JON STUART SCOLES, Chief Magistrate Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the Complaint (docket number 4) filed by Plaintiff Chad Thomas Marcotte on November 10, 2015, requesting judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's decision to deny his applications for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits.
The Commissioner's final determination not to award disability insurance benefits following an administrative hearing is subject to judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court has the authority to "enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner . . . with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." Id. The Commissioner's final determination not to award SSI benefits is subject to judicial review to the same extent as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
The Court "`must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.'" Bernard v. Colvin, 774 F.3d 482, 486 (8th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is defined as less than a preponderance of the evidence, but is relevant evidence a "`reasonable mind would find adequate to support the commissioner's conclusion.'" Grable v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1196, 1201 (8th Cir. 2014). In determining whether the ALJ's decision meets this standard, the Court considers "all of the evidence that was before the ALJ, but it [does] not re-weigh the evidence." Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). "The findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court not only considers the evidence which supports the ALJ's decision, but also the evidence that detracts from his or her decision. Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 2012).
In Culbertson v. Shalala, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained this standard as follows:
30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994). In Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011), the Eighth Circuit further explained that a court "`will not disturb the denial of benefits so long as the ALJ's decision falls within the available `zone of choice.'" "`An ALJ's decision is not outside that zone of choice simply because [a court] might have reached a different conclusion had [the court] been the initial finder of fact.'" Id. Therefore, "even if inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, the agency's decision will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005). See also Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2014) ("`As long as substantial evidence in the record supports the Commissioner's decision, [the court] may not reverse it because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because [the court] would have decided the case differently.' Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002).").
Marcotte was born in 1971. He is a high school graduate. He also attended a technical college for one year. In the past, he worked as farm laborer, power line installer/repairer, and truck driver.
Marcotte filed his application for disability insurance benefits on January 6, 2014, and application for SSI benefits on January 16, 2014, alleging disability due to irritable bowel syndrome, hemorrhoids with severe rectal bleeding, depression, bilateral shoulder disability, and cancer survivor with adrenal tumor surgically removed. He alleged he became disabled on February 16, 2013. His application was denied upon initial review, and on reconsideration. On June 29, 2015, Marcotte appeared via video conference with his attorney before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Jan E. Dutton for an administrative hearing.
On November 10, 2015, Marcotte filed the instant action for judicial review. A briefing schedule was entered on January 19, 2016. On April 18, 2016, Marcotte filed a brief arguing there is not substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that he is not disabled and that he is functionally capable of performing other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. On May 18, 2016, the Commissioner filed a responsive brief arguing the ALJ's decision was correct and asking the Court to affirm the ALJ's decision. Marcotte filed a reply brief on May 27, 2016.
Additionally, on April 4, 2016, the parties filed a joint statement of facts addressing Marcotte's background, the case's procedural history, testimony from the administrative hearing, and Marcotte's medical history. See docket number 14. The parties' joint parties' joint statement of facts is hereby incorporated by reference. Further discussion of pertinent facts will be addressed, as necessary, in the Court's consideration of the legal issues presented.
The ALJ determined Marcotte was not disabled. In making this determination, the ALJ was required to complete the five-step sequential test provided in the social security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(g); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); Moore v. Colvin, 769 F.3d 987, 988 (8th Cir. 2014). The five steps an ALJ must consider are:
Hill v. Colvin, 753 F.3d 798, 800 (8th Cir. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(g). "If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled." Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006).
In considering the steps in the five-step process, the ALJ:
Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 2010). At the fourth step, the claimant "`bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to [his] or her past relevant work.'" Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2010). If the claimant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to demonstrate that "`the claimant has the physical residual functional capacity to perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that are consistent with [his or] her impairments and vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience.'" Phillips v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 2012). The RFC is the most an individual can do despite the combined effect of all of his or her credible limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a)(1); Toland v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 2014). The ALJ bears the responsibility for determining "`a claimant's RFC based on all the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual's own description of [his or] her limitations.'" Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 2013); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The ALJ applied the first step of the analysis and determined Marcotte had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since February 16, 2013. At the second step, the ALJ concluded from the medical evidence Marcotte had the following severe impairments: osteoarthritis/bilateral degenerative joint disease of the AC joints with two shoulder surgeries, history of two hernia repairs, obesity, depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder. At the third step, the ALJ found Marcotte did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. At the fourth step, the ALJ determined Marcotte's RFC as follows:
(Administrative Record at 19). Also at the fourth step, the ALJ determined Marcotte is unable to perform his past relevant work. At the fifth step, the ALJ determined based on his age, education, previous work experience, and RFC, Marcotte could work at jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Therefore, the ALJ concluded Marcotte was not disabled.
