SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, District Judge.
Now before the Court in this gender-employment discrimination suit is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant the Illinois State Police ("ISP") (d/e 14). Plaintiff Kari J. Lauterbach has brought a two-count complaint against ISP alleging two theories of discriminatory pay because her pay as a Senior Public Service Administrator in the ISP's Bureau of Information Services was not commensurate with that of her male colleagues. Count 1 alleges that she was not paid equally for equal work in violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Count 2 alleges that ISP discriminated against her on the basis of gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e
In 1979, Kari Lauterbach completed her Associate Degree of Applied Science in data processing at Lakeland College and began working for the Illinois State Police in the entry-level position of Programmer I. Her starting salary was $1,048 per month. Over the course of her career with ISP, Lauterbach received four promotions: to Programmer II in October 1980; to Programmer III in July 1982; to Programmer IV in August 1985; and to Information Systems Executive 2 in April 1988. In August 1993, Lauterbach's position changed classifications to Senior Public Service Administrator (SPSA), a broad-banded employee class comprising several layers of "code," or non-law-enforcement, management within ISP. As code employees, Lauterbach and her colleagues were subject to a merit compensation system governed by the Illinois Personnel Code, 20 ILCS 415/1
Three layers of management fell within the SPSA classification: bureau chiefs, who reported directly to ranking law-enforcement management of the bureaus' respective divisions; assistant bureau chiefs who reported to the bureau chiefs; and section managers who reported to assistant bureau chiefs. As an SPSA, Lauterbach herself held several different job titles and roles in the management hierarchy between 1993 and her retirement in 2012. She first became a section manager in 1993. In October 2006, she became an interim assistant bureau chief while her bureau chief, Steve Bova, was out for three months to attend command college training, and an assistant bureau chief, Steve Nation, became the interim bureau chief. While interim assistant bureau chief, Lauterbach also retained all her responsibilities as a section manager. Upon Bova's return, Lauterbach briefly reverted to section manager only to return to the position of interim assistant bureau chief when Bova left the Bureau of Information Services for good in February 2007. She continued in her duties as both interim assistant bureau chief and section manager until January 2008, when she became interim bureau chief upon Nation's departure. She reverted to interim assistant bureau chief in March 2008 upon the hiring of Jamie Blakley as bureau chief, and she remained in that role until her retirement in 2012. Notably, each of Lauterbach's positions— section manager, assistant bureau chief, and bureau chief, as well as interim positions—was classified as an SPSA. Lauterbach describes the people holding positions under the broad-banded employee class of SPSA as "supervisors, managers of sections with a different number of employees reporting to each of us." (Def.'s Mem. Law Supp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J. [hereinafter "Def.'s Mem. Summ. J."], d/e 15, Ex. 1, at 13.) Although on at least two occasions Lauterbach requested command college training like that which her male colleagues had received, she was turned down because she was told that she could not be gone from the Bureau of Information Services for three months at a time.
Through several ISP administrative reorganizations, Lauterbach's position was switched to the Bureau of Information Services, under the auspices of first the Division of Information Technology Command and then, following a merger with the Bureau of Application Testing and Methodology in approximately June 2009, the Division of Administration. Starting in the mid-1990s and continuing until her retirement in 2012, Lauterbach identified at least two fellow SPSAs—Jamie Blakley and David Law, both men—who she came to learn earned greater salaries through the merit compensation system even though each of them had at one time held the title of assistant bureau chief or interim assistant bureau chief and, Lauterbach believed, their work was equal to hers.
Specifically, Law, who had begun working for ISP in 1976 at a monthly salary of $622, had received eight promotions as well as additional salary increases, including one salary adjustment for additional responsibilities and one "special" salary adjustment, pushing his monthly salary to $8,810 by the time he retired in 2009. For his part, Blakley had begun working for ISP in 1980 at a monthly salary of $842. Over the course of his career in the state system, Blakley earned eight promotions as well as additional salary increases, including one salary adjustment for additional responsibilities. His employment history also included transfers to the Lottery and the Department of Children and Family Services and a stint in private sector employment. By the time of Lauterbach's retirement in 2012, Blakley earned a monthly salary of $8,335. Lauterbach herself, despite four promotions and other salary increases, including two salary adjustments for additional responsibilities, earned a monthly salary of only $7,590.
