Justice BIRKETT delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 In this divorce proceeding, petitioner, Diana L. Heasley, appeals the trial court's judgment terminating the obligation of respondent, Kevin L. Heasley, to pay her maintenance. The trial court entered the termination order at the second review of maintenance following the divorce decree. We agree with petitioner that the trial court failed to recognize the limited scope intended for the second review. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment terminating maintenance and remand for further proceedings.
¶ 3 The parties were married in 1984 and have one child, Trista, born in March 1994. In May 2005, petitioner filed for dissolution of the marriage. In 2007, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing on contested issues. No transcripts or exhibits from that hearing are in the record, but this does not hamper our review of the issues presented in this appeal.
¶ 4 In December 2007, the court issued its judgment of dissolution. At the time, petitioner and respondent were, respectively, 45 and 44 years of age. The court ordered joint legal custody of Trista but granted petitioner sole physical custody. Respondent was ordered to pay $1,040 per month as child support. Also, he was required to pay maintenance in accord with the following provisions:
¶ 6 Several months later, in June 2010, the motion was heard by the Honorable R. Craig Sahlstrom. Petitioner was the sole witness at the hearing. She testified to her education and employment history. Petitioner graduated from Penn State in 1982 with an associate's degree in architectural engineering. Unable to find immediate work in her field of training, petitioner became a dental assistant. After the parties married, they moved to New Jersey and petitioner became employed full-time with a civil engineering firm, where she did drafting. When Trista was born in 1994, petitioner switched to part-time work with the firm, then later reverted to full-time work. Petitioner's full-time yearly salary at the firm was about $38,000. Three and a half years after Trista was born, petitioner ceased working outside the home. She became a homemaker and operated a home business (there are suggestions in the record that the business involved crafts). Petitioner was still not working outside the home when, in May 2005, she filed for divorce. In June 2005, while the dissolution petition was pending, the trial court directed petitioner to find employment in her field of training. Petitioner subsequently obtained part-time employment, working Mondays and Wednesdays at Lawrence Clayton Associates (LCA) (the record does not disclose the nature of this work, but the parties agree that it was not related to petitioner's field of training). When the dissolution decree was entered in December 2007, petitioner was still working part time with LCA and earning $12,000 per year.
¶ 7 There is no dispute in this appeal that advances in the architectural industry have rendered petitioner's 1982 associate's degree obsolete. Petitioner testified that, when the divorce decree was entered, she lacked the means to seek further education. She filed a motion seeking funds from respondent for her education, but she was "denied" them (we are unsure which pleading petitioner was referring to here). At this point, petitioner made a calculated "judgment" and decided to take a part-time teller position at First National Bank (FNB), working Tuesdays, Thursdays, Fridays, and Saturdays. The position at FNB was in addition to petitioner's part-time position at LCA. When she began at FNB, petitioner's hourly wage was about $8.50 an hour. Between her two jobs, petitioner worked 50 to 55 hours per week. In June 2008, petitioner quit her position at LCA and started full-time at FNB. She was so employed at the time of the June 2010 review hearing. Petitioner worked a "minimum" of 40 hours per week at FNB. Her current rate of pay was $10 per hour, or $17,000 per year — an increase from her salary at the time of the dissolution.
¶ 8 Petitioner recalled testifying at the divorce trial that she had considered seeking a degree in dental hygienistry. Petitioner ultimately did not pursue that degree. She noted that the education and training involved in becoming a dental hygienist would have required her to quit her employment. Based on her research, she determined that her yearly deficit for the two-year degree would have been roughly $80,000, between tuition, health insurance, and loss of current income. Petitioner's research also disclosed that the unemployment rate in Rockford was nearly 20% and that the dental industry in the area suffered a downturn in the recent poor economy.
¶ 10 Petitioner also received from the property division $125,000 in an individual retirement account (IRA). Withdrawals from the IRA were subject to a 10% penalty and a 17% tax. Petitioner withdrew $4,000 from the IRA to pay bills as well as debts owed to family members. Between the withdrawals and market decreases, the present balance of the IRA was approximately $72,000. Petitioner had not used any money from the IRA to pay for further education. Petitioner claimed that her debts had been "mounting" since the dissolution and that she depended on loans from family members.
¶ 11 Petitioner testified that, based on a recent annual review, she was promoted to "Teller III." She also applied recently for a supervisory position but was passed over for an applicant with more experience. Petitioner was not "content" with her current position and was seeking to advance within FNB by taking as many in-house courses that FNB offers "in computer knowledge or bank knowledge." She had taken courses that did not relate to her current position, in the event that another type of position within FNB will arise. Petitioner acknowledged that she had not taken any classes outside FNB or explored the costs of any courses or degrees aside from a dental hygienistry degree. Petitioner added that she had no intention of looking further into education outside the bank.
