MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

ROBERT W. PRATT, Chief Judge.

Currently before the Court are two motions for summary judgment. The first motion was filed by Iowa Right to Life Committee, Inc. ("IRTL") on January 14, 2011. Clerk's No. 44. The above-captioned government officials (collectively, "Defendants") filed a response on February 4, 2011. Clerk's No. 47. IRTL filed a reply on February 11, 2011. Clerk's No. 50. IRTL also filed two "Notices of Additional Authority" in support of its motion on June 9, 2011. Clerk's Nos. 51, 52. The second motion was filed by Defendants on January 14, 2011. Clerk's No. 45. IRTL filed a response on February 4, 2011. Clerk's No. 48. Defendants filed a reply on February 11, 2011. Clerk's No. 49. The matters are fully submitted.2

I. FACTUAL & PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The following facts are undisputed, unless otherwise noted. IRTL is an Iowa nonprofit corporation that is exempt from federal income taxes pursuant to 26 U.S.C. § 501(c)(4). Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts (hereinafter "Pl.'s Facts") ¶¶ 1, 7 (Clerk's No. 44-2); see also Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Statement of Undisputed Facts (hereinafter "Defs.' Resp. re Facts") ¶ 1, 7 (Clerk's No. 47-1). IRTL is affiliated with the National Right to Life Committee, Inc. and is funded solely by donations. See Pl.'s Facts ¶ 6. According to IRTL's mission statement, its "primary purpose is `to present factual information upon which individuals may make an informed decision about the various topics of fetal development, abortion, and alternatives to abortion, euthanasia, infanticide and prevention of cruelty to children.'" Id. IRTL asserts that "its major purpose is not and will never be the nomination or election of candidates."3 Id. ¶ 7 (citing Compl. ¶ 15).

Defendants are the officers and members of the Iowa Ethics and Campaign Disclosure Board (hereinafter the "Board"). Pl.'s Facts ¶¶ 2-3. Therefore, Defendants "have the power to investigate violations of, and to enforce the provisions of, Iowa Code chapter 68A, chapter 68B, and the rules adopted by the Board." Id.

In January 2010, the United States Supreme Court issued its opinion in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission. See ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 876, 886, 175 L.Ed.2d 753 (2010). In April 2010, Iowa revised its election laws and enacted new administrative rules.4

IRTL "wants to make independent expenditures to support candidates who it believes will fight to protect issues that are important to its organization, such as protecting life," but, according to IRTL, it "is chilled from doing so due to the burdens imposed by the restrictions challenged here—particularly the uncertainty of when PAC status might be imposed—and the potential civil and criminal penalties for violating the challenged provisions."5 Pl.'s Facts ¶ 5 (citing Compl. ¶ 13). IRTL also wishes to make campaign contributions to candidates for political office. See id. ¶¶ 11-12 (citing Compl. ¶¶ 19-20).

IRTL filed this case on September 7, 2010. See Compl. ¶ 3(a)-(d). Along with its complaint, IRTL also filed a motion for a preliminary injunction. Clerk's No. 2. The Court denied that motion on October 20, 2010. Clerk's No. 37 (hereinafter the "PI Order").6

II. STANDARD FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The term "summary judgment" is something of a misnomer. See D. Brock Hornby, Summary Judgment Without Illusions, 13 Green Bag 2d 273 (Spring 2010). It "suggests a judicial process that is simple, abbreviated, and inexpensive," while in reality, the process is complicated, time-consuming, and expensive.7 Id. at 273, 281. The complexity of the process, however, reflects the "complexity of law and life." Id. at 281. "Since the constitutional right to jury trial is at stake," judges must engage in a "paper-intensive and often tedious" process to "assiduously avoid deciding disputed facts or inferences" in a quest to determine whether a record contains genuine factual disputes that necessitate a trial. Id. at 281-82. Despite the seeming inaptness of the name, and the desire for some in the plaintiffs' bar to be rid of it, the summary judgment process is well-accepted and appears "here to stay."8 Id. at 281. Indeed, "judges are duty-bound to resolve legal disputes, no matter how close the call." Id. at 287.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) provides that "[a] party may move for summary judgment, identifying each claim or defense—or the part of each claim or defense—on which summary judgment is sought." However, "summary judgment is an extreme remedy, and one which is not to be granted unless the movant has established his right to a judgment with such clarity as to leave no room for controversy and that the other party is not entitled to recover under any discernible circumstances." Robert Johnson Grain Co. v. Chem. Interchange Co., 541 F.2d 207, 209 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Windsor v. Bethesda Gen. Hosp., 523 F.2d 891, 893 n. 5 (8th Cir.1975)). The purpose of summary judgment is not "to cut litigants off from their right of trial by jury if they really have issues to try." Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368 U.S. 464, 467, 82 S.Ct. 486, 7 L.Ed.2d 458 (1962) (quoting Sartor v. Ark. Natural Gas Corp., 321 U.S. 620, 627, 64 S.Ct. 724, 88 L.Ed. 967 (1944)). Rather, it is designed to avoid "useless, expensive and time-consuming trials where there is actually no genuine, factual issue remaining to be tried." Anderson v. Viking Pump Div., Houdaille Indus., Inc., 545 F.2d 1127, 1129 (8th Cir.1976) (citing Lyons v. Bd. of Educ., 523 F.2d 340, 347 (8th Cir.1975)).

