JIM D. PAPPAS, Bankruptcy Judge.
On January 16, 2014, Scott Paul, the former Chief Executive Officer of chapter 7
The Court conducted a preliminary hearing concerning the Motion on March 4, 2014, at which all counsel for the parties appeared an offered argument in support of their respective positions. Dkt. No. 120. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the issues under advisement noting that it would schedule a final evidentiary hearing if it deemed that to be necessary.
After a review of the record, it appears the material facts are not in dispute, and that no further hearing is required. This Memorandum of Decision constitutes the Court's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and disposes of the issues raised by the Motion.
As noted above, the relevant facts are not in dispute.
Debtor is a subsidiary of Tianwei New Energy Holdings, Co., Ltd. ("Tianwei"). On July 2, 2013, Debtor filed a chapter 7 bankruptcy petition. Dkt. No. 1.
On August 20, 2013, JH Kelly, LLC ("JH Kelly")—the primary contractor selected by Debtor to build a polysilicon plant in Pocatello, Idaho, and a major creditor in the bankruptcy case—sued Tianwei, along with the Movants individually, in the U.S. District Court for the District of Idaho, alleging that Tianwei and each of the Movants engaged in fraud, racketeering, and other misconduct during the time JH Kelly was constructing the plant, all of which caused JH Kelly to act to its detriment. See JH Kelly, LLC v. Tianwei New Energy Holdings, Co. Ltd., et al., 4:13-cv-00368-BLW (D. Idaho) (the "JH Kelly Action"). In addition, in its complaint, JH Kelly named several "Does" as defendants in the action alleging that they are parties that may have participated in the wrongful conduct, but who were unknown to JH Kelly at the time it filed the complaint.
Before filing the petition, Debtor had purchased the Policy,
Dkt. No. 107-1 at 16 (bold, all caps, and italics in original).
The Policy defines the bolded terms, above, in a definitions section.
Id. at 16-20. In Clause 22, as amended by Endorsement 21, the Policy provides an "Order of Payments." Id. at 72.
Id. (bold in original). As can be seen from these provisions, the liability limits under the Policy render it what is frequently referred to as a "wasting" policy, where payments made under the Policy reduce the total amount of proceeds available to cover all other losses.
The Movants have each submitted a claim for coverage for their respective defense costs related to the JH Kelly Action to the insurer as a claim under the Policy. Subject to a complete reservation of rights, the insurer has agreed to advance the defense costs of these directors and officers of Debtor for the JH Kelly Action, provided this Court grants the relief requested by the Movants' motion. In seeking the relief from the Court, the Movants argue the proceeds of the policy are not property of the Debtor's bankruptcy estate, and therefore, the automatic stay would not impair the insurer's ability to pay them their defense costs claims. Dkt. Nos. 107 and 113. In the alternative, the Movants argue the Court should modify the automatic stay, if it determines the Policy proceeds are property of the estate, and therefore subject to the automatic stay, because they have shown good cause for that relief as required under § 362(d)(1). Id.
In objecting to the relief sought by the Movants, Trustee argues that the proceeds are indeed property of Debtor's bankruptcy estate, and that cause has not been shown to modify the automatic stay. Trustee's primary concern is the "net effect" of this Court allowing the Movants to access the Policy proceeds to pay their defense costs will "diminish the bankruptcy estate's potential recovery of its own claims under the Policy" to the estate's detriment if Trustee seeks to recover from the Movants on his own claims that he is still investigating. Dkt. No. 112 at 4-5. Finally, at the hearing on the Movants' motion, Trustee argued a further evidentiary hearing is required where the Movants would be required to show that paying the defense costs out of their own pockets is a burden to them financially.
