JON STUART SCOLES, Magistrate Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the Complaint (docket number 4) filed by Plaintiff Maria Elizabeth Meyer on June 11, 2015, requesting judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's decision to deny her applications for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits. Meyer asks the Court to reverse the decision of the Social Security Commissioner ("Commissioner") and order the Commissioner to provide her disability insurance benefits and SSI benefits. In the alternative, Meyer requests the Court to remand this matter for further proceedings.
On May 29, 2012, Meyer applied for both disability insurance benefits and SSI benefits. In her applications, Meyer alleged an inability to work since January 1, 2009 due to Asperger's Syndrome, ADD, and recurrent migraine headaches. Meyer's applications were denied initially on August 8, 2012. On November 29, 2012, her applications were denied on reconsideration. On November 13, 2013, Meyer appeared via video conference with her attorney before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") David G. Buell for an administrative hearing. Meyer, Meyer's mother, Dr. Kristine Meyer, Ph.D., and vocational expert Roger F. Marquardt testified at the hearing. In a decision dated February 10, 2014, the ALJ denied Meyer's claims. The ALJ determined Meyer was not disabled and not entitled to disability insurance benefits or SSI benefits because she was functionally capable of performing work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. Meyer appealed the ALJ's decision. On April 14, 2015, the Appeals Council denied Meyer's request for review. Consequently, the ALJ's February 10, 2014 decision was adopted as the Commissioner's final decision.
On June 11, 2015, Meyer filed this action for judicial review. The Commissioner filed an Answer on August 14, 2015. On September 16, 2015, Meyer filed a brief arguing there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that she is not disabled and that she is functionally capable of performing other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. On November 13, 2015, the Commissioner filed a responsive brief arguing that the ALJ's decision was correct and asking the Court to affirm the ALJ's decision. On November 22, 2015, Meyer filed a reply brief. On November 23, 2015, Judge Mark W. Bennett referred this matter to a magistrate judge for issuance of a report and recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).
The Commissioner's final determination not to award disability insurance benefits following an administrative hearing is subject to judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court has the authority to "enter. . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner. . . with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." Id. The Commissioner's final determination not to award SSI benefits is subject to judicial review to the same extent as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
The Court "`must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.'" Bernard v. Colvin, 774 F.3d 482, 486 (8th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is defined as less than a preponderance of the evidence, but is relevant evidence a "`reasonable mind would find adequate to support the commissioner's conclusion.'" Grable v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1196, 1201 (8th Cir. 2014). In determining whether the ALJ's decision meets this standard, the Court considers "all of the evidence that was before the ALJ, but it [does] not re-weigh the evidence." Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). "The findings of the Commissioner. . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court not only considers the evidence which supports the ALJ's decision, but also the evidence that detracts from his or her decision. Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 2012)
In Culbertson v. Shalala, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained this standard as follows:
30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994). In Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011), the Eighth Circuit further explained that a court "`will not disturb the denial of benefits so long as the ALJ's decision falls within the available `zone of choice.'" "`An ALJ's decision is not outside that zone of choice simply because [a court] might have reached a different conclusion had [the court] been the initial finder of fact.'" Id. Therefore, "even if inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, the agency's decision will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005). See also Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2014) ("`As long as substantial evidence in the record supports the Commissioner's decision, [the court] may not reverse it because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because [the court] would have decided the case differently.' Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002).").
Meyer was born in 1979. She is a college graduate. It took her seven years to graduate from college due to organizational problems and difficulties getting along with a music professor.
At the administrative hearing, the ALJ inquired whether Meyer was working at the time of the hearing. Meyer responded that she worked part-time at a funeral home as a visitation host, taught a couple students as a private flute teacher, and worked "just very part-time" at a Bath and Body Works as a sales associate. She stated she works about 5 hours per week at the funeral home, 1 hour per week with two flute students, and about 3 hours per week at the Bath and Body Works.
Meyer's attorney asked Meyer to explain why she believed she is incapable of full-time work. Meyer explained:
(Administrative Record at 92-93.) Meyer also noted she kept a migraine diary, which showed having pain "probably" 50 to 70 percent of days, and incapacitating pain 40 percent of the time. Meyer stated stress, changes in weather, noise, and fumes trigger her migraine headaches.
