JAMES E. GRITZNER, Senior Judge, U.S. DISTRICT COURT
This matter comes before the Court on Motions to Dismiss Third-Party Complaints by Third-Party Defendant Hanifen Company, Inc., ECF Nos. 81 and 89. Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs Hiner Equipment LLC, Hiner Transport LLC, Hiner Logistics LLC, Howe Freightways, Inc., and James Langholf, by and through Julie Langholf as administrator of Estate of James Langholf, resist. A hearing on the Motions was held on February 25, 2015. Hanifen Company, Inc. was represented by Patrick Woodward; Howe Freightways, Inc. and Langholf were represented by attorneys Michael Weston and Hillary Weigle; and Hiner Equipment LLC, Hiner Transport LLC, and Hiner Logistics LLC were represented by attorney Thomas Crawford. The Motion is fully submitted and ready for disposition.
This case arises out of a fatal semi-truck crash on Interstate 80 that claimed the lives of Daniel Walsh and Jesse Inman. Walsh and Inman were employed as heavy-duty truckers by Hanifen Company, Inc. (Hanifen). On September 13, 2011, Walsh and Inman, while in the course of their employment and operating vehicles owned by Hanifen, responded to a request for roadside assistance by James Langholf, an employee of Howe Freightways, Inc. (Howe). While Walsh and Inman were
Plaintiffs Michele Grandstaff, individually and as administrator of the Estate of Daniel Walsh, and Winona (Walsh) McGraw (collectively, Grandstaff/Walsh) filed suit in this Court on September 12, 2013, alleging claims for negligent wrongful death against Hiner, Terrell, Howe, and Langholf.
Plaintiffs Rick Inman and Diana Picken (Inman/Picken), parents of Jesse Inman, filed a petition in the Iowa District Court for Poweshiek County on September 12, 2013. The case was removed to this Court pursuant to diversity jurisdiction on October 8, 2013. Inman/Picken allege claims for wrongful death/loss of consortium against Howe, Langholf, and Hiner. Upon agreement by the parties, the Grandstaff/Walsh and Inman/Picken suits were consolidated on January 22, 2014, by Magistrate Judge Ross A. Walters.
Defendants Howe and Langholf filed a Third-Party Complaint against Hanifen on September 5, 2014. Howe and Langholf amended their complaint on October 9, 2014, ECF No. 75. Defendant Hiner filed two Third-Party Complaints against Hanifen on October 9, 2014; one relating to the petition filed by Inman/Picken, ECF No. 76, and the other relating to the lead case filed by Grandstaff/Walsh, ECF No. 77. Hiner has since voluntarily dismissed its Third-Party Complaint relating to the Grandstaff/Walsh case and Howe and Langholf have since dismissed a portion of their Third Party Complaint relating to the Grandstaff/Walsh case. See ECF Nos. 102, 103, & 105.
Howe, Langholf, and Hiner (collectively, Third-Party Plaintiffs) allege they are entitled to contribution against Hanifen pursuant to Iowa Code § 668.5 for damages awarded to Inman/Picken in excess of their pro-rata share of liability and in an amount commensurate with the culpability of Hanifen. The Third-Party Complaints allege that the vehicle Inman operated at the time of the accident was owned, maintained, inspected, and controlled by Hanifen. It is alleged that Hanifen owed a duty to Inman to exercise reasonable care in the operation, inspection, maintenance, repair, control, ownership, and/or guidance of its motor vehicles to prevent injury and damages from occurring to Inman and others. Third-Party Plaintiffs allege that Hanifen, by and through its agents and employees, breached its duties and contributed to or proximately caused the accident. Third-Party Plaintiffs allege Hanifen negligently failed to equip and activate required warning signals and lights, and failed to properly inspect, supervise, train, and oversee its employees.
On October 20, 2014, Hanifen filed a Motion to Dismiss Howe and Langholf's Third-Party Complaint. ECF No. 81. On November 10, 2014, Hanifen filed a Motion to Dismiss Hiner's Third-Party Complaints. ECF No. 89. Both Motions present essentially the same arguments and seek the same relief and will therefore be considered collectively.
