Candy W. Dale, U.S. Magistrate Judge
Transgender individuals born in Idaho cannot obtain a birth certificate with the
As a preliminary matter, the Court notes the rare posture of the case. Plaintiffs, two transgender women born in Idaho, bring this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asking the Court for a declaration that IDHW's policy violates their constitutional rights and the rights of others similarly situated. Plaintiffs request that the Court apply heightened scrutiny review, and declare that IDHW's policy violates the Equal Protection Clause. They also seek a ruling that the policy infringes upon due process rights to informational privacy, individual liberty, autonomy, and dignity. Plaintiffs request further that the Court find that IDHW's policy impermissibly compels speech in violation of the First Amendment to the Constitution. Plaintiffs ask the Court to enjoin Defendants, and others subject to the injunction, from enforcing the policy.
In turn, Defendants do not defend the constitutionality of the policy. Instead, they admit it is unconstitutional. Specifically, that it violates the Equal Protection Clause, failing minimum scrutiny review because "a prohibition against changing the sex designation on the birth certificate of a transgender individual who has undergone clinically appropriate treatment to permanently change his or her sex" bears no rational relationship to a conceivable government interest. (Ans. to First Am. Compl., Dkt. 19 at 2-3 ¶ 5.) Defendants assert that, once they have an order from the Court in hand, they will create a new rule permitting transgender individuals to change the sex listed on their birth certificates. (Oral Argument at 9:50, F.V. v. Armstrong et al., No. 1:17-CV-00170-CWD (February 1, 2018).) Defendants indicate also that the new rule will include a provision that any revision history related to changes to the listed sex or name changes will not be marked on the reissued birth certificates of transgender individuals. Defendants further indicate they cannot proceed to create a rule until they receive a court order (Oral Argument at 9:51, F.V. v. Armstrong et al., No. 1:17-CV-00170-CWD (February 1, 2018).)
Defendants assert that, because they have made these concessions, the Court should exercise judicial restraint and decide the Plaintiffs' motion on the narrowest ground — that the current policy, as applied, is not rationally related to a legitimate government interest, violates the Plaintiffs' equal protection rights, and is thus unconstitutional under minimum scrutiny review.
Plaintiffs counter that, in the face of pervasive government discrimination against transgender individuals, the Court has a constitutional duty and inherent authority to define the level of scrutiny that should be applied to their equal protection claim, and should determine favorable judgment is warranted on the basis of the other constitutional claims — in addition to fashioning a remedy mandating equal treatment.
The Court will not reach Plaintiffs' Due Process or First Amendment claims for the following reasons. First, the Court finds resolution of the Equal Protection Clause claim captures "the essence of
After careful consideration, the Court finds IDHW's policy of categorically and automatically denying applications submitted by transgender individuals to change the sex listed on their birth certificates is unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court finds further that any constitutionally sound rule must not include the revision history as to sex or name to avoid impermissibly compelling speech and furthering the harms at issue. The Court notes also that the new rule should withstand heightened scrutiny review to fall within the contours of equal protection law. To reasonably assure the rule and remedy comply with such existing law, the Court will discuss the same after presenting the background, introducing the parties, and outlining the standard of review.
States are responsible for the development and implementation of laws related to vital events such as recording births and deaths. However, most states, including Idaho, use the Model State Vital Statistics Act published by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention as a basis for state law.
Idaho's vital statistics laws require that all amended birth certificates be marked as "amended," including a record of the nature of the change, unless the change is made under one of the following circumstances: (1) minor corrections made within one year after the date of the event necessitating the correction; (2) voluntary acknowledgements of paternity and non-paternity; and (3) for changes to name and paternal and maternal information in instances of adoption. Idaho Code §§ 39-250, 39-258-59; IDAPA 16.02.08.201. In these circumstances, the vital statistics laws require the amendments not be marked or noted on the birth certificate.
All applications to amend birth certificates are reviewed by the state registrar. The registrar's determination must serve the objectives of the vital statistics laws and the best interests of the public. IDAPA 16.02.08.201(e). When applications are denied, an individual has a right to petition a court for an order requiring the registrar make the requested amendment. Idaho Code § 39-250(5).
