JAMES E. SHADID, District Judge.
This matter is now before the Court on the United States' Appeal (Doc. 205) of Magistrate Judge Hawley's December 17, 2019 decision requiring the United States to eliminate certain redactions in documents disclosed to Defendant, the United States' Memorandum (Doc. 206) in Support, and Defendant's Memorandum (Doc. 207) in Opposition. For the reasons set forth below, Magistrate Judge Hawley's December 17, 2019 decision is AFFIRMED.
Sarah Nixon was convicted following a jury trial before District Judge Colin S. Bruce for international parental kidnapping, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1204. She was subsequently sentenced to 26 months in prison. Her conviction was affirmed on direct appeal. United States v. Nixon, 901 F.3d 918 (7th Cir. Aug. 28, 2018). While her appeal was pending before the Seventh Circuit, Nixon's appellate counsel filed a motion in the district court to supplement the record on appeal. Doc. 153. After Judge Bruce denied the motion, Nixon's appellate counsel renewed her motion to supplement the record on appeal before the Seventh Circuit, which was also denied. The documents appellate counsel sought to supplement the record on appeal with are central to Nixon's postconviction proceedings and are discussed below.
Following the conclusion of her direct appeal, the Court appointed the Federal Defender to represent Nixon in connection with anticipated postconviction proceedings. See Sept. 26, 2018 Text Order. On October 25, 2018, Nixon filed a Motion for New Trial pursuant to Rule 33 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. Doc. 173. Therein, she asserted Judge Bruce had a disqualifying bias against her and in favor of the United States.
Judge Bruce's ex parte communications with the Office became public in August 2018, when the Illinois Times published an article titled "Federal judge engaged in ex parte talk." That article reported on emails exchanged between Judge Bruce and United States Attorney's Office paralegal Lisa Hopps during Nixon's December 2016 trial, over which Judge Bruce presided. Hopps did not work on the Nixon trial, but the two began emailing about it after Hopps sent Judge Bruce an email complaining about his absence at former United States Attorney ("USA") Jim Lewis's going away party. Judge Bruce responded that he missed the party because of the Nixon trial. Judge Bruce went on to criticize one of the prosecutors in Nixon as "entirely inexperienced" and said the prosecutor was, among other things, "repeating the bullshit" to which Nixon testified, and turning a "slam-dunk" case into a "60-40" one for Ms. Nixon. Following the Illinois Times report, Chief Circuit Judge Wood (and later, Federal Public Defender Patton) filed a complaint with the Council, and the undersigned, in my capacity as Chief District Judge,
The Nixon-related emails came to light as a result of Hopps, in late 2017, sharing them with Assistant U.S. Attorney ("AUSA") Timothy Bass, after Judge Bruce issued an order finding that Bass had misled the court in United States v. Schock, No. 16-cr-30061. AUSA Bass later notified certain Office personnel in the Urbana branch of the emails with Hopps. Around May 2018, Elly Peirson, an AUSA on the Nixon trial, contacted Hopps asking for the emails. Peirson then shared the emails with USAO leadership—John Childress, Patrick Hansen, and Greggory Walters (an AUSA and the Office's Professional Responsibility and Ethics Advisor). Hansen and Walters subsequently shared the emails with the Department of Justice ("DOJ"). The Office then made the decision (1) to disclose the emails to Nixon's counsel and (2) to conduct a review to determine what other ex parte communications may exist and whether additional disclosures were necessary.
The USAO's disclosures prompted Nixon's Motion for New Trial. Doc. 173. In its response to the motion, the United States included extensive excerpts of Judge Bruce's ex parte emails. Doc. 181. Additionally, the United States disclosed to the Court and the Council several additional ex parte communications between Judge Bruce and the Office relating to other cases. However, the United States provided Nixon with redacted versions of these documents, asserting the work product doctrine and other privileges precluded disclosure of certain materials. Docs. 192-96. This Court referred the discovery dispute to Magistrate Judge Hawley, who entered an oral order on Nixon's Motion (Doc. 197) to Unredact on December 17, 2019. Magistrate Judge Hawley's rulings on Nixon's Motion to Unredact are the subject of this appeal.
In addition to the ex parte emails between the USAO and Judge Bruce, the parties have identified the following documents relevant to this appeal. See Doc. 206, at 10; Doc. 207, at 2.
