DEBORAH L. THORNE, UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY JUDGE.
Before the court is the disputed election of chapter 7 trustee Patrick J. O'Malley. Under 11 U.S.C. § 702(b), Fund Recovery Services, LLC elected O'Malley over the objections of the interim trustee and two insider creditors. As explained below, the court finds that Fund Recovery Services was ineligible to vote because its interest is materially adverse to other creditors' interests.
Argon X, LLC ("Argon X") and Argon Credit, LLC ("Argon Credit") were in the business of making near-prime consumer loans. The loans were sourced through non-debtor affiliates, then purchased by Argon X and serviced by Argon Credit. Princeton Alternative Funds, LLC ("Princeton") provided Argon X with a line of credit for $37 million secured by the loan portfolio. Although it is not completely clear to the court, it appears that Argon Credit at a minimum guaranteed Argon X's obligation. On December 7, 2016, Princeton declared the loan in default and assigned it to Fund Recovery Services, Inc. ("FRS").
Several days after the default, Argon Credit and Argon X filed voluntary petitions under chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.
A qualified creditor, holding at least twenty percent of the claims, may
Here, FRS filed proofs of claims in both cases prior to the election. Eugene Crane, Little Owl, and Margon objected to FRS' right to vote.
The Bankruptcy Code does not define a material adverse interest. The court must look outside the Code for guidance. Merriam-Webster defines adverse as "acting against or in a contrary direction." By this definition, most creditors have an adverse interest. The court would not be remiss in assuming that the majority of creditors want to maximize their interests with little to no thought given to any other estate interest. But, the inquiry does not end here. Section 702 requires a finding of material adversity. A creditor's interest is materially adverse when, "[a]t the time of the election, a creditor [has] the prospective ability to enhance its recovery at the estate's expense." In re Klein, 119 B.R. 971, 974-975 (N.D. Ill. 1990). Hence, courts tend to agree that potential preference liability often rises to the level of material adversity. In re Amherst Technologies, LLC, 335 B.R. 502, 508 (Bankr. D.N.H. 2006) (collecting cases); In re Lang Cartage Corp., 20 B.R. 534, 536-37 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1982). The court adopts this viewpoint.
Under section 547(b), which provides for recovery of preferential transfers, a trustee may recover certain payments made to a creditor within 90 days of the bankruptcy.
Here, Crane alleges that Argon Credit made several preference payments totaling around $1.2 million to Princeton, an insider and potential alter ego of FRS. While FRS challenges these allegations as "unsupported speculation and nothing more," Crane provides an excerpt from Argon Credit's general ledger, listing the transfers to Princeton and relevant dates. Crane does not have to definitively prove FRS' preference liability at this stage. The objection need only to have a sufficient basis to rise above the mere suspicion threshold. Amherst, 335 B.R. at 509 (citing In re San Diego Symphony Orchestra Ass'n, 201 B.R. 978, 983 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996)). The evidence before the court establishes a sufficient basis concerning FRS' preference exposure. The possibility of this preference liability demonstrates that FRS' interest is materially adverse to other unsecured creditors, disqualifying it from voting in the trustee election.
For the foregoing reasons, the court resolves the disputed election in favor of the objectors. FRS' potential preference liability makes it materially adverse to other creditors' interest which disqualifies it from voting. Thus, the interim trustee, Eugene Crane, will serve as the permanent trustee in these cases.
Except as provided in subsections (c) and (i) of this section, the trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the debtor in property—(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor; (2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor before such transfer was made; (3) made while the debtor was insolvent; (4) made—
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such creditor would receive if—