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 mandates the entry of summary judgment upon motion after there has been adequate time for discovery. Summary judgment can be entered against a party if that party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Summary judgment is appropriately granted when the record, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences, shows that there is no genuine issue of material fact, and that the moving party is therefore entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Harlston v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 37 F.3d 379, 382 (8th Cir.1994). The Court does not weigh the evidence, nor does it make credibility determinations. The Court only determines whether there are any disputed issues and, if so, whether those issues are both genuine and material. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Wilson v. Myers, 823 F.2d 253, 256 (8th Cir.1987) ("Summary judgment is not designed to weed out dubious claims, but to eliminate those claims with no basis in material fact.") (citing Weight Watchers of Quebec, Ltd. v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 398 F.Supp. 1047, 1055 (E.D.N.Y.1975)).

In a summary judgment motion, the moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact based on the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits, if any. See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Specifically,

Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(1). If the moving party has carried its burden, the nonmoving party must then go beyond its original pleadings and designate specific facts showing that there remains a genuine issue of material fact that needs to be resolved by a trial. See id.; see also Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Anderson, 477 U.S. at 257, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

"[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat a motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 247-48, 106 S.Ct. 2505. An issue is "genuine" if the evidence is sufficient to persuade a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. "As to materiality, the substantive law will identify which facts are material.... Factual disputes that are irrelevant or unnecessary will not be counted." Id.

Courts do not treat summary judgment as if it were a paper trial. Therefore, a "district court's role in deciding the motion is not to sift through the evidence, pondering the nuances and inconsistencies, and decide whom to believe." Waldridge v. Am. Hoechst Corp., 24 F.3d 918, 920 (7th Cir.1994). In a motion for summary judgment, the Court's job is only to decide, based on the evidentiary record that accompanies the moving and resistance filings of the parties, whether there really is any material dispute of fact that still requires a trial. See id. (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505 and 10 Charles A. Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2712 (3d ed.1998)).

Where, as here, there are cross motions for summary judgment, the parties share the burden of identifying the evidence that will facilitate this assessment. Waldridge, 24 F.3d at 921. "[T]he filing of cross motions for summary judgment does not necessarily indicate that there is no dispute as to a material fact, or have the effect of submitting the cause to a plenary determination on the merits." Wermager v. Cormorant Twp. Bd., 716 F.2d 1211, 1214 (8th Cir.1983) (citations omitted). "Cross motions simply require [the Court] to determine whether either of the parties deserves judgment as a matter of law on facts that are not disputed." Barnes v. Fleet Nat. Bank, 370 F.3d 164, 170 (1st Cir.2004) (quoting Wightman v. Springfield Terminal Ry., 100 F.3d 228, 230 (1st Cir.1996)). Therefore, the Court will evaluate each of the motions "independently to determine whether there exists a genuine dispute of material fact and whether the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." See St. Luke's Methodist Hosp. v. Thompson, 182 F.Supp.2d 765, 769 (N.D.Iowa 2001). The Court notes, however, that "[s]ummary judgments in favor of parties who have the burden of proof are rare, and rightly so." Turner v. Ferguson, 149 F.3d 821, 824 (8th Cir.1998).