Section 362(a)(3) provides an automatic stay as of the date of the petition that stays "any act to obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the estate or to exercise control over property of the estate . . . ." In this circuit, "a debtor's insurance policies are property of the estate." Groshong v. Sapp (In re MILA, Inc.), 423 B.R. 537, 542 (9th Cir. BAP 2010) (citing The Minoco Grp. Cos., Ltd v. First State Agency of New England Reinsurance Corp. (In re The Minoco Grp. Cos., Ltd.), 799 F.2d 517, 519 (9th Cir. 1986)); In re Somerset, Inc., 13.3 IBCR 81, 82 (Bankr. D. Idaho 2013). Whether the proceeds of a debtor's insurance policies are also property of the estate is an unsettled question. In re MILA, Inc., 423 B.R. at 543; see also Pintlar Corp. v. Fid. and Cas. Co. of New York (In re Pintlar Corp.), 124 F.3d 1310, 1314 (9th Cir. 1997).
Assuming, without deciding, the proceeds of the Policy are property of the bankruptcy estate,
"Section 362(d)(1) authorizes the bankruptcy court broad discretion to grant relief from the automatic stay imposed under § 362(a) for `cause.'" In re MILA, Inc., 423 B.R. at 542. In cases involving D & O policy proceeds, the bankruptcy court should balance the harm to the debtor if the stay is modified with the harm to the directors and officers if they are prevented from executing their rights to defense costs. Id. at 543-44 (citing In re Allied Digital Techs. Corp., 306 B.R. 505, 514 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004); In re CyberMedica, Inc., 2280 B.R. 12, 18 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002)). When D & O policies are determined by a bankruptcy court to be property of the estate, "courts have nonetheless granted relief from [the] stay to allow the insurer to advance defense costs payments when the harms weigh more heavily against the directors or officers than the debtor." In re MILA, Inc., 423 B.R. at 544 (citing In re CyberMedica, Inc., 280 B.R. at 18). In a "wasting" policy situation, courts factor whether defense costs might exhaust the coverage available to pay a future covered loss under the policy, or expose the bankruptcy estate to indemnification claims. In re MILA, Inc., 423 B.R. at 544. Further, "clear, immediate, and ongoing" losses to the directors and officers in incurring defense costs trumps only "hypothetical or speculative" claims by the trustee. Id. at 545.
In this case, the Court has balanced the potential harm to the bankruptcy estate of allowing the Movants to access the limited coverage available under the Policy against that to the Movants of having to fund their own defense to the JH Kelly Action. In this respect, the Court finds that the Movants are experiencing "clear, immediate, and ongoing" defense costs expenses arising from the litigation in the District Court, which costs are likely covered by the Policy. Further, Coverage A is paid first according to Clause 22, as modified by Endorsement 21, of the Policy, and thus any claims under Coverage B, or beyond, would be subordinate to the coverage requested by the Movants.
On the other hand, the potential for harm to the estate suggested by Trustee consist of hypothetical, indeed perhaps speculative claims he might pursue against the Movants, or some of them, such that he wants to conserve the total coverage proceeds available under the Policy. However, it does not appear that the bankruptcy estate is currently exposed to any other claims that would generate any claims against Coverage B, nor that the bankruptcy estate would incur any indemnification claims by the movants. Realistically, Trustee seems to be merely be seeking to protect the estate's claims against the Movants under Coverage A, a tactic that has been criticized by other courts facing this issue.
All things considered, the potential harm to the bankruptcy estate inherent in granting the Movants relief is negligible, if any. In addition, Trustee's argument that each of the Movants ought to be required to show that personally paying the defense costs is a burden, absent any identifiable potential harm to the estate, is not persuasive. Finally, the Court notes the policy limit of liability is $10,000,000, a significant amount, such that it is likely that the Movants' claims to the proceeds can be satisfied with ample coverage remaining if needed by the bankruptcy estate to address future claims.
In sum, the Court finds the Movants are incurring actual expense in defending the JH Kelly Action, and that such is a clear, immediate, and actual harm that greatly outweighs any speculative and hypothetical harm to the bankruptcy estate. Therefore, the Movants have shown cause for relief from the automatic stay under § 362(d)(1).
For the foregoing reasons, the Court will grant the Movants' motion for relief from the automatic stay. Counsel for Movants shall cooperate to jointly submit a single form of order consistent with this Memorandum for entry by the Court. Counsel for Trustee, shall approve the form of order.