COLIN STIRLING BRUCE, District Judge.
Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, is detained in the Rushville Treatment and Detention Center pursuant to the Illinois Sexually Violent Persons Act.
This case proceeds on an excessive force claim and a procedural due process claim. The events began on October 21, 2010, when Defendant Tarry Williams told Plaintiff that residents were not permitted to wear all-black clothing in the facility. When Plaintiff refused to change his all-black attire, Defendants McAdory and Williams allegedly used excessive force to escort Plaintiff to a segregation cell. A few days later, Plaintiff was punished by a disciplinary committee, allegedly without sufficient notice or a meaningful opportunity to defend himself.
Defendants move for summary judgment on multiple grounds, but the Court need only address one, the statute of limitations.
A two-year statute of limitations applies to this case, which means that the case must be filed within two years of the accrual of the claim. Bryant v. City of Chicago, 746 F.3d 239, 241 (7
Plaintiff admits that the excessive force occurred on October 21, 2010, and that the unconstitutional disciplinary hearing and punishment occurred on October 25, 2010. (Pl.'s Resp. d/e 94-1, pp. 1-2.) He could have filed suit immediately after the alleged violations. Plaintiff's claims therefore accrued on October 21 and 25, 2010, respectively. Barring some equitable exception or tolling, Plaintiff had until October 21, 2012, to file his excessive force claim and until October 25, 2012, to file his procedural due process claim. Plaintiff signed his Complaint on November 4, 2012 and filed his Complaint on November 5, 2012, beyond the two-year deadline.
It is true that the statute of limitations tolls while a prisoner exhausts his administrative remedies, but that is because a prisoner is statutorily required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing an action. 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(a). Plaintiff, though, is not a "prisoner" under the plain language of 42 U.S.C. Section 1997e(h) and therefore was not required to exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this case.
(Complaint, p. 4.); see also Walker v. Groot, 11-3033 (Complaint, p. 5: checking no to the question whether a grievance had been filed and explaining that "[t]he Plaintiff is not in Prison but is Civilly Committed at the Department of Human Services. PLRA does not apply."); Walker v. Pennock, 13-3079 (Complaint, p. 4: "the Court should take notice that the Plaintiff is not in prison . . . and is not required neither obligated . . . to complete a grievance . . . .");Walker v. Williams, 13-3358 (Complaint, p. 3)("The Plaintiff ask[s] the Court to please take notice that he is not in prisoner, . . . and is not required nor obligated . . . to complete a grievance. . . .").
Since Plaintiff was not required to pursue any administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit, the statute of limitations did not toll while he attempted to do so. Cf. Johnson v. Rivera, 272 F.3d 519 (7
Plaintiff next argues that his case is timely because Defendants' actions caused continuing harm. He argues that "[t]he sum total of the Defendants' actions and their effect did not complete themselves in October 2010, but continued to have their impact and influence into 2012." (Pl.'s Resp., d/e 94-1, p. 4.)
The continuing violation doctrine applies to ongoing constitutional violations, such as the continued refusal to provide medical care, Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d 316, 320 (7
The continuing violation doctrine does not apply here because the violations here were one-time, discrete wrongs. Kovacs v. U.S., 614 F.3d 666 (7
Plaintiff next argues that the doctrine of equitable estoppel applies because Defendants issued a misleading and false memo after the incident "reiterating" the rule against all-black clothing. Plaintiff asserts that he relied on this memo, concluding that he did not have a cause of action because the rule must have been posted before the incident. Plaintiff says that he learned much later that the rule had in fact not been posted before the incident. (Pl.'s Resp. 94-1, pp. 7-8.)
"[T]he doctrine of equitable estoppel comes into play if the defendant takes active steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time, . . . ." Shropshear v. Corp. Counsel of City of Chicago, 275 F.3d 593 (7