LEONARD T. STRAND, District Judge.
This matter is before me on a motion for new trial (Doc. No. 76) filed by defendant Cesar Ramos. Ramos filed a supporting brief (Doc. No. 79) and the Government filed a resistance (Doc. No. 83). The motion is fully submitted.
On September 23, 2015, the grand jury returned an indictment (Doc. No. 1) charging Ramos with three counts of making a material false declaration under oath. Doc. No. 1. On January 27, 2016, Ramos filed a motion to dismiss, which I denied on March 23, 2016. Doc. Nos. 13, 41. On April 5, 2016, I entered an order denying in part and granting in part the parties' motions in limine.
Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 33 provides that "[u]pon the defendant's motion, the court may vacate any judgment and grant a new trial if the interest of justice so requires." Fed. R. Crim. P. 33(a). "Although the district court possesses broa[d] discretion to grant a new trial under Rule 33, it must exercise the Rule 33 authority sparingly and with caution." United States v. McClellon, 578 F.3d 846, 857 (8th Cir. 2009) (internal citations omitted). "Unless the district court ultimately determines that a miscarriage of justice will occur, the jury's verdict must be allowed to stand." United States v. Campos, 306 F.3d 577, 579 (8th Cir. 2002).
Ramos' sole argument is that the Government violated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 100 (1986), when it struck potential juror Michael Rodriguez.
Foster v. Chatman, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016). Specifically, "[t]he Fourteenth Amendment prohibits the use of peremptory challenges to strike jurors solely on the basis of race." United States v. Warren, 788 F.3d 805, 812 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 349 (2015) (citing Batson, 476 U.S. at 85).
United States v. Hawkins, 796 F.3d 843, 864 (8th Cir. 2015).
The first step is the simplest Batson step, as the circumstances surrounding the use of peremptory strikes may give rise to an inference of a discriminatory purpose. Johnson v. California, 545 U.S. 162, 173 (2005). A defendant can make a prima facie case by demonstrating that the Government directed its challenges at members of a particular race. See Moran v. Clarke, 443 F.3d 646, 651 (8th Cir. 2006) ("the attempt to strike all black members of the venire and no one else raises an inference of a discriminatory purpose") (citing Green v. Travis, 414 F.3d 288, 299 (2d Cir. 2005)). However, simply stating that a member of a particular group was struck does not establish a prima facie case: "Although the number of African-Americans struck is relevant to determining whether a defendant has made a prima facie case, that evidence alone is insufficient to negate or create such a case." Luckett v. Kemna, 203 F.3d 1052, 1054 (8th Cir. 2000).
Regarding the second element, the Supreme Court has held that the way a juror acts — his or her demeanor during voir dire — can provide a race neutral ground for striking that juror. "[D]eference is especially appropriate where a trial judge has made a finding that an attorney credibly relied on demeanor in exercising a strike." Snyder v. Louisiana, 552 U.S. 472, 479 (2008). The Eighth Circuit has stated:
United States v. Warren, 788 F.3d 805, 813 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 349 (2015). In addition:
United States v. Robinson, 781 F.3d 453, 462 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 136 S.Ct. 596 (2015).
In the final Batson element, the court weighs the credibility of the alleged race neutral explanation against the defendant's burden to prove racial discrimination. See Edwards v. Roper, 688 F.3d 449, 457 (8th Cir. 2012), stating:
See also Stenhouse v. Hobbs, 631 F.3d 888, 893 (8th Cir. 2011), stating:
Ramos relies on the recent Supreme Court case of Foster v. Chatman, ___ U.S. ___, 136 S.Ct. 1737, 1747 (2016), and the recent Eighth Circuit case of United States v. House, ___ F.3d ___, 2016 WL 3144735, at *2 (8th Cir. Apr. 14, 2016). He argues:
Doc. No. 79 at 2. In response, the Government states:
Doc. No. 83 at 8-12.
In his juror questionnaire, Mr. Rodriguez crossed out a question about his past work experience and wrote "what difference does it make?" Doc. No. 85 at 2. Asked about his household he wrote, "I care for [an] elderly parent. She is disabled and I must be there most of the time. She is 85 years old." Id. Under the interests section, Mr. Rodriguez stated that he did nothing in his spare time but work and care for his mother, and that what he read, listened to and watched was "none of your business." Id. at 3. In the section regarding past contacts he and his family/friends have had with law enforcement, he answered several questions with "are you kidding me?" Id. at 4. Finally, he stated that the thinks the judicial system moves too slow, that he could not sit for jury duty, that he has cancer, that he did not have the time to be on a jury and requested that the court excuse him from service. Doc. No. 85 at 5-7.