Meyer's attorney also asked Meyer to describe her life with Asperger's syndrome:
(Administrative Record at 95.)
Dr. Kristine Meyer, Ph.D., ("Dr. Meyer") is Meyer's mother. She holds an M.A. in education and school counseling, a Ph.D. in educational leadership, and is a certified mental health counselor. Meyer's attorney asked Dr. Meyer to describe Meyer's difficulties with migraine headaches. Dr. Meyer stated Meyer's headaches affect her verbal communication skills and ability to perform routine functions like using the restroom or making food. Dr. Meyer estimated Meyer has 3 to 5 migraines per month, which could last for up to six days. Dr. Meyer testified that Meyer "is almost immobile and gets that paralyzed look. . . . [S]he's nauseous and vomits and just doesn't get dressed and stays on her couch or her bed for a long time because she just can't function with them."
At the hearing, the ALJ provided vocational expert Roger F. Marquardt with a hypothetical for an individual who:
(Administrative Record at 108-109.) The vocational expert testified that under such limitations, Meyer would be unable to perform her past relevant work, but could perform the following jobs: (1) production assembler, (2) mail clerk, and (3) sewing machine operator.
On February 9, 2012, Meyer met with Dr. Crystal M. Menken, Psy.D., complaining of depressed mood, impaired concentration, and sleep disturbance. In her interview with Meyer, Dr. Menken found:
(Administrative Record at 618.) Upon examination, Dr. Menken diagnosed Meyer with Asperger's disorder, depressive disorder, and migraine headaches (per Meyer's report). Dr. Menken's goals for Meyer were to: (1) provide education on Asperger's disorder, (2) increase her social skills, (3) improve her ability to gain/maintain employment, (4) decrease her depression symptoms, and (5) increase healthy coping skills. Dr. Menken concluded:
(Administrative Record at 621-22.)
On July 14, 2012, Meyer was referred by Disability Determination Services ("DDS") to Carroll D. Roland, Ph.D., for a psychological evaluation. Meyer presented with the following health problems: Asperger's disorder, depression, ADD, and migraines. Dr. Roland noted Meyer "reports 18 to 24 migraines per month with a duration lasting between 2 to 6 days."
(Administrative Record at 428.) Upon examination, Dr. Roland found Meyer's memory to be intact. Dr. Roland opined that she had the ability to remember 2 and 3-step instructions given by supervisory personnel. Dr. Roland also found Meyer is able to understand basic societal mores. Dr. Roland noted Meyer's "history of disorganization, difficulty focusing and susceptibility to distraction in her environment" were consistent with ADD.
In a letter dated September 18, 2012, Theresa Schwem, a community support worker who helped Meyer, provided information regarding Meyer's daily functional abilities. Schwem stated she had worked with Meyer for four months, and observed severe migraine headaches that were disabling. Schwem also noted:
(Administrative Record at 323.) Schwem also noted she was unable to meet with Meyer from July 3-17 and August 27-31 due to Meyer having severe migraine headaches. Finally, Schwem stated she and other Northstar Community Services staff help Meyer "with organization of her house, bills, appointments (for tardiness), [and] medications, because of her ADD, Asperger's, severe migraines, and minor schizoid personality features."
In a vocational report for the time period of March 26, 2013 through April 5, 2013, Emily Dykstra, a vocational services coordinator at NIVC Services, Inc., noted Meyer attended all six of her scheduled evaluation dates, but was 15-90 minutes late for each shift. Meyer also left her job early on two occasions due to migraine headaches. Dykstra opined that Meyer's "attendance meets expectations for competitive employment (90% or better), but her punctuality and chronic migraines will limit her employability."
In the work adjustment report from May 1, 2013 through June 7, 2013, Dykstra noted Meyer attended all of her scheduled worked shifts and had a production rate of 70% to 78%, which met expectations for competitive employment. Dykstra opined that:
(Administrative Record at 382.) Dykstra recommended a job coach to help her with punctuality and adjusting her daily routine schedule as needed.
On July 1, 2013, Susan Faber, Meyer's vocational counselor, opined "[i]t is very clear that [Meyer] does need ongoing supports to maintain her minimal employment, which does not come close to substantial gainful activity."
