MEMORANDUM OF DECISION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND DECEMBER 27, 2016 JUDGMENT [DKT. NO 119]

JACK B. SCHMETTERER, Bankruptcy Judge.

Defendants, J. Kevin Benjamin and Benjamin Brand, LLP move for an order altering or amending the Judgment entered following trial for Avoidance and Recovery of Preferential Transfer (Count 1) entered against them on December 27, 2016 [Dkt. No. 116], vacating the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made and entered that same day [Dkt. No. 114], and to direct entry of Judgment in their favor instead.

Defendants' motion to alter or amend judgment is brought pursuant to Rule 9023, Fed. R. Bankr. P., which incorporates Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). "To prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion to alter or amend judgment, a party must `clearly establish' (1) that the court committed a manifest error of law or fact, or (2) that newly discovered evidence precluded entry of judgment." Blue v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 698 F.3d 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2012) (citing Harrington v. City of Chicago, 433 F.3d 542, 546 (7th Cir. 2006). This Rule allows the court to correct its own errors and thus avoid the unnecessary appellate procedures. Russell v. Delco Remy Div. of Gen. Motors Corp., 51 F.3d 746, 749 (7th Cir. 1995); Charles v. Daley, 799 F.2d 343, 348 (7th Cir. 1986). It is not a vehicle for a party to undo its own procedural failures, or allow a party to introduce new evidence that was earlier available but not used, or to advance arguments that could and should have been presented prior to the judgment. Bordelon v. Chicago Sch. Reform Bd. of Trustees, 233 F.3d 524, 529 (7th Cir. 2000).

Defendants have not offered any newly discovered evidence. To succeed, Defendants must therefore make a showing of manifest error of law or fact. Because no manifest error of law has been shown, and because factual findings are well supported by the evidence, Defendants' motion to alter or amend will be denied. However, an amendment to the judgment on court's initiative will be entered in order to clarify how money is to be returned to the estate.

Defendants' first arguments are that the Court does not have jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff's preference claim, or that the preference claim is not a core proceeding. But these arguments merely repeat arguments previously heard and rejected. Defendants raise no new arguments or otherwise show any error made in rejecting those arguments. In the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made and entered on December 27, 2016, and in prior opinions denying Defendants' motion to dismiss, the Court discussed Stern v. Marshall, 564 U.S. 462 (2011), and other authorities for the proposition that bankruptcy courts have always had jurisdiction, and retain jurisdiction post-Stern, to hear preference claims. Unlike the state-law claims at issue in Stern, the preference claims in this case are based solely on bankruptcy law under 11 U.S.C. § 547. After Stern, bankruptcy courts in this District have recognized their statutory and constitutional authority to hear and determine such preference actions. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(F); In re MCK Millennium Ctr. Parking, LLC, 532 B.R. 716, 719-20 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2015) (collecting cases); In re Miskowicz, 513 B.R. 513 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2014).

Defendants' next claim is that the Plaintiff, as the Debtor in this Chapter 13, does not have standing to prosecute preference claims on behalf of the estate. This argument, again, has previously been heard and rejected in response to Defendants' motion to dismiss and in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law made and entered on December 27, 2016. In Cable v. Ivy Tech State College, a Seventh Circuit panel affirmed that a Chapter 13 debtor has standing to pursue claims of the estate:

200 F.3d 467, 472 (7th Cir. 1999) (overruled on other grounds); see Rainey v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 466 F. App'x 542, 544 (7th Cir. 2012) ("A Chapter 13 estate encompasses all property, including legal claims, acquired after the petition is filed and before the case is closed. Although there is a trustee in a Chapter 13 bankruptcy, the trustee acts as an advisor and administrator while the debtor remains in possession of the estate. The debtor thus can pursue legal claims for the benefit of the estate and its creditors." (citations omitted)) (citing Cable). No error of law by this Court in applying that precedent has been shown by the Defendants.

Defendants' next arguments address the factual findings of the Court. They first challenge the finding that the Debtor was insolvent at the time of the $14,000 transfer. The Court took extensive testimony from the Debtor and found her credible. It was concluded that the values of assets in her schedules in the present bankruptcy were reliable, even though they differed from the values shown by her in the schedules filed in a prior case. The Debtor credibly explained that she had used insurance values in the prior schedules and actual liquidation values in the present case. Further, the Court found that the Debtor's financial situation had deteriorated between the time she filed her prior Chapter 13 and the time of the $14,000 payment.

A debtor is presumed insolvent during the 90 days prior to the filing of a bankruptcy for preference purposes. 11 U.S.C. § 547(f). Substantial evidence supported that presumption and showed that the Debtor was insolvent throughout that 90 day period up until the date of the $14,000 payment. Defendants did not offer evidence sufficient to overcome the statutory presumption that was thereby supported.

Defendants also argue that the Court erred in concluding that the $14,000 payment was not in the ordinary course of business. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(2). The issue was raised in Defendants' pre-trial filings, but no material evidence to support that defense was introduced at trial. The evidence presented, in turn, did not show that the payment in question was made in the ordinary course of business or financial affairs of the Debtor and the Defendants, or made according to ordinary business terms. Rather, it was found that the Debtor failed to make her payment when it became due, and that no pre-established payment terms were agreed or followed. Defendants failed to offer any evidence of the ordinary range of business terms that Defendants use in their law practice. Accordingly, the Court held that the Defendants failed to meet their burden of establishing that the otherwise preferential payment fell within the ordinary course of business exception included in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c).

Defendants also contend that the Court misapplied the ordinary course of business standard by allegedly failing to recognize amendments made to § 547(c)(2) of the Bankruptcy Code. That is also without merit. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law cite the current version of § 547(c)(2), and that version was applied in this case. Pre-amendment case law discussed in interpreting § 547(c)(2) has been reaffirmed by the Seventh Circuit in interpreting the current version of that provision. See Unsecured Creditors Comm. of Sparrer Sausage Co., Inc. v. Jason's Foods, Inc., 826 F.3d 388, 393-97 (7th Cir. 2016). Defendants' arguments in this respect therefore lack any merit.

Finally, Defendants argue that the Court made procedural errors at trial. Defendants do not point to any particular errors that the Court made in admitting or denying evidence. Rather, they make various allegations regarding motions and depositions, and claim that "[t]he court further coached Plaintiff's attorney and improperly handled Defendants attorney's protests and objections." Defendants have failed to point out any specific instances supporting their accusations by reference to the record. Defendants' generalized accusations are insufficient to show a manifest error of law or fact to support their motion to alter or amend judgment.

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' motion to alter or amend will be entirely denied by separate order.

On motion of the Court sua sponte and as previously announced, the Judgment entered on December 27, 2016 will be amended to direct that collection by Debtor of this Judgment will be turned over by her to the Chapter 13 Trustee for the benefit of the Debtor's estate in accordance with terms of her confirmed plan.