JAMES E. GRITZNER, District Judge.
This matter comes before the Court on a motion for summary judgment, filed August 18, 2009, by Defendant Indiana Mills
IMMI is an Indiana corporation with its principal place of business in Westfield, Indiana. IMMI designed and manufactured the seat belt that was installed on the dozer Linden drove that gave rise to the present lawsuit. CNH America LLC, (Case) installed the seat belt on the dozer at its Burlington, Iowa, plant. Case sold and delivered the dozer to an Atlanta, Georgia, company in January 1997; and Baker Woods Construction, a Georgia company, bought the dozer in 1998. Linden, then a resident of Georgia, was driving the dozer near Douglasville, Georgia, on March 12, 2007, when it overturned and Linden was injured. Linden sued IMMI and Case in the Northern District of Georgia on May 29, 2007, but voluntarily dismissed that complaint in March 2008. Linden then moved to Iowa.
On January 30, 2009, Linden commenced this diversity jurisdiction lawsuit alleging strict products liability claiming IMMI's seat belt was defective in its design, manufacture, warnings, and instructions as well as alleging that IMMI was negligent. In the present motion, IMMI argues that under Iowa choice-of-law analysis, the statute of repose in either Indiana, Ind.Code Ann. § 34-20-3-1(a)-(b) (West 2009), or Georgia, Ga.Code Ann. § 51-1-11(b)-(c) (West 2009), should apply; Linden resists, arguing that the Iowa statute of repose, Iowa Code § 614.1(2A) (2009), should apply.
"Summary judgment is appropriate when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Myers v. Lutsen Mtns. Corp., 587 F.3d 891, 893 (8th Cir.2009); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). "A dispute is genuine if the evidence is such that it could cause a reasonable jury to return a verdict for either party." Miner v. Local 373, 513 F.3d 854, 860 (8th Cir.2008) (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)). On a motion for summary judgment, the Court views the evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovant. Id. The nonmovant "must set forth specific facts sufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial" and "may not rest upon mere denials or allegations in the pleadings." Id. (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986)). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505; Wells Fargo Fin. Leasing, Inc. v. LMT Fette, Inc., 382 F.3d 852, 856 (8th Cir.2004).
"[T]he issue of the appropriate choice of law is a question of law for the
A true conflict exists when there is an actual difference in the relevant laws of the different states. Consul Gen. of Rep. of Indonesia v. Bill's Rentals, Inc., 330 F.3d 1041, 1045 (8th Cir.2003). Applying the facts in this case reveals a true conflict. Case sold and delivered the dozer more than ten years but less than fifteen years before the accident that injured Linden occurred. Neither the Indiana nor the Georgia statute of repose allows Linden to commence an action more than ten years after the sale or delivery of the dozer.
Iowa has adopted the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws "most significant relationship" methodology for choice-of-law issues. Veasley v. CRST Int'l, Inc., 553 N.W.2d 896, 897 (Iowa 1996). The most significant relationship test is outlined in the Restatement as follows:
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971). As stated in the test, Iowa incorporates the provisions of § 6 of the Restatement as follows:
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 (1971); Veasley, 553 N.W.2d at 897-98. The Court will evaluate each factor in turn.
IMMI argues that this factor unequivocally favors application of Georgia's law while Linden argues that Georgia was merely a fortuitous location for the injury and is not significant in a choice-of-law analysis.