III. LAW AND ANALYSIS

A. Count One

In Count One, IRTL challenges Iowa Code §§ 68A.102(18) and 68A.402(9). Compl. ¶ 23. IRTL argues that these provisions "unconstitutionally impose[] political-committee (`PAC') status on groups whose major purpose is not the nomination or election of candidates."9 Pl.'s Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Pl.'s Br.") at 3 (Clerk's No. 44-1). The first challenged provision defines "political committee" as follows:

Iowa Code § 68A.102(18). The term "[c]ommittee includes a political committee and a candidate's committee." Id. § 68A.102(8). These definitions apply to Iowa's campaign finance laws "unless the context otherwise requires." Id. § 68A.102.

The second challenged provision provides:

Id. § 68A.402(9).

IRTL's arguments regarding Count One are all premised upon IRTL's assertion that if it makes its intended independent expenditures, 10 it "will be defined by statute as a political committee under Iowa law."11 Compl. ¶ 18 (citing Iowa Code § 68A.102(18)); see also Pl.'s Br. at 8 ("[I]f IRTL makes independent expenditures aggregating over $750 in a calendar year, it becomes not only an independent expenditure committee but also a committee and a political committee, and is subject to PAC burdens."). Defendants argue—as they did at the preliminary injunction stage— that this assertion is incorrect. See Defs.' Br. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Defs.' Br.") at 7 (Clerk's No. 45-1) (arguing that the challenged provisions "do not impose PAC status on IRTL for making an independent expenditure"); Defs.' Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Prelim. Inj. (hereinafter "Defs.' PI Br.") at 5-6 (Clerk's No. 20); Hr'g Tr.12 26:5-6 ("If you want to make an independent expenditure, you don't have to be a PAC ...."); id. at 28:8-16 (arguing that it is "`clear from ... a plain reading of the statute' that IRTL will be an independent expenditure committee, not a political committee"). Therefore, according to Defendants, IRTL does not have standing to challenge these provisions. Defs.' Br. at 6.

Defendants base their argument largely on the following statutory provision:

Iowa Code § 68A.404(3) (emphasis added). The Board refers to organizations that are required to file independent expenditure statements under this section as "independent expenditure committees."13 See Iowa Admin. Code r. 351-4.1(1)(d). For ease of reference, the Court adopts the Board's definition of "independent expenditure committee" for the purposes of this Order.

As the Court previously observed, "[i]f an organization has not yet `registered as a committee,' but makes an independent expenditure..., it would fall under the plain text of both sections [68A.404(3) and 68A.102(18) ]." PI Order at 7. Based on the plain text of § 68A.404, an organization cannot simultaneously be both a political committee and "a person, other than a committee"—i.e., an independent expenditure committee. See id. (citing Iowa Code §§ 68A.404(3), (3)(b)). Unfortunately, however, the statute "does not clarify how these two sections should be applied when an organization arguably falls under both definitions." PI Order at 7.

Defendants assert that if an organization falls under the plain text of § 68A.404(3), it will be regulated as an independent expenditure committee, not a political committee—in other words, that the "context... requires" that the definition in § 68A.102(8) not apply in the situation described above. See Hr'g Tr. 39:1-14 (referring to Iowa Code § 68A.102); see also Defs.' Br. at 6-7. This is a plausible reading of the statute and, based on the evidence in the record, it is consistent with how Iowa has, so far, actually interpreted the statute.14 See Iowa Admin. Code r. 351-4.1(1) (providing different rules for independent expenditure committees, permanent organizations, and political committees); see also Advisory Op. 2010-03 (Clerk's No. 20-1 at 13) ("[A]n independent expenditure committee will not be subject to the same registration and reporting requirements as a PAC.").

Nonetheless, IRTL insists that it is being chilled by the mere existence of the challenged statutory definitions. See Defs.' Br. at 6-7. The Court is still not convinced that IRTL's dual-coverage interpretation of the statute is reasonable in light of the plain text of Iowa Code §§ 68A.404(3)(b) or that Iowa will interpret its statute in the way IRTL fears; however, this Court is generally without authority to construe or narrow state statutes. See Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 330, 108 S.Ct. 1157, 99 L.Ed.2d 333 (1988).