¶ 12 The parties stipulated that respondent's current yearly salary was $96,000, an increase from his salary of $91,000 at the time of the dissolution.
¶ 13 After petitioner finished her testimony, the court engaged the parties in a lengthy dialogue as to the proper course regarding maintenance. Counsel for respondent remarked that he wished to call respondent to testify. The court indicated that respondent's testimony likely would make no difference, given the court's present inclination on the issue. Elaborating, the court expressed its belief that petitioner had made a good-faith effort to become financially independent and that respondent's maintenance obligation should not terminate until his retirement, barring a substantial change in circumstances:
¶ 14 Based on the court's remarks, respondent asked for a continuance to decide whether to present evidence on the issue. The court continued the matter to June 23, 2010, for a pretrial conference.
¶ 15 The record contains no report of any further proceedings on the motion. (The next hearing for which there is a report of proceedings occurred in June 2012.) On November 18, 2010, the trial court entered a written order disposing of the motion. The trial court denied the motion, stating: "The Court directs [petitioner] to remain fully employed and to seek out promotions and better job opportunities so as to increase her income." The court continued the matter to June 2012 for review of maintenance, at which
¶ 16 The matter was subsequently transferred to the Honorable Gwyn Gulley. In May 2012, respondent filed a motion to modify maintenance. Petitioner, for her part, filed a motion to increase maintenance. On September 7, 2012, the court entered an order terminating child support, as Trista had graduated from high school.
¶ 17 The motions regarding maintenance were heard on September 17, 2012. The parties represented to the court that they had agreed to an "expedited" hearing and would stand on the evidence presented at the June 2010 review as well as their recent financial affidavits. The parties did, however, make representations about events since the June 2010 review. The court appeared to regard these as stipulated facts for purposes of its decision, and the parties assume their truth for purposes of this appeal. Those facts were as follows. Petitioner's current salary was $21,000 and respondent's was $120,000 — both having increased since the June 2010 review. Petitioner was still employed as a bank teller at FNB, and her salary in that position would "top[ ] out somewhere" around $22,000 to $23,000. Since the June 2010 review, petitioner had taken no classes outside FNB. She had, however, continued to take in-house classes at FNB, including all the "word processing, all the accounting classes." Petitioner was also participating in a three-year "training program" with the goal of becoming "more of a bank administrator," such as a personal banker or branch manager. Petitioner was being "as active and as involved as [she] possibly [could] for any promotion that [would come] [her] way."
¶ 18 Three months later, on December 13, 2012, the trial court issued a written order providing that petitioner's maintenance would terminate in 18 months. The court recognized that, in a maintenance review proceeding, "there is no threshold requirement of * * * a substantial change in circumstances." See In re Marriage of Golden, 358 Ill.App.3d 464, 471-72, 294 Ill.Dec. 852, 831 N.E.2d 1177 (2005) (in a maintenance review, there is no requirement of a change in circumstances). The court made the following findings in support of the termination of maintenance:
The court also ordered that respondent contribute to Trista's college costs.
¶ 19 Petitioner filed a motion to reconsider the termination of maintenance. The trial court denied the motion, and petitioner filed this appeal.
¶ 21 On appeal, petitioner advances several challenges to the termination of maintenance. One of her contentions is that, in conducting the maintenance review in September 2012, the trial court misunderstood the intended scope of that review. We agree. As this issue disposes of this appeal, we need not address petitioner's remaining contentions.
¶ 22 Section 504(a) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (750 ILCS 5/504(a) (West 2012)) provides that the trial court "may grant a temporary or permanent maintenance award for either spouse in amounts and for periods of time as the court deems just * * * in gross or for fixed or indefinite periods of time." Section 504(a) sets forth several factors for the court's consideration in granting a maintenance award. See id.
¶ 23 In the December 2007 dissolution judgment, petitioner was awarded rehabilitative maintenance. "Rehabilitative maintenance is appropriate if evidence shows a potential for future employability at an income that allows approximately the same standard of living established during the marriage." In re Marriage of Brackett, 309 Ill.App.3d 329, 340, 242 Ill.Dec. 798, 722 N.E.2d 287 (1999). "Inherent in the concept of rehabilitative maintenance is the optimal goal that after a period of renewing or developing skills, or reentering the job market, the dependent former spouse will be able to become self-sufficient through his or her own income." In re Marriage of Lenkner, 241 Ill.App.3d 15, 20, 181 Ill.Dec. 646, 608 N.E.2d 897 (1993).