AUSA Bass and the Office of the Inspector General ("OIG") exchanged a series of emails in December 2017 and January 2018, in which Bass asked OIG to investigate alleged wrongdoing by certain personnel at the U.S. Attorney's office in connection with United States v. Aaron J. Schock, No. 16-cr-30061 (C.D. Ill.), the prosecution of a former U.S. congressman for various offenses in connection with the misuse of public and campaign funds. The exchange included several attachments, including (1) communications among AUSA Bass; Patrick Hansen, then Acting United States Attorney; John Childress, then Criminal Chief; and other personnel in the Office, regarding the handling of Schock and the drafting of filings for that case; (2) transcripts of grand jury proceedings in Schock; (3) a performance appraisal for AUSA Bass covering January through December 2016; and (4) several documents filed in the Schock case. These documents total 279 pages.
AUSA Bass forwarded some of the emails described immediately above (Pages 30-46) to the DOJ's Professional Responsibility Advisory Office ("PRAO") in December 2017. Thus, except for the email header reflecting the forward to PRAO, these documents are a duplicate of part of the Tim Bass/OIG Emails. These documents total 17 pages.
AUSA Bass, who handled the Schock case, and AUSA Elly Peirson, who handled this action, exchanged emails in May 2018 in which they discussed what to do about a December 2016 email exchange between Judge Bruce and Hopps. The United States has disclosed the Bruce/Hopps exchange itself to Nixon without redaction (except for a phone number). The Bass/Peirson Emails (including the Bruce/Hopps exchange) total eight pages.
Hopps sent a memorandum to Norman Wong, Principal Deputy Director of the Executive Office for United States Attorneys ("EOUSA"), in August 2018. The purpose of Ms. Hopps's communication was to ask EOUSA and the Department of Justice to take certain action regarding the USAO and Schock. This document is six pages long.
Eugene Miller, a supervisory AUSA, sent an email to himself in April 2016, summarizing and recording Judge Bruce's oral feedback regarding the performance of another AUSA in the office. The Judge provided feedback regarding that AUSA's work in general, across various cases. Although the email mentions two specific cases, it does not mention this case, United States v. Nixon. This document is two pages long.
Title 28 of the United States Code, Section 636, provides:
28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A). Appeals to the district court from a magistrate judge's order under § 636(b)(1)(A) are reviewed for clear error. Hall v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 469 F.3d 590, 594-95 (7th Cir. 2006) (under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, "when parties object to a magistrate judge's order, district judges are to review nondispositive decisions for clear error and dispositive rulings de novo").
"The Due Process Clause guarantees litigants an impartial judge, reflecting the principle that `no man is permitted to try cases where he has an interest in the outcome.'" Franklin v. McCaughtry, 398 F.3d 955, 959 (7th Cir. 2005) (quoting In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955)). In order to establish a judge's disqualifying bias, a litigant "must offer either direct evidence or `a possible temptation so severe that we might presume an actual, substantial incentive to be biased.'" Franklin, 398 F.3d at 959 (quoting Del Vecchio v. Illinois Dep't of Corr., 31 F.3d 1363, 1375 (7th Cir.1994) (en banc)). Similarly, when "determining whether a judgment should be vacated for a violation of [28 U.S.C.] § 455(a), it is appropriate to consider the risk of injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process." Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988); see also United States v. Atwood, 941 F.3d 883, 885 (7th Cir. 2019).
The purpose of the work product privilege "is to establish a zone of privacy in which lawyers can analyze and prepare their client's case free from scrutiny or interference by an adversary." Hobley v. Burge, 433 F.3d 946, 949 (7th Cir. 2006). "Work-product protection applies to attorney-led investigations when the documents at issue can fairly be said to have been prepared or obtained because of the prospect of litigation." Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 622 (7th Cir. 2010) (internal quotations omitted). In order to overcome the work product privilege, a party must make a "showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials in the preparation of the party's case and that the party is unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means." Id. at 949-50 (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3)).