This Court does, however, have the authority to certify questions of state law to the Iowa Supreme Court when doing so would effectively save time, energy, and resources, and help to build "a cooperative judicial federalism." Lehman Bros. v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 390-91, 94 S.Ct. 1741, 40 L.Ed.2d 215 (1974); see also L.R. 83 ("When a question of state law may be determinative of a cause pending in this court and it appears there may be no controlling precedent in the decisions of the appellate courts of the state ... [t]he court may, ... on its own motion, certify the question to the appropriate state court."). In this case, the question of whether the challenged provisions do, in fact, cover IRTL's intended activities—i.e., whether IRTL would, in fact, be regulated as both a "political committee" and an "independent expenditure committee" if it makes an independent expenditure—is determinative to the issue of whether IRTL has standing to challenge those provisions. See L.R. 83. The Court is not aware of any Iowa cases addressing this issue, let alone any "controlling precedent in the decisions of the appellate courts." See id. Moreover, the Court believes that certifying this issue of statutory interpretation is the most efficient way to resolve this matter.

Accordingly, the Court certifies the following questions to the Iowa Supreme Court:

B. Count Two

In Count Two, IRTL challenges Iowa Code §§ 68A.402B(3), 68A.404(3), 68A.404(4), Iowa Administrative Code Rule 351-4.9(15), Form Ind-Exp-O, and Board Form DR-3.15 Compl. ¶ 30. IRTL argues that these provisions impose "burdensome, PAC-style requirements [that] cannot be constitutionally imposed on groups simply for making independent expenditures."16 Pl.'s Br. at 11 (citing Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 897-99).

1. Standard of review.

According to IRTL, the challenged provisions are "PAC-style requirements"17 and "[l]aws that impose the kind of burdens imposed on PACs, e.g. registration and termination requirements, are ... subject to strict scrutiny." Pl.'s Br. at 11 (citing Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 897-98;) Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc. ("MCFL"), 479 U.S. 238, 262-63, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986). However, neither of the cases cited by IRTL squarely support this legal proposition.

In both Citizens United and MCFL, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of federal statutes that prohibited corporations and unions from using their general treasury funds to make certain independent expenditures. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 886; MCFL, 479 U.S. at 241, 107 S.Ct. 616. In this case, however, the challenged provisions do not ban any independent expenditures. See Iowa Code §§ 68A.402B(3), 68A.404(3), 68A.404(4); Iowa Admin. Code r. 351-4.9(15); Form Ind-Exp-O; Form DR-3. They "impose no ceiling on campaign-related activities and do not prevent anyone from speaking." See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 96 S.Ct. 612, 46 L.Ed.2d 659 (1976) and McConnell v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 201, 124 S.Ct. 619, 157 L.Ed.2d 491 (2003)) (internal quotation marks omitted). They do not substantially burden speech by "impos[ing] an unprecedented penalty on [those] who robustly exercise[] [their] First Amendment rights." See Ariz. Free Enter. Club's Freedom Club PAC v. Bennett, ___ U.S. ___, 131 S.Ct. 2806, 2818, 180 L.Ed.2d 664 (2011) (quoting Davis v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 554 U.S. 724, 739, 128 S.Ct. 2759, 171 L.Ed.2d 737 (2008)) (applying strict scrutiny to a state matching-funds requirement that substantially burdened certain candidate-related speech). Therefore, although they "may burden the ability to speak," they are only subject to exacting scrutiny—not strict scrutiny. See Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914; see also Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, 640 F.3d 304, 315 (8th Cir.2011) ("Unlike outright bans on corporate independent expenditures, which are ... subjected to strict scrutiny, courts generally view corporate disclosure laws as beneficial and subject such regulations to the less-rigorous exacting-scrutiny standard."); Doe v. Reed, ___ U.S. ___, 130 S.Ct. 2811, 2818, 177 L.Ed.2d 493 (2010) (applying exacting scrutiny where the challenged provision was "not a prohibition on speech ...").

2. Analysis of the challenged provisions.

"[U]nder exacting scrutiny, the government must only show a substantial relation between the disclosure requirement and the government's important interest in providing information to the electorate." Swanson, 640 F.3d at 315 (quoting Citizens United, 130 S.Ct. at 914 (internal quotation marks omitted)). The challenged provisions require certain persons18 who make independent expenditures to: (1) file Form Ind-Exp-O19 "within forty-eight hours of the making of an independent expenditure in excess of seven hundred fifty dollars in the aggregate, or within forty-eight hours of disseminating the communication to its intended audience, whichever is earlier" (Iowa Code § 68A.404(4)(a)); (2) file subsequent reports up to four times a year20 (id. § 68A.404(3)(a); see also id. §§ 68A.402(2), 68A.402A); (3) file a supplemental report if, during an election year, "the person making the independent expenditure either raises or expends more than one thousand dollars" (id. § 68A.404(3)(a)(1); see also id. § 68A.402(2)(b)); and (4) file a termination report with the Board within thirty days of determining that it will "no longer make an independent expenditure" (id. § 68A.402B).

