MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEBTORS' MOTION DOC. NO. 805

TERRY L. MYERS, Bankruptcy Judge.

Before the Court is Debtors' "Motion to Unwind/Vacate Overbid Sale and Order for Mediated Settlement & Sanctions," Doc. No. 805 ("Motion"). A hearing was held on March 6, 2018, to hear legal arguments and to determine if there are threshold legal issues and whether an evidentiary hearing is necessary. As a result of that hearing, the Motion was taken under advisement. The Court concludes a legal issue controls the outcome of this matter and no further hearing is required.

On October 7, 2016, Idaho Independent Bank ("IIB") made an offer to purchase certain estate property from chapter 7 trustee David Gardner ("Trustee") for $530,000 and Trustee filed a notice of such offer. Doc. No. 636. On October 13, 2016, Matthew Frantz, Tyson Frantz, and Tailored Management Services filed a notice of overbid offering $555,000 for the assets. Doc. No. 644. Four days later, on October 24, 2016, IIB filed a notice of overbid offering $600,000 for the assets. Doc. No. 645. A hearing was held on October 31, 2016, Doc. No. 654, and the Court issued an Order, Doc. No. 668 ("Order"), on November 18, 2016, approving sale of the assets to IIB in accordance with the terms of IIB's overbid.

On December 29, 2017, Debtors filed their Motion seeking relief from the Order. Doc. No. 805.1 In the Motion, Debtors expressly seek relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(2) for newly discovered evidence and under subsection (b)(3) of that rule for fraud, misrepresentation, or misconduct by opposing parties. Id. at 3.2

However, Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) provides, "[a] motion under Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time —and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding." The one year limitation period imposed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) on Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) and (3) motions is "absolute" and cannot be enlarged. See Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(2).3 See also, Gazes v. DelPrete (In re Clinton St. Food Corp.), 254 B.R. 523, 532 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2000) ("[T]he one year period [limiting Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) and (3)] is an absolute, outside limit, and a court lacks the power to grant motions filed beyond that time.").

IIB and Trustee object to the Motion, arguing it is untimely under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1) because it was filed on December 29, 2017, more than one year after the November 18, 2016 Order. Doc. Nos. 829, 830.4

In response, Debtors assert the Motion was timely because it was filed within one year of the "date of the proceeding." Referring to the "Webster Dictionary," Debtors claim a legal "proceeding" is a series of steps to enforce, adjudicate, or administer rights, remedies, laws, or regulations. Doc. No. 839 at 2-3. Debtors further argue that the "proceeding" in this case consist of all events necessary to consummate the sale to IIB. Debtors argue that after the hearing was held and the Order was entered, a due diligence period occurred, the balance of the purchase price was paid, a third-party designee was identified by IIB, and the sale was finalized contingent upon USDA approval. Debtors argue that USDA approval has not occurred and, therefore, the "proceeding" has not been completed. Accordingly, Debtors claim the one-year clock has not yet begun.5

Black's Law Dictionary provides that, in the context of bankruptcy specifically, a "proceeding" is "[a] particular dispute or matter arising within a pending case—as opposed to the case as a whole." Black's Law Dictionary 1324 (10th ed. 2014). It also defines proceeding more generally as "[a]n act or step that is part of a larger action," and "the business conducted by a court or other official body; a hearing." Id. The Court holds that these definitional concepts comport more closely with the intent of Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1)—to provide a discernable point in time at which the one-year clock begins to run—than does the broad, fluid interpretation of "proceeding" urged by Debtors.

The Court concludes that, in this instance, the "proceeding" that triggered the one-year time limit was Trustee's Motion to Authorize Sale. The hearing on that motion was held—and concluded—on October 31, 2016. See Doc. No. 654. Thus, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1), Debtors had at best one year from the date of the Order—November 18, 2017—to file a timely motion under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(2) and (3). As noted above, the Court cannot enlarge these time limits. Because Debtors filed the Motion on December 29, 2017, outside the one-year window, the Motion is untimely.6

Therefore, the Court will enter an order denying Debtors' Motion, Doc. No. 805.