(Administrative Record at 387.) Faber estimated Meyer's maximum ability to work per week is "probably" 10 hours or less. Faber indicated that Meyer did excellent work, but performed at a slow production rate. Faber concluded:
(Administrative Record at 388.)
In a letter dated October 17, 2013, Barbara Anderson, a community support worker who met with Meyer twice weekly to help Meyer set goals, observed:
(Administrative Record at 554.) Anderson also addressed Meyer's chronic migraine headaches, and opined that the migraines "are debilitating and she has them weekly."
Heidi Berg, a community services supervisor, also provided a letter dated October 18, 2013, regarding Meyer's need for community support services. Berg indicated North Star Community Services meets with Meyer twice per week, and helps Meyer organize all areas of her life so that she can live effectively on her own. Berg opined:
(Administrative Record at 552.)
The ALJ determined Meyer is not disabled. In making this determination, the ALJ was required to complete the five-step sequential test provided in the social security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(g); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); Moore v. Colvin, 769 F.3d 987, 988 (8th Cir. 2014). The five steps an ALJ must consider are:
Hill v. Colvin, 753 F.3d 798, 800 (8th Cir. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(g). "If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled." Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006).
In considering the steps in the five-step process, the ALJ:
Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 2010). At the fourth step, the claimant "`bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to [his] or her past relevant work.'" Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2010). If the claimant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to demonstrate that "`the claimant has the physical residual functional capacity to perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that are consistent with [his or] her impairments and vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience.'" Phillips v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 2012). The RFC is the most an individual can do despite the combined effect of all of his or her credible limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a)(1); Toland v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 2014). The ALJ bears the responsibility for determining "`a claimant's RFC based on all the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual's own description of [his or] her limitations.'" Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 2013); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The ALJ applied the first step of the analysis and determined Meyer had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since January 1, 2009. At the second step, the ALJ concluded from the medical evidence Meyer has the following severe impairments: mood disorder, ADD, Asperger's disorder, and recurrent headaches. At the third step, the ALJ found Meyer did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. At the fourth step, the ALJ determined Meyer's RFC as follows:
(Administrative Record at 59.) Also at the fourth step, the ALJ determined Meyer was unable to perform her past relevant work. At the fifth step, the ALJ determined that based on her age, education, previous work experience, and RFC, Meyer could work at jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Therefore, the ALJ concluded Meyer was not disabled.
Meyer argues that the ALJ erred in three respects. First, Meyer argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her subjective allegations of disability. Second, Meyer argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate and address evidence from non-medical sources. Lastly, Meyer argues the ALJ's RFC assessment is flawed because it is not supported by substantial evidence.
Meyer argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate her subjective allegations of disability. Meyer maintains the ALJ's credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner argues the ALJ properly considered Meyer's testimony, and properly evaluated the credibility of her subjective complaints.
When assessing a claimant's credibility, "[t]he [ALJ] must give full consideration to all the evidence presented relating to subjective complaints, including the claimant's prior work record, and observations by third parties and treating and examining physicians relating to such matters as: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; [and] (5) functional restrictions." Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). An ALJ should also consider a "a claimant's work history and the absence of objective medical evidence to support the claimant's complaints[.]" Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008). The ALJ, however, may not disregard a claimant's subjective complaints "`solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them.'" Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1066 (8th Cir. 2012).
Instead, an ALJ may discount a claimant's subjective complaints "if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole." Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 968 ((8th Cir. 2010); see also Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2000) ("The ALJ may not discount a claimant's complaints solely because they are not fully supported by the objective medical evidence, but the complaints may be discounted based on inconsistencies in the record as a whole."). If an ALJ discounts a claimant's subjective complaints, he or she is required to "`make an express credibility determination, detailing the reasons for discounting the testimony, setting forth the inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors.'" Renstrom, 680 F.3d at 1066; see also Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2008) (An ALJ is "required to `detail the reasons for discrediting the testimony and set forth the inconsistencies found.' Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2003)."). Where an ALJ seriously considers, but for good reason explicitly discredits a claimant's subjective complaints, the Court will not disturb the ALJ's credibility determination. Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007) (providing that deference is given to an ALJ when the ALJ explicitly discredits a claimant's testimony and gives good reason for doing so); Gregg v. Barnhart, 354 F.3d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 2003) ("If an ALJ explicitly discredits the claimant's testimony and gives good reasons for doing so, we will normally defer to the ALJ's credibility determination."). "`The credibility of a claimant's subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide, not the courts.'" Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2010).
