663 n. 8.
The "fighting issues" on Kawasaki's and Ohlins's Motions For Summary Judgment on the Thompsons' "manufacturing defect" claims are whether or not the Thompsons can prove — or, for now, generate genuine issues of material fact on-the third and fourth elements of such a claim, as set out just above. I will consider those elements, in turn.
To defeat summary judgment on this claim, on the basis of the third element, the Thompsons must generate genuine issues of material fact that the steering damper on Scott Thompson's 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle, or the motorcycle itself, at the time it left the particular defendant's control, contained a manufacturing defect that departed from its intended design, in one or more ways. Iowa Civil Jury Instruction No. 1000.1; Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 816 F.Supp.2d at 663 n. 8. As the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has suggested, this element has two prongs, which are both "essential elements" of the claim: (1) the intended design of the product, and (2) how the manufacturing of the particular product at issue departed from the intended product design. Depositors Ins. Co., 506 F.3d at 1095.
In their First Amended Complaint, the Thompsons allege that the "manufacturing defects" in Scott Thompson's 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle were that the steering damper failed to provide sufficient dampening and/or that the motorcycle was unstable. See First Amended Complaint,
Turning to the alleged "manufacturing defect" in the steering damper, I must first consider whether the Thompsons have generated genuine issues of material fact on the intended design of the steering damper. Depositors Ins. Co., 506 F.3d at 1095 (concluding that proof of departure from intended design requires proof of both (1) the intended design of the product, and (2) how the manufacturing of the particular product at issue departed from the intended product design); see also Iowa Civil Jury Instruction No. 1000.1 (stating the pertinent element as departure from intended design); Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 816 F.Supp.2d at 663 n. 8 (same). Kawasaki has conceded that its representative, Mr. Okabe, testified in depositions that the steering damper was designed to have a maximum dampening force of 1.5 kilonewtons at .6 meters per second with a tolerance of 30% to account for variation in each motorcycle. See Kawasaki's Brief at 6 (citing Okabe's Deposition, 54:3-55:4, 60:11-61:2, and Kawasaki's Appendix, Exhibit E, pp. 110, 111). Ohlins disputes that the Thompsons have identified any intended design of the steering damper, because Ohlins asserts that the functional specification for left-right balance tolerance of no more than 30%, on which the Thompsons rely, was not a "design specification" at all, but an internal testing tolerance. Ohlins also argues that the "left-right balance tolerance," if it was a "design specification," related to "click" position 15, but the Thompsons' own expert has opined that the damper on Scott Thompson's motorcycle was set at "click" position 5, 11, or 17, making a purported "specification" for "click" position 15 irrelevant.
Although I believe that Kawasaki and Ohlins probably have the better jury argument, I nevertheless conclude that the Thompsons have generated genuine issues of material fact that Kawasaki and Ohlins had a "design specification," that is, an "intended design" for the steering damper that required a maximum dampening force of 1.5 kilonewtons at .6 meters per second with a tolerance of 30% to account for variation in each motorcycle, as Mr. Okabe testified and Kawasaki conceded, and a left-right balance tolerance of no more than 30%. That is, from the evidence in the record cited by the Thompsons, viewed in the light most favorable to the Thompsons, a rational trier of fact could find that these were design specifications for the steering damper, not merely testing tolerances. Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43. Although Ohlins contends that the purported left-right balance tolerance of no more than 30% was only an internal testing standard and that such a standard specified for "click" position 15 is "irrelevant," where the Thompsons' expert has opined that the steering damper on Scott Thompson's motorcycle was set at "click" position 5, 11, or 17, I conclude that these challenges go to the weight of the evidence of a "design specification," not to the existence of evidence of a "design specification" or "intended design," as a matter of law.
