JON STUART SCOLES, Chief Magistrate Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on the Complaint (docket number 3) filed by Plaintiff Penny Lane Sankey on October 30, 2015, requesting judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's decision to deny her applications for Title II disability insurance benefits and Title XVI supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits.
The Commissioner's final determination not to award disability insurance benefits following an administrative hearing is subject to judicial review. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court has the authority to "enter . . . a judgment affirming, modifying, or reversing the decision of the Commissioner . . . with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing." Id. The Commissioner's final determination not to award SSI benefits is subject to judicial review to the same extent as provided in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 42 U.S.C. § 1383(c)(3).
The Court "`must affirm the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole.'" Bernard v. Colvin, 774 F.3d 482, 486 (8th Cir. 2014). Substantial evidence is defined as less than a preponderance of the evidence, but is relevant evidence a "`reasonable mind would find adequate to support the commissioner's conclusion.'" Grable v. Colvin, 770 F.3d 1196, 1201 (8th Cir. 2014). In determining whether the ALJ's decision meets this standard, the Court considers "all of the evidence that was before the ALJ, but it [does] not re-weigh the evidence." Vester v. Barnhart, 416 F.3d 886, 889 (8th Cir. 2005) (citation omitted). "The findings of the Commissioner . . . as to any fact, if supported by substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. . ." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). The Court not only considers the evidence which supports the ALJ's decision, but also the evidence that detracts from his or her decision. Perks v. Astrue, 687 F.3d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 2012)
In Culbertson v. Shalala, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals explained this standard as follows:
30 F.3d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1994). In Buckner v. Astrue, 646 F.3d 549, 556 (8th Cir. 2011), the Eighth Circuit further explained that a court "`will not disturb the denial of benefits so long as the ALJ's decision falls within the available `zone of choice.'" "`An ALJ's decision is not outside that zone of choice simply because [a court] might have reached a different conclusion had [the court] been the initial finder of fact.'" Id. Therefore, "even if inconsistent conclusions may be drawn from the evidence, the agency's decision will be upheld if it is supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole." Guilliams v. Barnhart, 393 F.3d 798, 801 (8th Cir. 2005). See also Cline v. Colvin, 771 F.3d 1098, 1102 (8th Cir. 2014) ("`As long as substantial evidence in the record supports the Commissioner's decision, [the court] may not reverse it because substantial evidence exists in the record that would have supported a contrary outcome, or because [the court] would have decided the case differently.' Krogmeier v. Barnhart, 294 F.3d 1019, 1022 (8th Cir. 2002).").
Sankey was born in 1974. She is a high school graduate. Sankey also attended three years of college and earned an Associate's Degree in nursing. In the past, she worked as a practical nurse, registered nurse, and secretary.
Sankey filed her applications for disability insurance benefits and SSI benefits on December 9, 2011, alleging disability due to two ruptured discs, degenerative disc disease, chronic right arm pain/radiculopathy, depression, adult ADHD, and generalized anxiety disorder. She alleged she became disabled on September 15, 2010. Her applications were denied upon initial review, and on reconsideration. On February 27, 2014, Sankey appeared via video conference with her attorney before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Julie K. Bruntz for an administrative hearing.
On October 30, 2015, Sankey filed the instant action for judicial review. A briefing schedule was entered on January 13, 2016. On April 29, 2016, Sankey filed a brief arguing there is no substantial evidence in the record to support the ALJ's finding that she is not disabled and that she is functionally capable of performing other work that exists in significant numbers in the national economy. On May 27, 2016, the Commissioner filed a responsive brief arguing the ALJ's decision was correct and asking the Court to affirm the ALJ's decision. Sankey filed a reply brief on June 7, 2016.
Additionally, on April 12, 2016, the parties filed a joint statement of facts addressing Sankey's background, the case's procedural history, testimony from the administrative hearing, and Sankey's medical history. See docket number 16. The parties' joint statement of facts is hereby incorporated by reference. Further discussion of pertinent facts will be addressed, as necessary, in the Court's consideration of the legal issues presented.