The place of injury is of little importance when the state wherein the injury occurred has no other interest in the case. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. e ("[T]he place of injury will not play an important role . . . when the place of injury can be said to be fortuitous or . . . bears little relation to the
Citing the comments to Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws, IMMI argues that the place of injury is important in a personal injury choice-of-law analysis, reasoning that "persons who cause injury in a state should not ordinarily escape liabilities imposed by the local law of that state on account of the injury." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. e. Yet, with an ironic twist, IMMI asserts that the place of injury should be given significant weight in this Court's analysis to allow IMMI to escape liability. Because this is a product liability action, following the Restatement's directive to evaluate the contacts according to their relative importance with respect to the particular issue, the place of injury is much less important than the place where the conduct that caused the injury occurred. Id. The Court does not give the place of injury decisive weight in recognition that Iowa has abandoned the lex loci delicti rule for choice-of-law analysis. Veasley, 553 N.W.2d at 897. With a stronger focus on where the challenged conduct occurred in a product liability action,
IMMI argues that it designed, manufactured, and marketed the seat belt in Indiana. Linden asserts that the final product was made or assembled in Iowa, and design decisions that led to the seat belt failure were made in Iowa.
Federal courts interpreting Iowa law have held that the place where conduct causing the injury occurred in products liability cases is "where the design, manufacture, and marketing conduct relating to the allegedly defective product occurred." Jones, 460 F.Supp.2d at 970; Johnson v. Am. Leather Specialties Corp., 578 F.Supp.2d 1154, 1167 (N.D.Iowa 2008). "In addition, in a products liability case, the place where the design, manufacture, and marketing conduct relating to the allegedly defective product occurred is of relatively greater weight than the `place of injury.'" Johnson, 578 F.Supp.2d at 1167 (citing Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2), cmt. e ("[W]hen the place of injury . . . is fortuitous and, with respect to the particular issue, bears little relation to the occurrence and the parties, the place where the defendant's conduct occurred will usually be given particular weight in determining the state of the applicable law.")).
As the parties dispute the location of the design, manufacture, and marketing of the allegedly defective product, the Court must identify the allegedly defective product for purposes of the claims against IMMI. IMMI insists that the product at issue in the claims against IMMI is the seat belt only, which was designed, developed,
In his complaint, Linden alleges that the seat belt was unreasonably dangerous when IMMI designed and manufactured it or "at the time it left [IMMI]'s control to be assembled by [Case] in Iowa." Compl. ¶ 34. Seat belts were shipped "F.O.B. Westfield, Indiana." Def. App. 38. Thus, the seat belts left IMMI's control in Indiana, already allegedly unreasonably dangerous but not yet incorporated into the dozer. Therefore, the Court will consider the seat belt alone as the claimed defective product for purposes of this motion and this Defendant.
In Foster v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 502 F.2d 867 (8th Cir.1974), a fuse manufactured in Iowa was incorporated into a grenade in Texas that exploded in a soldier's hand in Georgia. Id. at 869. The Eighth Circuit applied Iowa's then controlling most significant relationship test to determine the applicable law in a product liability action. Id. at 869-71. The court determined that Iowa law should apply, even though only the fuse was manufactured in Iowa.
Linden asserts that the joint decisions IMMI and Case made in Iowa about placing the seat belt on the subject dozer establish that the conduct that caused the injury occurred in Iowa rather than Indiana because those decisions made the seat belt defective. Linden relies on Jones v. Winnebago Indus., Inc, for the proposition that the place where the finished product is designed and manufactured, in this case the dozer with the seat belt installed, is the relevant product to consider for this factor. In Jones, the defective product was a slide-out mechanism incorporated into a Winnebago recreational vehicle in Iowa. Jones, 460 F.Supp.2d at 959.
Linden argues that the decision not to warn customers about the finite life of the seat belts was made in Iowa, thus linking IMMI's decision-making to Iowa. The record indicates that discussions between IMMI and Case about the finite life of the seat belt were based on tests done by John Deere that showed that the seat belt webbing deteriorated over time. The defect identified by Linden at oral argument, however, is that the placement of the belt allowed the buckle to rub under the circumstances of normal use in a way that eventually led the buckle to fail. Nothing in the record indicates that any decisions were made to not warn customers about the defect alleged by Linden, let alone decisions in Iowa. Furthermore, nothing in the record references the defect asserted by Linden. Without any mention of the rubbing defect in the record, Linden has not generated a factual issue that joint decisions made by IMMI and Case in Iowa led to this defect.