I come to a very different conclusion with regard to the prong of this element that requires proof of how the manufacturing of the particular product or component at issue departed from the intended product design. Depositors Ins. Co., 506 F.3d at 1095. First, however, I do not agree with the defendants that evidence that the subject steering damper was not new, had been in an accident, had been subjected to numerous expert tests, and had been exposed to Midwestern winter weather conditions, all of which can affect performance, proves beyond dispute
On the other hand, I do agree with the defendants that the Thompsons have failed to generate a genuine issue of material fact on a defect in the particular steering damper on Scott Thompson's motorcycle, despite the testing data on which they rely, where there is no showing that the dynamometers used in those tests were ever "correlated" (I think meaning "calibrated") to the dynamometer used by Ohlins to conduct the testing that the Thompsons now assert created the design specification, and no expert has opined that, when the testing data is properly correlated to the Ohlins dynamometer, it showed that the damper was outside of the 30% left-right balance tolerance. Without a baseline for comparison, from calibration of the testing equipment used by Drinan Products and RE Suspension to Ohlins's testing equipment, which purportedly established the intended design, or correlation of the Drinan Products and RE Suspension data to Ohlins's testing data, testing data are merely numbers, not proof of anything. See, e.g., American & Foreign Ins. Co. v. General Electric Co., 45 F.3d 135, 139 (6th Cir.1995) (rejecting expert evidence, in part, because the expert was unsure whether equipment had been calibrated). Furthermore, "[c]onclusory expert testimony is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Phillips, 675 F.3d 1126, 1134 (8th Cir.2012) (citing Herrero v. St. Louis Univ. Hosp., 109 F.3d 481, 485 (8th Cir.1997)).
Therefore, the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Thompsons' "manufacturing defect" claim on the ground that the Thompsons' have failed to generate genuine issues of material fact on the element requiring proof that the subject steering damper departed from the intended design of such steering dampers.
In addition or in the alternative, I conclude that the defendants are entitled to summary judgment on the Thompsons' "manufacturing defect" claims, because the Thompsons have failed to generate genuine issues of material fact on the "causation" element of such a claim. Iowa Civil Jury Instruction No. 1000.1 (requiring proof that the "manufacturing defect" was a proximate cause of the plaintiff's damage); Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co., 816 F.Supp.2d at 663 n. 8 (same). The Thompsons assert that one of their experts, Mark Ezra, has concluded that the manufacturing defect in the steering damper, regarding left-right dampening tolerances, contributed to cause Scott Thompson's accident. As Ohlins contends, this expert's causation conclusion is based on a faulty premise, making it insufficient to generate a genuine issue of material fact on "causation," because of the lack of calibration of the testing equipment or correlation of the testing data from which the expert purports to find a manufacturing defect. Again, "[c]onclusory expert testimony is not sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment." Northwest Airlines, Inc., 675 F.3d at 1134.
Therefore, both Kawasaki and Ohlins are entitled to summary judgment on the Thompsons' "manufacturing defect" claims on the ground that the Thompsons' have failed to generate genuine issues of material fact on the "causation" element of such a claim.
Ohlins also seeks summary judgment on the Thompsons' "design defect" claim
In its Supplemental (Amended And Substituted) Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 71), Ohlins argues that the Thompsons have no evidence to suggest that the design of the SD 1791 steering damper was defective per se. Ohlins argues that the "design defect" claim is actually directed at the decision to use the SD-1791 steering damper, with lesser dampening force, on the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle, instead of the SD-1790 steering damper that had been used on the 2006 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle. Ohlins asserts that there is no evidence that it was involved in that decision; rather, it was simply the vendor of an individual component incorporated into the motorcycle by Kawasaki. Ohlins points out that one of the Thompsons' experts, Mark Ezra, stated that he had no criticism of Ohlins's design of the SD 1791 steering damper itself.
In response, the Thompsons paint a much different picture, asserting that Ohlins substantially participated in the selection of the steering damper for the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle, citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 5. More specifically, the Thompsons assert that Ohlins offered advice about the appropriate steering damper for the 2006 Ninja, worked with Kawasaki for over a year on the steering mechanism for that model, and forced changes to Kawasaki's steering design. They argue that one of their experts, Mr. Higinbotham, has described the relationship between Ohlins and Kawasaki as "collaborative," and that Kawasaki's own marketing literature for the 2006 Ninja states that the "racing quality" steering system was developed "in collaboration with Ohlins." The Thompsons also assert that the SD-1791 steering damper was adapted to be used exclusively by Kawasaki as the OEM damper for the Ninja ZX-10R.