The ALJ determined Sankey was not disabled. In making this determination, the ALJ was required to complete the five-step sequential test provided in the social security regulations. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(g); Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 140-42 (1987); Moore v. Colvin, 769 F.3d 987, 988 (8th Cir. 2014). The five steps an ALJ must consider are:
Hill v. Colvin, 753 F.3d 798, 800 (8th Cir. 2014); see also 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)-(g), 416.920(a)-(g). "If a claimant fails to meet the criteria at any step in the evaluation of disability, the process ends and the claimant is determined to be not disabled." Pelkey v. Barnhart, 433 F.3d 575, 577 (8th Cir. 2006).
In considering the steps in the five-step process, the ALJ:
Kluesner v. Astrue, 607 F.3d 533, 537 (8th Cir. 2010). At the fourth step, the claimant "`bears the burden of demonstrating an inability to return to [his] or her past relevant work.'" Jones v. Astrue, 619 F.3d 963, 971 (8th Cir. 2010). If the claimant meets this burden, the burden shifts to the Commissioner at step five to demonstrate that "`the claimant has the physical residual functional capacity to perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that are consistent with [his or] her impairments and vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience.'" Phillips v. Astrue, 671 F.3d 699, 702 (8th Cir. 2012). The RFC is the most an individual can do despite the combined effect of all of his or her credible limitations. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(a), 416.945(a)(1); Toland v. Colvin, 761 F.3d 931, 935 (8th Cir. 2014). The ALJ bears the responsibility for determining "`a claimant's RFC based on all the relevant evidence, including the medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual's own description of [his or] her limitations.'" Myers v. Colvin, 721 F.3d 521, 527 (8th Cir. 2013); 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545, 416.945.
The ALJ applied the first step of the analysis and determined Sankey had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since September 15, 2010. At the second step, the ALJ concluded from the medical evidence Sankey had the following severe impairments: disorders of the back, affective disorder, anxiety disorder, and personality disorder. At the third step, the ALJ found Sankey did not have an impairment or combination of impairments listed in 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P, App. 1. At the fourth step, the ALJ determined Sankey's RFC as follows:
(Administrative Record at 15.) Also at the fourth step, the ALJ determined Sankey is unable to perform her past relevant work. At the fifth step, the ALJ determined based on her age, education, previous work experience, and RFC, Sankey could work at jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national economy. Therefore, the ALJ concluded Sankey was not disabled.
Sankey argues the ALJ erred in two respects. First, Sankey argues the ALJ's RFC assessment is flawed because it is not supported by substantial evidence and does not properly set forth her credible functional limitations. Second, Sankey argues the ALJ provided a flawed hypothetical question to the vocational expert at the administrative hearing.
Sankey argues the ALJ's RFC assessment is flawed. Specifically, Sankey argues the ALJ in making her RFC assessment, failed to include limitations regarding her difficulties with both pace, and neck, right arm, and right hand problems. Thus, Sankey contends the ALJ's RFC assessment is not supported by substantial evidence in the record. Sankey maintains this matter should be remanded for a new RFC determination based on a fully and fairly developed record.
When an ALJ determines that a claimant is not disabled, he or she concludes that the claimant retains the residual functional capacity to perform a significant number of other jobs in the national economy that are consistent with claimant's impairments and vocational factors such as age, education, and work experience. Beckley, 152 F.3d at 1059. The ALJ is responsible for assessing a claimant's RFC, and his or her assessment must be based on all of the relevant evidence. Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 803. Relevant evidence for determining a claimant's RFC includes "`medical records, observations of treating physicians and others, and an individual's own description of his [or her] limitations.'" Lacroix v. Barnhart, 465 F.3d 881, 887 (8th Cir. 2006) (quoting Strongson, 361 F.3d at 1070). While an ALJ must consider all of the relevant evidence when determining a claimant's RFC, "the RFC is ultimately a medical question that must find at least some support in the medical evidence of record." Casey, 503 F.3d at 697 (citing Masterson v. Barnhart, 363 F.3d 731, 738 (8th Cir. 2004)).
