JOE BILLY McDADE, Senior District Judge.
This matter is before the Court on Defendants,' Sunbelt Rentals, Inc. ("Sunbelt") and International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 965 ("Union"), respective Motions for Summary Judgment (Docs. 29 & 34), and Plaintiff Eddie Hardwick's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 31). Also pending is Plaintiff's Motion to Strike his original Reply Memorandum in Support of his Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 50), which is granted.
Summary judgment should be granted where "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED.R.CIV.P. 56(c). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must view the evidence on record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. SMS Demag Aktiengesellschaft v. Material Sciences Corp., 565 F.3d 365, 368 (7th Cir.2009). All inferences drawn from the facts must be construed in favor of the non-movant; however, the court is not required to draw every conceivable inference from the record. Smith v. Hope School, 560 F.3d 694, 699 (7th Cir.2009). The court draws only reasonable inferences. Id.
It is not the court's function to scour the record in search of evidence to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Instead, the court relies on the non-moving party to identify the evidence which creates an issue of triable fact. Cracco v. Vitran Exp., Inc., 559 F.3d 625, 632 (7th Cir.2009) (quoting Greer v. Bd. of Educ., 267 F.3d 723, 727 (7th Cir.2001)). If the evidence on record could not lead a reasonable jury to find for the non-movant, then no genuine issue of material fact exists and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. McClendon v. Indiana Sugars, Inc., 108 F.3d 789, 796 (7th Cir. 1997). At the summary judgment stage, however, the court may not resolve issues of fact; disputed material facts must be left for resolution at trial. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249-50, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
(Doc. 4, Ex. A at 2).
In early 2007, Sunbelt employees, including Plaintiff, became aware that Sunbelt might close its Decatur facility and open new facilities in Springfield, Illinois, and Champaign, Illinois. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 6). On January 10 or 11, 2008, Sunbelt announced that it would close its Decatur facility.
The Decatur Sunbelt employees, including Plaintiff, met at the Union hall on January 12, 2008 to discuss the closing of the Decatur facility, and were advised by the Union not to resign from Sunbelt, but to await layoff with the closing of the facility; O'Hara explained that he didn't know what the effect of a resignation would be on the employees' ability to be reinstated by Sunbelt. (Daniels Dep. at 11-12, 39-41; Hardwick Dep. at 251-53). After this meeting, Plaintiff told his wife that he had been advised not to resign from Sunbelt, and that it would be harder to get reinstatement if the employees did quit. (Carla Hardwick Dep. at 132-34). The Union officers believed that if an employee resigned prior to being laid off, he may forfeit his entitlement to backpay if the Union won in arbitration.
On January 15, 2008, Plaintiff and the other Decatur union members signed a grievance indicating their intent to "reserve and retain [their] contractual rights pursuant to Article 19 . . . and any right [their] may have to transfer to a position to a Sunbelt facility within the jurisdiction of" the Union;" Plaintiff gave this grievance to Moss and Brandon Tancak, the manager of the Decatur facility, on January 15, 2008. (Hardwick Dep. at 78, 69, 80-81; Doc. 30, Ex. 3 at 26; Zahn Dep. at 101). The Union held another meeting with the Decatur employees on January 18, 2008, and distributed grievance letters it had drafted for each employee; Plaintiff's letter indicated that he was declining the offered transfer to East Peoria, wished to retain his rights under Article 19, and grieved the failure of Sunbelt to offer him a position at Springfield. (Daniels Dep. at 12-13; Zahn Dep. at 99-100; Doc. 30, Ex. 9 at 2).