Defendants argue that the challenged provisions are substantially related to the government's "compelling interest in ensuring that shareholders and citizens are provided with the information needed to hold corporate and elected officials accountable for their positions and supporters" and that such disclosures are made in a timely manner.21 Defs.' Br. at 9 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 11-12. Therefore, according to Defendants, the challenged provisions survive exacting scrutiny. See id. at 13. In response, IRTL does not argue that the Iowa disclosure scheme fails exacting scrutiny.22 See Pl.'s Resp. to Defs.' Mot. for Summ. J. (hereinafter "Pl.'s Resp. Br.") at 6-9 (Clerk's No. 48); see also Pl.'s Br. at 10-15. Rather, IRTL insists that the challenged provisions are subject to strict scrutiny and argues that they are unconstitutional because they are not "narrowly tailored to a compelling [government] interest." 23 See Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 9.

In its recent opinion in Minnesota Citizens Concerned for Life, Inc. v. Swanson, the Eighth Circuit considered a constitutional challenge to Minnesota's independent-expenditure disclosure scheme. 640 F.3d at 307. The disclosure scheme at issue in Swanson "created two means by which corporations could make" independent expenditures. Id. at 308. Under the Minnesota scheme, a corporation "wishing to make such expenditures [could] either form and register an independent expenditure political fund if the expenditure is in excess of $100 or contribute to an existing independent expenditure political committee or political fund." Id. at 308-09 (quoting Minn.Stat. § 10A.12, subdiv. 1a and citing Minn.Stat. § 211B. 15, subdiv. 3 (internal quotation marks omitted)). A corporation that chose to create a fund was "subject to a series of statutory requirements" which included appointing a treasurer, segregating its funds from other corporate funds, filing "periodic, detailed reports" up to five times a year, and filing a termination report when the "political fund wants to dissolve." See id. at 309.

The Eighth Circuit concluded that this scheme was "adequately tailored" under exacting scrutiny because "Minnesota's provisions collectively impose no materially greater burden on corporations than the disclosure laws at issue in Citizens United."24 Id. at 316. The Eighth Circuit found that "[e]ven Minnesota's specific requirements for a treasurer, periodic reporting, and a separate fund are sufficiently tailored because, within the context of the entire Minnesota regulatory scheme, each requirement greatly enhances the transparency of corporate expenditures while imposing only reasonable burdens." Id.

In this case, IRTL argues that "Iowa law is like the burdensome, PAC-style disclosure Citizens [United ] found `burdensome' and `onerous,'" and suggests that the challenged provisions are substantially more burdensome than the disclosure laws that were upheld in Citizens United.25 See Pl.'s Resp. Br. at 7. Specifically, IRTL objects to Iowa's requirements that groups making independent expenditures: (1) file Form Ind-Exp-O "within forty-eight hours"; (2) remain registered as "independent expenditure committees" until they file a termination report;26 and (3) file periodic reports. See id. at 8-9. Although IRTL attacks the various requirements of the challenged provisions separately, the Court "must evaluate [Iowa's] provisions on independent expenditures as a whole." See Swanson, 640 F.3d at 314.

Considered as a whole, the challenged provisions "collectively impose no materially greater burden on corporations than the disclosure laws at issue in Citizens United." 27 See id. The information required by Form Ind-Exp-O "about the corporation's contributions and expenditures is similar to the disclosure requirements upheld in Citizens United." See id.; compare id. at 313-14 (explaining those requirements and citing 2 U.S.C. § 434(f)) with Pl.'s App. at 27 (showing Form Ind-Exp-O). Even the specific requirement challenged by IRTL—i.e., the 48-hour deadline for filing Form Ind-Exp-O and the periodic reporting requirement—are sufficiently tailored because, when viewed in the context of the entire Iowa regulatory scheme, these requirements "greatly enhance[] the transparency of corporate expenditures while imposing only [a] reasonable burden."28 See Swanson, 640 F.3d at 316; see also PI Order at 27-31 (discussing in detail the substantially identical arguments IRTL made at the preliminary injunction stage). Therefore, the Court concludes that the challenged provisions are adequately tailored to survive exacting scrutiny.29 Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count Two of IRTL's complaint.