In reply, Ohlins argues that, whatever Mr. Higinbotham may have opined, the record evidence shows that Ohlins did not "substantially participate" in the integration of the SD-1791 steering damper into the 2007 Ninja.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that, with respect to design defects, manufacturers of component parts generally are not liable for the design of the final product into which their parts are incorporated. In re Temporomandibular Joint Implants (TMJ) Prods. Liab. Litig., 97 F.3d 1050, 1055 (8th Cir.1996). The rationale for such a rule is that "`[a] component part supplier should not be cast in the role of insurer for any accident that may arise after that component part leaves the supplier's hands.'" Id. at 1056 (quoting Crossfield v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 1 F.3d 701, 705 (8th Cir.1993)); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 5, cmt. a ("As a general rule, component sellers should not be liable when the component itself is not defective as defined in this Chapter. If the component is not itself defective, it would be unjust and inefficient to impose liability solely on the ground that the manufacturer of the integrated product utilizes the component in a manner that renders the integrated product defective.").
However, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 5(b) provides an exception to this rule, as follows:
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 5(b) (emphasis added). The Iowa Supreme Court has not expressly adopted § 5 of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD), although it has expressly adopted §§ 1 and 2. Scott, 774 N.W.2d at 504. Assuming, without deciding, that the Iowa Supreme Court would do so, as part of a comprehensive scheme for products liability law, I look to the language of and comments to § 5(b) itself and to the decisions of other courts for guidance on the requirements for liability of a parts manufacturer for a "design defect" pursuant to § 5(b).
Comment e to this section of the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) explains the "substantial participation" requirement, as follows:
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 5(b), cmt. e (emphasis added).
In light of this comment, the United States District for the District of Minnesota, applying Minnesota law, concluded that recommending a certain specification for a part — in that case, the size of a vent hole for a gas pipeline electrofusion unit — "that is not incorporated into the final design cannot serve as the basis for liability" under § 5(b), and that a part manufacturer "cannot be found to have participated in the design of the [component] if its design recommendation was disregarded." Schanhaar v. EF Technologies, Inc., Civil No. 08-5382 ADM/LIB, 2010 WL 4056045, *4 (D.Minn. Oct. 14, 2010); see also Del Signore v. Asphalt Drum Mixers, 182 F.Supp.2d 730, 745 (concluding, using RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2 and comment e for
It is possible that the Thompsons have generated genuine issues of material fact as to whether Ohlins "substantially participated" in the design of the steering system for the 2006 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle, but the question is whether there is sufficient evidence to generate a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Ohlins "substantially participated" in the design of the steering system for the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle. The Thompsons' assertions notwithstanding, such evidence is sorely lacking here.
The Thompsons rely on e-mails from Ohlins engineers to Kawasaki about the change in the steering damper for the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R. See Plaintiffs' Appendix, Exhibit 11 (March 30, 2006, e-mail from Björkman at Ohlins to Okabe at Kawasaki stating, "May I ask why you want to reduce damping? We have heard that in some case[s], the brackets have cracked. With reduced damping this can be solved. I just want to inform you that many people that are going to race, or just run on track, have bought another needle from our distributors and changed it in the SD. This needle is without bleed hole, so it gives more damping. As I said, I just want to inform you, so you know that some people do like this."); id. at Exhibit 12 (April 11, 2006, e-mail from Okabe at Kawasaki to Björkman at Ohlins, stating, "We think this spec is OK for next year model. But also we want to know the tolerance of damping. How do you think this spec's maixmam [sic] damping of production torelance [sic]? You think tolerance is OK, we go ahead," and Björkman's response, "OK. It is difficult to say the tolerance now. We have only tried one needle. I will set the diameter tolerance of the bleed hole, on the needle drawing, to a little plus tolerance so the damping is not much over this value. I don't think you want very much less damping either, because then there is almost no function left."); id. at Exhibit 10 (May 28, 2006, e-mail from Björkman at Ohlins to Okabe at Kawasaki explaining that "[t]he best way to reduce maximum damping I think is to make a new needle with different bleed hole and nose angle. Do you have the maximum damping value
First, at most, the various e-mails from Ohlins's engineers to Kawasaki about the change in the steering damper for the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R, upon which the Thompsons rely, involve no more than providing mechanical or technical advice about the steering damper, how dampening levels could be changed, and the effect of changing dampening levels. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 5(b), cmt. e ("[P]roviding mechanical or technical services or advice concerning a component part does not, by itself, constitute substantial participation that would subject the component supplier to liability."). Second, those e-mails make clear that Kawasaki, not Ohlins, had the final say over the design decisions, including the level of dampening. See Gudmundson, 232 P.3d at 1073; Toshiba Int'l Corp., 152 S.W.3d at 782; Del Signore, 182 F.Supp.2d at 745. Finally, to the extent that Ohlins made a recommendation about whether or not to reduce dampening — that is, that Kawasaki should not reduce dampening — Kawasaki plainly rejected that advice. Schanhaar, 2010 WL 4056045 at *4.