During voir dire I questioned Mr. Rodriguez about his past jury service. He stated that he served on a jury during a state criminal trial for theft. Doc. No. 87 at 55-56. He went onto say that he personally knew the defendant in that case. Id. at 56. He stated that although he thought the defendant was guilty based on the facts, he "drug" out deliberations because he did not want to see the defendant "behind bars." Id. He then stated that he eventually voted for a guilty verdict because he was "upsetting everybody" and that he followed what the evidence and the law required. Id. at 57.
During the Government's portion of voir dire, Mr. Fairchild questioned Mr. Rodriguez further about the same topic. Id. at 72-76. Mr. Rodriguez reiterated that he had a problem voting guilty in the state criminal case because he felt the defendant was "a good person" who deserved "some help." Id. at 73. Mr. Rodriguez agreed that even though there was no doubt that the defendant had "committed the most serious offense," Mr. Rodriguez thought "for other reasons he should be punished less severely." Id. at 76.
Mr. Fairchild ultimately moved to strike Mr. Rodriguez for cause. I denied the request, stating that although "I under[stood] [the Government's] concern," I felt that because Mr. Rodriguez ultimately stated he would follow the court's instructions, striking him for cause would not be appropriate. Id. at 86-87. The Government then used one of its peremptory strikes to remove Mr. Rodriguez. Following that strike, Ramos' counsel made a Batson challenge and argued that because Ramos is of Hispanic decent, it was improper for the Government to strike Mr. Rodriguez. Id. at 103-04. In response, Mr. Fairchild stated:
Id. at 104-05. Ramos' counsel responded by providing some reasons as to why, in his opinion, Mr. Rodriguez would be a good juror. Id. at 105-06.
I denied the Batson challenge. Id. at 107. I first noted that it was not the court's role to determine whether Mr. Rodriguez would be a good juror. Id. at 106. I then expressed agreement with Mr. Fairchild that it was not at all clear that Mr. Rodriquez was actually of Hispanic descent. Id. I then explained that even if Ramos could make a prima facie showing of discriminatory intent, the Government provided a neutral, permissible explanation for striking Mr. Rodriguez. Id. at 107. While I did not expressly say so, I found the Government's explanation to be credible and determined that Ramos had failed to prove purposeful discrimination.
As set out above, a Batson challenge is a three step process: (1) the opponent of a peremptory strike must make a prima facie showing of discrimination; (2) the proponent of the strike must tender a race neutral explanation; and (3) if a race neutral explanation is presented, the trial court must determine whether the opponent of the strike has proven purposeful racial discrimination.
While the first step in the Batson analysis is usually the easiest, I cannot find that Ramos has met the low bar of establishing a prima facie case. As the Government notes, the record does not establish that Mr. Rodriguez is Hispanic.
The second issue is whether the Government provided a race neutral basis for the strike. Here, the Government has offered numerous neutral grounds for striking Mr. Rodriguez. As discussed above, Mr. Rodriguez acknowledged that when he served as a juror in a prior case, outside influences weighed on him during jury deliberations. He stated that he argued against a verdict of guilty with regard to the most-serious charge because the defendant was a "good guy" who "needed help," despite the fact that the evidence established the defendant's guilt. He also stated that he ultimately changed his mind, and agreed with a verdict of guilty, because the other jurors were becoming upset with him. The fact that Mr. Rodriguez had previously been on a criminal jury, and had argued for a verdict that was contrary to the evidence, was a legitimate, race neutral reason for the Government to strike him.
Additionally, and perhaps more importantly, Mr. Rodriguez had signaled in his juror questionnaire that he was unable or unwilling to serve on a jury. As noted above, Mr. Rodriguez reported that because of his health concerns and his family and work obligations, he did not have the time to be a juror. He underscored his desire to avoid jury service by answering numerous questions in a flippant manner (such as "are you kidding me?"). Mr. Rodriguez' jury questionnaire responses constitute another legitimate, race neutral reason for the Government to strike him.
Because the Government has offered race neutral explanations for its decision to strike Mr. Rodriguez, the final Batson factor asks whether Ramos has shown purposeful racial discrimination. The answer is clearly "no." Quite frankly, based on Mr. Rodriguez's in-court performance and his questionnaire answers, I suspect that most attorneys, regardless of the nature of the case, would have chosen to strike Mr. Rodriguez. He acknowledged that while serving as a juror in a prior case, he relied on an improper reason (his past association with the defendant) to advocate in favor of a verdict that was contrary to the evidence. His questionnaire answers were obnoxious and demonstrated a strong desire to avoid jury service. Accordingly, I find that Ramos has failed, by a very substantial margin, to prove that the Government's decision to strike Mr. Rodriguez was based on Mr. Rodriguez' (alleged) ethnicity.
For the reasons set out above, defendant's motion (Doc. No. 76) for a new trial is