Because of this salary discrepancy with her male colleagues, Lauterbach has brought a two-count complaint against ISP alleging two theories of discriminatory pay. Count 1 alleges that she was not paid equally for equal work in violation of the Equal Pay Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). Count 2 alleges that ISP discriminated against her on the basis of gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Following ISP's Answer to the Complaint, the parties proceeded immediately to discovery. ISP filed the present Motion for Summary Judgment on October 1, 2014. Following the Court's denial of Lauterbach's Motion to Strike an affidavit in support of ISP's Motion for Summary Judgment, the Court granted the parties additional time to file any supplemental briefing. The parties filed no supplements, and the Motion for Summary Judgment is now fully briefed and ready for disposition.
Summary judgment is proper if the moving party shows that no genuine dispute exists as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must consider the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in the nonmoving party's favor.
The moving party bears the initial responsibility of informing the court of the basis for the motion and identifying the evidence the moving party believes demonstrates the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
When the nonmoving party bears the ultimate burden of persuasion on a particular issue, the moving party need only show there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case.
Where the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion at trial, however, such as a defendant asserting an affirmative defense, the moving party must establish all the essential elements of that defense with credible evidence that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.
Generally speaking, a district court is "not required to scour every inch of the record for evidence that is potentially relevant to the summary judgment motion."
The Equal Pay Act provides in part:
29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1). To prove her claim under the Equal Pay Act, Lauterbach must establish a prima facie case that she did not receive equal pay for equal work. Once she has made her prima facie case, however, the Equal Pay Act creates a type of strict liability, shifting the burden of persuasion to ISP to offer a gender-neutral justification for unequal pay.
To establish a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, Lauterbach must show that (1) higher wages were paid to a male employee, (2) for equal work requiring substantially similar skill, effort, and responsibilities, and (3) that the work was performed under similar working conditions.
To demonstrate that she performed equal work, Lauterbach must establish, based upon actual job performance and content— not just job titles, classifications, or descriptions—that the work performed is substantially equal.
ISP contends that Lauterbach's work was not equal to that performed by her male colleagues, and that her prima facie case is, accordingly, flawed. ISP asserts that Lauterbach alleges only comparable work, not equal work, to her male colleagues. ISP points to the fact that Lauterbach and her colleagues Blakley and Law all managed different sections, and that those sections had different responsibilities. According to ISP, Lauterbach worked on security and disaster recovery. Blakley maintained the network, mobile data computing, the desktop, server installation, and application development. Law worked on applications. ISP also indicates that Lauterbach's male colleagues occupied distinct upper-management positions within ISP: Blakley, for instance, was an assistant bureau chief nine years before Lauterbach first became an interim assistant bureau chief. When Lauterbach became an interim assistant bureau chief, Blakley became the bureau chief and Lauterbach's direct supervisor.
Lauterbach counters that she had the same classification, SPSA, and job title, assistant bureau chief, as Blakley did, and that both Lauterbach and Blakley reported to Alan Bugard, at one time the bureau chief and their direct supervisor. Lauterbach reported directly to Bugard in part because she served as interim assistant bureau chief during a period when no permanent assistant bureau chief was hired. But while she served as interim assistant bureau chief, Lauterbach did not relinquish her permanent duties as security section manager. Lauterbach also asserts, though ISP denies, that nearly forty subordinate employees reported directly to her, the same number or more than reported to Blakley.
Lauterbach further argues that the job descriptions for her position and Blakley's position are nearly identical and that, if anything, her job description in fact required more skills.
(Pl.'s Mem. Law Opp. Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., d/e 20, Ex. 7.) Blakley's job description provides, in part:
(
Lauterbach also points to the portion of Alan Bugard's deposition in which Bugard identifies Blakley's job responsibilities were "application development" and "management and maintenance." (
Though both Lauterbach and ISP at times resort to arguments concerning little more than job titles, classifications, or descriptions, triable issues of fact remain on this issue of equal work. Like ISP, who asserts that Lauterbach's male colleagues occupied distinct upper-management positions belying the notion of equal work, Lauterbach insists that Blakley, Law, and her classification as SPSAs and positions as assistant bureau chiefs demonstrate equal work. But the fact that Lauterbach and her male colleagues managed different sections with different responsibilities, as ISP asserts, is ultimately of no moment. Lauterbach has shown at least that a common core of tasks exists between her work and that of her male colleagues. Blakley averred in his deposition that he was responsible for maintaining the ISP network, but Bugard averred that the network was Lauterbach's responsibility. Similarly, both Lauterbach and Blakley had some responsibility for servers. Furthermore, both Blakley's and Lauterbach's job descriptions required "progressively responsible professional experience in [the] management information systems environment" and "extensive knowledge in the areas of computer hardware, software, communications and applications." While not dispositive on the issue of equal work, these identical provisions of the job descriptions, in the context of overlapping responsibilities for computer networks and servers, are at least of probative value on the issue of equal work.