Marcotte argues the ALJ erred in four respects. First, Marcotte argues the ALJ failed to properly consider his diagnosis of irritable bowel syndrome. Second, Marcotte argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate the opinions of multiple doctors regarding his difficulties with irritable bowel syndrome, including Dr. Persaud (a treating source), Dr. Shook (a treating source), and Dr. Martin (a consultative examining source). Third, Marcotte argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his subjective allegations of disability. Lastly, Marcotte argues the ALJ provided a flawed hypothetical question to the vocational expert at the administrative hearing.
In a somewhat confusing argument, Marcotte asserts the ALJ erred in determining he did not suffer from irritable bowel syndrome, contrary to the evidence in the record. Marcotte maintains the ALJ misread medical records from Dr. Persaud, a treating specialist, who determined Marcotte had no evidence of inflammatory bowel disease, but did show evidence of irritable bowel syndrome. Specifically, Marcotte asserts:
Marcotte's Brief (docket number 15) at 5. While not entirely clear from his brief, Marcotte appears to also contend the ALJ's mistake clouded her consideration of the opinions of Dr. Shook and Dr. Martin, and the ALJ improperly disregarded their findings regarding irritable bowel syndrome. It is unclear what relief, if any, Marcotte seeks, but he concludes the ALJ erred "by incorrectly reading the records of Dr. Persaud, then attacks Dr. Persaud, Dr. Shook and Dr. Martin."
In her response, the Commissioner acknowledges the ALJ "incorrectly referenced the impairments at step three[.]"
Commissioner's Brief (docket number 16) at 7. The Commissioner concludes a deficiency in an ALJ's opinion-writing does not warrant reversal when the deficiency has no bearing on the outcome.
The Court agrees with the Commissioner. Contrary to Marcotte's assertion, in her decision, the ALJ did consider and address Marcotte's diagnosis of irritable bowel syndrome when determining his RFC.
Marcotte argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate and weigh the opinions of his treating physicians, Dr. Persaud and Dr. Shook. Marcotte also argues the ALJ failed to give "good" reasons for discounting Dr. Persaud's and Dr. Shook's opinions. Marcotte concludes this matter should be remanded for further consideration of Dr. Persaud's and Dr. Shook's opinions.
In June 2014, Marcotte met with Dr. Persaud complaining of rectal pain and burning. Upon examination, Dr. Persaud found "extensive" hemorrhoidal disease, but no evidence of inflammatory bowel disease. Marcotte's hemorrhoids were inflamed, but not thrombosed. Dr. Persaud treated Marcotte with stool softeners and ointment for his rectum.
Marcotte returned to Dr. Persaud in July 2015, complaining of bleeding and rectal pain. In reviewing Marcotte's treatment history, Dr. Persaud noted:
(Administrative Record at 513.) Upon limited examination, Dr. Persaud diagnosed Marcotte with irritable bowel syndrome, rectal pain, and bleeding. Dr. Persaud noted Marcotte was "having too much pain for rectal [examination]."
On May 5, 2015, Dr. Shook filled out a treating source functional capacity report for Marcotte. Dr. Shook determined Marcotte could: (1) occasionally and frequently lift 10 pounds; (2) stand and walk for less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday; and (3) sit for less than 2 hours in an 8-hour workday. Dr. Shook opined Marcotte would need to lie down 5-plus times per day after using the bathroom and recovering from back pain. Dr. Shook also found Marcotte could occasionally twist, stoop, crouch, and climb. Dr. Shook further indicated Marcotte would "need frequent [and] prolonged access to bathroom breaks due to [irritable bowel syndrome]."
Additionally, on June 15, 2015, Dr. Shook provided Marcotte's counsel with a letter documenting Marcotte's disability onset date. Dr. Shook opined "I have reviewed [Marcotte's] records and would conclude and concur that he has been totally disabled since February 16, 2013, though again acknowledging that he was severely impaired for some time prior to this."