By letters dated January 25, 2008, and January 30, 2008, Plaintiff resigned his employment at Sunbelt. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 9; Doc. 34, Exs. 1 & 2). In the January 25, 2008 letter, Plaintiff stated that he resigned from Sunbelt "due to:" the failure of Sunbelt to transfer him to the Champaign facility as previously promised
Sunbelt relayed Plaintiff's request for compensation for extra work to the Union, which assisted Plaintiff's wife in drafting a request for the unpaid compensation and submitted the request to Sunbelt. (Hardwick Dep. at 119-20). The Union did so though Plaintiff's claim was stale under Article 6 of the CBA. (Carla Hardwick Dep. at 151-52). Sunbelt reimbursed Plaintiff for the unpaid wages. (Hardwick Dep. at 119-20; Carla Hardwick Dep. at 151-52; Minick Second Dep. at 126, 128-29; Zahn Dep. at 28).
The Union filed a grievance under Article 19 of the CBA, covering all the union members employed at the Decatur facility, which ended in an arbitration held on July 25, 2008. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 10; Doc. 4, Ex. A at 1-2). The arbitrator was aware that Plaintiff had resigned on January 25, 2008, but was not informed of the reasons given for his resignation in the January 25, 2008 letter. (Doc. 32, Ex. 12 at 104-05; Zahn Aff. at ¶ 3). The arbitration award provided that:
(Doc. 4, Ex. A). The Union had doubts about Plaintiff's ability to recover backpay under the arbitration award, as he had resigned prior to the closing of the Decatur store.
The Union demanded in a letter to Sunbelt dated October 20, 2008, that the three union employees, Joe Daniels, Greg Brehm, and Plaintiff, who had not been returned to work pursuant to the arbitration award, be transferred to or hired for the Springfield facility, and be paid backpay. (Doc. 34, Ex. 3). By a letter dated November 4, 2008, Sunbelt responded to the Union's letter, requesting a negotiating session regarding Plaintiff's status, as he had resigned prior to the closing of the Decatur facility and had expressed complaints about Moss. In addition, Sunbelt noted that the shop foreman position (which would be a lateral transfer for Plaintiff) was currently filled by a union member. (Doc. 34, Ex. 4). The Union offered, in a letter dated November 7, 2008, to resolve the issue of these three employees by waiving back pay for the employees who had not been returned to work in return for their immediate reinstatement. (Doc. 34, Ex. 5). Sunbelt accepted the Union's offer by a letter on the same day. (Doc. 34, Ex. 6).
Plaintiff met with Zahn, the Union's Local President Dennis Minick, and O'Hara on November 15, 2008. (Hardwick Dep. at 198-201, 271-74). Zahn and Minick testified in their depositions that Plaintiff was informed at the meeting that he could either accept the lateral transfer to Springfield without backpay or resign for $3500; they assert that Plaintiff indicated he would accept some severance pay and resign, but wanted O'Hara to try to negotiate for more money from Sunbelt. (Minick Dep. at 47-48, 106-08; Zahn Dep. at 29-33, 42-44). Plaintiff testified at his deposition that he was only told at this meeting that he could accept $300 and resign; he denied that he was ever told, prior to this litigation, that Sunbelt had offered a lateral transfer to Springfield without backpay.
O'Hara wrote a letter to Plaintiff on December 1, 2008, explaining the Union's position as to the application of the arbitration award to him.
On December 18, 2008, Minick, acting on Zahn's direction, conducted a telephone poll of the Union's Executive Board on the question of whether Plaintiff was entitled to a lateral transfer with backpay to the Springfield facility under the arbitration award, given Plaintiff's resignation for other reasons. (Doc. 4 at ¶ 15; Minick Dep. at 44-46; Zahn Dep. at 45, 68-75; Doc. 34, Ex. 20 at 5). The members of the Executive Board were provided with a copy of the arbitration award, copies of Plaintiff's two resignation letters, a copy of the December 1, 2008 letter from O'Hara to Plaintiff indicating the Union's position, and a copy of notes and letters indicating Plaintiff's position. (Doc. 34, Exs. 20-23). Zahn also explained the reported statements by Plaintiff against Moss and that he would be disruptive at Springfield.
He explained the Union's position that Plaintiff's resignation, as it was based on Sunbelt's failure to transfer him to Champaign, had "wholly undermined" the claim that he should be encompassed by the arbitration award. (Doc. 30, Ex. 9 at 13).
