OPINION

SUE E. MYERSCOUGH, District Judge.

On January 26, 2015, the Court granted summary judgment to all the defendants except for Defendant DeWitt. The Court assumes familiarity with that order. The Court then appointed pro bono counsel for Plaintiff to explore the possibility of appealing the Court's determination that Defendants Saathoff and Dewitt were entitled to qualified immunity and to continue to represent Plaintiff in this case. Plaintiff has chosen not to appeal the Court's qualified immunity ruling. Instead, Plaintiff has submitted a motion for leave to file an amended complaint.

Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint names only Correctional Officer Dewitt as a defendant. Plaintiff alleges in the amended complaint that Dewitt wrote a false disciplinary ticket on February 13, 2012 against Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff's oral complaint about Dewitt's behavior to Dewitt's supervisor, Lt. Ketcherside. Dewitt had allegedly been vocal to Plaintiff about Dewitt's dislike of the prison job system, which Dewitt allegedly said allowed inmates like Plaintiff to "do too much." (Amended Compl. para. 10.) Plaintiff allegedly felt threatened and reported Dewitt's behavior to Lt. Ketcherside. Lt. Ketcherside allegedly asked Defendant Dewitt to stop this behavior, whereupon Defendant Dewitt allegedly promised Plaintiff that Dewitt would "get" Plaintiff. (Amended Compl. para. 17.) Defendant Dewitt then allegedly wrote a false disciplinary report accusing Plaintiff of disobeying a direct order and insolence. (Amended Comp. paras. 18-19.). The report caused Plaintiff to be placed in segregation and to lose his prison job. (Amended Compl. para. 20.)

Defendant objects to the amended complaint on the grounds that the claim is barred by the statute of limitations and does not relate back to the filing of the complaint. However, Plaintiff's pro se deposition, taken on May 29, 2014 (four months in advance of Defendant's calculated deadline), gave clear notice of this claim. (Pl.'s Dep. pp. 10-24.) Additionally, the Court disagrees with Defendant that this claim does not relate back under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). Taking a broad view, Plaintiff's claim about the false disciplinary report arose out of the same general "transaction or occurrence" set out in Plaintiff's original complaint: Defendant Dewitt's alleged manipulation of prison procedures to retaliate against Plaintiff. Defendants' argument requires parsing the facts too finely. Further, Dewitt admits that allowing this claim to proceed causes him no prejudice. He needs no more discovery on the claim because the facts are undisputed for summary judgment purposes. (d/e 63, p. 2.) In sum, the claim is timely and its addition causes no undue prejudice or surprise to Defendant.

Whether the claim survives summary judgment is a different question. Defendant concedes that Plaintiff has a First Amendment protected right to report staff misconduct to other prison officials. Defendant also concedes that Plaintiff's version of events, if true, allows an inference of retaliatory motive. (Defendant denies Plaintiff's accusations, but the Court must accept Plaintiff's version at the summary judgment stage.)

However, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim fails because the undisputed facts show that Defendant would have written the disciplinary report anyway because Plaintiff had disobeyed Defendant's orders to stop interfering with inmate placements. See Mays v. Springborn, 719 F.3d 631, 633 (7th Cir. 2013)(defendant has burden to rebut retaliatory inference with evidence that the "`defendant's conduct was not a necessary condition of the harm— harm would have occurred anyway.'")(quoted cite omitted).

The Court agrees with Plaintiff that the resolution of this issue belongs to the jury. Plaintiff essentially admits that he went over Dewitt's head to correct the cell placement of another inmate, Plaintiff's Dep. p. 12, but there is evidence that Plaintiff did not break any rules in doing so. Both charges were eventually expunged, which implies that the order given by Dewitt to stay out of the issue was an improper order. The sincerity of Dewitt's proffered explanation is a factual dispute on this record. See Harris v. Walls, 604 Fed. Appx. 518, 522 (7th Cir. 2015)(affirming summary judgment where the plaintiff had no evidence to challenge the sincerity of defendants' reason for disciplining him and the plaintiff had indisputably broken prison rules). A rational jury could find that Dewitt's proffered reason was a pretext for putting into motion events which Dewitt knew would cause Plaintiff's placement in segregation long enough for Plaintiff to lose his jobs. A rational jury could also find for Defendant, but that only underscores that a jury is needed.