"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to `state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell
Third-Party Plaintiffs seek a right of contribution against Hanifen pursuant to Iowa Code § 668.5. Section 668.5(1) controls a party's right to contribution, providing that "[a] right of contribution exists between or among two or more persons who are liable upon the same indivisible claim for the same injury, death, or harm, whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or any of them." Iowa Code § 668.5(1). Iowa courts "have construed section 668.5(1) to require the party seeking contribution to have `common liability' with the contributor." Estate of Ryan v. Heritage Trails Assocs., Inc., 745 N.W.2d 724, 730 (Iowa 2008). "Common liability exists when the injured party has a legally cognizable remedy against both the party seeking contribution and the party from whom contribution is sought." McDonald v. Delhi Say. Bank, 440 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1989). "It is not necessary, however, that the common liability rest on the same legal theory." Allied Mut. Ins. Co. v. State, 473 N.W.2d 24, 27 (Iowa 1991). Accordingly, for common liability to exist in this case Third-Party Plaintiffs must show that Plaintiffs Inman/Picken could have sued Hanifen directly for damages arising from the accident.
"Contribution is not available when the party from whom it is sought has a special defense against an action by the injured party." McDonald, 440 N.W.2d at 841(citing Iona Power & Light Co. v. Abild Constr. Co., 259 Iowa 314, 144 N.W.2d 303, 308 (1966)). Hanifen maintains that the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act provides a special defense against Plaintiffs that breaks common liability. Iowa Code § 85.20 provides:
In other words, "the rights and remedies of an injured employee against the employer, under chapter 85, are exclusive of all other rights and remedies of such employee against his employer." Price v. King, 259 Iowa 921, 146 N.W.2d 328, 331 (1966).
Iowa courts have long recognized that the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act provides a special defense to the right of contribution by a third-party tortfeasor. Abild, 144 N.W.2d at 306; see 15 Ia. Prac., Workers' Compensation § 8:5 ("When an injured employee sues a third party for its fault in causing the injuries, the third party has no right of action against the employer for contribution based on the employer's negligence or a theory of strict liability."). The Iowa Supreme Court has reasoned that "since common liability forms the basis for recovery in a claim for equitable contribution between joint tortfeasors and the employer's liability by virtue of the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act is statutorily limited and not dependent on negligence, no common liability exists between an employer and a third party tortfeasor allowing contribution."
It is undisputed that Daniel Walsh and Jesse Inman were employed by Hanifen at the time of the accident and that they were fatally killed during the course of their employment with Hanifen. Therefore, claims against Hanifen for injuries arising out of the accident brought by Jesse Inman and Daniel Walsh's personal or legal representatives, dependents, or next of kin are explicitly barred by Iowa's Workers' Compensation Act, Iowa Code § 85.20.
Third-Party Plaintiffs argue that common liability exists because Inman/Picken, as parents of their adult child Jesse Inman, are not barred by the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act from bringing suit against Hanifen for parental loss of consortium because Inman/Picken have no remedy under the Act for the death of their adult child. Iowa Code § 85.31 provides for payments of workers compensation benefits only to dependents of the employee, including the surviving spouse, children, and parents of a minor employee who were wholly dependent upon the earnings of the minor employee. See Iowa Erosion Control, Inc. v. Sanchez, 599 N.W.2d 711, 713 (Iowa 1999) (noting that "a parent may be dependent on a child, and entitled to workers' compensation benefits following a work-related death, has long been the law in Iowa"). Third-Party Plaintiffs argue that Inman/Picken's only avenue for relief is through Iowa Code § 613.15A, which provides that "[a] parent or the parents ... may recover for the expense and actual loss of services, companionship, and society resulting from the death of an adult child."
The Iowa Supreme Court has held that "the exclusive-remedy provisions of the workers' compensation act apply to consortium claims by spouses and children who are beneficiaries thereunder even though they are not actually entitled to workers' compensation benefits in the particular case." Garien v. Schneider, 546 N.W.2d 606, 609 (Iowa 1996) (citing Johnson v. Farmer, 537 N.W.2d 770, 773 (Iowa 1995)). In Johnson v. Farmer, an injured employee's husband and children brought claims for loss of consortium against the employer after the employee was injured in a car accident during the course of her employment. 537 N.W.2d at 771-71, 773. The Iowa Supreme Court held that the "exclusive remedy provisions of section 85.20 serve to preclude the loss-of-consortium claims" brought by the employee's husband and children. Id. at 773. Although the spouse and children of the injured employee were not entitled to benefits under the Act, the spouse and children were dependents and therefore subject to the exclusive remedy provision.
In an unpublished opinion, the Iowa Court of Appeals addressed loss of consortium claims brought by individuals who were unable to recover under the Act, but were not explicitly excluded from bringing loss of consortium claims against the employer
In fealty to the broad and essential purpose of the Iowa Workers' Compensation Act's exclusive remedy provision
For the reasons stated, Hanifen's Motions to Dismiss, ECF Nos. 81 & 89, must be