By a letter to Sunbelt dated January 7, 2009, Plaintiff, through his attorney, demanded that the arbitration award be enforced on his behalf, with reinstatement to Springfield and backpay. (Doc. 4, Ex. D). The Union responded to this letter by a letter dated January 9, 2009, which stated that the Union would
If Plaintiff made this agreement, the Executive Board would take up the matter to "expedite the filing of a Petition to Confirm." (Doc. 4, Ex. E at 2-3). The letter explained the Union's belief that there were three facts undermining Plaintiff's claim to a lateral transfer with backpay under the arbitration agreement: Plaintiff had resigned prior to the closing of the Decatur facility, his resignation was motivated by reasons other than Sunbelt's refusal to transfer him to Springfield, and he had informed Union members that the only reason he sought a transfer to Springfield was to be disruptive there.
Plaintiff, through his attorney, replied on January 13, 2009, requesting documentation from the Union as to Plaintiff's reasons for resigning and his statements that he would be disruptive at Springfield. (Doc. 34, Ex. 22). On that same date, the Union responded by sending copies of Plaintiff's resignation letters and explaining its position. (Doc. 4, Ex. F). On January 20, 2009, Plaintiff, through his counsel, indicated his belief that he should not be required to pay the attorney's fees and expenses, and that the Union was "effectively refusing to attempt to enforce the arbitration award on his behalf." (Doc. 4, Ex. G).
Plaintiff filed his initial complaint on February 13, 2009, in McLean County, Illinois, against only Sunbelt; he sought to confirm the arbitration award against Sunbelt. (Doc. 1). Sunbelt removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1441 and 1446, as the federal Labor
The parties agree in their briefs that this type of action is subject to § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185. Cleveland v. Porca Co., 38 F.3d 289, 296 fn. 5 (7th Cir.1994) (citing Martin v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 911 F.2d 1239, 1244 (7th Cir.1990)). As employees are not parties to CBAs or arbitration awards between their employers and their unions, an employee may bring suit to confirm an arbitration award only if the employee states a § 301 fair representation claim and the confirmation of the award is integral to that claim. Id. at 297 (citing Martin, 911 F.2d at 1244). Likewise, an employee's claim against his employer is "interlocked" with his claim against his union; each must succeed or both fail. Crider v. Spectrulite Consortium, Inc., 130 F.3d 1238, 1241 (7th Cir. 1997) (citing White v. General Motors, 1 F.3d 593, 595 (7th Cir.1993)).
The parties' respective Motions for Summary Judgment thus cover the same essential legal issue: whether the Union breached its duty of fair representation. Without withstanding or winning summary judgment as to that issue, Plaintiff cannot withstand or win summary judgment to "confirm" the arbitration award or on the issue that Sunbelt breached the terms of the CBA. See, e.g., Porca, 38 F.3d 289, 296-97. Both Defendants argue that the Union did not breach this duty as a matter of law, while Plaintiff argues that the Union did, as a matter of law, breach its duty by "failing to enforce the lateral transfer to Springfield portion of the Arbitration Award," and by "failing to enforce the back pay portion of the Arbitration Award."
All union activities are subject to the union's duty of fair representation, which is breached if the union's actions were "arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith," which are separate elements.
Arbitrariness is judged by an objective standard, and, to be arbitrary, the union's conduct must be "so far outside a wide range of reasonableness that it is wholly irrational or arbitrary." Crider, 130 F.3d at 1243 (quoting O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 78, 111 S.Ct. 1127). Plaintiff claims that it was arbitrary for the Union to "fail to enforce" the arbitration award on his behalf. He appears to fault the Union for its initial attempt to settle his claim to reinstatement and backpay, for its handling of that settlement attempt, and for its initial refusal to litigate and subsequent conditional offer to litigate his claim. The Court finds that the Union's course of action regarding the application of the arbitration award to Plaintiff was not arbitrary, as a matter of law.