From the evidence in the record cited by the Thompsons, viewed in the light most favorable to the Thompsons, a rational trier of fact could not find that Ohlins "substantially participated" in the integration of its steering damper into the steering system of the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle. Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43. Consequently, Ohlins cannot be held liable for a "design defect" in the 2007 Ninja ZX10R motorcycle. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 5(b). Ohlins is also entitled to summary judgment on this claim.
The last "claim" still at issue is the Thompsons' claim in
Kawasaki argues that the Thompsons have failed to satisfy the requirement to prove intentional wrongful conduct that far exceeds the bounds of reasonableness to obtain punitive damages against Kawasaki
The Thompsons assert that they have, at the very least, generated genuine issues of material fact on the requirements for an award of punitive damages against Kawasaki. Specifically, they point to evidence that Scott Thompson's motorcycle was defectively designed, and that Kawasaki has not asserted otherwise. They also argue that Kawasaki was more than merely negligent in choosing the steering damper for the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle, meeting the standard for "legal malice," because Kawasaki intentionally and significantly decreased the dampening function of the steering damper on the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R, as compared to the steering damper on the 2006 Ninja ZX-10R; Kawasaki knew that the steering damper on the 2007 Ninja ZX10R was a "safety device" and an essential component for the stability of the motorcycle to prevent uncontrollable "wobble" and other stability problems that caused Scott Thompson's accident; Kawasaki chose to change the steering damper, rather than increase the strength of the mounting bracket, which would not have had the same impact on motorcycle stability; Kawasaki chose to do so, contrary to the warnings and recommendations of Ohlins's engineers; and Kawasaki did so over a very short time period, as compared to the lengthy period invested in developing the steering system for the 2006 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle model, without sufficient testing of the new design.
Kawasaki replies that Ohlins did not question the change in the steering damper based on safety concerns, but questioned the change based on the desires of racing customers. Kawasaki also argues that the Thompsons' experts' criticisms of the development and testing process for the new steering mechanism are legally insufficient to support an award of punitive damages. Kawasaki also argues that there is no evidence that Kawasaki sold the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle with knowledge that it was unreasonably dangerous or with knowledge of prior injuries or accidents caused by the steering damper on that motorcycle. What "customer complaint" evidence the Thompsons have offered, Kawasaki argues, is inadmissible, because the Thompsons have laid no proper foundation for it, that evidence is "riddled with hearsay," and, in any event, it is more prejudicial than probative, where there is no showing of substantial similarity.
Under Iowa law, punitive damages are merely incidental to the main cause of action and they are derived from the underlying cause of action. Campbell v. Van Roekel, 347 N.W.2d 406, 410 (Iowa 1984). Thus, punitive damages can only be awarded when the plaintiff prevails on an underlying cause of action, then proves the requirements for punitive damages under Iowa law. See Holt v. Quality Egg, L.L.C., 777 F.Supp.2d 1160, 1172 (N.D.Iowa 2011) (also concluding that the plaintiff is not required to prove that "willful and wanton conduct" was an element of the underlying claim before punitive damages may be awarded). Here, I have now granted summary judgment in favor of Ohlins on all of the causes of action against it, and I have granted summary judgment in favor of Kawasaki on the "manufacturing
As the Iowa Supreme Court explained, in a products liability case,
Mercer v. Pittway Corp., 616 N.W.2d 602, 617 (Iowa 2000). I have concluded that "punitive damages must be based on evidence that relates to the underlying cause of action," because IOWA CODE § 668A.1 requires that punitive damages be based on sufficient proof that "`the conduct of the defendant from which the claim arose constituted willful and wanton disregard for the rights or safety of another.'" Holt, 777 F.Supp.2d at 1173 (quoting IOWA CODE § 668A.1).