As explained above, IDHW interprets Idaho vital statistics law to prohibit changes to the listed sex unless there was an error in recording the sex at birth. Notably, IDHW asserts that Idaho birth certificates reflect the "sex" of a person at birth and do not contain a "gender marker" designation. (Ans. to First Am. Compl., Dkt. 23 at 2 ¶¶ 3-4.) From this interpretation comes IDHW's policy of automatically and categorically denying applications made by transgender individuals for the purpose of changing the listed sex to reflect their gender identity.
There is scientific consensus that biological sex is determined by numerous elements, which can include chromosomal composition, internal reproductive organs, external genitalia, hormone prevalence, and brain structure.
Gender identity, also known as core gender, is the intrinsic sense of being male, female, or an alternative gender. WPATH Standards of Care at 96. Transgender is an adjective used to designate "a person whose identity does not confirm unambiguously to conventional notions of male or female gender."
Transgender individuals often suffer emotional distress in the process of recognizing and responding to the complex social and personal scenarios that result because their gender identity does not align with birth-assigned sex. (Dkt. 28-5 at 8; See e.g., American Medical Association Resolution 122 (A-08) at 1 (2008)). A clinical
Transgender individuals, especially those suffering from gender dysphoria, often proceed through a process known as transition, defined as follows:
WPATH Standards of Care at 97.
In other words, transition is the process where a person works to bring their lived experience and outer appearance into alignment with their gender identity. Transition can include medical treatments, such as hormone therapy and surgery, but is often limited to social transition. WPATH Standards of Care at 71, 97. Not all transgender people choose to undergo surgery as a part of the transition process. This is due to numerous potential factors, including whether surgery is medically necessary, and personal and financial factors such as lack of insurance coverage. (See First Am. Compl., Dkt. 19 at 6 ¶ 24; see also Ans. to First Am. Compl., Dkt. 19 at 5 ¶ 24.)
Social transition includes changes in clothing, name, pronouns, hairstyle, and identity documents to reflect one's gender identity. Id. at 9-10. "A complete transition is one in which a person attains a sense of lasting personal comfort with their gendered self, thus maximizing overall health, well-being, and personal safety." (Decl. of Dr. Randi Ettner, Dkt. 28-5 at 10.)
Mismatches between identification documents and outward gender presentation can create risks to the health and safety of transgender people. Transgender people who present mismatched identification are verbally harassed, physically assaulted, denied service or benefits, or asked to leave the premises. James et al., The Report of the 2015 U.S. Transgender Survey, Washington D.C., National Center for Transgender Equality at 7 (2016) (hereinafter Transgender Survey).
Statistics regarding the ongoing discrimination transgender individuals face highlight why involuntary disclosure of transgender status creates these risks. For instance, nearly twenty-five percent of surveyed college students, when perceived as a transgender person, were verbally, physically, or sexually assaulted in 2015. Transgender Survey at 9. This figure tracks the percentage of workers reporting mistreatment in the workplace due to gender identity. Id. at 10. More than seventy-five percent of transgender workers take steps to avoid such mistreatment at work by hiding or delaying their gender transition, or by quitting their job. Id. at 11.
Across all environments, almost fifty percent of transgender people surveyed for the 2015 report responded that they had been verbally harassed due to their gender identity. Id. at 13. Nearly one in ten reported being physically assaulted because of their gender identity. Id. Notably, the reported lifetime suicide attempt rate for transgender people is nearly nine times the rate of the United States population on average. Id. at 8.
Plaintiffs are two transgender women who were born in Idaho. Each Plaintiff has undergone the process of transition but is unable to obtain a birth certificate that reflects her gender identity.
F.V. is a 28-year-old woman born in Idaho. She is a transgender person who was assigned the sex of male at birth. Although F.V. states that she knew from approximately age 6 she was female, she began to live openly as a female when she was 15 years old. She has lived as a woman since that time, and asserts that doing so has been essential to her sense of self. F.V. relates that she "cannot imagine living life as a man" because she is not a man, and would be living a lie to try to do so. (Decl. of F.V., Dkt. 28-3 at 2.)
F.V. has taken steps, both medically and socially, to bring her body and expression of gender in line with her female gender identity.