Where there were significant doubts as to Plaintiff's case, the Union was entitled to consider the expense and impact on the other bargaining unit members of demanding full application of the arbitration award to Plaintiff and eventual litigation, and decide that either a settlement or conditional offer to litigate was the best course of action.
Plaintiff also argues that the fact that in his November 7, 2008 demand letter to Sunbelt, O'Hara stated that "Mr. Har[d]wick resigned prior to the Decatur closing only because he was not offered a comparable position as that which he held at the Decatur facility," is an admission by the Union that Plaintiff's resignation was indeed motivated by the Decatur plant's closing, such that he would be entitled to application of the award, and that the Union later wrongfully changed its position on Plaintiff's entitlement to reinstatement to Springfield with backpay. This letter, and the subsequent documents showing the Union's doubts about Plaintiff's case, do not reveal any unreasonable action by the Union. It was not unreasonable for O'Hara to present Plaintiff's strongest position in the first demand letter pursuant to the award, including citation to Plaintiff's favorable testimony at the arbitration hearing that he quit because of the closure, though O'Hara might have also known that Plaintiff's other stated reasons undermined his claim. It is also not unreasonable for a party to change its negotiating position when presented with new evidence or resistance from the other party, especially where the Union did believe all along that Plaintiff's case was the weakest because of his resignation. Instead of showing arbitrary behavior, this initial strong demand showed the Union's efforts to obtain the best result possible for Plaintiff, though Plaintiff's actions had severely undermined his position.
In a related vein, Plaintiff argues that O'Hara's December 1, 2008 letter "falsely" states that he was not eligible for application of the award because of his pre-closing resignation, and that this legal opinion is evidence of the Union's arbitrary behavior. A plaintiff challenging a union's interpretation of a contract must "not merely to demonstrate that his favored reading of the labor contract is as plausible as the union's, . . . but rather [must] show that the union's reading could eventually be deemed not even colorable, thus creating an issue of material fact regarding arbitrariness." Trnka, 30 F.3d at 61-62. First, as noted above, to characterize O'Hara's statement of his legal opinion as "false" is inaccurate, as Plaintiff provides no evidence that O'Hara did not indeed hold this legal opinion.
Further, O'Hara's legal opinion on this issue was a reasonable one. O'Hara's opinion, as expressed in the letter, was based on Plaintiff's own assertions to Sunbelt that the reason for his resignation was Sunbelt's failure to honor its promise to transfer him to Champaign and his complaints about Moss. As discussed above, Plaintiff's resignation, prior to the closure of the Decatur facility, for reasons other than that closure and Sunbelt's failure to transfer him to Springfield, arguably placed him outside of eligibility for transfer under Article 19, which is the source of the arbitration award's authority. Plaintiff was also not entitled to backpay under the arbitration award itself, which provides that employees are entitled to backpay "to the extent that any of those employees suffered loss of wages as a result of [Sunbelt's] failure to" transfer them to Springfield.
Where, as here, there were competing interpretations of the language of Article 19 and the arbitration award, and where the arbitration award may have indeed been in conflict with Article 19 under Plaintiff's construction, it was entirely reasonable for the Union to decide not to expend its resources for the uncertain benefit of only one member of the bargaining unit.
Plaintiff and Defendants differ on whether Plaintiff was told about the negotiations between Union and Sunbelt resulting in the agreement that Plaintiff could be transferred to Springfield but receive no backpay. Construing this dispute in Plaintiff's favor to find that he was not actually informed of this offer, the Court finds that this decision by the Union did not render its actions arbitrary. The law is clear that it is the Union's province to negotiate employees' claims with the employer, and that the Union is entitled to resolve those claims in a reasonable manner, taking into account
Rupe, 679 F.2d at 691 (quoting Baker v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 656 F.2d 1245, 1250 (7th Cir.1981)). The handling of an employee's grievance is left to the discretion of the union, which "may also consider the merits of the case or the effect on the larger collective bargaining unit in making various strategic decisions during the grievance procedure." Garcia v. Zenith Electronics Corp., 58 F.3d 1171, 1176 (7th Cir.1995) (citing NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175, 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001, 18 L.Ed.2d 1123 (1967); Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 191, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1966); Griffin v. Air Line Pilots Assoc., 32 F.3d 1079, 1083 (7th Cir.1994)). "The
On November 7, 2008, the Union and Sunbelt agreed to settle Plaintiff's claim by having him transfer to Springfield without backpay. On November 10, 2010, at the "sidebar" discussion, after hearing that Sunbelt was reluctant to reinstate Plaintiff because of his comments criticizing Moss, and given the information that Plaintiff had said to Minick that he disliked Moss and wanted to be a disruption at Springfield, the Union offered an alternate settlement agreement of a severance package, which Sunbelt accepted.