Additionally, an ALJ has a duty to develop the record fully and fairly. Cox v. Astrue, 495 F.3d 614, 618 (8th Cir. 2007). Because an administrative hearing is a non-adversarial proceeding, the ALJ must develop the record fully and fairly in order that "`deserving claimants who apply for benefits receive justice.'" Wilcutts, 143 F.3d at 1138 (quoting Battles v. Shalala, 36 F.3d 43, 44 (8th Cir. 1994)); see also Smith v. Barnhart, 435 F.3d 926, 930 (8th Cir. 2006) ("A social security hearing is a non-adversarial proceeding, and the ALJ has a duty to fully develop the record."). "There is no bright line rule indicating when the Commissioner has or has not adequately developed the record; rather, such an assessment is made on a case-by-case basis." Mouser v. Astrue, 545 F.3d 634, 639 (8th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted).
Furthermore, an ALJ is required to evaluate every medical opinion he or she receives from a claimant. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c). If the medical opinion is not from a treating source, then the ALJ considers the following factors for determining the weight to be given to the non-treating medical opinion: "(1) examining relationship, (2) treating relationship, (3) supportability, (4) consistency, (5) specialization, and (6) other factors." Wiese v. Astrue, 552 F.3d 728, 731 (8th Cir. 2008). "`It is the ALJ's function to resolve conflicts among the opinions of various treating and examining physicians. The ALJ may reject the conclusions of any medical expert, whether hired by the claimant or the government, if they are inconsistent with the record as a whole.'" Wagner v. Astrue, 499 F.3d 842, 848 (8th Cir. 2007) (quoting Pearsall v. Massanari, 274 F.3d 1211, 1219 (8th Cir. 2001)).
The Court will first address the ALJ's consideration of Sankey's alleged difficulties with pace. Sankey argues the ALJ failed to fully adopt the opinions of Dr. Dan L. Rogers, Ph.D., a consultative examining psychologist, when making her RFC assessment for Sankey. Specifically, Sankey asserts the ALJ did not include Dr. Rogers' opinion that she "is able to understand and remember instructions, procedures, and locations[, but] . . . her pace is poor and even though she can maintain attention most of the time, her concentration is poor, consequently, she is not able to reliably carry out instructions" in her RFC determination for Sankey.
In her decision, the ALJ thoroughly reviewed Sankey's medical history and explained her reasoning for finding only moderate limitations with regard to Sankey's concentration, persistence, and pace. Specifically, the ALJ determined:
(Administrative Record at 14.) Based on this finding, the ALJ in her RFC assessment limited Sankey to "simple, routine tasks."
In Brachtel v. Apfel, a claimant was found to "often" have deficiencies of concentration, persistence, or pace. 132 F.3d 417, 421 (8th Cir. 1997). The ALJ's RFC assessment in Brachtel, provided that the claimant had the ability "`to do only simple routine repetitive work, which does not require close attention to detail.'" Id. (quotation omitted). Upon review, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals determined the limitations requiring the claimant to only do "simple routine repetitive work," properly accounted for the claimant's deficiencies in concentration, persistence, and pace in the ALJ's RFC assessment. Id.; see also Howard v. Massanari, 255 F.3d 577, 582 (8th Cir. 2001) (finding the ability to do simple, repetitive, routine tasks adequately captures a claimant's deficiencies in concentration, persistence, or pace). Accordingly, in this case, the Court finds the ALJ's RFC determination that Sankey is able to perform "simple, routine tasks" adequately accounts for Sankey's deficiencies in concentration, attention, and pace.
In her decision, the ALJ also thoroughly considered Dr. Rogers' opinions and addressed his opinions as follows:
(Administrative Record at 18-19.)