F.V. asserts that living with a birth certificate declaring she is male is a permanent
Dani Martin (Dani) is a 31-year-old woman born in Idaho. Dani is a transgender person who was assigned the sex of male at birth. Like F.V., Dani states that she knew from a young age she was female. However, fear of rejection and bullying prevented her from coming out when she was younger. With the support of her spouse and her family, Dani began to transition in 2014. She has lived her life openly as a woman since that time.
Like F.V., Dani has taken steps, both medically and socially, to bring her body and expression of gender in line with her female identity. Her social transition has included legally changing her name from a traditionally male name to a traditionally female one, and changing her name and gender on her driver's license and in her social security records. Like F.V., Dani has been unable to change the gender on her birth certificate due to Idaho's prohibitory policy.
The mismatch between Dani's gender identity and the sex listed on her birth certificate has exposed her to harassment and embarrassment. She asserts the mismatch has also prevented her from making the change in other important records — perpetuating instances where she is forced to disclose her transgender status, face embarrassment, harassment, and potential physical violence.
The three Defendants are employees of IDHW. As supervisors and custodians of records, they are each variously responsible for the implementation, enforcement, development, and interpretation of Idaho's vital statistics laws.
Defendant Russell Barron is the Director of IDHW. He supervises the activities of IDHW, including the enforcement of the Vital Statistics Act, Vital Statistics Rules, and the agency's policies and interpretations of such laws.
Defendant Elke Shaw-Tullock is the Administrator of IDHW's Division of Public Health. The division includes the Bureau of Vital Records and Health Statistics. She supervises activities of the division, including enforcement of the Vital Statistics Act, Vital Statistics Rules, and the agency's policies and interpretations of such laws.
Defendant James Aydelotte is the State Registrar and Bureau Chief of the Bureau of Vital Records and Health Statistics at IDHW. He is the official custodian of vital records for the State of Idaho and also enforces the Vital Statistics Act, Vital Statistics Rules, and the agency's policies and interpretations of such laws.
Summary judgment is appropriate where a party can show, as to any claim or defense, "there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). One of the principal purposes of summary judgment "is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported claims...." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). It is "not a disfavored procedural shortcut," but is instead a tool to prevent factually insufficient claims or defenses "from going to trial with the attendant unwarranted consumption of public and private resources." Id. at 327, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(3) authorizes a court to grant summary judgment for the moving party "if the motion and supporting materials — including the facts considered undisputed — show that the movant is entitled to it. The existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party's position is insufficient. Rather, `there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the [non-moving party].'" Ransier at *2, (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986)).
To prevail on a motion for a permanent injunction, plaintiffs must demonstrate: (1) they have suffered an irreparable injury or harm; (2) remedies available at law are inadequate to compensate for such injury or harm; (3) considering the balance of hardships between the parties, an equitable remedy is warranted; and (4) public interest is not disserved by a permanent injunction. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S.Ct. 1837, 164 L.Ed.2d 641 (2006).
When a court grants injunctive relief, it must tailor the remedy to the specific harm shown by plaintiffs. Hawaii v. Trump, 859 F.3d 741, 785 (9th Cir.), cert. granted sub nom. Trump v. Int'l Refugee Assistance Project, ___ U.S. ___, 137 S.Ct. 2080, 198 L.Ed. 2d 643 (2017), and cert. granted, judgment vacated, ___ U.S. ___, 138 S.Ct. 377, 199 L.Ed.2d 275 (2017), and vacated, 874 F.3d 1112 (9th Cir. 2017); Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702, 99 S.Ct. 2545, 61 L.Ed.2d 176 (1979). The scope of the remedy fashioned by a court is dictated by the extent of the violation established by the plaintiffs. 859 F.3d 741, 785. Aside from these parameters, a court has significant discretion in fashioning an appropriate and proportionate remedy. Id.