"The attorney-client privilege protects communications made in confidence by a client ... to an attorney, acting as an attorney, for the purpose of obtaining legal advice." Sandra T.E., 600 F.3d at 618. When analyzing whether a communication falls within the protection of the attorney-client privilege, the Court considers: "(1) whether legal advice of any kind was sought from a professional legal adviser in his capacity as such; and (2) whether the communication was related to that purpose and made in confidence by the client." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
The deliberative process privilege covers communications that are (1) pre-decisional and (2) deliberative. Nat'l Sec. Archive v. C.I.A., 752 F.3d 460, 463 (D.C. Cir. 2014) (citing Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 141, 151 (D.C. Cir. 2006)). Pre-decisional communications must have occurred before any final agency decision on the relevant matter. Id. Deliberative communications are communications "intended to facilitate or assist development of the agency's final position on the relevant issue." Id. The deliberative process privilege may be overcome upon a sufficient showing of a particularized need that outweighs the reasons for confidentiality. United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993).
On December 17, 2019, Magistrate Judge Hawley issued a ruling regarding the five sets of documents identified and described above. See generally Doc. 206-1. From the 312 pages of documents at issue, Magistrate Judge Hawley ordered nine specific unredactions. Judge Hawley prefaced his analysis of the redactions at issue with the following comment:
Doc. 206-1, at 5-7. The Court will now address each of the nine specific unredactions ordered by Judge Hawley.
In December 2017 and January 2018, AUSA Bass exchanged a series of emails with OIG in which he asked OIG to investigate alleged wrongdoing by specific USAO attorneys in connection with the Schock case. In ruling on Nixon's motion, Magistrate Judge Hawley stated:
Doc. 206-1, at 8-9. In order to provide a meaningful analysis of Magistrate Judge Hawley's ruling, the Court believes it necessary in this instance to refer with particularity to the statement at issue.
Doc. 201-1, at 4.
The United States' brief on appeal largely parrots its response to Defendant's Motion to Unredact. Cf. Docs. 206, 202. Therein, the United States again makes blanket assertions of privilege—work product, grand jury secrecy, the Privacy Act, personal privacy and security— that appear directed to the entirety of the 279-page document, rather than the single discrete half-paragraph which Judge Hawley ordered unredacted and which is the subject of this appeal. Doc. 206, at 29-31. The specific passage Judge Hawley ordered unredacted is AUSA Bass's statement to OIG requesting an investigation into a perceived conspiracy between USAO attorneys and Judge Bruce to sabotage the Schock case. Doc. 201-1, at 4.
The United States, as the party seeking to bar disclosure to Defendant, has the burden of "establishing the existence of the privilege as well as its applicability in the particular situation." Scott v. City of Peoria, 280 F.R.D. 419, 421-22 (C.D. Ill. 2011) (citing Bank of America v. Veluchamy, 643 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 2011)). "Blanket claims of privilege are not acceptable." Id. (citing Holifield v. U.S., 909 F.2d 201, 204 (7th Cir. 1990)). Yet that is exactly what the United States has done here. Because the United States fails to explain to this Court why any asserted privilege applies to preclude the production of the portion of Bass's statement to OIG that Judge Hawley ordered unredacted, it has failed by a wide margin to establish any error on Magistrate Judge Hawley's part—let alone clear error. In fact, this conclusion applies equally to each of the redactions at issue in this appeal See infra.
In addition to assertions of privilege, the United States also argues that "[m]ost of the information in these emails is irrelevant to Nixon's Motion for New Trial because it relates to other litigation and does not refer to any communications between Judge Colin Bruce and the U.S. Attorney's office." Doc. 206, at 30. At issue in Nixon's Motion for New Trial is whether Judge Bruce was actually biased and/or appeared to be biased against her and in favor of the United States. The United States articulates the following standard for an actual bias claim: "Where the defendant seeks a new trial based on an allegation that the presiding judge was actually or presumptively biased, the defense `must offer either direct evidence or a possible temptation so severe that [the appellate court] might presume an actual, substantial incentive to be biased.'" Doc. 206, at 16 (quoting Franklin v. McCaughtry, 398 F.3d 955, 960 (7th Cir. 2005)). Here, AUSA Bass's assertion that the USAO was in cahoots with Judge Bruce to sabotage the Schock case, even if fantastic, is relevant indirect evidence of Judge Bruce's alleged bias—"it has [a] tendency to make a fact more or less probable than it would be without the evidence." Fed. R. Evid. 401(a). Moreover, the passage Judge Hawley ordered unredacted provides crucial context to varying relationships between individuals in USAO and Judge Bruce. In other words, the Court anticipates Nixon's claim of bias is not simply that Judge Bruce was always biased in favor of the United States; rather, it is likely Nixon will argue Judge Bruce was biased in favor of certain USAO employees (and perhaps biased against other USAO employees). A detailed understanding of those varying relationships will thus be necessary when considering the merits of Nixon's Motion for New Trial. For these reasons, the Court affirms Magistrate Judge Hawley's ruling with respect to this redaction.