This choice was not arbitrary, as it served the Union's interests in "group organization and coherence[,] . . . the maintenance of the Union's bargaining power and the necessity of maintaining an effective continuing relationship with the employer." Rupe, 679 F.2d at 691. Where the Union had information that the employer was reluctant to reinstate Plaintiff, and that Plaintiff had criticized Sunbelt's district manager's management style, had expressed his personal dislike of the manager, and had stated that he wanted to be transferred to Springfield in order to be disruptive, it was reasonable for the Union to find that, between the two alternatives, severance of Plaintiff's employment would be a better choice than allowing him to work at Springfield, where he could undermine the group's coherence and the Union's continuing relationship with Sunbelt. Garcia, 58 F.3d at 1176 (7th Cir.1995) (citing Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. at 180, 87 S.Ct. 2001) ("The interests of individual employees sometimes may be compromised for the sake of the larger bargaining collective."); Jenkins v. United Rubber, Cork, Linoleum and Plastic Workers of America, Local 959, 5:95-cv-116-DE, 1996 WL 934595, *3 (E.D.N.C. Aug. 12, 1996) (aff'd by Jenkins v. Nettles, 121 F.3d 698, 1997 WL 499932, *2 (4th Cir.1997)) (no breach where rejected offer of settlement from union and failed to inform employee of offer). See also O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 79, 111 S.Ct. 1127 (settling rather than unilaterally terminating strike, though worse choice, not arbitrary).
Indeed, Zahn testified that, upon Minick's telling him about Plaintiff's alleged comments regarding Moss and that he would be disruptive at Springfield, he "was concerned about the remainder of the bargaining unit, the other employee that would be involved there. It is hard enough-labor relations today are hard enough without somebody being there that is trying to be not a team player and actually
The analyses of whether a union's conduct is discriminatory or in bad faith are separate, but related; they turn on the "subjective motivation of the Union officials." Crider, 130 F.3d at 1243 (citing Trnka v. Local Union No. 688, UAW, 30 F.3d 60, 63 (7th Cir.1994)). "To establish discrimination or bad faith, [the employee] must prove the existence of an improper motive behind the [union's] actions, and point to specific facts that support the finding of such a motive." Cintron v. Sysco Food Services of Chicago, Inc., 96-c-1632, 1997 WL 457500, *5 (N.D.Ill. Aug. 7, 1997) (citing O'Neill, 499 U.S. at 74-75, 111 S.Ct. 1127; United Steelworkers of America, AFL-CIO-CLC v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 372, 110 S.Ct. 1904, 109 L.Ed.2d 362 (1990)).
Plaintiff claims that it was discriminatory for the Union to "enforce" the arbitration award on behalf of other employees while refusing to do so for him. AS Plaintiff notes, discrimination turns on "a failure to treat all persons equally when no reasonable distinction can be found between
Further, it was not discriminatory for the Union to offer Plaintiff the negotiated severance package, rather than the reinstatement without backpay offered to Daniels and Brehm. As noted above, the Union had information that Sunbelt was reluctant to reinstate him, and that Plaintiff had criticized Moss' management style, had expressed his personal dislike of Moss, and had stated that he wanted to be transferred to Springfield in order to be disruptive. There is no evidence that there were similar concerns about Daniels and Brehm. These concerns, as discussed above, constituted a non-arbitrary basis on which the Union could choose between the two settlement alternatives; they also constitute a substantial difference between Plaintiff and the two employees who were offered reinstatement. Plaintiff has failed to show that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether the Union handled his claim in a discriminatory manner.