In his decision, the ALJ generally determined that:
(Administrative Record at 60.) The ALJ exhaustively reviewed Meyer's complaints of migraine headaches, difficulties associated with Asperger's disorder, and other physical and mental health problems, pointing out that Meyer's symptoms were consistently improved with treatment.
(Administrative Record at 66-68.)
In his decision, the ALJ thoroughly considered and discussed Meyer's treatment history, the objective medical evidence, her functional restrictions, use of medications, work history, and activities of daily living in making his credibility determination. Thus, having reviewed the entire record, the Court finds that the ALJ adequately considered and addressed the Polaski factors in determining that Meyer's subjective allegations of disability were not credible. See Johnson, 240 F.3d at 1148; see also Goff, 421 F.3d at 791 (an ALJ is not required to explicitly discuss each Polaski factor, it is sufficient if the ALJ acknowledges and considers those factors before discounting a claimant's subjective complaints); Tucker v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2004) ("The ALJ is not required to discuss each Polaski factor as long as the analytical framework is recognized and considered. Brown v. Chater, 87 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 1996)."). Accordingly, because the ALJ seriously considered, but for good reasons explicitly discredited Meyer's subjective complaints, the Court will not disturb the ALJ's credibility determination. See Johnson, 240 F.3d at 1148. Even if inconsistent conclusions could be drawn on this issue, the Court upholds the conclusions of the ALJ because they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 801.
Meyer argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate and consider evidence from nonmedical sources. Specifically, Meyer argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the testimony of her mother, Dr. Meyer. Meyer also argues in general, the ALJ failed to properly address the opinions of various community support workers, and in particular, the opinions of Susan Faber, a vocational rehabilitation specialist. Meyer maintains this matter should be remanded for further consideration of the non-medical source evidence.
The Social Security Administration considers community support workers, vocational rehabilitation specialists, and parents to be acceptable, non-medical sources. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1513(d); 416.913(d); Sloan v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 883, 888 (8th Cir. 2007) (providing non-medical sources include social welfare agency personnel, rehabilitation counselors, and parents). Social Security Ruling 06-03p explains how the SSA considers opinions from sources not classified as "acceptable medical sources," or "other non-medical sources." See Id. SSR 06-03p provides that when considering the opinion of a source that is classified as an other, non-medical source, such as a case worker or special education facilitator, "it would be appropriate to consider such factors as the nature and extent of the relationship between the source and the individual, the source's qualifications, the source's area of specialty or expertise, the degree to which the source presents relevant evidence to support his or her opinion, whether the opinion is consistent with other evidence, and any other factors that tend to support or refute the opinion." SSR 06-03p. Furthermore, in discussing SSR 06-03p, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, in Sloan, pointed out:
Sloan, 499 F.3d at 888 (quoting SSR 06-03p). In determining the weight afforded to "other source" evidence an "ALJ has more discretion and is permitted to consider any inconsistencies found within the record." Raney v. Barnhart, 396 F.3d 1007, 1010 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
In his decision, the ALJ thoroughly addressed the opinions of all the non-medical sources. In addressing the statements of Meyer's parents, the ALJ determined:
(Administrative Record at 65.)