Next, Judge Hawley ordered unredacted a portion of another email communication between AUSA Bass and the OIG.
Doc. 206-1, at 9-10.
The bulk of the material Judge Hawley ordered unredacted in this document is AUSA Bass's reassertion of a conspiracy between the USAO and Judge Bruce to sabotage the Schock case. Doc. 201-3, at 10. Again, the United States fails to explain to this Court why any asserted privilege applies to preclude the production of the portion of Bass's statement to OIG that Judge Hawley ordered unredacted. The other discrete passages Judge Hawley ordered unredacted are passing references to "the Schock matter." Id. at 10-11. These references provide necessary context for the communications between the USAO and Judge Bruce. For these reasons, the Court affirms Magistrate Judge Hawley's ruling with respect to this redaction.
Judge Hawley ordered unredacted the following portions of the same email communication between AUSA Bass and the OIG:
Doc. 206-1, at 10-11.
The first redaction Judge Hawley ordered removed set forth the date a motion was filed in the Schock case. Doc. 201-4, at 2. The second redaction Judge Hawley ordered removed begins with "[s]everal weeks later ... Judge Bruce entered an order". Id. Thereafter, AUSA Bass goes on to complain about Judge Bruce's order. Id. at 2-3. The United States does not attempt to redact the portion of that passage which states "and during and following the time period during which Mr. Hansen and Mr. Childress had repeated ex parte contact with Judge Bruce." Id. at 2. In order for the reader to comprehend that passage, it must know the time period to which Bass is referring. The portions ordered unredacted by Judge Hawley are therefore relevant to the issue presented in Nixon's Motion for New Trial. The United States fails to explain to this Court why any asserted privilege applies to preclude the production of the portion of Bass's statement to OIG that Judge Hawley ordered unredacted. For these reasons, the Court affirms Magistrate Judge Hawley's ruling with respect to this redaction.
Judge Hawley ordered unredacted the following portions of the same email communication between AUSA Bass and the OIG:
Doc. 206-1, at 12-13.
The first redaction Judge Hawley ordered removed was a date. The United States makes no argument to this Court why that decision amounts to clear error. The Second redaction Judge Hawley ordered removed referred to "the presiding judge in the Schock matter." Doc. 201-4, at 5. The Court affirms Magistrate Judge Hawley's ruling with respect to this redaction for the same reasons set forth in the analysis of Redaction 2, supra. The third redaction Judge Hawley ordered unredacted refers to an AUSA's statement that he did not want the Schock case and both he and the interim United States Attorney believed Judge Bruce was hostile to AUSA Bass. Doc. 201-4, at 6. Judge Hawley found these passages both relevant to Nixon's claim and not covered by any asserted privilege. The United States makes no specific argument to this Court explaining why Judge Hawley's ruling was clearly erroneous, nor does the Court discern any basis to disagree with the Magistrate Judge's ruling. Accordingly, the Court affirms Magistrate Judge Hawley's ruling with respect to this redaction.
Judge Hawley ordered unredacted the following portions of the same set of email communications between AUSA Bass and the OIG:
Doc. 206-1, at 14.
The only redaction Judge Hawley ordered removed in this passage is the statement by AUSA Bass to the OIG indicating his willingness to provide OIG with additional information about AUSA Hansen and USA Childress's repeated contact with Judge Bruce. The United States makes no specific argument to this Court explaining why Judge Hawley's ruling was clearly erroneous, nor does the Court discern any basis to disagree with the Magistrate's ruling. Accordingly, the Court affirms Magistrate Judge Hawley's ruling with respect to this redaction.
Judge Hawley ordered unredacted AUSA Bass's forward to PRAO of an email communication between Bass and the OIG:
Doc. 206-1, at 15-16. This communication supplied OIG with the "additional information" Bass suggested in Redaction 5, supra.
