JOAN B. GOTTSCHALL, District Judge.
Defendant Fairmont Hotel ("Fairmont") has moved to dismiss Counts I and II of Plaintiff Michael Jackson's complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6); in the alternative, Fairmont has requested a more definite statement under Rule 12(e). For the reasons stated below, the court denies the motion in its entirety.
On October 19, 2011, Plaintiff Michael Jackson filed this action against Fairmont, his former employer. Jackson had been employed as a bellman and bartender at Fairmont for twelve years. On June 23, 2007, Jackson underwent a blood alcohol test at Fairmont's behest—apparently, management claimed that he smelled of alcohol—and the test revealed a blood alcohol content ("BAC") of 0.007. According to Jackson, this BAC is below the 0.050 BAC that is considered to be a "positive" test. Jackson also states that many employees told him on the day in question that he did not smell of alcohol. In any event, on July 2 or July 3, 2007, Jackson was terminated by Fairmont for allegedly being under the influence of alcohol on June 23, 2007. The decision to terminate, which was made by Acting Human Resources Manager Haromy Oki, took place shortly after Jackson had "gone to the hospital for evaluation for depression and alcohol evaluation." (See Compl. at 4, 6.) In Count I, Jackson, who is black and HIV-positive, alleges that his termination violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and 42 U.S.C. § 1981.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) allows a defendant to move for dismissal of a complaint if it "fail[s] to state a claim for which relief can be granted." The court must accept all facts pleaded in the complaint as true, and must draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff's favor. INEOS Polymers, Inc. v. BASF Catalysts, 553 F.3d 491, 497 (7th Cir. 2009). In general, "the complaint need only contain a `short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,'" E.E.O.C. v. Concentra Health Services, Inc., 496 F.3d 773, 776 (7th Cir. 2007) (quoting Rule 8(a)), with sufficient facts to put the defendant on notice "of what the ... claim is and the grounds upon which it rests." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)) (internal quotation mark omitted) (alterations in original). To survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), the complaint need not present particularized facts, but "demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic, 550 U.S. at 555).
Fairmont has moved to dismiss both Counts I and II of Jackson's complaint. The two counts are nearly identical, differing only as to whether Jackson's termination was motivated by his race or his disability status, and will be treated together. Fairmont argues that Jackson's complaint cannot support his claim that his termination was discriminatory because the allegations in the complaint are merely "conclusory" and "threadbare."
Fairmont's Memorandum of Law in Support of its Motion to Dismiss Counts I and II also requests that the court order Jackson to make a more definite statement, presumably pursuant to Rule 12(e), in the event that Jackson's claims are not dismissed. Because Counts I and II of Jackson's complaint include the "specific, identifiable alleged actions and incidents of discrimination" that Fairmont requested, no more definite statement is necessary. (See Mem. in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss at 5.)
For the reasons stated above, Fairmont's motion to dismiss or, alternatively, for a more definite statement is denied. Fairmont shall answer Counts I and II by June 15, 2012, and the parties shall appear for a status hearing on June 19, 2012 at 9:30 a.m.