Finally, Plaintiff presents no evidence of bad faith, or subjectively wrongful motivation, on the part of the Union. Trnka, 30 F.3d at 63 ("where innocent or multiple explanations for a defendant's actions abound a plaintiff must rely on more than post hoc, propter hoc reasoning," to show bad faith). Indeed, the undisputed facts show that the Union made reasonable efforts to reach a resolution of Plaintiff's claims that was satisfactory to him, even agreeing to expeditiously litigate his claim to entitlement under the arbitration award, though it was not required to do so in order to carry out its duty of fair representation. Cf. Ooley, 961 F.2d at 1303 (bad faith shown where union attorney admitted that union's true reason for dropping grievance was to protect itself from litigation by employees). Further, the Union successfully pressed Plaintiff's grievances related to compensation for extra work he had performed at Sunbelt, which is evidence of a lack of bad faith. Crider, 130 F.3d at 1244 (no bad faith where union representatives tried to broker settlement for employee and pursued other grievances on his behalf) (citing Souter v. Int'l Union, UAW, 993 F.2d 595, 599 (7th Cir. 1993)).
Plaintiff, though he does not clearly set out which facts he sees as evidence of bad faith and which as evidence of discrimination or arbitrariness, appears to point to several facts that he might be construing as evidence of bad faith. He claims that the Union's change of position as to his entitlement under the arbitration award is
Likewise, the Union's failure to inform Plaintiff of the reinstatement without backpay offer from Sunbelt was not in bad faith. First, Plaintiff presents no evidence of an improper motive by the Union. Further, the Union's course of conduct in dealing with Plaintiff's claim shows that the Union was working to reach some kind of favorable settlement with Sunbelt, though both Sunbelt and the Union believed that Plaintiff's claim was weak. Indeed, since Plaintiff had deliberately disregarded the Union's advice not to resign from Sunbelt, the Union went "above and beyond" its responsibilities in attempting to correct the effects of Plaintiff's poor decision. The weakness of Plaintiff's claim under Article 19 and the arbitration award meant that the Union could have, absent evidence of bad faith, refused to press his claim at all. In this situation, it is not per se bad faith for the Union to take its legitimate concerns, discussed above, into account when deciding between alternative methods of resolving an employee's claim, even though that resulted in a less-advantageous
As Plaintiff has failed to show either that the undisputed facts show the Union to have breached its duty of fair representation, or that there are genuine issues of material fact as to that question, Defendant Sunbelt Rentals, Inc.'s Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 29) is GRANTED, Defendant International Union of Operating Engineers Local No. 965's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 34) is GRANTED, and Plaintiff Eddie Hardwick's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Doc. 31) is DENIED. In addition, Plaintiff's Motion to Strike (Doc. 50) is GRANTED; Plaintiff's Memorandum filed January 7, 2010 (Doc. 43) is STRIKEN.
CASE TERMINATED.
Plaintiff's new job did not work out, and he subsequently returned to Illinois and sought reinstatement with Sunbelt. (Hardwick Dep. at 98-99, 187-88).
Further, in response to Sunbelt's iteration of the Union's offer, and its statement that Plaintiff rejected the offer, discussed below, Plaintiff states that he disputes the fact. (Doc. 29 at 19; Doc. 35 at 5). However, he cites only to his own affidavit explaining the reasons that he refused the Union's offer to enforce the agreement on his behalf, not any evidence suggesting that the Union did not send him the letter in question or that his attorney did not reject the offer on his behalf. Thus, there is no reason to believe that the offer was not made by the Union, or that the offer was not rejected by Plaintiff.