C. Count Three

In Count Three, IRTL challenges Iowa Code § 68A.503, which bans direct corporate campaign contributions.30 Compl. ¶ 40. IRTL argues that this ban is unconstitutional in light of Citizens United.31 See Pl.'s Br. at 15-16. Specifically, IRTL argues that Iowa's direct-contribution ban violates its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 16-17, 26.

As an initial matter, IRTL argues that § 68A.503 is subject to strict scrutiny.32 Pl.'s Br. at 18. The Court does not agree. The Eighth Circuit has recently confirmed that, even in the wake of Citizens United, bans on corporate contributions are still subject to only "closely drawn"—not strict—scrutiny.33 See Swanson, 640 F.3d at 318; see also generally Bennett, 131 S.Ct. at 2817 (describing a law that imposed contribution limits as a "stricture[] on campaign-related speech" that was "less onerous" than laws that regulate independent expenditures and, therefore, subject to a "lower level of scrutiny"). Therefore, "a restriction on direct contributions will pass constitutional muster if the limit is `closely drawn to match a sufficiently important interest.'"34 640 F.3d at 318 (quoting Fed. Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 162, 123 S.Ct. 2200, 156 L.Ed.2d 179 (2003)).

Applying this standard in Swanson, the Eighth Circuit concluded that Minnesota's ban on corporate contributions was not constitutionally deficient. Id. at 319. In doing so, the Eighth Circuit indicated that both "avoiding quid pro quo corruption and the circumvention of its other limits on direct contributions" were sufficiently important governmental interests. Id. The Eighth Circuit also stated that "Minnesota appears to have properly tailored its restriction because, pursuant to Beaumont, Minnesota can generally ban all direct corporate contributions." Id.

In this case, Iowa also has a sufficiently important interest in the prevention of corruption.35 See id.; see also Beaumont, 539 U.S. at 154, 123 S.Ct. 2200 (noting that the ban upheld in that case "was and is intended to prevent corruption or the appearance of corruption" (internal quotation marks omitted)). And, because "pursuant to Beaumont, [Iowa] can generally ban all direct corporate contributions," § 68A.503 is sufficiently "closely drawn" to match this anti-corruption interest.36 See Swanson, 640 F.3d at 319.

Therefore, the Court concludes that § 68A.503 "pass[es] constitutional muster."37 See id. Accordingly, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count Three of IRTL's complaint.

D. Count Four

In Count Four, IRTL challenges Iowa Code §§ 68A.404(2)(a)-(b), 68A.404(5)(g), and Form Ind-Exp-O. Compl. ¶ 45. According to IRTL, these provisions "unconstitutionally forbid[] corporations, but not other groups or associations, from making independent expenditures unless the board of directors expressly authorizes the independent expenditures, in advance and within the same calendar year that the independent expenditures are to be made."38 Pl.'s Br. at 28. Specifically, IRTL argues that these provisions violate its rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 28, 34. The Court will consider each of these arguments in turn.

1. First Amendment.

Defendants argue, inter alia, that IRTL does not have standing to challenge these provisions under the First Amendment. Defs.' Br. at 17. "Article III of the Constitution limits federal jurisdiction to cases and controversies, and the `core component of standing is an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement.'" Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie, 456 F.3d 793, 799 (8th Cir.2006) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560, 112 S.Ct. 2130, 119 L.Ed.2d 351 (1992)).

Nat'l Right to Life Political Action Comm. v. Connor, 323 F.3d 684, 689 (8th Cir.2003) (citing Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560-61, 112 S.Ct. 2130). "[S]tanding cannot be inferred argumentatively from averments in the pleadings, but rather must affirmatively appear in the record." FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 231, 110 S.Ct. 596, 107 L.Ed.2d 603 (1990) (internal citation marks and quotation omitted), overruled on other grounds by City of Littleton v. Z.J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 124 S.Ct. 2219, 159 L.Ed.2d 84 (2004). "In response to a summary judgment motion, however, the plaintiff can no longer rest on such `mere allegations,' but must `set forth' by affidavit or other evidence `specific facts'...." Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561, 112 S.Ct. 2130.

