CANDY W. DALE, District Judge.
Before the Court is a motion for summary judgment filed by Defendants Randy Blades, the Idaho Department of Correction (IDOC), the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI), Ben Metzger, and Marty Thomas, seeking judgment as a matter of law on all remaining claims asserted by pro se Plaintiff Dennis Abbott. (Dkt. 26.) The Court previously dismissed Abbott's individual capacity claims against all Defendants, as well as all claims asserted against Defendants Doslin, Rosenthal, Hunter, Blair, Bassford, and Nourse in the Complaint. (Dkt. 22.)
Abbott alleges Defendants, acting in their official capacities, violated his rights under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq., and § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq., by not allowing him to participate in the Correctional Industries (C.I.) training program because he is confined to a wheelchair, and by failing to provide a wheelchair-accessible restroom in the C.I. facilities. Abbott seeks monetary, injunctive, and declaratory relief for Defendants' violations.
All parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge. (Dkt. 12.) In the interest of avoiding delay, and because the Court conclusively finds the decisional process would not be significantly aided by oral argument, Defendants' motion will be decided on the record without oral argument. Dist. Idaho L. Rule 7.1(d). For reasons explained below, the Court will grant summary judgment.
At all times mentioned in his Complaint, Plaintiff Dennis Abbott, who uses a wheelchair due to his disability, was an inmate at the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI). Since filing this action, Abbott has been released from ISCI custody. See Aff. Magnelli, Ex. A. (Dkt. 26-7 at 4) ("I have been released on parole."). Abbott's claim arises from his desire to participate in Correctional Industries, a training and workforce preparedness program for offenders, while he was in ISCI's custody.
According to Defendants, C.I. is a self-funded state agency that relies upon revenues from the sale of its goods and products to sustain its operations See Aff. Anderson, ¶ 3. (Dkt. 26-6). C.I. does not receive federal funding to operate its programs, nor does it receive funding from IDOC or the State of Idaho to operate its programs. Id.
Acceptance into the C.I. training program is a multi-step process. See Aff. Walden, ¶ 2. (Dkt. 26-4 at 2.) First, the inmate must be recommended by his case manager to ensure his employment will not interfere with other rehabilitative programs the inmate may be involved in. Next, security staff must determine whether the offender is eligible to participate in offender work programs.
Access to the C.I. building is restricted to those inmates who have been selected to participate in the training program. C.I.'s main entrance, the "clean room," is accessible by stairs only and is equipped with a metal detector, which offender employees are required to pass through to gain physical entry into the facilities.
In January of 2013, Abbott applied for a clerk position open in C.I.'s upholstery shop.
Before selecting a candidate for the clerk position in the C.I. training program, Metzger asked the other offender workers and staff members for their thoughts about Abbott and the other applicants. Regarding Abbott, "one or two were critical of [Abbott] as a manipulator." See Aff. Metzger, ¶ 8. (Dkt. 26-3 at 3.) This feedback, coupled with Abbott's less than honest answer to one of the questions on Abbott's application, led Metzger to select an inmate he considered more qualified than Abbott.
On April 9, 2013, Abbott filed a grievance regarding the denial of his application to the C.I. training program. See Complaint, Ex. L. (Dkt. 3-13 at 2.) On his grievance form, Abbott stated: "Americans with Disabilities Act, Title II violation. Correctional Industries has no passage for offenders who are in wheelchairs to enter the jobsite and gain employment for such industries. . . ." Id. On the grievance form, under the section suggesting a "solution for the problem," Abbott stated: "Give me the job I asked for or equivalent." Id. On April 17, 2013, Terri Rosenthal, the ISCI Administrative Support Manager, responded to and denied Abbott's grievance.
On April 19, 2013, Abbott appealed Rosenthal's denial of his grievance. In his appeal, Abbott stated, "I am asserting there is a viable discrimination within this facility in not allowing offenders in wheelchairs to have a pay job. . . . Correctional Industries only have stairs for offenders to reports for work. There is no ramp for wheelchairs." Id. In addition, Abbott's appeal states, "[m]ake this institution disability friendly." Id.
During the appeal process, Abbott filed an offender concern form addressed to Rosenthal on April 21, 2013. In the "concern" section, Abbott wrote: "I am barred from entering C.I. because of barriers, that being stairs and C.I. is not interested in making accommodations for offenders in wheelchairs and this is why I must take this to court." See Complaint, Ex. K (Dkt. 3-12 at 2.) On the same day, Rosenthal responded and explained to Abbott, "if you are accepted into the training program we can make a reasonable accommodation for you to enter CI; however not your wheelchair pusher."
On April 25, 2013, Defendant Randy Blades, the ISCI warden, denied Abbott's appeal.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 directs the court to "grant summary judgment if the movant shows there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Critically, "the mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). "A dispute about a material fact is genuine `if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'" FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir.2010) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248).