The ALJ is required to "assess the record as a whole to determine whether treating physicians' opinions are inconsistent with substantial evidence of the record." Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2007) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2)). "Although a treating physician's opinion is entitled to great weight, it does not automatically control or obviate the need to evaluate the record as a whole." Hogan v. Apfel, 239 F.3d 958, 961 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Prosch v Apfel, 201 F.3d 1010, 1013 (8th Cir. 2000)). "The ALJ may discount or disregard such an opinion if other medical assessments are supported by superior medical evidence, or if the treating physician has offered inconsistent opinions." Id.; see also Travis, 477 F.3d at 1041 ("A physician's statement that is `not supported by diagnoses based on objective evidence' will not support a finding of disability. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 2003). If the doctor's opinion is `inconsistent with or contrary to the medical evidence as a whole, the ALJ can accord it less weight.' Id."). The ALJ may discount or disregard a treating physician's opinion if other medical assessments are supported by superior medical evidence, or if the treating physician has offered inconsistent opinions. Hamilton v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 607, 609 (8th Cir. 2008).
Also, the regulations require an ALJ to give "good reasons" for assigning weight to statements provided by a treating physician. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2). An ALJ is required to evaluate every medical opinion he or she receives from a claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d). If the medical opinion from a treating source is not given controlling weight, then the ALJ considers the following factors for determining the weight to be given to all medical opinions: "(1) examining relationship, (2) treating relationship, (3) supportability, (4) consistency, (5) specialization, and (6) other factors." Wiese, 552 F.3d at 731 (citing 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c)). "`It is the ALJ's function to resolve conflicts among the opinions of various treating and examining physicians. The ALJ may reject the conclusions of any medical expert, whether hired by the claimant or the government, if they are inconsistent with the record as a whole.'" Wagner, 499 F.3d at 848 (quoting Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001)). The decision must contain specific reasons for the weight given to the treating source's medical opinion, supported by evidence in the case record, and must be sufficiently specific to make clear to any subsequent reviewers the weight the adjudicator gave to the treating source's medical opinion and the reasons for that weight. SSR 96-2P, 1996 WL 374188 (1996).
Finally, an ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully and fairly. Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2007); Sneed v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2004); Wilcutts v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 1998). Because an administrative hearing is a non-adversarial proceeding, the ALJ must develop the record fully and fairly in order that "`deserving claimants who apply for benefits receive justice.'" Wilcutts, 143 F.3d at 1138 (quoting Battles v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 43, 44 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Smith v. Barnhart, 435 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2006) ("A social security hearing is a non-adversarial proceeding, and the ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record."). "There is no bright line rule indicating when the Commissioner has or has not adequately developed the record; rather, such an assessment is made on a case-by-case basis." Mouser v. Astrue, 545 F.3d 634, 639 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
In her decision, the ALJ addressed the opinions of Dr. Persaud as follows:
(Administrative Record at 24.)
The ALJ addressed Dr. Shook's opinions as follows:
(Administrative Record at 25.)
Having reviewed the entire record, the Court finds that the ALJ properly considered and weighed the opinion evidence provided by Dr. Persaud and Dr. Shook. The Court also finds that the ALJ provided "good reasons" for discounting Dr. Persaud's and Dr. Shook's opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Strongson, 361 F.3d at 1070; Edwards, 314 F.3d at 967. Accordingly, even if inconsistent conclusions could be drawn on this issue, the Court upholds the conclusions of the ALJ because they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 801.
Marcotte argues the ALJ failed to properly consider and weigh the opinions of Dr. Martin, a consultative examining physician who performed a comprehensive examination for Marcotte. Marcotte concludes that this matter should be remanded for further consideration of the opinions of Dr. Martin.
On March 25, 2014, at the request of Disability Determination Services, Dr. Martin performed a comprehensive examination for Marcotte. At the examination, Marcotte's primary complaints were spinal pain, bilateral shoulder discomfort, and irritable bowel syndrome. In reviewing Marcotte's medical records, Dr. Martin noted:
(Administrative Record at 375.) Upon examination, Dr. Martin diagnosed Marcotte with history of irritable bowel syndrome, per patient report. Dr. Martin noted, however, "it must be stated that it is not clear to me that [Marcotte] has really had adequate intervention and treatment for his irritable bowel complaints or his hemorrhoid complaints."