As to the "malice" requirement, the Iowa Supreme Court has also explained,
McClure, 613 N.W.2d at 231. The Thompsons have not asserted that there is any evidence showing that Kawasaki acted with "actual malice," so their punitive damages claim must be based on an assertion that Kawasaki acted with "legal malice" in selling the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle with a "design defect." See Mercer, 616 N.W.2d at 617 (explaining that, under Iowa law, "punitive damages are appropriate only when actual or legal malice is shown"); McClure, 613 N.W.2d at 231 (defining "actual malice" and "legal malice").
Attempting to put more meat on the bones of what "legal malice" means, I note that, in Mercer, the Iowa Supreme Court rejected a punitive damages claim, because the evidence showed only a reasonable disagreement
Kawasaki has specifically admitted that the steering damper is a "safety device" equipped on a motorcycle for the purpose of minimizing kickback and bringing about faster convergence. See Kawasaki's Response To Plaintiffs' Statement Of Additional Material Facts In Opposition To The Kawasaki Defendants' Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 75), ¶ 7. Thus, Kawasaki was necessarily aware that changes to the steering damper had potential safety consequences.
I have rejected the Thompsons's contention that e-mails from Ohlins to Kawasaki about Kawasaki's decision to reduce the dampening force in the steering damper for the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R model motorcycle demonstrate that Ohlins was a "substantial participant" in the design of the steering mechanism for that model. However, the question here is quite different, as to relevance of Ohlins's e-mails to a punitive damages claim against Kawasaki. On that question, I do believe that this evidence generates genuine issues of material fact that Kawasaki had notice of potential problems with reducing the dampening level — even if Ohlins couched its comments in terms of there being almost no dampening at all, not specifically in terms of a "safety" problem — and that Kawasaki then ignored those potential problems. This evidence would warrant a reasonable juror concluding that Kawasaki took a persistent course to reduce the dampening level of the steering mechanism with no care and with disregard of the safety consequences. Id. at 1173-74 (citing cases concerning the relevance of evidence showing that the defendant acted with no care and with disregard of the safety consequences); Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43 (stating the "rational trier of fact" or "reasonable juror" standard for summary judgment). Such evidence is plainly sufficiently close in time to Kawasaki's design decisions to be informative of whether or not Kawasaki acted willfully and wantonly in taking the actions from which the "design defect" claim arose. Id. at 1174.
Additional evidence reasonably supporting a prayer for "punitive damages" in light of the conduct from which the "design defect" claim arose is evidence that Kawasaki made the decision to change the steering damper, admittedly a "safety device," for the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle within a comparatively short time, with
Although I might not award punitive damages on the present record, that is not the question on a motion for summary judgment. From the evidence in the record cited by the Thompsons, viewed in the light most favorable to the Thompsons, a rational trier of fact could find that Kawasaki acted "willfully and wantonly" in designing the steering system of the 2007 Ninja ZX-10R motorcycle, Torgerson, 643 F.3d at 1042-43, so that punitive damages based on the conduct from which the "design defect" claim arose may be appropriate. See Holt, 777 F.Supp.2d at 1173 (citing IOWA CODE § 668A.1 as requiring that punitive damages be based on the conduct from which the underlying cause of action arose). Consequently, Kawasaki is not entitled to summary judgment on the Thompsons' prayer for punitive damages on the "design defect" claim against it.
Upon the foregoing,
1. KHI's and KMC's November 5, 2012, joint Motion For Partial Summary Judgment (docket no. 64) is
2. Ohlins's November 27, 2011, Supplemental (Amended And Substituted) Motion For Summary Judgment (docket no. 71) is
3. This action will proceed to trial only on the "design defect" claim against KHI and KMC in
As the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) explains, in comment n to § 2, the strict liability rule set forth in subsection (a) does not require risk-utility assessment, but a negligence claim does. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) § 2(a) cmt. n. However, "[w]hat must be shown under either [a negligence or strict liability] theory is that the product in question did, in fact, have a manufacturing defect at the time of sale that contributed to causing the plaintiff's harm." Id. Thus, if the [product] did not have a manufacturing defect at the time of sale, then [the plaintiff's] manufacturing defect claim would fail under either a negligence or a strict liability theory.
Nationwide Agribusiness Ins. Co. v. SMA Elevator Constr., Inc., 816 F.Supp.2d 631, 663 (N.D.Iowa 2011).