Having reviewed the entire record, the Court also finds the ALJ properly considered and weighed the medical opinion evidence from Dr. Rogers. The Court also finds that the ALJ provided "good reasons" for the weight she assigned to Dr. Rogers' medical opinions. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(c)(2); Strongson, 361 F.3d at 1070; Edwards, 314 F.3d at 967. Because the ALJ gave only partial weight to Dr. Rogers' opinion and fully explained her reasoning for finding only moderate limitations in the area of pace, the Court concludes the ALJ's RFC assessment on this issue is sufficient. See Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 803 (providing an ALJ's assessment of a claimant's RFC must be based on relevant evidence). Even if inconsistent conclusions could be drawn on this issue, the Court upholds the conclusions of the ALJ because they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 801.
Turning to the issue of Sankey's alleged neck, right arm, and hand problems, the ALJ thoroughly addressed and reviewed Sankey's medical history, including treatment for back, neck, shoulder, arm, and hand pain. Specifically, the ALJ found:
(Administrative Record at 17.) The ALJ also outlined Sankey's activities of daily living and determined her alleged limitations, including problems with her neck, right arm, and right hand, were inconsistent with her daily activities.
Having reviewed the entire record, the Court concludes the ALJ properly considered Sankey's medical records, observations of treating physicians, and Sankey's own description of her limitations in making the ALJ's RFC assessment with regard to Sankey's ability to use are arms and hands. See Lacroix, 465 F.3d at 887. The ALJ also fully and fairly developed the record with regard to Sankey's limitations associated with her neck, right arm, and right hand problems. See Cox, 495 F.3d at 618. The Court concludes the ALJ's RFC assessment with regard to Sankey's ability to use her arms and hands is supported by substantial evidence in the record. See Bernard, 774 F.3d at 486. Even if inconsistent conclusions could be drawn on this issue, the Court upholds the conclusions of the ALJ because they are supported by substantial evidence on the record as a whole. Guilliams, 393 F.3d at 801.
In conclusion, the Court will also address the ALJ's overall RFC assessment for Sankey. In her assessment, the ALJ thoroughly addressed and considered Sankey's medical history and treatment for all of her complaints in determining her RFC.
Sankey argues the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert was incomplete because it did not properly account for all of her impairments. Sankey also argues the ALJ's hypothetical question did not contemplate all of her functional limitations. Sankey maintains this matter should be remanded so that the ALJ may provide the vocational expert with a proper and complete hypothetical question.
Hypothetical questions posed to a vocational expert, including a claimant's RFC, must set forth his or her physical and mental impairments. Goff, 421 F.3d at 794. "The hypothetical question must capture the concrete consequences of the claimant's deficiencies." Hunt v. Massanari, 250 F.3d 622, 625 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Taylor v. Chater, 118 F.3d 1274, 1278 (8th Cir. 1997)). The ALJ is required to include only those impairments which are substantially supported by the record as a whole. Goose v. Apfel, 238 F.3d 981, 985 (8th Cir. 2001); see also Haggard v. Apfel, 201 F.3d 591, 595 (8th Cir. 1999) ("A hypothetical question `is sufficient if it sets forth the impairments which are accepted as true by the ALJ.' See Davis v. Shalala, 31 F.3d 753, 755 (8th Cir. 1994) (quoting Roberts v. Heckler, 783 F.2d 110, 112 (8th Cir. 1985).").
Having reviewed the entire record, the Court finds that the ALJ thoroughly considered and discussed both the medical evidence and Sankey's testimony in determining Sankey's impairments and functional limitations.
The Court finds the ALJ properly considered and weighed the medical opinion evidence in the record. The Court also finds the ALJ considered the medical evidence as a whole, and made a proper RFC determination based on a fully and fairly developed record. Finally, the ALJ's hypothetical question to the vocational expert properly included those impairments and functional limitations substantially supported by the record as a whole. Accordingly, the Court determines that the ALJ's decision is supported by substantial evidence and shall be affirmed.
1. The final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security is
2. Plaintiff's Complaint (docket number 3) is
3. The Clerk of Court is directed to enter judgment accordingly.