The United States argues the email forwarded to PRAO is protected by the attorney-client privilege because PRAO is responsible for advising Assistant U.S. Attorneys and other DOJ attorneys on issues of professional responsibility. Doc. 206, at 31-32. Further, the United States argues that, "in light of the pendency of Schock and his role as an AUSA, Mr. Bass necessarily sought PRAO's advice in anticipation of possible litigation or a state bar proceeding — which can be "of an adversarial nature sufficient to constitute `litigation' — regarding his professional conduct." Id. at 32 (citing for comparison McCook Metals L.L.C. v. Alcoa Inc., 192 F.R.D. 242, 262 (N.D. Ill. 2000)).
First, Nixon correctly points out—and the United States elsewhere concedes—the PRAO forward is a duplicate of part of the Tim Bass/OIG Emails. Doc. 206, at 11; Doc. 207, at 9. The Court agrees with Nixon that this communication is not covered by the attorney-client privilege because AUSA Bass, as the holder of the privilege, disclosed the exact same information to OIG. Therefore, the communication was not confidential and is not protected by the attorney-client privilege. See Powers v. Chi. Transit Auth., 890 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir. 1989); Sandra T.E. v. S. Berwyn Sch. Dist. 100, 600 F.3d 612, 618 (7th Cir. 2010) ("The attorney-client privilege protects communications made in confidence by a client and a client's employees to an attorney, acting as an attorney, for the purpose of obtaining legal advice.") (emphasis added).
Second, and contrary to the United States' assertion, it does not appear that AUSA Bass forwarded the OIG email to PRAO to seek "PRAO's advice in anticipation of possible litigation or a state bar proceeding." Doc. 206, at 32. Rather, it is apparent from a reading of the email that AUSA Bass forwarded the email to PRAO in his continued effort to raise concerns regarding the conduct of certain colleagues in the USAO and Judge Bruce. Accordingly, the Court affirms Magistrate Judge Hawley's ruling with respect to this redaction.
Judge Hawley also ordered unredacted AUSA Bass's email to AUSA Peirson:
Doc. 206-1, at 16.
The United States makes no effort before this Court to explain why Judge Hawley's ruling was clearly erroneous. Rather, the United States simply rehashes the arguments previously raised before Judge Hawley. Doc. 206, at 36. While the discussion between AUSAs Bass and Peirson likely constitutes protected work product, Judge Hawley found that even if such privilege applied, "the defendant's need for this and its relevance would outweigh that." Doc. 206-1, at 8.
This Court's review of the email leads to the same conclusion. The Court finds the following excerpt of AUSA Bass's email particularly illustrative of the relevance of the redacted material: "Judge Bruce's prior employment in this office and his close relationships and ongoing contacts with interim management of the office created a conflict of interest." Doc. 201-16, at 4. In short, AUSA Bass's email to Peirson is relevant because it tends to support Nixon's theory that Judge Bruce was actually or apparently biased in favor of the United States due to his close and continued relationships with the upper echelons of the USAO. Nixon has also established a necessity for producing the document, as there is no other way for Nixon to obtain the information from other sources. United States v. Farley, 11 F.3d 1385, 1389 (7th Cir. 1993) ("The deliberative process privilege may be overcome where there is a sufficient showing of a particularized need to outweigh the reasons for confidentiality."). Moreover, the United States completely fails to grapple with the issue of necessity before this Court, and thus waives any argument to the contrary.
Judge Hawley next ordered unredacted portions of AUSA Peirson's email response to AUSA Bass:
Doc. 206-1, at 17.
The first portion of this communication Judge Hawley ordered unredacted was Peirson's email response to Bass, wherein she confirmed the receipt of the Judge Bruce/Lisa Hopps emails exchanged during the Nixon trial and acknowledged Bass's recommendation that the email should be disclosed to the defense. Doc. 201-16, at 4. The second portion of the communication Judge Hawley ordered unredacted was Peirson's statement that she spoke to AUSA Eugene Miller and AUSA Gregg Walters to seek their advice. Id.
The United States argues before this Court that the communications are privileged work product because they convey the mental impressions and thought processes of the participating attorneys in relation to pending litigation. Doc. 206, at 36. While this may be true, the statements Judge Hawley ordered unredacted are relevant to Nixon's Motion for New Trial because they relate directly to Judge Bruce's ex parte communications during the Nixon trial and indicate who had knowledge of the ex parte communications and when they learned about the communications. Again, Nixon has also established a necessity for producing the document, as there is no other way for Nixon to obtain the information from other sources.