Lauterbach's prima facie case goes further still in her allegations that she supervised as many or more subordinate employees as Blakley and that she assumed Law's duties upon his retirement.
Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, the burden of proof shifts to the employer to show that the pay disparity is due to (1) a seniority system; (2) a merit system; (3) a system which measures earnings by quantity or quality of production; or (4) any other factor other than gender. 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1)(i)-(iv);
ISP asserts that differences in Lauterbach's pay ($7,590 monthly) relative to Blakley ($8,335) and Law ($8,810) are the result of a bona fide merit compensation system governed by the Illinois Personnel Code, 20 ILCS 415/1
According to ISP, in general terms, Lauterbach, Blakley, and Law "had different entrance base salaries, different movements between salary systems, different promotions, and varying annual merit compensation increases and bonuses." Specifically, Lauterbach began work at ISP in 1979 at a monthly salary of $1,048. Law began in 1976 at $622 monthly, and Blakley in 1980 at $842. Blakley also transferred from ISP to other state employment with the Lottery and the Department of Children and Family Services and eventually left for private sector employment in 2004, returning in 2008. Lauterbach received four promotions over the course of her career; Blakley and Law, on the other hand, received eight promotions each. Finally, Lauterbach received two salary adjustments for additional responsibilities. Meanwhile, Law received one salary adjustment for additional responsibilities and one "special" salary adjustment to serve the best interest of the ISP, and Blakley received just one salary adjustment for additional responsibilities. According to ISP, these facts show that Lauterbach and her male colleagues were all subject to the merit compensation system and, because the rules of that system applied equally to Lauterbach and her male colleagues, ISP is not liable to Lauterbach under the Equal Pay Act.
ISP's description of its merit compensation system is ultimately, however, question-begging. Under the Equal Pay Act, the inquiry is not whether any merit pay system
Moreover, accepting the facts in the light most favorable to Lauterbach as the nonmoving party, the allegations in this case present triable issues of fact suitable for jury determination in any event. Indeed, Lauterbach has marshaled plenty of evidence in discovery that, accepted as true, would permit a reasonable jury to find in her favor. Specifically, Lauterbach asserts that she undertook a project in the mid-1990s to rewrite job descriptions for her subordinate employees after she was told the bureau chief would consider submitting her for a salary adjustment. When Lauterbach completed the job-description project, however, her salary adjustment was put on hold because a salary adjustment for a male colleague had become a higher priority.
Lauterbach further details opportunities she was denied but that were given to her male colleagues that would have resulted in salary increases under the merit compensation system. For instance, Lauterbach asserts that Blakley was sent to command college training to receive credits needed to earn a promotion but, when she requested command college training on at least two occasions, she was turned down because she could not be gone from ISP for three months at a time. (
The Court notes still more facts that undercut the nondiscriminatory application of ISP's merit compensation system to Lauterbach relative to her male colleagues. To detail just one example, recall that Lauterbach received four promotions over the course of her career while Blakley received eight during his. Logs of salary and job classification transactions reveal that Lauterbach began work at ISP in 1979 as a "Programmer I" and needed just three promotions to reach "Programmer IV" in 1985. (
Whether a nondiscriminatory reason justifies lower pay for Lauterbach than her male colleagues is, in this case, ultimately suitable for a jury to decide. ISP has presented some evidence that Lauterbach received fewer promotions, justifying a lower salary, and numerically more salary adjustments than Blakley or Law, undercutting the suggestion of gender discrimination. But ISP has presented no evidence to show why these decisions, under the merit compensation system, were merit-based. ISP's burden is to prove, not just assert, that Lauterbach's lower pay was nondiscriminatory.
In Count 2 of her Complaint, Lauterbach alleges that ISP discriminated against her on the basis of gender under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title VII prohibits employers from discriminating against their employees based on "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). Lauterbach's Title VII claim is based on the same allegations of unequal pay for equal work as is her Equal Pay Act claim. And indeed Title VII and the Equal Pay Act cover the same sort of substantive legal harm, discriminatory pay.