In considering medical evidence, an ALJ is required to evaluate every medical opinion he or she receives from a claimant. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1527(c), 416.927(c). If the medical opinion is not from a treating source, then the ALJ considers the following factors for determining the weight to be given to the non-treating medical opinion: "(1) examining relationship, (2) treating relationship, (3) supportability, (4) consistency, (5) specialization, and (6) other factors." Wiese v. Astrue, 552 F.3d 728, 731 (8th Cir. 2009) (citing 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)). "`It is the ALJ's function to resolve conflicts among the opinions of various treating and examining physicians. The ALJ may reject the conclusions of any medical expert, whether hired by the claimant or the government, if they are inconsistent with the record as a whole.'" Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001)).
Furthermore, when considering a physician's RFC assessment, an ALJ is not required to give controlling weight to the physician's assessment if it is inconsistent with other substantial evidence in the record. Strongson, 361 F.3d at 1070; see also Travis v. Astrue, 477 F.3d 1037, 1041 (8th Cir. 2007) ("A physician's statement that is `not supported by diagnoses based on objective evidence' will not support a finding of disability. Edwards v. Barnhart, 314 F.3d 964, 967 (8th Cir. 2003). If the doctor's opinion is `inconsistent with or contrary to the medical evidence as a whole, the ALJ can accord it less weight.' Id."). "If the RFC assessment conflicts with an opinion from a medical source, the adjudicator must explain why the opinion was not adopted." Social Security Ruling, 96-8p (July 2, 1996).
Additionally, an ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully and fairly. Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2007); Sneed v. Barnhart, 360 F.3d 834, 838 (8th Cir. 2004); Wilcutts v. Apfel, 143 F.3d 1134, 1137 (8th Cir. 1998). Because an administrative hearing is a non-adversarial proceeding, the ALJ must develop the record fully and fairly in order that "`deserving claimants who apply for benefits receive justice.'" Wilcutts, 143 F.3d at 1138 (quoting Battles v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 43, 44 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Smith v. Barnhart, 435 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2006) ("A social security hearing is a non-adversarial proceeding, and the ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record."). "There is no bright line rule indicating when the Commissioner has or has not adequately developed the record; rather, such an assessment is made on a case-by-case basis." Mouser v. Astrue, 545 F.3d 634, 639 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
In her decision, the ALJ thoroughly addressed and reviewed Dr. Martin's opinions and findings on physical examination of Marcotte.
Given the ALJ's thorough review of Dr. Martin's physical examination of Marcotte, and having reviewed the entire record, including the ALJ's overall discussion of the objective medical evidence and Marcotte's treatment history, the Court finds the ALJ properly considered and weighed the opinion evidence provided by Dr. Martin. Specifically, the ALJ granted Dr. Martin's opinions "some" weight, and addressed inconsistencies within their opinions and the record as a whole. Therefore, the Court concludes that the ALJ properly considered and applied the factors for evaluating a consultative examiner's opinions, and properly granted "some" weight to Dr. Martin's opinions. See Wiese, 552 F.3d at 731. Accordingly, even if inconsistent conclusions could be drawn on this issue, the Court upholds the conclusions of the ALJ because they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 801.
Marcotte argues the ALJ failed to properly evaluate his subjective allegations of disability. Marcotte maintains the ALJ's credibility determination is not supported by substantial evidence. The Commissioner argues the ALJ properly considered Marcotte's testimony, and properly evaluated the credibility of his subjective complaints.
When assessing a claimant's credibility, "[t]he [ALJ] must give full consideration to all the evidence presented relating to subjective complaints, including the claimant's prior work record, and observations by third parties and treating and examining physicians relating to such matters as: (1) the claimant's daily activities; (2) the duration, frequency, and intensity of the pain; (3) precipitating and aggravating factors; (4) dosage, effectiveness and side effects of medication; [and] (5) functional restrictions." Polaski v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1320, 1322 (8th Cir. 1984). An ALJ should also consider a "a claimant's work history and the absence of objective medical evidence to support the claimant's complaints[.]" Finch v. Astrue, 547 F.3d 933, 935 (8th Cir. 2008). The ALJ, however, may not disregard a claimant's subjective complaints "`solely because the objective medical evidence does not fully support them.'" Renstrom v. Astrue, 680 F.3d 1057, 1066 (8th Cir. 2012).