The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that all similarly situated people be treated alike. City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 439, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 87 L.Ed.2d 313 (1985). Equal protection requirements restrict state legislative action that is inconsistent with bedrock constitutional guarantees, such as equality in treatment. See Obergefell v. Hodges, ___ U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2603, 192 L.Ed.2d 609 (2015). An equal protection claim is established when plaintiffs show they were treated differently than other similarly situated people. City of Cleburne at 439-440, 105 S.Ct. 3249. Yet, states are given significant leeway to establish laws to effectively govern citizens and remedy societal ills. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631, 116 S.Ct. 1620, 134 L.Ed.2d 855 (1996). Because of this, successful equal protection claims additionally require plaintiffs to show the difference in treatment was the result of intentional or purposeful discrimination. Stone v. Trump, No. CV MJG-17-2459, 280 F.Supp.3d 747, 767-68, 2017 WL 5589122, at *15 (D. Md. Nov. 21, 2017).
In this matter, Plaintiffs, transgender individuals born in Idaho, have adequately
Yet, in turn, IDHW permits some classes of people, adoptive parents for instance, to make amendments to birth certificates without record of the amendment on the reissued certificate. IDHW has similar laws and policies related to the change of paternal information. These laws give certain people access to birth certificates that accurately reflect who they are, while denying transgender people, as a class, access to birth certificates that accurately reflect their gender identity. Therefore, as Defendants concede, Plaintiffs' equal protection claims are valid.
The Supreme Court of the United States has set forth a framework of tiered review for equal protection claims. Latta v. Otter, 19 F.Supp.3d 1054, 1073 (D. Idaho), aff'd, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014). Each tier of scrutiny requires a different level of justification for the challenged law. Id. The level of scrutiny applied to the law is determined by the type of classification at issue. Id. If a law classifies on the basis of a suspect class or a quasi-suspect class, it is subject to heightened scrutiny review — and, depending on the type of suspect classification, such laws are subject to either strict scrutiny review or intermediate scrutiny review. If a law does not classify on the basis of a suspect or quasi-suspect class, it is subject to minimum scrutiny — commonly called rational basis review. Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 319-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637, 125 L.Ed.2d 257 (1993).
Therefore, the most stringent level of review is strict scrutiny. The Supreme Court has carefully defined the limits of this level of review. It is applied when laws impermissibly interfere with fundamental rights or to the disadvantage of a suspect class. Latta, 19 F.Supp.3d at 1073. Strict scrutiny applies to classifications based on race, alienage, and national origin. IDWH's policy makes a classification based on transgender status. Therefore, under clear Supreme Court precedent, it does not trigger strict scrutiny review.
In contrast, the most lenient level of scrutiny is rational basis review. This level of review is applied to laws that impose a difference in treatment between groups but do not infringe upon a fundamental right, or target a suspect or quasi-suspect class. Heller at 319-21, 113 S.Ct. 2637. In such instances, if a court can identify any rational basis supportive of the government's need for the law, it is upheld. Id. In this matter, IDHW Defendants concede no rational basis exists to support the categorical denial of requests to amend sex-assigned birth on the basis of correcting it to match one's gender identity.
The Court notes the importance and potential implications of restrictions and restraints IDHW may place on the ability of transgender people to apply for and receive approval of applications to change the sex listed on their birth certificates. Because the Court does not have a proposed rule before it, it will not extrapolate on the potential legal ramifications of such restrictions — such topics are not ripe for its consideration. However, any new rule must not subject one class of people to any more onerous burdens than the burdens placed on others without constitutionally-appropriate
The Court agrees there is no rational basis to support IDHW's policy. The following facts make this conclusion apparent: (1) IDHW already has a process in place for making amendments to birth certificates, as is evidenced by Idaho's vital statistics laws; (2) the vital statistics laws make certain that amendments or corrections are kept confidential when they pertain to sensitive personal and potentially private information, such as paternity or adoptive status; and (3) the laws make room for the amendment of any other information on the birth certificate with the proper form of application and evidence.
Thus, under an alternative, constitutionally-sound reading of Idaho's vital statistics laws, amendments to the listed sex are not only possible, but procedures are in place to facilitate such amendments — and the Act allows the Board to draft a rule that does just that.