Linden does not directly claim that IMMI made any design or manufacturing changes at Case's behest, rather he merely asserts that advice and input concerning the seat belts were received in Iowa. For the specific purposes of the conflict of laws analysis currently before the Court, that is not enough.
Based on the discussion above, this factor weighs heavily in favor of the application of Indiana law because this is a product liability action. See Johnson, 578 F.Supp.2d at 1167.
The third factor used to determine which state has the most significant relationship with the lawsuit is the ubication of the parties. Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2)(c). Section 145 comment e notes that the weight accorded to domicile, residence, place of incorporation, and place of business depends upon the extent to which they are "grouped" with other contacts. Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws § 145 cmt. e. The same comment also notes that a corporation's principal place of business is of more importance than its place of incorporation. Id. The Court will consider the residence of all parties to this motion.
Linden further argues that this factor favors application of Iowa law because he is a resident of Iowa. IMMI asserts that Linden only moved to Iowa for litigation purposes and should be considered a resident of Georgia for purposes of this motion. IMMI avers that Linden's residence at the time of injury is the relevant inquiry. IMMI cites to various other jurisdictions in support of its argument. See, e.g., Hall v. Gen. Motors Corp., 229 Mich.App. 580, 582 N.W.2d 866, 870 (1998) (after a survey of cases determining residence for choice-of-law purposes the court stated, "[t]he rationale that permeates these decisions is a judicial objective of preventing plaintiffs from forum shopping by post injury moves"); Reich v. Purcell, 67 Cal.2d 551, 63 Cal.Rptr. 31, 432 P.2d 727, 730 (1967) (Traynor, CJ) ("[Plaintiff's] residence and domicile at the time of the accident are the relevant residence and domicile. At the time of the accident the plans to change the family domicile were not definite and fixed, and if the choice of law were made to turn on events happening after the accident, forum shopping would be encouraged."). Linden's move may or may not have been motivated by this litigation. However, the Court finds the rationale of Hall and Reich persuasive; therefore, it considers Linden's residence to be Georgia for purposes of this portion of the conflict of laws analysis.
Thus, considering the residence of both Linden and IMMI, this factor favors application of either Indiana or Georgia law.
The parties agree, as does the Court, that there was no relationship between the parties relevant to consideration of this motion. See Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2)(d) (fourth factor to be taken into account is "the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered") (emphasis added); see also Johnson, 578 F.Supp.2d at 1168 (noting that Restatement contemplates that no relationship might exist and finding no relevant relationship between the parties such that the fourth factor did not favor application of any state's law). Therefore, this factor is neutral.
Under the foregoing analysis, it is clear that balancing the § 145 factors favors application of Indiana law. The place where conduct causing the injury occurred is Indiana, as is the principal place of business of IMMI. While the injury occurred in Georgia, and Linden resided in Georgia at the time of the accident, the place where conduct causing the injury occurred is given more weight than the place of injury. Johnson, 578 F.Supp.2d at 1167 (citing Restatement (Second) of
Iowa choice-of-law analysis incorporates the principles of Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 in evaluating the contacts taken into account by § 145. Veasley, 553 N.W.2d at 897-98. The Court's ultimate determination must be which state "has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6." Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(1); accord Veasley, 553 N.W.2d at 898. Comment b to Restatement (Second) Conflicts of Laws § 145 states as follows:
"Respect for interstate and international systems is maintained when the forum state, when choosing to apply its own law, has a `substantial connection' with the issue." Veasley, 553 N.W.2d at 899. The Iowa Supreme Court noted in analyzing this factor that the Iowa law at issue was "not so abnormal that an application of Iowa law would greatly disrupt interstate order." Id.
