GUTIERREZ, Judge.
Ronald Lee Macik appeals from the judgment of the district court summarily dismissing his petition for post-conviction relief. For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
In 1972, Macik pled guilty to first degree murder for a homicide that occurred at the Idaho State Penitentiary in 1971, and the district court imposed a life sentence. In 2011, Macik mailed a letter to the district court that was treated as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea from nearly forty years prior, and counsel was appointed to represent Macik. In that matter, the district court denied the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, determining that it lacked jurisdiction to consider the merits of the motion. We affirmed in State v. Macik, Docket No. 39233 (Ct. App. May 24, 2012) (unpublished). Macik then filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief in 2012 that alleged several claims relating to the entry of his guilty plea in 1972. The State moved for summary dismissal, and the district court granted the motion five days after its filing. In Macik v. State, Docket No. 40321 (Ct. App. Oct. 24, 2013) (unpublished), we held that the district court erred by summarily dismissing Macik's petition for post-conviction relief without providing Macik twenty days to respond to the motion, and we remanded the case for further proceedings.
This appeal arises from the remanded post-conviction case. On remand, Macik filed an affidavit that claimed that he was on the drug Thorazine from 1969 to 1972, which he asserted affected his perception for many years.
In his appellate brief, Macik raises two issues. He argues that the district court erred by dismissing the petition without applying an actual innocence standard.
Even though Macik does not expressly argue that the district court erred by dismissing his petition as untimely, we will nonetheless review this issue. Macik's post-conviction claims relate back to his guilty plea in 1972, and any petition for post-conviction relief that was not equitably tolled had to be filed by July 1, 1984. See LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho 387, 389, 807 P.2d 66, 68 (Ct. App. 1991) (explaining that a 1979 amendment added a limitation period to Idaho's post-conviction procedure act and that for judgments of conviction entered prior to the 1979 amendment, the then-applicable five-year limitation period began to run on July 1, 1979, the effective date of the amendment).
Macik's affidavit before the district court on remand explained that he was on Thorazine until 1972, had a stroke in 2007 that resulted in a clear memory, and that he was transferred to a federal penitentiary in Pennsylvania without access to Idaho legal materials. These assertions were likely made in an attempt to assert equitable tolling. Equitable tolling has been recognized in Idaho: (1) where the petitioner was incarcerated in an out-of-state facility without legal representation or access to Idaho legal materials; and (2) where mental disease, or psychotropic medication, or both prevented the petitioner from timely pursuing challenges to the conviction. Schultz v. State, 151 Idaho 383, 386, 256 P.3d 791, 794 (Ct. App. 2011). In addition, we have noted that "in some circumstances commencement of the limitation period may be delayed until the petitioner discovers the facts giving rise to the claim." Id.
We begin with Macik's assertion regarding his out-of-state incarceration and lack of access to Idaho legal materials. We take judicial notice of the fact that Macik filed a letter with the Ada County District Court in March 2011, which was later treated as a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, stating his address as the Idaho Correction Center in Boise. This letter was part of the record in Docket No. 39233. Moreover, as the district court pointed out on remand, Macik was appointed counsel (specifically, the Ada County Public Defender) in April 2011 to address the motion to withdraw the guilty plea. Thus, at least as of April 2011, Macik was no longer incarcerated at an out-of state facility and no longer lacked access to Idaho legal materials; yet, Macik's petition was not filed until September 2012, more than one year later. Because Macik did not file his petition within one year of the date any equitable tolling would have ended, his incarceration out-of-state does not excuse the untimeliness of his petition. See Idaho Code § 19-4902(a) (as of 1993, establishing a one-year limitation period); Martinez v. State, 130 Idaho 530, 536-37, 944 P.2d 127, 133-34 (Ct. App. 1997) ("Since Martinez did not file his post-conviction application within one year of gaining the ability to access the Idaho courts through his counsel, his application is barred by the limitation period of I.C. 19-4902."); see also Reyes v. State, 128 Idaho 413, 414-16, 913 P.2d 1183, 1184-86 (Ct. App. 1996) (per curiam) (affirming the dismissal of Reyes' application as untimely and applying the one-year limitation period, even though Reyes was convicted prior to the 1993 amendment).
Macik's assertion regarding being medicated with Thorazine also does not excuse the untimeliness of his petition. Macik himself acknowledged that he was on the medication until only 1972, and thus the petition had to be filed by July 1, 1984. See LaFon, 119 Idaho at 389, 807 P.2d at 68. For Macik's next averment relating to equitable tolling, even if we assumed that equitable tolling started the limitation period at the 2007 episode in which Macik developed an "extraordinary unexplained ability" to recall his life events from 1969 until 1972, Macik still had to file his petition for post-conviction relief by September 2008. See I.C. § 19-4902(a). Because Macik did not file his petition until 2012, Macik's stroke in 2007 does not excuse the untimeliness of his petition.
In short, Macik's petition was filed after any limitation period required the petition to be filed, even if equitable tolling applied. Thus, the petition was untimely and was subject to summary dismissal. Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 959, 88 P.3d 776, 778 (Ct. App. 2003) ("The failure to file a timely petition is a basis for dismissal of the petition."). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the district court summarily dismissing Macik's petition for post-conviction relief.
Chief Judge MELANSON and Judge LANSING,