Yet, as explained above, Plaintiffs ask the Court to take a step further to find that IDHW's policy similarly fails to withstand heightened scrutiny, which includes the mid-tier of equal protection review — intermediate scrutiny. Historically, intermediate scrutiny applies to quasi-suspect classifications based on sex and illegitimacy. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461, 108 S.Ct. 1910, 100 L.Ed.2d 465 (1988). For quasi-suspect classifications to be upheld, the state must show the classification is substantially related to an important governmental objective. "The purpose of this heightened level of scrutiny is to ensure quasi-suspect classifications do not perpetuate unfounded stereotypes or second-class treatment." Latta v. Otter, 19 F.Supp.3d 1054, 1073 (D. Idaho), aff'd, 771 F.3d 456 (9th Cir. 2014) (citing United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 534, 116 S.Ct. 2264, 135 L.Ed.2d 735 (1996)).
Plaintiffs argue that IDHW's refusal to treat transgender people like others of the same sex, i.e. other males or females, requires intermediate review because such treatment discriminates on the basis of sex or otherwise employs another quasi-suspect classification — transgender status. In other words, Plaintiffs suggest two ways for the Court to conclude that heightened scrutiny applies to government classifications based on transgender status. The first — the Court could find that discrimination based on transgender status is discrimination based on sex or gender. The second — the Court could conclude that transgender status is a suspect classification in and of itself. In either case, Plaintiffs contend IDHW's policy is not substantially related to an important governmental objective and fails intermediate scrutiny review. The merits of both prongs of the Plaintiffs' argument will be discussed in turn.
In 1977, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held rational basis review appropriately applied to classifications based on "transsexual" status, because sex-based discrimination in the context of Title VII included only discrimination based on one's anatomical gender —
The Supreme Court's decision in Price Waterhouse is particularly important to the development of a more robust understanding of sex-based gender discrimination in the law. Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. 228, 240, 109 S.Ct. 1775, 104, L.Ed.2d 268 (1989). There, the Court held that Title VII bars discrimination based on the fact that a person is a woman or a man, and based on the fact that a person fails to act like a woman or a man — i.e. it protects people from discrimination based on their failure to adhere to society's expectations of traditional gender roles. Id.
In 2000, the Ninth Circuit employed the reasoning from Price Waterhouse in a new statutory context. Schwenk v. Hartford, 204 F.3d 1187, 1202 (9th Cir. 2000). In Schwenk, the Ninth Circuit held that violence perpetrated against a transgender person, because they presented as a certain gender, was violence motivated by gender for purposes of the Gender Motivated Violence Act. Id. Since Schwenk, at least one court in the Ninth Circuit has held Schwenk's reasoning supports the follow-on conclusion that discrimination against transgender people is a form of sex discrimination subject to intermediate scrutiny review. Norsworthy v. Beard, 87 F.Supp.3d 1104, 1121 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (where the court found that Schwenk overruled the specific conclusions on which the Holloway decision relied); see also Olive v. Harrington, 2016 WL 4899177, at *5 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 14, 2016) and Marlett v. Harrington, No. 115CV01382MJSPC, 2015 WL 6123613, at *4 (E.D. Cal. Oct. 16, 2015) (pro se screening orders citing Norsworthy, stating discrimination on the basis of transgender status is subject to intermediate scrutiny).
Of particular importance, significant changes in the medical understanding of gender identity call for a reexamination of its place in the equal protection context in relation to sex-based discrimination. Duronslet v. Cty. of Los Angeles, 266 F.Supp.3d 1213, 1223 (C.D. Cal. 2017) (discussing advances since Holloway v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 566 F.2d 659 (9th Cir. 1977). "[I]t would not be inconsistent with Holloway ... to conclude, based on an adequately developed factual record, that our current understanding of transgenderism requires the application of heightened scrutiny." Id.
Indeed, our medical understanding of biological sex and gender has advanced significantly in the forty-one years since Holloway. For instance, it is universally acknowledged in leading medical guidance that not all individuals identify as the sex they are assigned at birth.
In the equal protection context, the Supreme Court "has recognized that new insights and societal understandings can reveal unjustified inequality [...] that once passed unnoticed and unchallenged."
Courts have applied this test and have found that government discrimination based on transgender status is discrimination against a quasi-suspect class and thus is subject to intermediate scrutiny. Adkins v. City of New York, 143 F.Supp.3d 134 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).
Id.
Similarly, in Evancho v. Pine-Richland School Dist., the court concluded intermediate
Id. at 289.