IRTL argues that it has standing because it "is chilled by the prior-board-approval requirement."39 Pl.'s Br. at 28. It is true that, in the First Amendment context, a "chilling effect alone may constitute injury." Zanders v. Swanson, 573 F.3d 591, 593 (quoting St. Paul Area Chamber of Commerce v. Gaertner, 439 F.3d 481, 487 (8th Cir.2006)). "Yet, the `chilling' effect of exercising a First Amendment right must be objectively reasonable." Id. at 594 (citing Republican Party of Minn. v. Klobuchar, 381 F.3d 785, 792 (8th Cir.2004)). Therefore, in order to establish that it has suffered an Article III injury, IRTL must demonstrate that "it must either make significant changes to its operations to obey the regulation, or risk a criminal enforcement action by disobeying the regulation." Minn. Citizens Concerned for Life v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 113 F.3d 129, 131 (8th Cir. 1997); see also Zanders, 573 F.3d at 594.

In this case, IRTL has not alleged or asserted that it will have to make any changes at all—let alone significant changes—in order to obey the challenged provisions. See Compl. ¶¶ 44-53. Indeed, IRTL has not even asserted that it has (or will be) "forced to modify their speech and behavior to comply with" the challenged provisions.40 See Gaertner, 439 F.3d at 487 (concluding that plaintiffs had standing to bring a pre-enforcement constitutional challenge where, inter alia, "they assert[ed] that they have been forced to modify their speech and behavior to comply with" the challenged statutes). Instead, IRTL merely avers that it "is chilled by the prior-board-approval requirement." Pl.'s Br. at 28. This mere "allegation[] of a subjective chill" is not sufficient to meet IRTL's burden. See Eckles v. City of Corydon, 341 F.3d 762, 767 (8th Cir.2003) (stating that, in order to establish standing, a plaintiff "must present more than allegations of a subjective chill") (quoting Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 816-17, 95 S.Ct. 2222, 44 L.Ed.2d 600 (1975) (internal quotation marks omitted)). Therefore, the Court concludes that IRTL has not met its burden to show that it has standing to bring a First Amendment challenge against these provisions.

2. Fourteenth Amendment.

IRTL argues that the challenged provisions violate the Fourteenth Amendment because they target corporations for negative treatment.41 See Pl.'s Br. at 34. The main provision challenged by IRTL states:

Iowa Code § 68A.404(2). Contrary to IRTL's assertion, this provision does not discriminate between corporations and "other groups or associations." Compare id. with Pl.'s Br. at 28.

Nonetheless, IRTL insists that this provision actually targets corporations because, among other things, two of the other challenged provisions—namely, Iowa Code § 68A.404(5)(g) and Form Ind-Exp-O—refer only to "corporations." See Pl.'s Br. at 31-32. Section § 68A.404(5)(g) requires:

Form Ind-Exp-O includes a "Statement of Certification" which requires the person submitting the form to affirm that "[i]f [the] expenditure was made by a corporation[,] the board of directors, executive council, or similar organizational leadership body expressly authorized the expenditure by resolution or other affirmative action this year." See Pl.'s App. at 27.

Even if this requirement only applies to corporations, IRTL must still show that it is "similarly situated to those who allegedly receive favorable treatment." Arnold v. City of Columbia, 197 F.3d 1217, 1220 (8th Cir.1999). In its brief, IRTL asserts that "corporations and other organized associations are similarly situated." Pl.'s Br. at 27. However, IRTL does not cite a single piece of evidence in support of this statement, nor does it identify any relevant similarities between corporations and these other associations.42 See id. Indeed, IRTL's "Statement of Undisputed Material Facts" does not discuss this issue at all. See Clerk's No. 44-2. IRTL's bare, conclusory statement is not sufficient to carry its burden on this key element of its equal protection claim.43 See Nolan v. Thompson, 521 F.3d 983, 990 (8th Cir.2008) (affirming dismissal of an equal-protection claim where the record lacked sufficient evidence "to enable a meaningful comparison between [the plaintiff] and those he claims are similarly situated"). Because IRTL has failed to point to a single piece of evidence that supports an essential element of its Fourteenth Amendment claim, Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Count Four of IRTL's complaint.

IV. CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, "Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment" (Clerk's No. 44) is DENIED IN PART and "Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment" (Clerk's No. 45) is GRANTED IN PART. Specifically, Defendant's motion is granted and IRTL's motion is denied as to Counts Two, Three and Four of IRTL's complaint. The Court reserves ruling on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment on Count One of IRTL's complaint until the Iowa Supreme Court rules on—or declines to answer—the statutory-interpretation questions certified in Section III(A), supra.

IT IS SO ORDERED.