Linden argues that Iowa has a substantive connection with the issue because IMMI tested, helped fit, and discussed the seat belt with Case in Iowa, and Case built the dozer and installed the seat belt in Iowa. Linden also argues that Iowa's statute of repose is not an outlier when considering all statutes of repose in affect in the United States, and that some jurisdictions have no such limitation. IMMI argues that the claimed substantive connection is really not substantive at all because one of its customers merely incorporated its product into a dozer in Iowa.
Under the restrictions of the current analysis, the Court finds IMMI's Iowa connection is tenuous rather than substantive. The major aspects at issue for purposes of this motion—design, manufacture, and marketing (failure to warn)—happened in Indiana. Iowa's statute of repose cannot be considered abnormal as it coincides with the statute of repose of at least one other state. See Iowa Code Ann. § 614.1(2A); Tex. Code Ann., Civil Practice & Remedies § 16.012. Notwithstanding the non-abnormality of Iowa's statute of repose, this factor does not favor application of Iowa law over Indiana law because Iowa does not have a substantial connection with the issue. Based on the consideration of the § 145 factors, Indiana has the dominant interest; therefore, Indiana has an appropriate substantive connection with the product liability issues in this case. See Johnson, 578 F.Supp.2d at 1169-70.
The relevant policies of the forum and other states are the second and third significant § 6 factors to consider in a tort case. Jones, 460 F.Supp.2d at 973.
IMMI argues that Iowa has no interest in applying its law because IMMI is not an
The underlying purpose of Indiana's statute of repose shows
Estate of Shebel v. Yaskawa Elec. Am. Inc., 713 N.E.2d 275, 278 (Ind.1999) (citations omitted). Indiana's statute of repose is focused on providing Indiana manufacturers a degree of certainty regarding liability for their products. As such, Indiana policy favors the application of its statute of repose to IMMI, an Indiana company. Applying Iowa's statute of repose would be repugnant to the stated policy of Indiana's statute of repose.
Georgia's statute of repose was enacted to stabilize insurance underwriting and eliminate stale claims. Love v. Whirlpool Corp., 264 Ga. 701, 449 S.E.2d 602, 605 (1994). The concern for stabilizing insurance underwriting was "generated by the open-ended liability of manufacturers." Id. The second purpose, eliminate stale claims, may have arisen out of concern for the courts or manufacturers; but since no Georgia manufacturer appears in this case, the purposes of Georgia's statute of repose would not be offended by applying another state's law, and this factor does not favor applying Georgia law.
Linden argues that since he is a resident of Iowa, Iowa has a great interest in fully compensating him as a tort victim. Since he states in his response
Since application of any statute of repose is merely a mathematical exercise, this factor is neutral.
The Iowa Supreme Court recognized that the other § 6 factors may be of little
Under Iowa's choice-of-law analysis, the Court finds that Indiana has the most significant relationship to the parties and issues in this case for purposes of this motion. IMMI designed, manufactured, and marketed the seat belt in Indiana, and Indiana has an interest in applying its product liability laws to products manufactured in Indiana. While Linden may be a current resident of Iowa, and the seat belt was incorporated into the dozer by Case in Iowa, those facts do not outweigh Indiana's interest manifested by application of the most significant relationship methodology. Accordingly, the Court will apply Indiana law to Linden's claims against IMMI.
Indiana's statute of repose bars any product liability action under strict liability or negligence to be commenced more than ten years after the product is delivered to the initial user. Ind. Code Ann. § 34-20-3-1 (West 2009). In this case, the seat belt was delivered to the initial user and incorporated into the dozer in January 1997. This suit was commenced in January 2009, more than twelve years after initial delivery. Therefore, Linden's claims against IMMI are barred as a matter of law.
For the reasons stated, Defendant IMMI's Motion for Summary Judgment (Clerk's No. 49) must be
Ind. Code Ann. § 34-20-3-1(a)-(b) (West 2009).
Georgia's statute of repose contains the following relevant provisions:
Ga. Code Ann. § 51-1-11(b)-(c) (West 2009).
Iowa Code § 614.1(2A) (2009).