"The moving party initially bears the burden of proving the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." In re Oracle Corp. Secs. Litig., 627 F.3d 376, 387 (9th Cir.2010) (citing Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)). "Where the moving party meets that burden, the burden then shifts to the non-moving party to designate specific facts demonstrating the existence of genuine issues for trial." Id. "If a party fails to properly support an assertion of fact or fails to properly address another party's assertion of fact as required by Rule 56(c), the court may . . . consider the fact undisputed for the purposes of the motion," Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2), and "the court may grant summary judgment if the motion and supporting materials—including the facts considered undisputed—show that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment." Dist. Idaho L. Rule 7.1(e).
The ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are congruent statutes in purpose and in application. See Clark v. California, 123 F.3d 1267, 1270 (9th Cir. 1997). The evidence required for bringing a Rehabilitation Act claim is the same as that for an ADA claim, with the additional requirement that the disability discrimination be committed by an entity receiving federal financial assistance. See 29 U.S.C. § 794. Therefore, the standards of an ADA claim apply also to a claim under the Rehabilitation Act.
Title II of the ADA provides that no "qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity." 42 U.S.C. § 12132.
A claim under Title II of the ADA requires the plaintiff to establish: (1) he has a disability; (2) he is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive a public entity's services, programs or activities; (3) he was denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) that such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of his disability. Weinreich v. Los Angeles Cnty. Metro. Transp. Auth., 114 F.3d 976, 978 (9th Cir. 1997). Title II of the ADA extends to prison inmates who are deprived of the benefits of and participation in prison programs, services, or activities because of a disability. See Pa. Dep't of Corr. v. Yeskey, 524 U.S. 206, 211 (1998).
Further, "[t]o recover monetary damages under Title II of the ADA or Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination on the part of the defendant." Duvall v. Cnty. of Kitsap, 260 F.3d 1124, 1138 (9th Cir. 2001). The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit applies the "deliberate indifference" standard to determine intentional discrimination. See Id. Deliberate indifference requires the plaintiff to demonstrate the defendant knew that harm to a plaintiff's federally protected right is substantially likely and that the defendant failed to act upon that likelihood. Id; see City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 389 (1988).
A plaintiff satisfies the knowledge element of deliberate indifference by demonstrating he alerted the "public entity to his need for accommodation (or where the need for accommodation is obvious, or required by statute or regulation)." Id. at 1139. Upon receiving a request for accommodation, defendants are "required to undertake a fact specific investigation to determine what constitutes a reasonable accommodation." Id. "[A] public entity does not `act' by proffering just any accommodation: it must consider the particular individual's need when conducting its investigation into what accommodations are reasonable." Id. "A failure to act must be a result of conduct that is more than negligent, and involves an element of deliberateness." Id.
In his Complaint, Abbott contends Defendants violated both Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, because he was denied the clerk position in the upholstery unit within ISCI's C.I. training program due to his disability. Defendants assert, because participation in the C.I. training program is not a fundamental right, and because the C.I. training program does not receive federal funding, Abbott's claims are barred by sovereign immunity. Alternatively, Defendants argue if sovereign immunity does not apply, Abbott has nonetheless failed to satisfy the elements of a Title II ADA or Rehabilitation Act claim.
Abbott does not address directly either argument in his response, nor does he present an alternative argument for denying summary judgment. In addition, Abbott's assertions of disputed facts are not properly supported pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). However, the Court will consider Abbott's undisputed facts for purposes of deciding the motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2).
The Court need not decide whether sovereign immunity applies in this instance.
Defendants do not dispute the first two elements of Abbott's claim. Defendants concede Abbott is a "qualified individual with a disability" and that Abbott is otherwise qualified to participate in the C.I. training program. However, Defendants argue Abbott was not excluded from participation in the C.I. training program, but even if he was, he was not excluded due to his disability. In addition, Defendants contend if discrimination is found, Abbott's claim still fails because he is unable to prove Defendants acted with deliberate indifference to his federally protected right to accommodation.
The Court finds the record is less than clear as to whether Abbott was denied participation in the C.I. training program.
Defendants contend they do not have a policy or practice of denying inmates with disabilities acceptance into the C.I. training program and Abbott has put forth insufficient evidence to support the existence of such a policy. However, there is no dispute Abbott applied and interviewed for a clerk position in the upholstery unit in C.I., and Defendants explain several reasons why Abbott was not selected for the position—which Abbott does not dispute.
First, the Defendants present a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason why Abbott was not hired—because he was not the most qualified applicant. In Metzger's affidavit, he states: "After conducting the interviews I chose another candidate for the position. This person interviewed better, had a better skill set and better interpersonal skills." See Aff. Metzeger, ¶ 7. (Dkt. 26-3 at 3.) Next, Metzger explains he felt Abbott was less than honest on his application for the clerk position, because on Abbott's application, next to the line marked "physical restrictions," Abbott wrote: "none (wheelchair)."
Abbott does not dispute Defendant's evidence. Rather, Abbott's allegation of Defendants' discrimination rests upon allegations made in his Complaint—specifically including the statement made by the offender lead man in the upholstery shop that C.I. does not hire offenders in wheelchairs. Defendants do not dispute the lead man's statement. See Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 26-1 at 5).