It is clear from the ALJ's decision that he considered and addressed the testimony and statements of Meyer's parents, particularly the testimony of Meyer's mother, Dr. Meyer. Furthermore the ALJ provided reasons for discounting the testimony of Meyer's parents. By providing reasons for discrediting Meyer's parents, the ALJ did more than is necessary according to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, for evaluating the credibility of third-party witnesses. In Robinson v. Sullivan, 956 F.2d 836, 841 (8th Cir. 1992), the Eighth Circuit determined that failure to provide any reasons for discrediting a third-party witness is not error when support for discrediting such a witness is found in the same evidence used by an ALJ to find that a claimant's testimony is not credible. See also Lorenzen v. Chater, 71 F.3d 316, 319 (8th Cir. 1995) ("[A]lthough the ALJ failed to list specific reasons for discrediting the testimony of Carol Bennett, it is evident that most of her testimony concerning Lorenzen's capabilities was discredited by the same evidence that discredits Lorenzen's own testimony concerning his limitations."); Buckner, 646 F.3d at 559-60 (discussing Robinson and Lorenzen and applying that reasoning to testimony from the claimant's girlfriend). Because the ALJ explicitly considered the testimony and statements of Meyer's parents in his decision, and provided reasons for discrediting their testimony and statements, the Court concludes the ALJ properly addressed their testimony in making his credibility determinations. Moreover, the Court finds that the reasons articulated by the ALJ for discrediting Meyer's are supported by the reasons for discrediting Meyer's own testimony regarding her limitations. See Buckner, 646 F.3d at 559-60; Lorenzen, 71 F.3d at 319.
The ALJ also addressed the opinions of community support workers who assist Meyer:
(Administrative Record at 66.) The ALJ also addressed the opinions of Susan Faber:
(Administrative Record at 66.)
Having reviewed the entire record, the Court finds that the ALJ properly considered the various opinions of the community support workers and the opinions of Faber in accordance with SSR 06-03p. Furthermore, the Court finds that the ALJ fully and fairly developed the record with regard to these opinions, and adequately explained his reasoning for finding inconsistencies between their opinions and the record as a whole. See Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2007) (providing that an ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully and fairly). Great deference is given to an ALJ's evaluation of "other source" evidence, and the Court concludes that the ALJ adequately addressed the evidence from the non-medical sources. See Raney, 396 F.3d at 1010. Accordingly, even if inconsistent conclusions could be drawn on this issue, the Court upholds the conclusions of the ALJ because they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 801.
Meyer argues the ALJ's RFC assessment is flawed. Specifically, Meyer argues the ALJ's RFC assessment is incomplete because it does not properly account for all of her impairments and functional limitations. Meyer also argues the ALJ's RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Meyer maintains this matter should be remanded for a new RFC determination based on a fully and fairly developed record.
When an ALJ determines that a claimant is not disabled, he or she concludes that the claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that are consistent with claimant's impairments and vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience. Beckley, 152 F.3d at 1059. The ALJ is responsible for assessing a claimant's RFC, and his or her assessment must be based on all of the relevant evidence. Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 803; see also Roberts v. Apfel, 222 F.3d 466, 469 (8th Cir. 2000) (same). Relevant evidence for determining a claimant's RFC includes "`medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual's own description of his [or her] limitations.'" Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 887 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strongson, 361 F.3d at 1070). While an ALJ must consider all of the relevant evidence when determining a claimant's RFC, "the RFC is ultimately a medical question that must find at least some support in the medical evidence of record." Casey, 503 F.3d at 697 (citing Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 738 (8th Cir. 2004)).
Additionally, an ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully and fairly. Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2007); Sneed v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2004); Wilcutts v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 1998). Because an administrative hearing is a non-adversarial proceeding, the ALJ must develop the record fully and fairly in order that "`deserving claimants who apply for benefits receive justice.'" Wilcutts, 143 F.3d at 1138 (quoting Battles v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 43, 44 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Smith v. Barnhart, 435 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2006) ("A social security hearing is a non-adversarial proceeding, and the ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record."). "There is no bright line rule indicating when the Commissioner has or has not adequately developed the record; rather, such an assessment is made on a case-by-case basis." Mouser v. Astrue, 545 F.3d 634, 639 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
In determining Meyer's RFC, the ALJ thoroughly addressed and considered Meyer's medical history and treatment for her complaints.
I find the ALJ properly determined Meyer's credibility with regard to her subjective allegations of disability, properly considered and addressed the opinions of non-medical sources, and properly determined Meyer's RFC based on a fully and fairly developed record. Accordingly, I believe the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
For the reasons set forth above, I respectfully recommend that the district court
The parties are advised, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), that within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy of this Report and Recommendation, any party may serve and file written objections with the district court.