Setting aside the precedential weakness of Samples and Carrion discussed by the Union, the proposition that a union must press its enforcement of an award to the fullest possible extent flies in the face of Porca, in which the Seventh Circuit held that a union's decision to settle a dispute about an arbitration award, rather than litigating to enforce the award or returning to the arbitrator for clarification, was not a breach of its duty of fair representation. 38 F.3d at 296 ("a union may settle a dispute after it has gone to arbitration"). Where the Seventh Circuit has implicitly disapproved a principle stated by another Circuit, this Court will follow the Seventh Circuit.
Finally, as is discussed throughout this opinion, there are substantial questions as to the arbitration award's applicability to Plaintiff-an award need not be "enforced" on behalf of one to whom it does not apply. For the employees to whom the award clearly applied, the Union did "enforce" the award to its full extent; it reasonably offered to settle, rather than litigate, the claims of the employees such as Plaintiff, whose status under the award was more tenuous.
Plaintiff also claims that his "reservations of rights" under Article 19 in the Union-drafted letters of January 15 and 18, 2008 operate to immunize him from the effect of his later resignation. Given Plaintiff's January 25, 2008 resignation, and his stated reasons for the resignation, it was not unreasonable for the Union to conclude that he had effectively waived his rights under Article 19 and thus the arbitration award that followed from it, as Article 19 requires that the employees be "displaced" by the facility closure in order to be eligible for transfer. A "reservation of rights" is not a license to act in contravention of conditions upon those rights, and Plaintiff had been well-advised that he should not resign from Sunbelt.
Moreover, the Union was entitled to protect the interests of its other bargaining unit members by not pursuing potentially-fruitless claims for the benefit of only one member. See Neal v. Newspaper Holdings, Inc., 349 F.3d 363, 369 (7th Cir.2003) (citing Reed v. International Union of UAW, 945 F.2d 198, 203 (7th Cir.1991); Rupe v. Spector Freight Sys., Inc., 679 F.2d 685, 691 (7th Cir.1982)) (Union "has discretion to act in consideration of such factors as the wise allocation of its own resources, its relationship with other employees, and its relationship with the employer."); Rupe, 679 F.2d at 691 (quoting Baker v. Amsted Industries, Inc., 656 F.2d 1245, 1250 (7th Cir.1981)) ("the Union must be allowed the discretion to balance many considerations and interests, including the effect of various resolutions of the grievance on other employees, the requirements of group organization and coherence, the desire for consistent treatment of similar claims, the appropriate allocation of limited resources for pursuing both individual and group claims, the maintenance of the Union's bargaining power and the necessity of maintaining an effective continuing relationship with the employer.").
Finally, the Union had already undertaken a reasonable level of "enforcement" of the arbitration award on Plaintiff's behalf, given the doubts about his eligibility under it-even if the Union had never made the offer to litigate, its actions up to that point would have been reasonable. Where the Union could have refused to litigate Plaintiff's claim altogether, it is by definition reasonable for the Union to agree to litigate with certain protective conditions.
Similarly, Plaintiff appears to argue that it was wrongful for the Union to share with Sunbelt's representatives at the November 2008 "sidebar" the information received by the Union that Plaintiff had made comments against Moss and to the effect that he wanted to be a disruption at Springfield. Defendants do not dispute that this information was shared. This sharing of information was neither arbitrary nor in bad faith. First, there is no evidence that the Union's representatives knew or had any reason to believe this information was false (assuming, as Plaintiff contends, that it was false), so it was not unreasonable to rely on it. Further, to the extent Plaintiff argues that the Union should not have shared unflattering information about him with Sunbelt, this action does not render the Union's conduct toward Plaintiff unreasonable or in bad faith, as there is no evidence that Sunbelt's bargaining position toward Plaintiff changed because of it—as Plaintiff repeatedly points out, Sunbelt did not withdraw its offer of transfer without backpay on hearing this information. (Doc. 32 at ¶ 89). Porca, 38 F.3d at 295 fn. 4 (citing Acri v. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers, 781 F.2d 1393, 1397 (9th Cir.1986) ("must be a causal relationship between the union's unfair representation and the injury")).