Instead, an ALJ may discount a claimant's subjective complaints "if there are inconsistencies in the record as a whole." Wildman v. Astrue, 596 F.3d 959, 968 ((8th Cir. 2010); see also Lowe v. Apfel, 226 F.3d 969, 972 (8th Cir. 2000) ("The ALJ may not discount a claimant's complaints solely because they are not fully supported by the objective medical evidence, but the complaints may be discounted based on inconsistencies in the record as a whole."). If an ALJ discounts a claimant's subjective complaints, he or she is required to "`make an express credibility determination, detailing the reasons for discounting the testimony, setting forth the inconsistencies, and discussing the Polaski factors.'" Renstrom, 680 F.3d at 1066; see also Ford v. Astrue, 518 F.3d 979, 982 (8th Cir. 2008) (An ALJ is "required to `detail the reasons for discrediting the testimony and set forth the inconsistencies found.' Lewis v. Barnhart, 353 F.3d 642, 647 (8th Cir. 2003)."). Where an ALJ seriously considers, but for good reason explicitly discredits a claimant's subjective complaints, the Court will not disturb the ALJ's credibility determination. Johnson v. Apfel, 240 F.3d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Schultz v. Astrue, 479 F.3d 979, 983 (8th Cir. 2007) (providing that deference is given to an ALJ when the ALJ explicitly discredits a claimant's testimony and gives good reason for doing so); Gregg v. Barnhart, 354 F.3d 710, 714 (8th Cir. 2003) ("If an ALJ explicitly discredits the claimant's testimony and gives good reasons for doing so, we will normally defer to the ALJ's credibility determination."). "`The credibility of a claimant's subjective testimony is primarily for the ALJ to decide, not the courts.'" Vossen v. Astrue, 612 F.3d 1011, 1017 (8th Cir. 2010).
In her decision, the ALJ addressed Marcotte's subjective allegations of disability as follows:
(Administrative Record at 25-26.)
It is clear from the ALJ's decision that she thoroughly considered and discussed Marcotte's treatment history, medical history, functional restrictions, activities of daily living, work history, and use of medications in making her credibility determination. Thus, having reviewed the entire record, the Court finds that the ALJ adequately considered and addressed the Polaski factors in determining Marcotte's subjective allegations of disability were not credible. See Johnson, 240 F.3d at 1148; see also Goff, 421 F.3d at 791 (an ALJ is not required to explicitly discuss each Polaski factor, it is sufficient if the ALJ acknowledges and considers those factors before discounting a claimant's subjective complaints); Tucker v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 781, 783 (8th Cir. 2004) ("The ALJ is not required to discuss each Polaski factor as long as the analytical framework is recognized and considered. Brown v. Chater, 87 F.3d 963, 966 (8th Cir. 1996)."). Accordingly, because the ALJ seriously considered, but for good reasons explicitly discredited Marcotte's subjective complaints, the Court will not disturb the ALJ's credibility determination. See Johnson, 240 F.3d at 1148. Even if inconsistent conclusions could be drawn on this issue, the Court upholds the conclusions of the ALJ because they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 801.
Marcotte argues the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert was incomplete because it did not properly account for all of his impairments. Marcotte also argues the ALJ's hypothetical did not contemplate all of his functional limitations. Marcotte maintains this matter should be remanded so that the ALJ may provide the vocational expert with a proper and complete hypothetical question.
Hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert, including a claimant's RFC, must set forth his or her physical and mental impairments. Goff, 421 F.3d at 794. "The hypothetical question must capture the concrete consequences of the claimant's deficiencies." Hunt v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Taylor v. Chater, 118 F.3d 1274, 1278 (8th Cir. 1997)). The ALJ is required to include only those impairments which are substantially supported by the record as a whole. Goose v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Haggard v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 1999) ("A hypothetical question `is sufficient if it sets forth the impairments which are accepted as true by the ALJ.' See Davis v. Shalala, 31 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Roberts v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 110, 112 (8th Cir. 1985).").
Having reviewed the entire record, the Court finds that the ALJ thoroughly considered and discussed both the medical evidence and Marcotte's testimony in determining Marcotte's impairments and functional limitations.
The Court finds the ALJ properly considered and weighed the medical opinion evidence in the record. The Court also finds the ALJ properly determined Marcotte's credibility with regard to his subjective complaints of disability. Finally, the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert properly included those impairments and functional limitations substantially supported by the record as a whole. Accordingly, the Court determines that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and shall be affirmed.
1. The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is
2. Plaintiff's Complaint (docket number 4) is
3. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
