Order

JONATHAN E. HAWLEY, Magistrate Judge.

Before the Court is the Plaintiff Cozad's motion for sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b). (D. 21)1. For the reasons stated, infra, the motion is GRANTED.

I

On March 15, 2017, Cozad filed a motion (D. 18) seeking to compel discovery responses from the Defendant Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC). The motion sought an order compelling the IDOC to produce discovery that Cozad had requested from the IDOC on October 31, 2016, which included a request for all emails sent to or received from Warden Dorethy and Tammy Morgan that referenced Cozad. This Court granted the motion, ordering the IDOC to provide the outstanding discovery on or before May 1, 2017. To this day, the emails have never been produced. Moreover, at Dorethy's deposition on June 6, 2017—a full month after the deadline for producing the outstanding emails—Dorethy testified that no one had ever asked her to produce the emails.

In light of the IDOC's failure to comply with Cozad's initial discovery request and this Court's subsequent order, Cozad seeks sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b). Specifically, Cozad seeks as sanctions:

(D. 21 at ECF p. 4).

The IDOC responds that its failures were not willful or in bad faith and, accordingly, sanctions "are not substantially justified." (D. 26 at ECF p. 2). It also asserts that it has finally performed the search for the requested emails and is in the process of reviewing them for relevance and privilege, although the IDOC does not provide the Court with an estimate of when this review might be completed. Finally, regarding the request to re-depose Dorethy, the IDOC blames Cozad for any need to do so, arguing that Cozad should have filed a motion with the Court prior to that deposition if she believed the IDOC's discovery responses were sufficient.

In reply, Cozad notes that the IDOC fails to apply the proper legal standard for imposing sanctions here, Rule 37, which does not require a showing of bad faith. She also notes that the IDOC's response does not contest any of the facts supporting the imposition of sanctions here. Finally, she argues that she did not know that the IDOC's discovery responses were deficient until the deposition of Dorethy, where she first learned that no one had even attempted to comply with the Court's order.

II

A

Rule 37 permits a number of different sanctions for a party's failure to comply with a Court's discovery order. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Moreover, "instead of or in addition to" any sanction a court may impose, "the court must order the disobedient party . . . to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney's fees, caused by the failure, unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(C).

Under Rule 37, sanctions are justified here. The initial request for the emails in question was made almost a year ago and it was two months between this Court ordering the production of the emails and Dorethy's deposition when Cozad learned that she had not even been asked to look for the emails. Now, three months after her deposition and over two months since the motion for sanctions was filed, the emails have still not been produced. Rather, the IDOC asserts it has finally performed the search it should have made nearly a year ago but does not even attempt to estimate when it will actually produce the emails. The IDOC provides no explanation, let alone justification, for its failure to look for the emails in question after this Court ordered it to produce them. Whether the IDOC ignored this Court's order through negligence or bad faith, sanctions are justified.

B

Having concluded that sanctions are appropriate, the Court must next consider what an appropriate sanction is. Although the willfulness of a party's violation of a court order is not relevant to whether sanctions should be imposed, it is relevant to what sanction a court should impose. Tamari v. Bache & Co., 729 F.2d 469, 474-75 (7th Cir. 1984), citing Societe Internationale v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197, 208, 78 S.Ct. 1087, 1094, 2 L.Ed.2d 1255 (1958); Marquis v. Chrysler Corp., 577 F.2d 624, 642 (9th Cir. 1978).

In the present case, there is no evidence that the IDOC's failure to follow this Court's order was willful or in bad faith. Rather, it is clear that the IDOC's failure to comply was through neglect. Accordingly, the more severe sanctions set forth in Rule 37(b)(2)(i)-(vii) are not warranted, nor does Cozad seek such sanctions. Rather, Cozad seeks only the information that has yet to be produced, an opportunity to depose Dorethy and others with the benefit of that information, and recovery of its fees and costs created by IDOC's sanctionable conduct. Cozad's suggested sanctions are reasonable, non-punitive, and directly related to the sanctionable conduct. Moreover, her request for reasonable expenses caused by the IDOC's failure is required by Rule 37(b)(2)(C), "unless the failure was substantially justified or other circumstances make an award of expenses unjust." The IDOC has offered nothing to suggest that its failures fall within these exceptions.

Accordingly, the Court sanctions the IDOC pursuant to Rule 37(b) for its failure to comply with this Court's order of March 30, 2017, and, pursuant to Rule 37(b)(2)(A) & (C), as that sanction orders as follows:

The Court further orders that Cozad's counsel shall within 7 days of this Order file an affidavit setting forth the reasonable expenses and costs associated with its bringing of the motion for sanctions. The IDOC shall have 7 days after the filing thereof to make any objection to the reasonableness of those expenses and costs. If the IDOC files no objection, it shall remit to Cozad's counsel the requested amount within 21 days of this Order.

Failure of the IDOC to comply with this Order, including adhering to the deadlines set forth herein, will result in the imposition of additional sanctions, which may include the more severe sanctions set forth in Rule 37(b)(2)(i)-(vii).

It is so ordered.