Defendant also quotes Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541, 555 (7th Cir. 2009), in which the Seventh Circuit stated, "a single retaliatory disciplinary charge that is later dismissed is insufficient to serve as the basis of a § 1983 action." That statement was premised upon the fact that no actionable injury was inflicted as a result of the disciplinary charge alone. In this case, actionable injury was inflicted as a result of the disciplinary ticket: segregation and the loss of prison jobs.

Therefore, this case will go to trial on Plaintiff's claim in his amended complaint that DeWitt filed a disciplinary charge against Plaintiff in retaliation for Plaintiff's complaints to Lt. Ketcherside.

Plaintiff's amended complaint does not contain the claim against Dewitt regarding the alleged blocking of Plaintiff's reassignment as a peer educator after Plaintiff was released from segregation. Massey v. Helman, 196 F.3d 727, 735 (7th Cir.1999) ("`When a plaintiff files an amended complaint, the new complaint supersedes all previous complaints and controls the case from that point forward . . .'"). In any event, Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's evidence that Warden Murray, who is not a defendant, was responsible for the nonreassignment. (Murray Aff. paras. 7-8; Dewitt Aff. paras. 5(d) & (e)). Summary judgment is, therefore, granted on this claim. However, Plaintiff argues that Defendant has not explained why Plaintiff was not reassigned as a lieutenant clerk, but the Court did not identify that as a claim or direct Defendant to address that issue.

Plaintiff is advised that he will be unable to obtain compensatory damages for emotional pain because he suffered no physical injury. 42 U.S.C. 1997e(e). Plaintiff may seek punitive damages, but in the Court's experience, plaintiff's verdicts in these kinds of cases are exceedingly rare, much less an award of punitive damages. At the final pretrial conference, Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins will explore the possibility of settlement.

If settlement is not possible, the case will be tried. However, the Court's congested trial calendar makes it impossible to schedule the trial before May, and, even then, this trial will be continued if a criminal trial needs to be scheduled to avoid speedy trial violations. Magistrate Judge Schanzle-Haskins will be able to conduct the trial sooner, if the parties consent to the exercise of his jurisdiction.

IT IS ORDERED:

NOTICE OF RIGHT TO CONSENT TO DISPOSITION OF A CIVIL CASE BY A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, you are hereby notified that, upon the consent of all the parties in a civil case, the Court may appoint a United States Magistrate Judge of this District, who is specially certified to conduct any or all proceedings, including trial of and the entry of a final judgment. A copy of the appropriate consent form is attached.

You should be aware that your decision to consent, or not to consent, to the disposition of your case before a United States Magistrate Judge is entirely voluntary and should be communicated to the Clerk of the Court. Only if all the parties to the case consent to the reference to a Magistrate Judge will either the District Judge or Magistrate Judge to whom the case has been assigned be informed of your decision. Neither a District Judge nor a Magistrate Judge will attempt to persuade or induce any party to consent to the reference of this case to a Magistrate Judge.

If all parties consent, the form is to be e-signed (s/NAME) by all and e-filed with the Court pursuant to guidance in the Court's Local Rules 11.4(A) or (B). A certificate of service is not required to be filed with this document.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

NOTICE OF AVAILABILITY OF A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE TO EXERCISE JURISDICTION

In accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(c), and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, you are notified that a United States magistrate judge of this district court is available to conduct any or all proceedings in this case including a jury or nonjury trial, and to order the entry of a final judgment. Exercise of this jurisdiction by a magistrate judge is, however, permitted only if all parties voluntarily consent.

You may, without adverse substantive consequences, withhold your consent, but this will prevent the court's jurisdiction from being exercised by a magistrate judge. If any party withholds consent, the identity of the parties consenting or withholding consent will not be communicated to any magistrate judge or to the district judge to whom the case has been assigned.

An appeal from a judgment entered by a magistrate judge shall be taken directly to the United States court of appeals for this judicial circuit in the same manner as an appeal from any other judgment of this district court.

CONSENT TO THE EXERCISE OF JURISDICTION BY A UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

In accordance with provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73, the parties in this case consent to have a United States magistrate judge conduct any and all proceedings in this case, including the trial, order the entry of a final judgment, and conduct all post-judgment proceedings.

Reference Order

IT IS ORDERED: This case is referred to a United States magistrate judge to conduct all proceedings and order the entry of a final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed. R. Civ. P. 73.

Note: Return this form to the clerk of court only if you are consenting to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States magistrate judge. Do not return this form to a judge.