The differences of burden distribution between the Equal Pay Act and Title VII lead to different legal standards to be applied on summary judgment, if not necessarily to different outcomes on the claims. To escape liability to Lauterbach under the Equal Pay Act, ISP must demonstrate that its merit compensation system, not gender discrimination, determined Lauterbach's pay by a showing of credible evidence that would entitle it to a directed verdict if not controverted at trial.
To establish her claim under Title VII, Lauterbach may proceed under either a direct or an indirect method to prove unlawful discrimination. Lauterbach has chosen the indirect method.
To establish a prima facie case under the indirect method of Title VII, Lauterbach must offer evidence that (1) she is a member of a protected class; (2) her job performance met ISP's legitimate expectations; (3) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (4) another similarly situated individual who was not in the protected class was treated more favorably than she was.
Employees are similarly situated where they are directly comparable to one another in all material respects.
ISP contends that Lauterbach and her male colleagues Blakley and Law were not similarly situated employees because they managed different sections with different responsibilities: Lauterbach worked on security and disaster recovery; Blakley maintained the network, mobile data computing, the desktop, server installation, and application development; Law worked on applications. ISP also points out that Lauterbach and her male colleagues "were at times [each other's] supervisors" and that Lauterbach's male colleagues occupied distinct upper-level management positions. (Def.'s Mem. Summ. J., d/e 15, at 21-22.) Finally, ISP asserts that Blakley was an assistant bureau chief nine years before Lauterbach first became an interim assistant bureau chief.
Lauterbach counters, as she did to establish her prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, that she and her male colleagues held the same job classification of SPSA, the same job title of (interim) assistant bureau chief, the same supervisor when both she and Blakley reported to bureau chief Alan Bugard, the same level of responsibility, and roughly the same number of subordinate employees. The Court also notes the similarities in the job descriptions for Lauterbach and Blakley, as previously discussed in the analysis of Lauterbach's Equal Pay Act claim. And as previously discussed, the Court further recognizes the issues of material fact concerning Lauterbach's and Blakley's respective responsibilities for ISP's network and servers, as well as whether Lauterbach took over Law's duties upon his retirement.
Arguably, if Lauterbach has satisfied her burden at summary judgment with respect to her prima facie case under the Equal Pay Act, she has perforce satisfied the same prima facie burden under Title VII. Under the Equal Pay Act, the plaintiff's prima facie case must ultimately show that an employer paid different wages to employees of opposite sexes for
In light of the issues of material fact Lauterbach has raised and the substantial similarities evinced in job classification, job title, job description, supervisor, and supervisory responsibilities, Lauterbach has marshaled enough evidence for a reasonable fact-finder to conclude that she has carried her burden to establish a prima facie case under Title VII.
As discussed earlier, ISP asserts that its merit compensation system, governed by the Illinois Personnel Code and the Illinois Department of Central Management Services' Personnel Rules and Pay Plan, is a bona fide merit pay system. Lauterbach, moreover, does not dispute that ISP's merit compensation system discharges its burden of production under
Pretext means "a lie, specifically a phony reason for some action."
To meet her burden to show pretext on summary judgment, Lauterbach must "identify such weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies, or contradictions" in ISP's asserted reason "that a reasonable person could find [the reason] unworthy of credence."
And, as discussed in the context of ISP's defenses to Equal Pay Act liability, Lauterbach has identified still other weaknesses in ISP's assertion that her lower pay was justified under the merit compensation system. Lauterbach alleges that she did not receive salary adjustments for additional responsibilities when she deserved them on three occasions in the mid-1990s, 2000, and 2007. (Def.'s Mem. Summ. J., d/e 15, Ex. 1, at 26;
In sum, the evidence Lauterbach has presented would permit a rational jury to find in her favor on the issue of pretext. Because she has presented sufficient evidence to create genuine issues of material fact, her Title VII claim must also be presented to a jury, and summary judgment must be denied.
Each of the steps in determining ISP's liability to Lauterbach under both the Equal Pay Act and Title VII present genuine issues of material fact, suitable for a jury to determine. For this reason, the Motion for Summary Judgment (d/e 14) is DENIED.
IT IS SO ORDERED.