The Court finds there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Abbott was denied the clerk position in the C.I. program by reason of his disability. Though Defendants allege a non-discriminatory reason as to why Abbott was not selected for the clerk position—that a more qualified candidate was selected—Defendants nonetheless fail to identify the more qualified offender, fail to state his qualifications or state why he was more qualified for the clerk position compared to Abbott, and fail to indicate whether the more qualified offender was disabled.
Additionally Defendants do not dispute the lead man made the comment "we can't hire anyone in a wheelchair." Though the lead man is an inmate, it is unclear whether he had any input in the offender selection process for positions in C.I.
The Court concludes the Defendants have failed, based on the record before the Court, to prove the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on elements three and four of Abbott's claim. This does not stop the Court's inquiry, however, as the Court must determine whether the alleged discrimination, if proven, was intentional.
Construing the facts most favorable for Abbott, Abbott asserts he was not hired for the clerk position because the C.I. facility's main entrance and restrooms were not handicapped accessible.
With regard to entry into the C.I. building, it is undisputed Defendants were willing to make accommodations for Abbott's disability so he could enter the C.I. building. Rosenthal explained in her response to Abbott's grievance: "We can usually make a reasonable accommodation if necessary." Complaint, Ex. M. (Dkt. 3-14 at 4.) In his appeal, Abbott did not question the feasibility of accommodations; instead, he asserted that entry into the C.I. facility was only possible by stairs, and insisted that C.I. should be disability friendly. In response to Abbott's appeal, Blades stated if Abbott was accepted into the CI program: "we will make accommodations for your wheelchair issue into CI entry." Id. Blades response also went beyond Abbott's original grievance, which mentioned only the stairs, and explained: "We will also look at disability clean room accessibility, ADA compliance ramps, and restrooms." Id. Defendants' clear willingness to accommodate Abbott's disability is contrary to a finding that Defendants were deliberately indifferent when making their decision to deny Abbott the clerk position in the C.I. program. In his response, Abbott challenges the reasonableness of Defendants suggested accommodations for Abbott's entry into the C.I. building. Specifically, he argues the alternative entry is against security regulations because it is not equipped with a metal detector. However, Warden Blades clearly stated in his response to Abbott's appeal: "We can overcome any security concern."
In addition, Abbott challenges the reasonableness of the restroom modifications raised for the first time by Blades in his grievance response, although Abbott failed to specifically include them in his grievance. In their motion for summary judgment, Defendants assert they would have converted C.I.'s restrooms so that they were handicapped accessible, and while renovations were being made, Abbott could have used the handicapped restroom in a nearby dining hall. In response, Abbott challenges Rosenthal's April 21, 2013 reply to Abbott's offender form, filed separate from the grievance, which states: "We can make a reasonable accommodation for you to enter; however not your wheelchair pusher."
The Court finds Abbott's after the fact challenge to the restroom accessibility issue is in stark contrast to Warden Blades's April 25, 2013 denial of Abbott's appeal, where Blades states: "[w]e will make accommodations for your wheelchair issue into CI entry," and will address accessibility issues with the ramps and restrooms. There is no support for Abbott's argument that a wheelchair pusher would not have been available as part of the accommodation for restroom accessibility, interim or otherwise.
Even construing these above facts and arguments in favor of Abbott, they do not create a genuine issue upon which a reasonable jury could conclude that Defendants acted with deliberate indifference. Abbott's failure to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Defendant's alleged discrimination was intentional is, therefore, fatal to his claim under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act.
Abbott requests the Court issue a declaratory judgment establishing that Defendants violated Abbott's rights pursuant to Title II of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act. In addition, he requests the Court enter an injunction prohibiting Defendants from the continued violation of his rights. Defendants argue Abbott's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief are moot because Abbott is no longer incarcerated at ISCI. Abbott fails to address this argument or offer any alterative argument in response. The Court agrees with Defendants.
In McQuillon v. Schwarzenegger, 369 F.3d 1091 (9th Cir.2004), the Court explained the mootness doctrine relative to requests for injunctive and declaratory relief:
Id. at 1095.
Because Abbott is no longer an inmate at ISCI, he is not entitled to injunctive or declaratory relief. Ordering Defendants to provide Abbott with a position in the C.I. training program and making accommodations for his entry into the building would not afford Abbott any relief because he is no longer imprisoned. Moreover, Abbott's claims do not challenge an ongoing prison policy nor are they part of a class action claim, which might otherwise trigger an exception to the mootness doctrine and allow Abbott's claim to proceed.
Dismissal of the injunctive and declaratory relief requests also is in harmony with the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA).Title 18 U.S.C. § 3626 limits the type of prospective relief available in prison conditions lawsuits brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Under that section, the term "prospective relief" is defined as "all relief other than compensatory monetary damages."18 U.S.C. § 3626(g)(7). Particularly, 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A) limits such relief as follows:
In this instance, no prospective relief of the type requested by Abbott is necessary to protect his constitutional rights. Accordingly, Abbot's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief are moot and subject to dismissal.
The Court will grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants as to Abbott's claim for monetary damages brought pursuant to Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. In addition, the Court will dismiss Abbott's claims for injunctive and declaratory relief because they are moot, as Abbott is no longer incarcerated.
1. Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. 26) is