The findings in Adkins and Evancho echo findings made regarding homosexual people as a class and recognized by this Court in Latta, the Ninth Circuit in SmithKline, and the Supreme Court in Windsor and Obergefell. Applying the four factor analysis, the cases found: (1) homosexual people have endured persecution and discrimination; (2) sexual orientation has no relation to aptitude or ability to contribute to society; (3) homosexual people are a discernable group with non-obvious distinguishing characteristics; and (4) the class is a politically weakened minority.
The pervasive and extensive similarities in the discrimination faced by transgender people and homosexual people are hard to ignore: (1) transgender people have been the subject of a long history of discrimination that continues to this day; (2) transgender status as a defining characteristic bears no "relation to ability to perform or contribute to society; (3) transgender status and gender identity have been found to be "obvious, immutable, or distinguishing characteristic[s];" and (4) transgender people are unarguably a politically vulnerable minority. Norsworthy, 87 F.Supp.3d at 1119 n.8; Adkins, 143 F.Supp.3d at 140; See generally, SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Labs., 740 F.3d 471, 481-84 (9th Cir. 2014). This is especially true in Idaho where transgender people have no state constitutional protections from discrimination based on their transgender status in relation to employment decisions, housing, and other services. Therefore, transgender people bear all of the characteristics of a quasi-suspect class and any rule developed and implemented by IDHW should withstand heightened scrutiny review to be constitutionally sound.
Defendants, as conceded, violate the Equal Protection Clause by failing to provide an avenue for transgender people to amend the sex listed on their birth certificates. Plaintiffs have sufficiently demonstrated that they have suffered irreparable injury and harm that cannot be remedied by ordinary remedies at law — and by Defendants' acknowledgment, IDHW cannot proceed to create a new rule to remedy the harm without a court order. Furthermore, the balance of the hardships warrants an equitable remedy, because allowing such amendments would pose no new burden on Defendants: Idaho vital statistics laws allow IDHW to create and implement a constitutionally-sound rule, and IDHW already has in place processes and procedures to facilitate the amendment of birth certificates in the ordinary course of its everyday activities. Finally, the public interest is not disserved by a permanent injunction. A rule providing an avenue to obtain a birth certificate with a listed sex that aligns with an individual's gender identity promotes the health, well-being,
In the Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) Program, the victim of a hate crime may be an individual, a business, an institution, or society as a whole. In 2015, the nation's law enforcement agencies reported that there were 7,173 victims of hate crimes. Of these victims, 52 were victimized in separate multiple-bias incidents.
The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd, Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act of 2009, 18 U.S.C. § 249 required the FBI to collect data concerning hate crimes committed by or directed against juveniles. Beginning in 2013, law enforcement began reporting the number of victims who are 18 years of age or older and the number of victims under the age of 18 in addition to reporting the number of individual victims. Of the 4,198 individuals for which victim age data were reported in 2015, 3,702 hate crime victims were adults, and 496 hate crime victims were juveniles.
In 2013, the national UCR Program began collecting revised race and ethnicity data in accordance with a directive from the U.S. Government's Office of Management and Budget. The race categories were expanded from four (White, Black, American Indian or Alaska Native, and Asian or Other Pacific Islander) to five (White, Black or African American, American Indian or Alaska Native, Asian, and Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander). The ethnicity categories changed from "Hispanic" and "Non-Hispanic" to "Hispanic or Latino" and "Not Hispanic or Latino." (See the Methodology for more information about this program change as well as others.)
An analysis of data for victims of single-bias hate crime incidents showed that:
• 59.2 percent of the victims were targeted because of the offenders' bias against race/ethnicity/ancestry.
• 19.7 percent were victimized because of bias against religion.
• 17.7 percent were targeted because of bias against sexual orientation.
• 1.7 percent were victims of gender-identity bias.
• 1.2 percent were targeted because of bias against disability.
Further examination of these bias categories showed the following details:
Among single-bias hate crime incidents in 2015, there were 4,216 victims of race/ethnicity/ancestry motivated hate crime.
• 52.2 percent were victims of crimes motivated by their offenders' anti-Black or African American bias.
• 18.7 percent were victims of anti-White bias.