Additionally, the United States argues Judge Hawley held that relevance overrides all considerations of privilege. Doc. 206, at 37-38. The United States is mistaken. Judge Hawley first considered relevance, and then he considered whether any privilege would apply. See Doc. 206-1, at 6 ("If there's information that I found to be relevant that was proposed to be redacted by the government, then I considered whether or not any other of the asserted bases for the redaction would apply."). Thus, to the extent the passages Judge Hawley ordered unredacted were protected by the work product doctrine, Judge Hawley did not clearly error when he found Defendant's need for the information outweighed the United States' assertion of privilege. The Court affirms Magistrate Judge Hawley's ruling with respect to this redaction.
Lisa Hopps sent a memorandum to Norman Wong, Principal Deputy Director of EOUSA, in August 2018. Judge Hawley ordered unredacted one paragraph and part of another from this memorandum:
Doc. 206-1, at 19. Again, in order to provide a meaningful analysis of Magistrate Judge Hawley's ruling, the Court believes it necessary in this instance to refer with particularity to the statement at issue. Specifically, the portion Judge Hawley ordered unredacted read:
Doc. 201-17, at 3.
The United States argues in general terms before this Court that the Hopps Memorandum is protected by the deliberative process privilege and the work product doctrine, and further argues much of the content in the memorandum is irrelevant. Doc. 206, at 37-38. As Nixon rightly points out, the United States' brief before this Court is completely devoid of any discussion regarding Nixon's asserted need for the redacted documents. See Doc. 207, at 9 ("The government has not even established these privileges apply to the information ordered unredacted let alone explain how Judge Hawley's determination that Ms. Nixon's need for the information outweighs the privilege is clearly erroneous."). In the Court's view, this omission is itself sufficient grounds for finding no clear error in Judge Hawley's ruling and thus affirming his decision.
However, even if the Court were to excuse the United States' failure to address the issues material to this appeal, the Court believes a proper balancing of Nixon's demonstrated need for the documents against the United States' asserted privileges tips in favor of disclosure. The Court finds particularly relevant the statement from Hopps that "Colin has been unable to disconnect himself from our office. It's almost as if he is a silent part of management. No other federal judge in our district is in constant contact with our office and seems to know everything that is going on like Colin does." Doc. 201-17, at 3. This statement is significant because it goes to the heart of the issue presented in Nixon's Motion for New Trial—whether Judge Bruce was actually or apparently biased in favor of the United States due to his close and continuous relationship with the USAO management. Given the undoubted relevance of this document and the fact that Nixon has no other means of acquiring the information contained therein, the Court finds Judge Hawley did not clearly error when he ordered the above passages unredacted. The Court affirms Magistrate Judge Hawley's ruling with respect to this redaction.
Judge Hawley's analysis was necessarily limited by the fact that the redactions at issue were not available to the public (or the defense) at the time he made his ruling. Thus, in order to preserve the United States' right to appeal his decision, Judge Hawley issued his ruling in such a manner as to not reveal the contents of the redactions at issue. However, on appeal, the United States did not ask this Court to refrain from making publicly available the material ordered unredacted in the event Judge Hawley's ruling was affirmed. Although mindful of the sensitive or embarrassing nature of these materials, this Court has specifically referenced some of the materials previously redacted by the United States when necessary to develop a cogent and through analysis of the parties' arguments on appeal. Nonetheless, some of those materials ordered unredacted are not repeated verbatim in this opinion and remain unavailable to the public. Accordingly, the Court directs the United States to immediately provide Defendant with the revised set of redacted documents which incorporate Judge Hawley's ruling. The Court further directs the United States to file on the public docket within seven days of this Order a revised set of redacted documents which incorporate Judge Hawley's ruling.
For the reasons set forth above, Magistrate Judge Hawley's December 17, 2019 decision is AFFIRMED. The Court directs the United States to immediately provide Defendant with the revised set of redacted documents which incorporate Judge Hawley's ruling. The Court further directs the United States to file on the public docket within seven days of this Order a revised set of redacted documents which incorporate Judge Hawley's ruling.
