Justice CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
¶ 1 The State charged four individuals, including the defendant, Bethany McKee, with six counts of first degree murder in connection with the alleged strangling deaths of two males. After the indictment was filed, a reporter, respondent Joseph Hosey, wrote several articles that contained alleged details of the murders. During pretrial matters, counsel for McKee filed a motion to divest Hosey of his reporter's privilege, which sought the materials Hosey used to write the articles and the source of those materials. The circuit court granted the motion, and after Hosey was found in direct criminal and civil contempt for refusing to comply with the divestiture order, Hosey appealed. On appeal, Hosey argues that the court erred when it granted the motion for divestiture. We reverse.
¶ 3 On January 31, 2013, the State charged four individuals, including the defendant, Bethany McKee, via indictment with six counts of first degree murder in connection with the alleged strangling deaths of two males.
¶ 4 On March 1, 2013, counsel for McKee filed a motion for a gag order to seal the court records on the case. In that motion, counsel for McKee stated that the news website, the Joliet Patch, ran a series of articles online beginning on February 26, 2013, that contained alleged details of the events surrounding the murders. The articles were written by respondent Joseph Hosey. One of the articles from February 26, 2013, stated that the Patch had obtained the police reports from the investigation. The circuit court entered an agreed order on March 1, 2013, that prohibited the parties from discussing the case with the media and that sealed the court record.
¶ 5 On July 3, 2013, counsel for McKee filed a motion to divest Hosey of his reporter's privilege. In addition to acknowledging that the Joliet Patch obtained police reports from the case, the motion also alleged that Hosey additionally obtained the toxicology reports from the autopsies of the victims. The motion further stated that the Joliet clerk's office: (1) did not receive a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) (5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012)) request for the reports from Hosey; (2) denied all other FOIA requests for the reports; and (3) did not have copies of the reports. The motion also alleged that the divestiture was necessary because the "leak" compromised McKee's ability to receive a fair trial and violated her due process rights, and that the divestiture would stop the "leak."
Also in support of its ruling, the court stated the following with regard to the relevancy of the divestiture to the case's pending issues:
Accordingly, the court divested Hosey of his reporter's privilege and required him to surrender copies of the documents he received, including any information that tended to identify the source of the material provided to him. Further, in the event that disclosure did not identify the source, the court ordered Hosey to provide an affidavit revealing the source of the material provided to him.
¶ 7 Hosey asked the court to find him in contempt so he could appeal. On September 20, 2013, the court found Hosey in direct criminal and civil contempt, which included a $1,000 fine and a $300-per-day fine for every day of noncompliance extending for 180 days, at the end of which Hosey would be subject to incarceration until he complied with the court's order. Hosey appealed.
¶ 9 On appeal, Hosey argues that the court erred when it granted the motion for divestiture. Hosey contends, inter alia, that the divestiture motion did not meet
¶ 10 Initially, we note that the parties dispute the applicable standard of review. Hosey contends that we should apply the de novo standard, while McKee argues that we should apply the manifest weight of the evidence standard. We believe the appropriate standard is in fact the de novo standard. We acknowledge that section 8-905 of the Code of Civil Procedure states that divestiture proceedings are civil proceedings (735 ILCS 5/8-905 (West 2012)), and that in such proceedings, the party seeking divestiture has the burden of proof by a preponderance of the evidence (People v. Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill.2d 177, 188, 244 Ill.Dec. 13, 724 N.E.2d 901 (2000) (applying the manifest weight of the evidence standard); In re Subpoena Duces Tecum to Arya, 226 Ill.App.3d 848, 854, 168 Ill.Dec. 432, 589 N.E.2d 832 (1992) (same)). However, the dispositive question on appeal concerns the scope of relevancy under section 8-906 of the Code of Civil Procedure — Hosey argues for a narrow definition of relevance, while the defendant argues for a broad definition of relevance. Accordingly, this appeal presents a question of law, which we review de novo. See People v. Slover, 323 Ill.App.3d 620, 623, 257 Ill.Dec. 359, 753 N.E.2d 554 (2001) (addressing the scope of terms in section 8-902 and applying the de novo standard to that question of statutory construction); cf. Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill.2d at 188, 192-95, 244 Ill.Dec. 13, 724 N.E.2d 901 (stating earlier in the opinion that the manifest weight of the evidence standard applied to the appeal, but later stating that in addressing the scope of relevancy under section 8-904 that the court was performing statutory construction).
¶ 11 In Illinois, reporters possess a qualified privilege regarding confidentiality of sources. Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill.2d at 187, 244 Ill.Dec. 13, 724 N.E.2d 901; see 735 ILCS 5/8-901 to 8-909 (West 2012). "The purpose of the privilege is to assure reporters access to information, thereby encouraging a free press and a well-informed citizenry." Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill.2d at 187, 244 Ill.Dec. 13, 724 N.E.2d 901. In cases other than libel and slander cases in which an individual claims the qualified privilege, the party seeking the information can apply to the circuit court for a divestiture of the qualified privilege. 735 ILCS 5/8-903 (West 2012).
¶ 12 In relevant part, the party seeking the divestiture must meet three threshold requirements in the application:
¶ 13 With regard to the threshold requirement of relevancy, it is important to note the type of proceeding in which the information is being sought. In Pawlaczyk, the proceeding was a special grand jury proceeding related to perjury charges. Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill.2d at 193, 244 Ill.Dec. 13,
¶ 14 In this case, the proceeding in which the information is being sought is a criminal prosecution for first degree murder. See 735 ILCS 5/8-903(a), 8-904 (West 2012); Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill.2d at 193, 244 Ill.Dec. 13, 724 N.E.2d 901. Specifically, McKee has been charged with six counts of first degree murder — one count for each victim under each of the three subsections of the first degree murder statute. See 720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1)-(3) (West 2012). The circuit court noted in its decision that the information being sought was seemingly off topic with regard to the murder charges. However, the court stated that the information pertained to whether the "leak" violated the Illinois Supreme Court Rules or other Illinois law — in other words, to collateral matters. As a matter of statutory construction, relevance to such collateral matters is not sufficient to satisfy section 8-904's threshold requirement that the sought-after information be relevant to the proceedings in which it is being sought. See Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill.2d at 193-94, 244 Ill.Dec. 13, 724 N.E.2d 901; accord Brown v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 755, 204 S.E.2d 429, 431 (1974) (holding that divestiture is warranted in a criminal case when the information sought is material to proof of an element of the offense charged, to proof of the defense asserted by the accused, to a reduction in the gradation of the charge, or to a mitigation of the penalty associated with the charge). Because the identity of Hosey's source cannot be said to relevant to a fact of consequence to the first degree murder allegations, we hold that the circuit court erred when it granted the motion for divestiture. See Pawlaczyk, 189 Ill.2d at 193-94, 244 Ill.Dec. 13, 724 N.E.2d 901.
¶ 15 Our ruling on the relevancy issue obviates the need to address Hosey's other arguments on appeal, including his argument related to the contempt order and its associated fines. Because we have reversed the circuit court's judgment, the court's contempt order and its associated fines are hereby vacated.
¶ 17 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is reversed.
¶ 18 Reversed.
Presiding Justice LYTTON and Justice SCHMIDT concurred in the judgment and opinion.