• 9.3 percent were victims of anti-Hispanic or Latino bias.
• 3.8 percent were victims of bias against a group of individuals in which more than one race was represented (anti-multiple races, group).
• 3.3 percent were victims of anti-American Indian or Alaska Native bias.
• 3.2 percent were victims of anti-Asian bias.
• 1.1 percent were victims of anti-Arab bias.
• 0.1 percent (6 individuals) were victims of anti-Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander bias.
• 8.1 percent were victims of anti-Other Race/Ethnicity/Ancestry bias.
Of the 1,263 victims targeted due to sexual-orientation bias:
• 62.2 percent were victims of crimes motivated by their offenders' anti-gay (male) bias.
• 19.6 percent were victims of anti-lesbian, gay, bisexual, or transgender (mixed group) bias.
• 13.5 percent were victims of anti-lesbian bias.
• 2.8 percent were victims of anti-bisexual bias.
• 1.9 percent were victims of anti-heterosexual bias.
Of the 1,402 victims of anti-religious hate crimes:
• 52.1 percent were victims of crimes motivated by their offenders' anti-Jewish bias.
• 21.9 percent were victims of anti-Islamic (Muslim) bias.
• 4.3 percent were victims of anti-Catholic bias.
• 4.1 percent were victims of bias against groups of individuals of varying religions (anti-multiple religions, group).
• 3.6 percent were victims of anti-Eastern Orthodox (Russian, Greek, Other) bias.
• 3.4 percent were victims of anti-Protestant bias.
• 1.3 percent were victims of anti-Other Christian bias.
• 0.6 percent were victims of anti-Mormon bias.
• 0.4 percent were victims of anti-Hindu bias.
• 0.4 percent were victims of anti-Sikh bias.
• 0.1 percent were victims of anti-Jehovah's Witness bias.
• 0.1 percent were victims of anti-Buddhist bias.
• 0.1 percent were victims of anti-Atheist/Agnostic bias.
• 7.6 percent were victims of bias against other religions (anti-other religion).
Of the 88 victims of hate crimes due to the offenders' biases against disabilities:
• 52 were victims of anti-physical disability bias.
• 36 were targets of anti-mental disability bias.
Of the 30 victims of hate crime motivated by offenders' biases toward gender:
• 22 were categorized as anti-female.
• 8 were anti-male.
Of the 122 victims of gender-identity bias:
• 76 were victims of anti-transgender bias.
• 46 were victims of anti-gender non-conforming bias.
Of the 7,173 victims of hate crime, 62.5 percent were victims of crimes against persons, and 36.6 percent were victims of crimes against property. The remaining 0.9 percent were victims of crimes against society.
In 2015, 4,482 victims of hate crimes were victims of crimes against persons. Regarding these victims and the crimes committed against them:
• 18 persons were murdered, and 13 were raped. (Concerning rape, data for 12 rapes were submitted under the UCR Program's revised definition; 1 rape was submitted under the legacy definition. See the Methodology for more information about this and other program changes.)
• 41.3 percent of the victims were intimidated.
• 37.8 percent were victims of simple assault.
• 19.7 percent were victims of aggravated assault.
• 0.4 percent (20) were victims of other types of offenses, which are collected only in the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS).
In 2015, 2,626 victims of hate crimes were victims of crimes against property. Of these:
• 72.2 percent were victims of destruction/damage/vandalism.
• 10.4 percent were victims of larceny-theft.
• 6.6 percent were victims of burglary.
• 5.6 percent were victims of robbery.
• 1.4 percent were victims of arson.
• 0.9 percent (24) were victims of motor vehicle theft.
• 2.8 percent were victims of other types of hate crime offenses, which are collected only in NIBRS.
There were 65 victims of hate crimes categorized as crimes against society. Crimes against society (e.g., weapon law violations, drug/narcotic offenses, gambling offenses) represent society's prohibition against engaging in certain types of activity; they are typically victimless crimes in which property is not the object.
Gender Dysphoria, American Psychiatric Association, Physician review by Ranna Parekh, M.D., M.P.H. (February 2016), https://www.psychiatry.org/patients-families/gender-dysphoria/what-is-gender-dysphoria (last visited Mar. 5, 2018).