¶ 24 Concerning modification and termination of maintenance, section 510(a-5) of the Act (750 ILCS 5/510(a-5) (West 2012)) states:
¶ 26 Where there is no such provision for review, a motion to reconsider maintenance initiates a modification proceeding rather than a review proceeding. See Golden, 358 Ill.App.3d at 469, 294 Ill.Dec. 852, 831 N.E.2d 1177 ("Review proceedings * * * are held pursuant to prior court orders while modification proceedings can be initiated by the parties without prior order of the court."). As section 510(a-5) provides, maintenance will not be altered in a modification proceeding absent proof by the movant of a substantial change in circumstances. This threshold of proof is not required, however, in review proceedings. Blum, 235 Ill.2d at 35-36, 335 Ill.Dec. 614, 919 N.E.2d 333; Golden, 358 Ill.App.3d at 471-72, 294 Ill.Dec. 852, 831 N.E.2d 1177.
¶ 27 Review proceedings can be general or limited. See Blum, 235 Ill.2d at 32, 335 Ill.Dec. 614, 919 N.E.2d 333; Golden, 358 Ill.App.3d at 470, 294 Ill.Dec. 852, 831 N.E.2d 1177 ("Review proceedings regarding maintenance can encompass various issues."). A general review of maintenance will involve consideration of all factors in section 510(a-5). See Blum, 235 Ill.2d at 31-32, 335 Ill.Dec. 614, 919 N.E.2d 333. Limited review involving fewer statutory factors is possible. See id. at 32, 335 Ill.Dec. 614, 919 N.E.2d 333 ("The factors set forth in section 510(a-5) are inapplicable when the parties have otherwise agreed on the terms of modification and termination of maintenance in a written marital settlement agreement approved by the court, pursuant to section 502" [of the Act (750 ILCS 5/502 (West 2012))]); Golden, 358 Ill.App.3d at 470, 294 Ill.Dec. 852, 831 N.E.2d 1177 ("[T]he trial court can define the scope of the review, including limiting the review to certain issues."). A trial court that orders a review proceeding is encouraged to notify the parties of any limitations the court intends to set on that review:
A common consideration for review of maintenance is the spouse's efforts toward financial independence:
¶ 28 The September 17, 2012, reconsideration of maintenance was a review proceeding, not a modification proceeding, because it was done pursuant to direction in the November 18, 2010, order following the first review of maintenance. We consider how, if at all, the court intended to limit the scope of the second review. "Generally, the intention of the court is determined by the language in the order entered, but where the language of the order is ambiguous, it is subject to construction." Twardowski v. Holiday Hospitality Franchising, Inc., 321 Ill.App.3d 509, 512, 254 Ill.Dec. 776, 748 N.E.2d 222 (2001). An ambiguous order "should be interpreted in the context of the record and the situation that existed at the time of [its] rendition." Id. The relevant sources include "pleadings, motions and issues before the court; the transcript of proceedings before the court; and arguments of counsel." In re Marriage of Lehr, 317 Ill.App.3d 853, 858, 251 Ill.Dec. 336, 740 N.E.2d 417 (2000).
¶ 29 The trial court's November 18, 2010, order provided for review of maintenance in 18 months. The court gave only the following guidance as to what would be its concern at the next review: "The Court directs [petitioner] to remain fully employed and to seek out promotions and better job opportunities so as to increase her income." Petitioner could reasonably interpret this as the sole criterion by which the trial court, at the next review, would judge her efforts toward self-sufficiency. Respondent, we note, never appealed that order.
¶ 30 At the September 2012 review, the trial court specifically faulted petitioner for failing to pursue educational opportunities "from 2005 to 2012[, i.e., to the date of the second review]." Construing the November 18 order, we see no requirement that petitioner seek further education. Obviously, petitioner could, and did, "remain fully employed" without going back to school. Moreover, there was no question at the September 2012 review that petitioner had sought "promotions" within FNB. As for "better job opportunities," this ambiguous phrase is clarified by the trial court's remarks at the June 2010 review. The court found that petitioner had made good-faith efforts by obtaining and continuing full-time employment with FNB and seeking promotions. The court "hope[d]" that petitioner would advance at FNB and become "branch manager or something." We see no suggestion in these remarks that the court expected petitioner to seek further schooling or job opportunities outside of FNB.
¶ 31 The decision to modify or terminate maintenance is within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be disturbed on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion. In re Marriage of McLauchlan, 2012 IL App (1st) 102114, ¶ 19, 359 Ill.Dec. 463, 966 N.E.2d 1151. The trial court abuses its discretion when, inter alia, it applies an improper legal standard. Rockford Police Benevolent & Protective Ass'n v. Morrissey, 398 Ill.App.3d 145, 154, 339 Ill.Dec. 84, 925 N.E.2d 1205 (2010). Here, the court failed to recognize the limited scope of review authorized in the November 18, 2010, order.
¶ 32 Accordingly, we vacate the trial court's judgment terminating maintenance
¶ 34 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court of Winnebago County is vacated and the cause is remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
¶ 35 Vacated and remanded with directions.
Presiding Justice BURKE and Justice SCHOSTOK concurred in the judgment and opinion.